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**1AC – Nuke Leadership**

**Contention 1 is Nuclear Leadership –**

**US nuclear leadership is in terminal decline – countries are looking to expand nuclear use now. Federal action to revitalize our domestic industry is the only way to manage new reactor security and proliferation risks internationally by setting global norms**

**Wallace and Williams 12** [MICHAEL WALLACE is a senior adviser leading the U.S. Nuclear Energy Project at CSIS. He is a member of the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC), which advises the president on matters related to homeland security, and a member of the Board of Directors for Baltimore Gas and Electric, SARAH WILLIAMS is program coordinator and research associate in the U.S. Nuclear Energy Project at CSIS, she was a Herbert Scoville Jr. peace fellow and program coordinator at the Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Nuclear Energy in America: Preventing its Early Demise”, 2012, <http://csis.org/files/publication/120405_GF_Final_web-sm.pdf>, Chetan]

America’s nuclear energy industry is in decline. Low natural gas prices, financing hurdles, new safety and security requirements, failure to resolve the waste issue and other factors are hastening the day when existing reactors become uneconomic, making it virtually impossible to build new ones. Two generations after the United States took this wholly new and highly sophisticated technology from laboratory experiment to successful commercialization, our nation is in danger of losing an industry of unique strategic importance, unique potential for misuse, and unique promise for addressing the environmental and energy security demands of the future. The pace of this decline, moreover, could be more rapid than most policymakers and stakeholders anticipate. With 104 operating reactors and the world’s largest base of installed nuclear capacity, it has been widely assumed that the United States—even without building many new plants— would continue to have a large presence in this industry for some decades to come, especially if existing units receive further license extensions. Instead, current market conditions are such that growing numbers of these units are operating on small or even negative profit margins and could be retired early. Meanwhile, China, India, Russia, and other countries are looking to significantly expand their nuclear energy commitments. By 2016, China could have 50 nuclear power plants in operation, compared with only 14 in 2011. India could add 8 new plants and Russia 10 in the same time frame. These trends are expected to accelerate out to 2030, by which time China, India, and Russia could account for nearly 40 percent of global nuclear generating capacity. Meanwhile, several smaller nations, mostly in Asia and the Middle East, are planning to get into the nuclear energy business for the first time. In all, as many as 15 new nations could have this technology within the next two decades. Meanwhile, America’s share of global nuclear generation is expected to shrink, from about 25 percent today to about 14 percent in 2030, and—if current trends continue—to less than 10 percent by mid-century. With the center of gravity for global nuclear investment shifting to a new set of players, the United States and the international community face a difficult set of challenges: stemming the spread of nuclear weapons-usable materials and know-how; preventing further catastrophic nuclear accidents; providing for safe, long-term nuclear waste management; and protecting U.S. energy security and economic competitiveness. In this context, **federal action to reverse the American nuclear industry’s impending decline is a national security imperative**. The United States cannot afford to become irrelevant in a new nuclear age. Our nation’s commercial nuclear industry, its military nuclear capabilities, and its strong regulatory institutions can be seen as three legs of a stool. All three legs are needed to support America’s future prosperity and security and to shape an international environment that is conducive to our long-term interests. Three specific aspects of U.S. leadership are particularly important. First, managing the national and global security risks associated with the spread of nuclear technology to countries that don’t necessarily share the same perspective on issues of nonproliferation and nuclear security or may lack the resources to implement safeguards in this area. An approach that relies on influence and involvement through a viable domestic industry is likely to be more effective and less expensive than trying to contain these risks militarily. Second, setting global norms and standards for safety, security, operations, and emergency response. As the world learned with past nuclear accidents and more recently with Fukushima, a major accident anywhere can have lasting repercussions everywhere. As with nonproliferation and security, America’s ability to exert leadership and influence in this area is **directly linked** to the strength of our domestic industry and our active involvement in the global nuclear enterprise. A strong domestic civilian industry and regulatory structure have **immediate** national security significance in that they help support the nuclear capabilities of the U.S. Navy, national laboratories, weapons complex, and research institutions. Third, in the past, the U.S. government could exert influence by striking export agreements with countries whose regulatory and legal frameworks reflected and were consistent with our own nonproliferation standards and commitments. At the same time, our nation set the global standard for effective, independent safety regulation (in the form of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission), led international efforts to reduce proliferation risks (through the 1970 NPT Treaty and other initiatives), and provided a model for industry self-regulation. The results were not perfect, but America’s institutional support for global nonproliferation goals and the regulatory behaviors it modeled clearly helped shape the way nuclear technology was adopted and used elsewhere around the world. This influence seems **certain to wane** if the United States is no longer a major supplier or user of nuclear technology. With existing nonproliferation and safety and security regimes looking increasingly inadequate in this rapidly changing global nuclear landscape, American leadership and leverage is more important and more central to our national security interests than ever. To maintain its leadership role in the development, design, and operation of a growing global nuclear energy infrastructure, the next administration, whether Democrat or Republican, must recognize the invaluable role played by the commercial U.S. nuclear industry and take action to prevent its early demise.

**Small modular reactors establish the US as a leader in nuclear tech**

**Rosner and Goldberg 11** – William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics and Physics at the University of Chicago, and Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory (Robert and Stephen, November. “Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S.” <https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalcopy.pdf>)

As stated earlier, SMRs have the potential to achieve significant greenhouse gas emission reductions. They could provide alternative baseload power generation to facilitate the retirement of older, smaller, and less efficient coal generation plants that would, otherwise, not be good candidates for retrofitting carbon capture and storage technology. They could be deployed in regions of the U.S. and the world that have less potential for other forms of carbon-free electricity, such as solar or wind energy. There may be technical or market constraints, such as projected electricity demand growth and transmission capacity, which would support SMR deployment but not GW-scale LWRs. From the on-shore manufacturing perspective, a key point is that the manufacturing base needed for SMRs can be developed domestically. Thus, while the large commercial LWR industry is seeking to transplant portions of its supply chain from current foreign sources to the U.S., the SMR industry offers the potential to establish **a large domestic manufacturing base** building upon already existing U.S. manufacturing infrastructure and capability, including the Naval shipbuilding and underutilized domestic nuclear component and equipment plants. The study team learned that a number of sustainable domestic jobs could be created – that is, the full panoply of design, manufacturing, supplier, and construction activities – if the U.S. can establish itself as a credible and substantial designer and manufacturer of SMRs. While many SMR technologies are being studied around the world, a strong U.S. commercialization program can enable U.S. industry to be first to market SMRs, thereby serving as a **fulcrum** for export growth as well as a lever in influencing international decisions on deploying both nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel cycle technology. A viable U.S.-centric SMR industry would enable the U.S. to **recapture** technological leadership in commercial nuclear technology, which has been lost to suppliers in France, Japan, Korea, Russia, and, now rapidly emerging, China.

**This is especially true for small reactors – countries are looking to follow the NRC’s lead in new technical standards and operations for SMRs**

**Lovering et al 12** [Jessica Lovering, Ted Nordhaus, and Michael Shellenberger are policy analyst, chairman, and president of the Breakthrough Institute, a public policy think tank and research organization. “Out of the Nuclear Closet”, September 7th, 2012, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/07/out_of_the_nuclear_closet>, Chetan]

To move the needle on nuclear energy to the point that it might actually be capable of displacing fossil fuels, we'll need new nuclear technologies that are cheaper and smaller. Today, there are a range of nascent, smaller nuclear power plant designs, some of them modifications of the current light-water reactor technologies used on submarines, and others, like thorium fuel and fast breeder reactors, which are based on entirely different nuclear fission technologies. Smaller, modular reactors can be built much faster and cheaper than traditional large-scale nuclear power plants. Next-generation nuclear reactors are designed to be incapable of melting down, produce drastically less radioactive waste, make it very difficult or impossible to produce weapons grade material, useless water, and require less maintenance. Most of these designs still face substantial technical hurdles before they will be ready for commercial demonstration. That means a great deal of research and innovation will be necessary to make these next generation plants viable and capable of displacing coal and gas. The United States could be a leader on developing these technologies, but unfortunately U.S. nuclear policy remains mostly stuck in the past. Rather than creating new solutions, efforts to restart the U.S. nuclear industry have mostly focused on encouraging utilities to build the next generation of large, light-water reactors with loan guarantees and various other subsidies and regulatory fixes. With a few exceptions, this is largely true elsewhere around the world as well. Nuclear has enjoyed bipartisan support in Congress for more than 60 years, but the enthusiasm is running out. The Obama administration deserves credit for authorizing funding for two small modular reactors, which will be built at the Savannah River site in South Carolina. But a much more sweeping reform of U.S. nuclear energy policy is required. At present, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has little institutional knowledge of anything other than light-water reactors andvirtually no capability to review or regulate alternative designs. This affects nuclear innovation in other countries as well, since the NRC remains, despite its many critics, the **global gold standard** for thorough regulation of nuclear energy. Most other countries **follow the NRC's lead** when it comes to establishing new technical and operational standards for the design, construction, and operation of nuclear plants. What's needed now is a new national commitment to the development, testing, demonstration, and early stage commercialization of a broad range of new nuclear technologies -- from much smaller light-water reactors to next generation ones -- in search of a few designs that can be mass produced and deployed at a significantly lower cost than current designs. This will require both greater public support for nuclear innovation and an entirely different regulatory framework to review and approve new commercial designs. In the meantime, developing countries will continue to build traditional, large nuclear powerplants. But time is of the essence. With the lion's share of future carbon emissions coming from those emerging economic powerhouses, the need to develop smaller and cheaper designs that can scale faster is all the more important. A true nuclear renaissance can't happen overnight. And it won't happen so long as large and expensive light-water reactors remain our only option. But in the end, there is no credible path to mitigating climate change without a massive global expansion of nuclear energy. If you care about climate change, nothing is more important than developing the nuclear technologies we will need to get that job done.

**And without effective management, global prolif is inevitable**

**Macalister 9** [Jerry Macalister – journalist for the Guardian, “New Generation Of Nuclear Power Stations ’Risk Terrorist Anarchy’”, March 16th, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/mar/16/nuclearpower-nuclear-waste>, Chetan]

The new generation of atomic power stations planned for Britain, China and many other parts of the world risks proliferation that could lead to "nuclear anarchy", a security expert warned in a report published today. Governments and multilateral organisations must come up with a strategy to deal the impact of the new nuclear age, which will produce enough plutonium to make 1m nuclear weapons by 2075, argues Frank Barnaby from the Oxford Research Group thinktank in a paper for the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR). "We are at a crossroads. Unless governments work together to safeguard nuclear energy supplies, the rise in unsecured nuclear technology will put us all in danger. Without this, we are hurtling towards a state of nuclear anarchy where terrorists or rogue states have the ways and means of making nuclear weapons or 'dirty bombs', the consequences of which are unimaginable," says Barnaby. Any country choosing to operate new-generation nuclear reactors in future would have relatively easy access to plutonium, which is used to make the most efficient atomic weapons, along with the nuclear physicists and engineers to design them. These countries would be latent nuclear-weapon powers "and it is to be expected that some will take the political decision to become actual nuclear weapons powers," argues Barnaby in his paper submitted to the IPPR's independent Commission on National Security chaired by former Nato boss, Lord George Robertson. The issue of nuclear proliferation security has been largely ignored until today as the nuclear power debate has concentrated on the economics, social issues and how to deal with radioactive waste. Ministers in the UK have made clear their desire to see a new generation of facilities to replace existing ones at a time when North Sea gas is running out and the country needs to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels to meet its Kyoto protocol carbon emission targets. Nuclear power plants across the life cycle produce one third of the CO2 of gas-fired ones. Barnaby says that a shortage of uranium for the kind of reactors that EDF and others are considering building in Britain could encourage them to reprocess fuel and produce more plutonium. But he is equally convinced that a nuclear renaissance will lead to fast breeder reactors which produce more nuclear fuel than they use and which could be useful to terrorists. The Atomic Energy Agency and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development have already suggested that uranium resources would last less than 70 years if processed using the current generation of light water nuclear reactors. Barnaby wants the non-proliferation treaty strengthened at a "make or break" review conference next year and would also like to see countries as yet without nuclear capabilities discouraged from obtaining enriched uranium, a problem highlighted in the case of Iran. Ian Kearns, deputy commissioner of the IPPR's security commission, said it was crucial that the rush to address climate change did not worsen the international security environment. "A global nuclear renaissance, if badly managed, could bring enormous complications in terms of nuclear non-proliferation and terrorism. Policymakers need to be alert to the dangers and to construct policies that bring secure low-carbon energy and a stable nuclear weapons environment," he said. Companies such as E.ON of Germany who want to build new nuclear plants in Britain declined to comment on the issue.

**SMR’s are prolif resistant – multiple features**

**Kuznetsov 8** – former Lead Researcher at the Kurchatov Institute (Russia) (Vladimir, March-August. “Options for small and medium sized reactors (SMRs) to overcome loss of economies of scale and incorporate increased proliferation resistance and energy security” Progress in Nuclear Energ Vol 50 issues 2-6, p 248. ScienceDirect)

For many less developed countries, these are the features of enhanced proliferation resistance and increased robustness of barriers for sabotage protection that may ensure the progress of nuclear power. All NPPs with innovative SMRs will provide for the implementation of the established safeguards veriﬁcation procedures under the agreements of member states with the IAEA. In addition to this, many innovative SMRs offer certain intrinsic **proliferation resistance** features to prevent the misuse, diversion or undeclared production of ﬁssile materials and/or to facilitate the implementation of safeguards (IAEA, 2006b). For example, many of water-cooled SMRs employ low enrichment uranium and once-through fuel cycle as basic options. Therefore, the features contributing to proliferation resistance of such SMRs are essentially similar to that of presently operated PWRs and BWRs. They also include an unattractive isotopic composition of the plutonium in the discharged fuel, and radiation barriers provided by the spent fuel. The intrinsic proliferation resistance features common to all HTGRs include high fuel burn-up (low residual inventory of plutonium, high content of 240 Pu); a difﬁcult to process fuel matrix; radiation barriers; and a low ratio of ﬁssile to fuelblock/fuel-pebble mass. Although several HTGRs make a provision for reprocessing of the TRISO fuel, the corresponding technology has not been established yet and, until such time as when the technology becomes readily available, the lack of the technology is assumed to provide an enhanced proliferation resistance. All liquid metal cooled SMRs are fast reactors that can ensure a self-sustainable operation on ﬁssile materials or realize fuel breeding to feed other reactors present in nuclear energy systems. In both cases, and if the fuel cycle is closed, the need of fuel enrichment and relevant uranium enrichment facilities would be eliminated, which is a factor contributing to enhanced proliferation resistance. Other features to enhance proliferation resistance of fast reactors are the following: No separation of plutonium and uranium at any fuel cycle stage and leaving a small (1e2% by weight) fraction of ﬁssion products permanently in the fuel; Denaturing of the ﬁssile materials, e.g., through the optimization of the core design to achieve a higher content of 238 Pu in the plutonium, to preclude the possibility of weapon production via securing an inadmissibly high level of residual heat of the plutonium fuel e the 238 Pu/Pu ratio needed to achieve this still needs to be deﬁned adequately.

**New and rapid proliferators are uniquely destabilizing – offensive posturing, launch on warning, poor control**

**Horowitz 9** – professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania (Michael, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53.2, Apr 09 pg. 234-257)

Learning as states gain experience with nuclear weapons is complicated. While to some extent, nuclear acquisition might provide information about resolve or capabilities, it also generates uncertainty about the way an actual conflict would go—given the new risk of nuclear escalation—and uncertainty about relative capabilities. **Rapid proliferation** may especially heighten uncertainty given the potential for reasonable states to disagree at times about the quality of the capabilities each possesses.2 What follows is an attempt to describe the implications of inexperience and incomplete information on the behavior of nuclear states and their potential opponents over time. Since it is impossible to detail all possible lines of argumentation and possible responses, the following discussion is necessarily incomplete. This is a first step. The acquisition of nuclear weapons increases the confidence of adopters in their ability to impose costs in the case of a conflict and the expectations of likely costs if war occurs by potential opponents. The key questions are whether nuclear states learn over time about how to leverage nuclear weapons and the implications of that learning, along with whether actions by nuclear states, over time, convey information that leads to changes in the expectations of their behavior—shifts in uncertainty— on the part of potential adversaries. Learning to Leverage? When a new state acquires nuclear weapons, how does it influence the way the state behaves and how might that change over time? Although nuclear acquisition might be orthogonal to a particular dispute, it might be related to a particular security challenge, might signal revisionist aims with regard to an enduring dispute, or might signal the desire to reinforce the status quo. This section focuses on how acquiring nuclear weapons influences both the new nuclear state and potential adversaries. In theory, systemwide perceptions of nuclear danger could allow new nuclear states to partially skip the early Cold War learning process concerning the risks of nuclear war and enter a proliferated world more cognizant of nuclear brinksmanship and bargaining than their predecessors. However, each new nuclear state has to resolve its own particular civil–military issues surrounding operational control and plan its national strategy in light of its new capabilities. **Empirical research** by Sagan (1993), Feaver (1992), and Blair (1993) suggests that viewing the behavior of other states does not create the necessary tacit knowledge; there is **no substitute for experience** when it comes to handling a nuclear arsenal, even if experience itself cannot totally prevent accidents. Sagan contends that civil–military instability in many likely new proliferators and pressures generated by the requirements to handle the responsibility of dealing with nuclear weapons will skew decision-making toward **more offensive strategies** (Sagan 1995). The questions surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear command and control suggest there is no magic bullet when it comes to new nuclear powers’ making control and delegation decisions (Bowen and Wolvén 1999). Sagan and others focus on inexperience on the part of new nuclear states as a key behavioral driver. **Inexperienced operators** and the bureaucratic desire to “justify” the costs spent developing nuclear weapons, combined with organizational biases that may favor escalation to avoid decapitation—the “**use it or lose it” mind-set**— may cause new nuclear states to adopt riskier launch postures, such as **launch on warning,** or at least be perceived that way by other states (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992; Sagan 1995).3 Acquiring nuclear weapons could alter state preferences and make states **more likely to escalate disputes** once they start, given their new capabilities.4 But their general lack of experience at leveraging their nuclear arsenal and effectively communicating nuclear threats could mean new nuclear states will be more likely to **select adversaries poorly and to find themselves in disputes with resolved adversaries that will reciprocate militarized challenges**. The “nuclear experience” logic also suggests that more experienced nuclear states sahould gain knowledge over time from nuclearized interactions that helps leaders effectively identify the situations in which their nuclear arsenals are likely to make a difference. Experienced nuclear states learn to select into cases in which their comparative advantage, nuclear weapons, is more likely to be effective, increasing the probability that an adversary will not reciprocate. Coming from a slightly different perspective, uncertainty about the consequences of proliferation on the balance of power and the behavior of new nuclear states on the part of their potential adversaries could also shape behavior in similar ways (Schelling 1966; Blainey 1988). While a stable and credible nuclear arsenal communicates clear information about the likely costs of conflict, in the short term, nuclear proliferation is likely to increase uncertainty about the trajectory of a war, the balance of power, and the preferences of the adopter.

**Proliferation compounds the risk of nuclear war which eliminate the majority of the world’s population**

**Toon et al 7­**—Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at University of Colorado [Owen B. Toon, Alan Robock (Professor of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University), Richard P. Turco (Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at UCLA, Charles Bardeen (Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at University of Colorado), Luke Oman (Professor of Earth and Planetary Sciences at Johns Hopkins University), Georgiy L. Stenchikov (Professor of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University), “NUCLEAR WAR: Consequences of Regional-Scale Nuclear Conflicts,” Science, 2 March 2007, Vol. 315. no. 5816, pp. 1224-1225]

The world may no longer face a serious threat of global nuclear warfare, but regional conflicts continue. Within this milieu, acquiring nuclear weapons has been considered a potent political, military, and social tool (1-3). National ownership of nuclear weapons offers perceived international status and insurance against aggression at a modest financial cost. Against this backdrop, we provide a quantitative assessment of the potential for casualties in a regional-scale nuclear conflict, or a terrorist attack, and the associated environmental impacts (4, 5). Eight nations are known to have nuclear weapons. In addition, North Korea may have a small, but growing, arsenal. Iran appears to be seeking nuclear weapons capability, but it probably needs several years to obtain enough fissionable material. Of great concern, 32 other nations--including Brazil, Argentina, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan--have sufficient fissionable materials to produce weapons (1, 6). A de facto nuclear arms race has emerged in Asia between China, India, and Pakistan, which could expand to include North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan (1). In the Middle East, a nuclear confrontation between Israel and Iran would be fearful. Saudi Arabia and Egypt could also seek nuclear weapons to balance Iran and Israel. Nuclear arms programs in South America, notably in Brazil and Argentina, were ended by several treaties in the 1990s (6). We can hope that these agreements will hold and will serve as a model for other regions, despite Brazil's new, large uranium enrichment facilities. Nuclear arsenals containing 50 or more weapons of low yield [15 kilotons (kt), equivalent to the Hiroshima bomb] are relatively easy to build (1, 6). India and Pakistan, the smallest nuclear powers, probably have such arsenals, although no nuclear state has ever disclosed its inventory of warheads (7). Modern weapons are compact and lightweight and are readily transported (by car, truck, missile, plane, or boat) (8). The basic concepts of weapons design can be found on of the Internet. The only serious obstacle to constructing a bomb is the limited availability of purified fissionable fuels. There are many political, economic, and social factors that could trigger a regional-scale nuclear conflict, plus many scenarios for the conduct of the ensuing war. We assumed (4) that the densest population centers in each country--usually in megacities--are attacked. We did not evaluate specific military targets and related casualties. We considered a nuclear exchange involving 100 weapons of 15-kt yield each, that is, ~0.3% of the total number of existing weapons (4). India and Pakistan, for instance, have previously tested nuclear weapons and are now thought to have between 109 and 172 weapons of unknown yield (9). Fatalities predicted due to immediate radiation, blast, and fire damage from an attack using 50 nuclear weapons with 15-kt yield on various countries. Airbursts were assumed. Estimates for ground bursts, including early radioactive fallout, are about 25% less (4). Fatalities were estimated by means of a standard population database for a number of countries that might be targeted in a regional conflict (see figure, above) [snipped - non-text]. For instance, such an exchange between India and Pakistan (10) could produce about 21 million fatalities--about half as many as occurred globally during World War II. The direct effects of thermal radiation and nuclear blasts, as well as gamma-ray and neutron radiation within the first few minutes of the blast, would cause most casualties. Extensive damage to infrastructure, contamination by long-lived radionuclides, and psychological trauma would likely result in the indefinite abandonment of large areas leading to severe economic and social repercussions. Fires ignited by nuclear bursts would release copious amounts of light-absorbing smoke into the upper atmosphere. If 100 small nuclear weapons were detonated within cities, they could generate 1 to 5 million tons of carbonaceous smoke particles (4), darkening the sky and affecting the atmosphere more than major volcanic eruptions like Mt. Pinatubo (1991) or Tambora (1815) (5). Carbonaceous smoke particles are transported by winds throughout the atmosphere but also induce circulations in response to solar heating. Simulations (5) predict that such radiative-dynamical interactions would loft and stabilize the smoke aerosol, which would allow it to persist in the middle and upper atmosphere for a decade. Smoke emissions of 100 low-yield urban explosions in a regional nuclear conflict would generate substantial global-scale climate anomalies, although not as large as in previous "nuclear winter" scenarios for a full-scale war (11, 12). However, indirect effects on surface land temperatures, precipitation rates, and growing season lengths (see figure, below) would be likely to degrade agricultural productivity to an extent that historically has led to famines in Africa, India, and Japan after the 1783-1784 Laki eruption (13) or in the northeastern United States and Europe after the Tambora eruption of 1815 (5). [figure snipped] Climatic anomalies could persist for a decade or more because of smoke stabilization, far longer than in previous nuclear winter calculations or after volcanic eruptions. Studies of the consequences of full-scale nuclear war show that indirect effects of the war could cause more casualties than direct ones, perhaps eliminating the majority of the world's population (11, 12). Indirect effects such as damage to transportation, energy, medical, political, and social infrastructure could be limited to the combatant nations in a regional war. However, climate anomalies would threaten the world outside the combat zone. The predicted smoke emissions and fatalities per kiloton of explosive yield are roughly 100 times those expected from estimates for full-scale nuclear attacks with high-yield weapons (4). Change in growing season (period with freeze-free days) in the first year after smoke release from 100 15-kt nuclear explosions [modified from figure 11 in (5)]. Unfortunately, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has failed to prevent the expansion of nuclear states. A bipartisan group including two former U.S. secretaries of state, a former secretary of defense, and a former chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee has recently pointed out that nuclear deterrence is no longer effective and may become dangerous (3). Terrorists, for instance, are outside the bounds of deterrence strategies. Mutually assured destruction may not function in a world with large numbers of nuclear states with widely varying political goals and philosophies. New nuclear states may not have well-developed safeguards and controls to prevent nuclear accidents or unauthorized launches. This bipartisan group detailed numerous steps to inhibit or prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (3). Its list, with which we concur, includes removing nuclear weapons from alert status to reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon; reducing the size of nuclear forces in all states; eliminating tactical nuclear weapons; ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty worldwide; securing all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world; controlling uranium enrichment along with guaranteeing that uranium for nuclear power reactors could be obtained from controlled international reserves; safeguarding spent fuel from reactors producing electricity; halting the production of fissile material for weapons globally; phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce and research facilities and rendering the materials safe; and resolving regional confrontations and conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers The analysis summarized here shows that the world has reached a crossroads. Having survived the threat of global nuclear war between the superpowers so far, the world is increasingly threatened by the prospects of regional nuclear war. The consequences of regional-scale nuclear conflicts are unexpectedly large, with the potential to become global catastrophes. The combination of nuclear proliferation, political instability, and urban demographics may constitute one of the greatest dangers to the stability of society since the dawn of humans.

#### Prolif is fast – breakdown of norms

**Blechman, 8** – Stimson Center Co-Founder, Stimson Center Nuclear Disarm Distinguished Fellow, Ph.D. (Barry, 9/29. “Nuclear Proliferation: Avoiding a Pandemic.” http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/nuclear-proliferation-avoiding-a-pandemic/)

There is serious risk that the international agreements and processes that have kept the number of nations armed with nuclear weapons fairly low are breaking down. Over the past ten years, three nations joined the six previously declared nuclear powers and a tenth is in the offing. Unless strong actions are taken during the first 18 months of the administration, we could see a world of twenty or even thirty nuclear-armed states by the 2020s. Meeting this challenge requires specific, near-term steps to shore up the current regime plus bold actions to move eventually to a world completely free of nuclear weapons.

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**New proliferators will be uniquely destabilizing – guarantees escalation.**

**Cimbala, 8** (Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. – Penn. State Brandywine, Comparative Strategy, “Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia”, 27, InformaWorld)

If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then it may be a matter of even more concern with regard to states with newer and more opaque forces and command systems. In addition, the Americans and Soviets (and then Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one another’s military operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies, including those that might influence the decision for or against war. Another consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. Future threats to American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction may be presented by states or nonstate actors motivated by cultural and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and NorthKorea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike–vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.

**1AC – Warming**

Contention 2 is warming

#### Newest and BEST studies show that warming is real and anthropogenic - skeptics are converting

Muller 12 (Richard A., professor of physics at the University of California, Berkeley, and a former MacArthur Foundation fellow, “The Conversion of a Climate-Change Skeptic,” 7-28-12, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/opinion/the-conversion-of-a-climate-change-skeptic.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all>)

CALL me a converted skeptic. Three years ago I identified problems in previous climate studies that, in my mind, threw doubt on the very existence of global warming. Last year, following an intensive research effort involving a dozen scientists, I concluded that global warming was real and that the prior estimates of the rate of warming were correct. I’m now going a step further: Humans are almost entirely the cause. My total turnaround, in such a short time, is the result of careful and objective analysis by the Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature project, which I founded with my daughter Elizabeth. Our results show that the average temperature of the earth’s land has risen by two and a half degrees Fahrenheit over the past 250 years, including an increase of one and a half degrees over the most recent 50 years. Moreover, it appears likely that essentially all of this increase results from the human emission of greenhouse gases. These findings are stronger than those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the United Nations group that defines the scientific and diplomatic consensus on global warming. In its 2007 report, the I.P.C.C. concluded only that most of the warming of the prior 50 years could be attributed to humans. It was possible, according to the I.P.C.C. consensus statement, that the warming before 1956 could be because of changes in solar activity, and that even a substantial part of the more recent warming could be natural. Our Berkeley Earth approach used sophisticated statistical methods developed largely by our lead scientist, Robert Rohde, which allowed us to determine earth land temperature much further back in time. We carefully studied issues raised by skeptics: biases from urban heating (we duplicated our results using rural data alone), from data selection (prior groups selected fewer than 20 percent of the available temperature stations; we used virtually 100 percent), from poor station quality (we separately analyzed good stations and poor ones) and from human intervention and data adjustment (our work is completely automated and hands-off). In our papers we demonstrate that none of these potentially troublesome effects unduly biased our conclusions. The historic temperature pattern we observed has abrupt dips that match the emissions of known explosive volcanic eruptions; the particulates from such events reflect sunlight, make for beautiful sunsets and cool the earth’s surface for a few years. There are small, rapid variations attributable to El Niño and other ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream; because of such oscillations, the “flattening” of the recent temperature rise that some people claim is not, in our view, statistically significant. What has caused the gradual but systematic rise of two and a half degrees? We tried fitting the shape to simple math functions (exponentials, polynomials), to solar activity and even to rising functions like world population. By far the best match was to the record of atmospheric carbon dioxide, measured from atmospheric samples and air trapped in polar ice. Just as important, our record is long enough that we could search for the fingerprint of solar variability, based on the historical record of sunspots. That fingerprint is absent. Although the I.P.C.C. allowed for the possibility that variations in sunlight could have ended the “Little Ice Age,” a period of cooling from the 14th century to about 1850, our data argues strongly that the temperature rise of the past 250 years cannot be attributed to solar changes. This conclusion is, in retrospect, not too surprising; we’ve learned from satellite measurements that solar activity changes the brightness of the sun very little.

**It’s the most likely scenario for extinction**

**Deibel 7** [Terry L. Professor of IR at National War College, 2007 “Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft”, Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today]

Finally, **there is one major existential threat** to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, **which**, though far in the future, **demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists** worldwide have **been observing** the gathering of this threat **for three decades now, and what was once a** mere **possibility has passed through probability to near certainty**. Indeed **not one of more than 900 articles on climate change published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. “In legitimate scientific circles**,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “**it is virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the fun damentals of global warming**.” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second”;“**Earth’s warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year” as disease spreads**; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. “**The world is slowly disintegrating**,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate change…but we just call it breaking up.” From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. **Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serous the effects will be**. As the newspaper stories quoted above show, **we are already experiencing** the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more **violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction, and** threatened **inundation of low-lying countries** like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less **the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet** that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village. **Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow**. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But **the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures**. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that “humankind’s **continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support system**. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “**we’re just going to burn everything up; we’re going to heat the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse**.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possibly end life on this planet. **Global warming is the** post-Cold War era’s **equivalent of nuclear winter** at least as serious **and considerably better supported scientifically**. Over the long run **it puts dangers form** terrorism and traditional **military challenges to shame. It is a threat** not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially **to the continued existence of life on this planet**.

**Climate change acts as a conflict multiplier – social unrest, civil war and political crises will all escalate as a result of changes in the environment**

**Brzoska et al 12** [Michael Brzoska - Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy and Klima Campus, University of Hamburg, , Jürgen Scheffran - Research Group Climate Change and Security, Institute of Geography and Klima Campus, University of Hamburg, Grindelberg, Jason Kominek - Institute of Sociology, University of Hamburg, Michael Link - Research Unit Sustainability and Global Change, Center for Earth System Research and Sustainability, University of Hamburg, - Janpeter Schilling - School of Integrated Climate System Sciences, Klima Campus, University of Hamburg, “Climate Change and Violent Conflict”, Science 18 May 2012: 869-871, Chetan]

Long-term historical studies tend to find a coincidence between climate variability and armed conflict, in line with some narratives about the evolution and **collapse of civilizations** [e.g., (8)]. For instance, Zhang and others (9) combine a set of variables for the time period 1500–1800 to identify climate change as a **major driver** of large-scale human crises in the Northern Hemisphere. Tol and Wagner (10) cautiously conclude that, in preindustrial Europe, cooler periods were more likely to be related to periods of violence than warmer phases. Similar findings have been presented for eastern China (11). However, the results have been less conclusive for recent periods. For instance, in one study, a significant correlation between temperature and civil war in Africa between 1981 and 2002 is used to project a substantial climate-induced increase in the incidence of civil war in Africa until 2030 (12). Yet, this result is not robust for an extended time period and alternative definitions of violent conflict (13). Food insecurity has been found to contribute to violence, as exemplified by recent “food riots” (14, 15), but there is little empirical evidence that climate variability is an important driver of violent land-use conflicts—e.g., in the Sahel (16). In Kenya, changing rainfall patterns have the potential to increase resource scarcity as a driver of pastoral conflict (17). However, more conflict in the form of violent livestock theft is reported during the rainy season than during drought (18). Similarly, conflicts over shared river systems have been associated with low-level violence, yet full-scale wars are unlikely [e.g., (19, 20)]. Instead, an increase in international water agreements has been observed (21). Finally, some studies suggest that natural disasters related to extreme weather conditions substantially increase the risk of intrastate conflict (22). In contrast, Bergholt and Lujala (23) find no increased likelihood of armed civil conflict due to weather-related disasters, and Slettebak (24) observes that, in crisis, cooperation frequently prevails. New research is on the way as new databases on nonstate conflicts, low-level violence, social instability events, and geo-referenced spatiotemporal patterns become available (25–27) (table S1). In addition to data needs, it is important to account for complexities in the relation between climate change and conflict. There are multiple pathways and feedbacks between the climate system, natural resources, human security, and societal stability (Fig. 1). Since the 1990s, there has been an extensive scientific debate on how the scarcity of natural resources affects violence and armed conflict (29, 30). More recently, conflict studies pay attention to the vulnerability of natural and social systems to climate impacts (31). Vulnerability can be broken down into three factors: (i) exposure to climate change, (ii) sensitivity to climate change, and (iii) adaptive capacity (32). The last two can be affected by conflict. Many of the world’s poorest people are exposed to various risks to life, health, and well-being. If climate change adds to these risks, it can increase humanitarian crises and aggravate existing conflicts without directly causing them. The question is whether human development, resilience, and adaptive capacity can compensate for increasing exposure and sensitivity to climate change. In previous decades, humanitarian aid, development assistance, and wealth per capita have increased (33), which has contributed to a reduction of global poverty as a possible driver of conflict. International efforts to prevent and manage conflicts have also been strengthened, and the number of armed conflicts has declined since the end of the Cold War (34). In recent years, however, this trend slowed down or is being reversed. While the number of democratic states has grown over the past half-century, the number of fragile states with weak institutions has also increased (35). If the debate on the securitization of climate change provokes military responses and other extraordinary measures, this could reinforce the likelihood of violent conflict. Main aspects of security concern include interventions in fragile states, the securing of borders (e.g., against disaster refugees), and access to resources (e.g., in the Mediterranean or Arctic region) [see (36)]. Other responses to climate change may also become causes of conflict, including bioenergy (as producers compete for land and food-related resources), nuclear power (which can lead to nuclear weapons proliferation), or geoengineering (through disagreements between states). Thus, there is a need for conflict-sensitive mitigation and adaptation strategies that contain conflict and contribute to cooperation via effective institutional frameworks, conflict management, and governance mechanisms. Research Challenges The balance between political and social factors and climate change could shift when the global temperature reaches levels that have been unprecedented in human history. There is reason to believe that such a change might overwhelm adaptive capacities and response mechanisms of both social and natural systems and thus lead to “**tipping points**” toward societal instability and an **increased likelihood** of violent conflict (37). Although some fundamental issues have been raised in previous research, numerous interdisciplinary questions still need to be investigated to understand the feedback loops involved (Table 1). Models of the various linkages can build on a rich set of tools from complexity science, multiagent systems, social-network analysis, and conflict assessment to extend previous data and experiences into future scenarios that cover different social, economic, and political contexts (28). Research across scientific disciplines will be needed to identify opportunities and coherent strategies to address societal challenges related to climate change.

#### Warming is still reversible – it’s not past the tipping point yet – this decade is key – consensus of scientists prove

Chestney 12 (Nina, “Global warming close to becoming irreversible-scientists”, 3/26, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/26/us-climate-thresholds-idUSBRE82P0UJ20120326>)

The world is close to reaching tipping points that will make it irreversibly hotter, making this decade critical in efforts to contain global warming, scientists warned on Monday. Scientific estimates differ but the world's temperature looks set to rise by six degrees Celsius by 2100 if greenhouse gas emissions are allowed to rise uncontrollably. As emissions grow, scientists say the world is close to reaching thresholds beyond which the effects on the global climate will be irreversible, such as the melting of polar ice sheets and loss of rainforests. "This is the critical decade. If we don't get the curves turned around this decade we will cross those lines," said Will Steffen, executive director of the Australian National University's climate change institute, speaking at a conference in London. Despite this sense of urgency, a new global climate treaty forcing the world's biggest polluters, such as the United States and China, to curb emissions will only be agreed on by 2015 - to enter into force in 2020. "We are on the cusp of some big changes," said Steffen. "We can ... cap temperature rise at two degrees, or cross the threshold beyond which the system shifts to a much hotter state." TIPPING POINTS For ice sheets - huge refrigerators that slow down the warming of the planet - the tipping point has probably already been passed, Steffen said. The West Antarctic ice sheet has shrunk over the last decade and the Greenland ice sheet has lost around 200 cubic km (48 cubic miles) a year since the 1990s. Most climate estimates agree the Amazon rainforest will get drier as the planet warms. Mass tree deaths caused by drought have raised fears it is on the verge of a tipping point, when it will stop absorbing emissions and add to them instead. Around 1.6 billion tonnes of carbon were lost in 2005 from the rainforest and 2.2 billion tonnes in 2010, which has undone about 10 years of carbon sink activity, Steffen said. One of the most worrying and unknown thresholds is the Siberian permafrost, which stores frozen carbon in the soil away from the atmosphere. "There is about 1,600 billion tonnes of carbon there - about twice the amount in the atmosphere today - and the northern high latitudes are experiencing the most severe temperature change of any part of the planet," he said. In a worst case scenario, 30 to 63 billion tonnes of carbon a year could be released by 2040, rising to 232 to 380 billion tonnes by 2100. This compares to around 10 billion tonnes of CO2 released by fossil fuel use each year. Increased CO2 in the atmosphere has also turned oceans more acidic as they absorb it. In the past 200 years, ocean acidification has happened at a speed not seen for around 60 million years, said Carol Turley at Plymouth Marine Laboratory. This threatens coral reef development and could lead to the extinction of some species within decades, as well as to an increase in the number of predators. As leading scientists, policy-makers and environment groups gathered at the "Planet Under Pressure" conference in London, opinions differed on what action to take this decade. London School of Economics professor Anthony Giddens favours focusing on the fossil fuel industry, seeing as renewables only make up 1 percent of the global energy mix. "We have enormous inertia within the world economy and should make much more effort to close down coal-fired power stations," he said. Oil giant Royal Dutch Shell favours working on technologies leading to negative emissions in the long run, like carbon capture on biomass and in land use, said Jeremy Bentham, the firm's vice president of global business environment.

**And only a rapid and global expansion of nuclear power can help us reach carbon targets**

**Harvey 12** [Fiona Harvey – Environmental Correspondent for the Guardian, “Nuclear power is only solution to climate change” – citing Jeffrey Sachs: Director of the Earth Institute and professor of sustainable development at Columbia, May 3rd, 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/03/nuclear-power-solution-climate-change>, Chetan]

Combating climate change will **require** an expansion of nuclear power, respected economist Jeffrey Sachs said on Thursday, in remarks that are likely to dismay some sections of the environmental movement. Prof Sachs said atomic energy was needed because it provided a low-carbon source of power, while renewable energy was not making up enough of the world's energy mix and new technologies such as carbon capture and storage were not progressing fast enough. "We won't meet the carbon targets if nuclear is taken off the table," he said. He said coal was likely to continue to be cheaper than renewables and other low-carbon forms of energy, unless the effects of the climate were taken into account. "Fossil fuel prices will remain low enough to wreck [low-carbon energy] unless you have incentives and [carbon] pricing," he told the annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank in Manila. A group of four prominent UK environmentalists, including Jonathon Porritt and former heads of Friends of the Earth UK Tony Juniper and Charles Secrett, have been campaigning against nuclear power in recent weeks, arguing that it is unnecessary, dangerous and too expensive. Porritt told the Guardian: "It [nuclear power] cannot possibly deliver – primarily for economic reasons. Nuclear reactors are massively expensive. They take a long time to build. And even when they're up and running, they're nothing like as reliable as the industry would have us believe." But Sachs, director of the Earth Institute and professor of sustainable development at Columbia University in the US, said the world had no choice because the threat of climate change had grown so grave. He said greenhouse gas emissions, which have continued to rise despite the financial crisis and deep recession in the developed world, were "nowhere near" falling to the level that would be needed to avert dangerous climate change. He said: "Emissions per unit of energy need to fall by a factor of six. That means electrifying everything that can be electrified and then making electricity largely carbon-free. It requires renewable energy, nuclear and carbon capture and storage – these are all very big challenges. We need to understand the scale of the challenge." Sachs warned that "nice projects" around the world involving renewable power or energy efficiency would not be enough to stave off the catastrophic effects of global warming – a wholesale change and overhaul of the world's energy systems and economy would be needed if the world is to hold carbon emissions to 450 parts per million of the atmosphere – a level that in itself may be inadequate. "We are nowhere close to that – as wishful thinking and corporate lobbies are much more powerful than the arithmetic of climate scientists," he said.

#### SMR’s are key

**Rosner and Goldberg, 11** – William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics and Physics at the University of Chicago, and Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory (Robert and Stephen, November. “Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S.” <https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalcopy.pdf>)

Nuclear power occupies a unique position in the debate over global climate change as the only carbon-free energy source that (1) is already contributing to world energy supplies on a large scale, (2) has potential to be expanded if the challenges of safety, nonproliferation, waste management, and economic competitiveness are addressed, and (3) is technologically fully mature. //We concluded that any alternative nuclear development pathway (such as additional flexibility in technology approaches and deployment strategies) would need to be evolutionary, rather than a disruptive, radical shift. The urgency of scale-up is such that only technologies that have either already been tested in the marketplace or at least are close to commercial demonstration should be eligible for consideration. We further concluded that (1) small modular light-water reactor (SMR) designs offer such opportunities for scale-up and, therefore, could move us faster to clean energy supplies, but (2) because of the high capital intensity of nuclear energy projects, the cost of nuclear electricity is particularly sensitive to the availability of financing at competitive rates. In the report Nuclear Reactors: Generation to Generation, we described the evolution of nuclear reactor designs from Generation I technology to Generation IV designs, and concluded that the determining factor in establishing the future nuclear marketplace will likely be based on “who wants to invest and where.” We discussed the significant nuclear activity in China and, given the degree that manufacturing and design work has gone off-shore for the current generation of reactors, the United States has an opportunity to be the leader in the design and deployment of SMRs. And we opined that SMRs are the logical choice for smaller countries or countries with limited electrical grid capacity and the attendant safety, security, and nonproliferation benefits, stating that a detailed economic analysis would be done shortly that will address the relative competitiveness of SMRs.

**1AC – Solvency**

**Contention 3 is Solvency –**

**Government incentives are vital – only route to commercialization of SMRs**

**Rosner and Goldberg 11** (William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics and Physics at the University of Chicago, and Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory (Robert and Stephen, November. “Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S.” <https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalcopy.pdf>)

Assuming that early SMR deployments will carry cost premiums (until the benefits of learning are achieved), the issue is whether federal government incentives are needed to help overcome this barrier. Some may argue that commercial deployment will occur, albeit at a slower pace, as the cost of alternatives increases to a level that makes initial SMR deployments competitive. Others may argue that SMR vendors should market initial modules at market prices and absorb any losses until a sufficient number of modules are sold that will begin to generate a profit. However, the combination of the large upfront capital investment, the long period before a return on capital may be achieved, and the large uncertainty in the potential level of return on investment make it **unlikely that SMRs will be commercialized without some form of government incentive**. The present analysis assumes that government incentives will be essential to **bridging this gap** and **accelerating private sector investment,,,** (see Appendix D). It is the study team’s understanding that DOE has proposed to share the cost of certain SMR design and licensing study activities. This section analyzes possible options for government incentives for early deployments (LEAD and FOAK plants) in addition to federal cost sharing for the design and licensing effort. The present analysis considers several alternative approaches to providing such incentives, either in the form of direct or indirect government financial incentives, or through market transformation actions that will **spur demand** for FOAK plants in competitive applications. The study team’s approach is to identify targeted, least-cost incentives that could form the basis for further dialogue between stakeholders and policy makers.

**Providing production cost incentives solves and alleviates cost overruns**

**Rosner and Goldberg 11** (William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics and Physics at the University of Chicago, and Special Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory (Robert and Stephen, November. “Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S.” <https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalcopy.pdf>)

Production Cost Incentive: A production cost incentive is a performance-based incentive. With a production cost incentive, the government incentive would be triggered only when the project successfully operates. The project sponsors would assume full responsibility for the upfront capital cost and would assume the full risk for project construction. The production cost incentive would establish a target price, a so-called “market-based benchmark.” Any savings in energy generation costs over the target price would accrue to the generator. Thus, a production cost incentive would provide a **strong motivation** for cost control and learning improvements, since any gains greater than target levels would enhance project net cash flow. Initial SMR deployments, without the benefits of learning, will have significantly higher costs than fully commercialized SMR plants and thus would benefit from production cost incentives. Because any production cost differential would decline rapidly due to the combined effect of module manufacturing rates and learning experience, the financial incentive could be set at a declining rate, and the level would be determined on a plant-by-plant basis, based on the achievement of cost reduction targets. The key design parameters for the incentive include the following: 1. The magnitude of the deployment incentive should decline with the number of SMR modules and should phase out after the fleet of LEAD and FOAK plants has been deployed. 2. The incentive should be market-based rather than cost-based; the incentive should take into account not only the cost of SMRs but also the cost of competing technologies and be set accordingly. 3. The deployment incentive could take several forms, including a direct payment to offset a portion of production costs or a production tax credit. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized a production tax credit of $18/MWh (1.8¢/kWh) for up to 6,000 MW of new nuclear power plant capacity. To qualify, a project must commence operations by 2021. Treasury Department guidelines further required that a qualifying project initiate construction, defined as the pouring of safetyrelated concrete, by 2014. Currently, two GW-scale projects totaling 4,600 MW are in early construction; consequently, as much as 1,400 MW in credits is available for other nuclear projects, including SMRs. The budgetary cost of providing the production cost incentive depends on the learning rate and the market price of electricity generated from the SMR project. Higher learning rates and higher market prices would decrease the magnitude of the incentive; lower rates and lower market prices would increase the need for production incentives. Using two scenarios (with market prices based on the cost of natural gas combined-cycle generation) yields the following range of estimates of the size of production incentives required for the FOAK plants described earlier.

#### **Nuclear expansion is inevitable – it’s only a question of time and tech**

**Wallace, 12** – senior adviser with the U.S. Nuclear Energy Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Michael, with Sarah Williams, research associate, 2/8. “2012 Global Forecast: Risk, Opportunity, and the Next Administration.” http://issuu.com/csis/docs/2012\_global\_forecast)

America’s nuclear energy industry is in decline. Low natural gas prices, financing hurdles, new safety and security requirements, failure to resolve the waste issue and other factors are hastening the day when existing reactors become uneconomic, making it virtually impossible to build new ones. Two generations after the United States took this wholly new and highly sophisticated technology from laboratory experiment to successful commercialization, our nation is in danger of losing an industry of unique strategic importance, unique potential for misuse, and unique promise for addressing the environmental and energy security demands of the future. The pace of this decline, moreover, could be more rapid than most policymakers and stakeholders anticipate. With 104 operating reactors and the world’s largest base of installed nuclear capacity, it has been widely assumed that the United States—even without building many new plants— would continue to have a large presence in this industry for some decades to come, especially if existing units receive further license extensions. Instead, current market conditions are such that growing numbers of these units are operating on small or even negative profit margins and could be retired early. Meanwhile, China, India, Russia, and other countries are looking to significantly expand their nuclear energy commitments. By 2016, China could have 50 nuclear power plants in operation, compared with only 14 in 2011. India could add 8 new plants and Russia 10 in the same time frame. These trends are expected to accelerate out to 2030, by which time China, India, and Russia could account for nearly 40 percent of global nuclear generating capacity. Meanwhile, several smaller nations, mostly in Asia and the Middle East, are planning to get into the nuclear energy business for the first time. In all, as many as 15 new nations could have this technology within the next two decades. Meanwhile, America’s share of global nuclear generation is expected to shrink, from about 25 percent today to about 14 percent in 2030, and—if current trends continue—to less than 10 percent by mid-century. With the center of gravity for global nuclear investment shifting to a new set of players, the United States and the international community face a difficult set of challenges: stemming the spread of nuclear weapons-usable materials and know-how; preventing further catastrophic nuclear accidents; providing for safe, long-term nuclear waste management; and protecting U.S. energy security and economic competitiveness. In this context, federal action to reverse the American nuclear industry’s impending decline is a national security imperative. The United States cannot afford to become irrelevant in a new nuclear age. Our nation’s commercial nuclear industry, its military nuclear capabilities, and its strong regulatory institutions can be seen as three legs of a stool. All three legs are needed to support America’s future prosperity and security and to shape an international environment that is conducive to our long-term interests. Three specific aspects of U.S. leadership are particularly important. First, managing the national and global security risks associated with the spread of nuclear technology to countries that don’t necessarily share the same perspective on issues of nonproliferation and nuclear security or may lack the resources to implement safeguards in this area. An approach that relies on influence and involvement through a viable domestic industry is likely to be more effective and less expensive than trying to contain these risks militarily. Second, setting global norms and standards for safety, security, operations, and emergency response. As the world learned with past nuclear accidents and more recently with Fukushima, a major accident anywhere can have lasting repercussions everywhere. As with nonproliferation and security, America’s ability to exert leadership and influence in this area is directly linked to the strength of our domestic industry and our active involvement in the global nuclear enterprise. A strong domestic civilian industry and regulatory structure have immediate national security significance in that they help support the nuclear capabilities of the U.S. Navy, national laboratories, weapons complex, and research institutions. Third, in the past, the U.S. government could exert influence by striking export agreements with countries whose regulatory and legal frameworks reflected and were consistent with our own nonproliferation standards and commitments. At the same time, our nation set the global standard for effective, independent safety regulation (in the form of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission), led international efforts to reduce proliferation risks (through the 1970 NPT Treaty and other initiatives), and provided a model for industry self-regulation. The results were not perfect, but America’s institutional support for global nonproliferation goals and the regulatory behaviors it modeled clearly helped shape the way nuclear technology was adopted and used elsewhere around the world. This influence seems certain to wane if the United States is no longer a major supplier or user of nuclear technology. With existing nonproliferation and safety and security regimes looking increasingly inadequate in this rapidly changing global nuclear landscape, American leadership and leverage is more important and more central to our national security interests than ever. To maintain its leadership role in the development, design, and operation of a growing global nuclear energy infrastructure, the next administration, whether Democrat or Republican, must recognize the invaluable role played by the commercial U.S. nuclear industry and take action to prevent its early demise.

**Federal action is crucial to encourage private investing by controlling risk factors that cause regulatory delays**

**Gale et al 9** (Kelley Michael, Finance Department Chair – Latham & Watkins, “Financing the Nuclear Renaissance: The Benefits and Potential Pitfalls of Federal & State Government Subsidies and the Future of Nuclear Power in California,” Energy Law Journal, Vol. 30, p. 497-552, <http://www.felj.org/docs/elj302/19gale-crowell-and-peace.pdf>)

In a similar fashion, regulatory risk insurance and loan guarantees provided by the federal government should **encourage private financing** of domestic nuclear power projects because the government providing the guarantees also **controls many of the risk factors** //which could give rise to regulatory delays in commencing commercial operation of a new nuclear project. Further, in the nuclear power industry, the federal government is reviewing development applications and reactor designs, and is equipped with a team of experts in nuclear technologies, so that if the federal government has skin in the game, so to speak, private lenders may take **additional comfort** that the government has performed a certain level of due diligence on a particular project and determined that there are no major flaws from its vantage point. Section II.D.3 below discusses the risks covered by federally provided regulatory risk insurance and the ways in which it can be adapted to best encourage private sector financing for nuclear energy.

**Lack of financing prevents construction of small modular nuclear plants in the status quo**

**Domenici and Meserve 10** [Pete V. Domenici and Dr. Richard Meserve – Bipartisan Policy Center, “Letter to Chairman Jaczko – Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission”, April 6th, 2010, <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NRC%20Licensing%20Review.pdf>, Chetan]

In summary, we found that, while many of the stakeholders have encountered some problems in maneuvering through the licensing process, there was a **near-unanimous** view that all parties have acted appropriately and in good faith to resolve any problems. The NRC was not seen to have needlessly delayed or extended the licensing process. Based on our interviews, we believe that the difficulty of obtaining **financing is a bigger obstacle** to nuclear plant construction at the moment than licensing issues.

**View their solvency arguments with skepticism – anti-nuclear propaganda from the fossil fuel industry permeate the media, finance and governmental approaches to nuke power**

**Adams 9-12** [Rod Adams gained his nuclear knowledge as a submarine engineer officer and as the founder of a company that tried to develop a market for small, modular reactors from 1993-1999. “Plutonium power for the people”, September 12th, 2012, <http://theenergycollective.com/rodadams/111941/plutonium-power-people>, Chetan]

One of the biggest threats to the continued wealth and power held by the global fossil fuel industry is a “plutonium economy///” fueled by abundant resources of uranium that can be converted into fissile plutonium in a breeder reactor. (Yes, I know that a thorium economy is just as big of a threat to the dominant position of fossil fuels, but the understanding of the potential impact of that technology is less widespread than the understanding of fast breeder reactors.) Of course, the fossil fuel industry has always employed plenty of experts in the field of communications. They also have a huge following of friends in the media, in finance and in government who have profited immensely by the hydrocarbon economy and would love to see those profitable relationships continue. Hydrocarbon communications experts and their friends recognized many decades ago that there would not be too many tears shed if they accurately explained why they were threatened by the idea of carbon based fuels being replaced in the energy market by concentrated fissile fuels, so they developed a much more effective sales pitch. By helping to **reinforce scary images** of nuclear war and tying the fears inspired by those images to the materials used in building bombs, the antiplutonium propaganda machine has convinced many ///decision makers and voters that innovative machinery that turns relatively worthless uranium into useful fuel are secretly designed by mad scientists intent on creating bomb material. As one result of the effective campaign against plutonium, President Carter outlawed nuclear fuel recycling and turned multibillion dollar investments at Barnwell, South Carolina and at Clinch River, Tennessee from potentially profitable production facilities into expensive, non-functional eyesores. Today, the propaganda machine is still **actively working to stoke fears** of plutonium because the material is still a strong threat to the prosperity of the fossil fuel industry. After all, plutonium, like uranium and thorium, contains 2 million times as much energy per unit mass as oil. It releases that energy in the form of heat that can be converted into useful power in machines that are essentially identical to the heat engines used to convert coal heat into useful energy. It can be used in machines that are almost identical to those used to convert natural gas or diesel fuel heat into useful power, but that method is not yet in common use. Not only is heat from plutonium abundant and concentrated (which vastly reduces the transportation infrastructure required to supply power plants) fission heat also comes without any emissions of CO2, CO, SOX, NOX, fly ash, mercury or any of the other atmospheric pollution produced by burning stuff dug out of the ground.

## 2ac v Wayne State LM

#### Case outweighs and turns the k – even if everything they say is true global warming still causes really bad thigns to happen – seal level rise, starvation, global resource depletion –

And nuclear prolif is still a problem – a world of multiple nuclear states is still dangerous

#### Perm do the alternative

#### Case turns the K – global nuclear power usage is inevitable – other countries view nuclear power as the solution to their problems – that’s wallace

#### -- Judge choice – logical decision maker can reject bad representations and still vote for the plan as a good idea – key to logical policymaking and prevents extremism

#### Privileging representations locks in violence – policy analysis is the best challenge to power

Taft-Kaufman 95 (Jill, Professor of Speech – CMU, Southern Communication Journal, 60(3), Spring)

The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

#### Vague alts are a voter – makes the neg a moving target which makes it impossible to be affirmative – we can’t predict their strategies which causes worse and vaguer aff writing – bad for research and education

#### Fear of death enhances the value to life – recognizing death allows us to create a world of meaning and love

Kelsang 99 (Geshe, Internationally Renowned Teacher of Buddhism, “Dealing With Fear”, http://www.dealingwithfear.org/fear-of-death.htm/)

A healthy fear of death would be the fear of dying unprepared, as this is a fear we can do something about, a danger we can avert. If we have this realistic fear, this sense of danger, we are encouraged to prepare for a peaceful and successful death and are also **inspired to make the most of our very precious human life instead of wasting it**. This "sense of danger" inspires us to make preparations so that we are no longer in the danger we are in now, for example by practicing moral discipline, purifying our negative karma, and accumulating as much merit, or good karma, as possible. We put on a seat belt out of a sense of danger of the unseen dangers of traffic on the road, and that seat belt protects us from going through the windshield. We can do nothing about other traffic, but we can do something about whether or not we go through the windscreen if someone crashes into us. Similarly, we can do nothing about the fact of death, but we can seize control over how we prepare for death and how we die. Eventually, through [Tantric](http://www.tharpa.com/background/about-tantra.htm) spiritual practice, we can even attain a deathless body. In [Living Meaningfully, Dying Joyfully](http://www.tharpa.com/lmdj.htm), Geshe Kelsang says: Dying with regrets is not at all unusual. **To avoid a sad and meaningless end to our life we need to remember continually that we too must die**. Contemplating our own death will inspire us to use our life wisely by developing the inner refuge of spiritual realizations; otherwise we shall have no ability to protect ourself from the sufferings of death and what lies beyond. Moreover, when someone close to us is dying, such as a parent or friend, we shall be powerless to help them because we shall not know how; and we shall experience sadness and frustration at our inability to be of genuine help. Preparing for death is one of the kindest and wisest things we can do both for ourself and others. The fact of the matter is that this world is not our home. We are travelers, passing through. We came from our previous life, and in a few years, or a few days, we shall move on to our next life. We entered this world empty-handed and alone, and we shall leave empty-handed and alone. Everything we have accumulated in this life, including our very body, will be left behind. All that we can take with us from one life to the next are the imprints of the positive and negative actions we have created. **If we ignore death we shall waste our life** working for things that we shall only have to leave behind, creating many negative actions in the process, and having to travel on to our next life with nothing but a heavy burden of negative karma. On the other hand, if we base our life on a realistic awareness of our mortality, we shall regard our spiritual development as far more important than the attainments of this world, and we shall view our time in this world principally as an opportunity to cultivate positive minds such as patience, love, compassion, and wisdom. Motivated by these virtuous minds we shall perform many positive actions, thereby creating the cause for future happiness.

#### Framework – the aff has to prove the plan is better than the status quo or a competitive policy option. That’s best

#### A. Fairness – the aff commits nine minutes to the 1AC. Allowing the neg to moot that speech skews the debate in favor of the neg.

#### B. Predictability – there are an infinite amount of frameworks and alternatives that could be used outside of policymaking. It is impossible for the aff to be prepared for all of them. This results in debates to be won not on the quality of the argument but the unpredictability.

#### Poetry is fluid and has no criteria for evaluation

Bleiker 2k (Roland, Senior Lecturer – U Queensland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics, p. 271)

But how can something as inaudible as transversal poetic dissent possibly be evaluated? How can a form of resistance that engages linguistic and discursive practices be judged or merely be understood, by the very nexus of power and knowledge it seeks to distance itself from? These difficult questions beg for complex answers. I do not claim to have solved them here, nor do I believe that they can actually be solved, at least not in an absolute and definitive way. The impact of discursive dissent on transversal social and political dynamics is mediated through tactical and temporal processes. A poem, for instance, does not directly cause particular events, it does not visualize an opponent in space and time. A linguistic expression of dissent works by insinuating itself into its target—the population at large—without taking it over, but also without being separated from it. Even the agent becomes gradually blurred. The effect of a poem cannot be reduced to its author or even to the poem itself. Those who have read it my have passed altered knowledge on to other people, and thus influenced the transversal constitution of societal values.

No offense – our framework allows the use of poetry. It’s simply another form of evidence – they can say that their poetry provides a justification for the federal government acting. Just because it isn’t commonly used doesn’t mean it’s theoretically incompatible with policy debate.

#### --Turn: the alt causes the policy sector to be dominated by the most conservative policymakers.

Olav. F. Knudsen, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, ‘1 [*Security Dialogue* 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing  Securitization,” p. 366]

A final danger in focusing on the state is that of building the illusion that  states have impenetrable walls, that they have an inside and an outside, and  that nothing ever passes through. Wolfers’s billiard balls have contributed to  this misconception.   But the state concepts we should use are in no need of  such an illusion. Whoever criticizes the field for such sins in the past needs to  go back to the literature. Of course, we must continue to be open to a frank  and unbiasedassessment of the transnational politics which significantly in-  fluence almost every issue on the domestic political agenda. The first decade  of my own research was spent studying these phenomena – and I disavow  none of my conclusions about the state’s limitations. Yet I am not ashamed to  talk of a domestic political agenda. Anyone with a little knowledge of Euro-  pean politics knows that Danish politics is not Swedish politics is not German  politics is not British politics. Nor would I hesitate for a moment to talk of the  role of the state in transnational politics, where it is an important actor, though  only one among many other competing ones. In the world of transnational  relations, the exploitation of states by interest groups – by their assumption of  roles as representatives of states or by convincing state representatives to  argue their case and defend their narrow interests – is a significant class of  phenomena, today as much as yesterday. Towards a Renewal of the Empirical Foundation  for Security Studies  Fundamentally, the sum of the foregoing list of sins blamed on the Copen-  hagen schoolamounts to a lack of attention paid to just that ‘reality’ of security which Ole Wæver consciously chose to leave aside a decade ago in order  to pursue the politics of securitization instead. I cannot claim that he is void of  interest in the empirical aspects of security because much of the 1997 book is  devoted to empirical concerns. However, the attention to agenda-setting –  confirmed in his most recent work – draws attention away from the important issues we need to work on more closely if we want to contribute to a better understanding of European security as it is currently developing.  That inevitably requires a more consistentinterest in security policy in the  making – not just in the development of alternative security policies. The dan-  ger here is that, as alternative policies are likely to fail grandly on the political  arena, crucial decisions may be made in the ‘traditional’ sector of security  policymaking, unheeded by any but the most uncritical minds.

#### Perm do the plan and the alt

#### Case outweighs – if they’re right there’s no risk to voting aff but if we’re right voting neg is terminally dangerous

#### Floating PIKs are a voter –

#### A) Infinitely regressive – justifies picking out of one word, misspellings, and grammatical errors, which is impossible to defend and hurts topic education

#### B) Aff ground – we can’t generate offense for every word in the 1AC

#### C) Moving target – they don't specify their advocacy, which allows shifting – crushing debatability and argumentative responsibility

C

#### -- Extinction is evil – it certainly kills billions of valuable lives, permanently destroys any benefit of existence, and denies future generations the choice to live

Morgan 9 (Dennis, Professor of Public Speaking and Current Affairs – Hankuk University, “World on Fire: Two Scenarios of the Destruction of Human Civilization and Possible Extinction of the Human Race”, 41(10))

To be or not to be—that is indeed the ultimate question that humanity must answer. Will Shakespeare’s words continue to inspire generations to come, or will his works be completely lost and forgotten? The same question can be asked about all of the great works of art and expressions of the human spirit that have evolved through the ages. Will everything that is good and noble in human evolution, civilization, and culture be abandoned and completely lost or else completely forgotten by the ‘‘lucky’’ remnant that somehow manages to survive—if there are survivors? The ‘‘second death’’ is most tragic, for not only will our history be lost, but the future will be lost too. Will the yet-born never even be given the opportunity to receive the wisdom and beauty of the human spirit and experience what it means to be alive? How can we cheat them of this grand opportunity that should be theirs by right? Love will be lost, and our planet may very well become just as dead as every other planet that we know about in the universe. Who knows? Perhaps our planet is the only one in which the miracle of life managed to evolve. There is still so much more for us to discover about the universe and our own origins. We have not yet ‘‘come of age’’ as one race—the human race. We have yet to understand what it even means to be human, and before we do, are we to just let it slide through our hands and lose it all? Why??? For various psychological reasons, we have shielded ourselves in a state of denial concerning the price of our progress and the real nature and state of industrial civilization and its development. Perhaps we have shielded ourselves from the ugly side of our own human nature. How could we fail to see that we are standing on a precipice, at the very brink of falling headlong into an abyss of no return? We must not fall into this abyss blind and mute without a fight for life. We should look squarely at it and squarely at ourselves and ask ourselves Stephen Hawking’s question. Our species is about 100,000 years old. Civilization is only a fraction of that, yet long before the advent of human civilization, at a very threshold moment in human evolution, man discovered how to make and use fire. But do we really own it, or will we instead burn by the very fire we make? Do we really have as much control over it as we’d like to think we have? Knowing the ultimate cost, the risk of the complete destruction of human civilization and the possible extermination of our own species and perhaps all life, the future itself, how can we take such a risk? We live on a planet of finite resources with a finite atmosphere that miraculously supports life. Now, the development of industrial civilization has taken us to such a point that we have reached the endgame: we are standing on a precipice overlooking the abyss—from which there is no return. The 21st century is the most important and critical century because it is the century when humankind will determine whether we fall headlong into that abyss or whether we manage to gather real courage, wisdom and restraint to resist the temptation of such awful and ultimately self-destructive power. We must tear the scales from our eyes and view that power for what it is. This is the time that represents a moment of challenge for the ultimate survival of the species. If we fail, we will pay the ultimate price from which there will be no return. As long as our hearts still beat and we still breathe the air every day, then we are still alive, and that means that we still have a chance to make a difference and change the course that we’re on now. Let us not fall into the abyss headlong, blind and mute. Indeed, we must fight for life and for the yet-born generations of the future, and they will bear the fruit of our labor. They will look back proudly and say, ‘‘These are our true ancestors who cared enough about us to fight for our right to exist. Without them, we would not be able to love, to make music and gaze upon the stars at night. We would not be able to be filled with the wonder and joy of life and the beauty of nature. Without them, this Earth would have been an unlivable place like so many other planets, and we would not have come into existence. Thus, they have bequeathed to us this precious ethic - to care about the future and the yet-born future generations - to leave them a world that is at least as wonderful and joyous as the one we were born into.’’

#### Apply the precautionary principal – even if there’s a chance death might not be real, we should act like it is, because any impact from it not being real doesn’t really exist – scientists have been wrong before and death sure seems real – even if we make life worse for a while, if they’re right, there’s no terminal impact to that

#### -- Fiat is good – voting issue:

#### A) Ground – lack of plan focus creates a massive neg side, they can spend the whole 1NC -criticizing one concept and we’d always lose

#### B) Education – their interpretation encourages ultra-generics at the expense of topic education.

#### C) Aff choice is best – neg choice moots all the 1AC and promotes clash of civilization debates.

#### No prior questions

**Owen 02** David Owen, 2 Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not **undermine** the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may **provide the best account available to us.** In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the **most important** kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, **it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR.** Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous **grip on** the **action,** event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a **reductionist program’** in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the **preferred model** or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, **this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science** since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, **not to be prejudged** before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of **generality over** that of **empirical validity.** The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and **prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right**, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially **vicious circle arises.**

**Threats real**

**Schweller 4** [Randall L. Schweller, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University, “Unanswered Threats A Neoclassical RealistTheory of Underbalancing,” International Security 29.2 (2004) 159-201, Muse]

Despite the historical frequency of underbalancing, little has been written on the subject. Indeed, Geoffrey Blainey's memorable observation that for "every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace" could have been made with equal veracity about overreactions to threats as opposed to underreactions to them.92 Library shelves are filled with books on the causes and dangers of exaggerating threats, ranging from studies of domestic politics to bureaucratic politics, to political psychology, to organization theory. By comparison, there have been few studies at any level of analysis or from any theoretical perspective that directly explain why states have with some, if not equal, **regularity underestimated dangers to their survival**. There may be some cognitive or normative bias at work here. Consider, for instance, that there is a commonly used word, paranoia, for the unwarranted fear that people are, in some way, "out to get you" or are planning to do oneharm. I suspect that just as many people are afflicted with the opposite psychosis: the delusion that everyone loves you when, in fact, they do not even like you. Yet, we do not have a familiar word for this phenomenon. Indeed, I am unaware of any word that describes this pathology (hubris and overconfidence come close, but they plainly define something other than what I have described). That noted, international relations theory does have a frequently used phrase for the pathology of states' underestimation of threats to their survival, the so-called Munich analogy. The term is used, however, in a disparaging way by theorists to ridicule those who employ it. The central claim is that the naïveté associated with Munich and the outbreak of World War II has become an overused and inappropriate analogy because few leaders are as evil and unappeasable as Adolf Hitler. Thus, the analogy either mistakenly causes leaders [End Page 198] to adopt hawkish and overly competitive policies or is deliberately used by leaders to justify such policies and mislead the public. A more compelling explanation for the paucity of studies on underreactions to threats, however, is the tendency of theories to reflect contemporary issues as well as the desire of theorists and journals to provide society with policy- relevant theories that may help resolve or manage urgent security problems. Thus, born in the atomic age with its new balance of terror and an ongoing Cold War, the field of security studies has naturally produced theories of and prescriptions for national security that have had little to say about—and are, in fact, heavily biased against warnings of—the dangers of underreacting to or underestimating threats

. After all, the nuclear revolution was not about overkill but, as Thomas Schelling pointed out, speed of kill and mutual kill.93 Given the apocalyptic consequences of miscalculation, accidents, or inadvertent nuclear war, small wonder that theorists were more concerned about overreacting to threats than underresponding to them. At a time when all of humankind could be wiped out in less than twenty-five minutes, theorists may be excused for stressing the benefits of caution under conditions of uncertainty and erring on the side of inferring from ambiguous actions overly benign assessments of the opponent's intentions. The overwhelming fear was that a crisis "might unleash forces of an essentially military nature that overwhelm the political process and bring on a war thatnobody wants. Many important conclusions about the risk of nuclear war, and thus about the political meaning of nuclear forces, rest on this fundamental idea."94 Now that the Cold War is over, we can begin to redress these biases in the literature. In that spirit, I have offered a domestic politics model to explain why threatened states often fail to adjust in a prudent and coherent way to dangerous changes in their strategic environment. The model fits nicely with recent realist studies on imperial under- and overstretch. Specifically, it is consistent with Fareed Zakaria's analysis of U.S. foreign policy from 1865 to 1889, when, he claims, the United States had the national power and opportunity to expand but failed to do so because it lacked sufficient state power (i.e., the state was weak relative to society).95 Zakaria claims that the United States did [End Page 199] not take advantage of opportunities in its environment to expand because it lacked the institutional state strength to harness resources from society that were needed to do so. I am making a similar argument with respect to balancing rather than expansion: incoherent, fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance against potentially dangerous threats because elites view the domestic risks as too high, and they are unable to mobilize the required resources from a divided society. The arguments presented here also suggest that elite fragmentation and disagreement within a competitive political process, which Jack Snyder cites as an explanation for overexpansionist policies, are more likely to produce underbalancing than overbalancing behavior among threatened incoherent states.96 This is because a balancing strategy carries certain political costs and risks with few, if any, compensating short-term political gains, and because the strategic environment is always somewhat uncertain. Consequently, logrolling among fragmented elites within threatened states is more likely to generate overly cautious responses to threats than overreactions to them. This dynamic captures the underreaction of democratic states to the rise of Nazi Germany during the interwar period.97 In addition to elite fragmentation, I have suggested some basic domestic-level variables that regularly intervene to thwart balance of power predictions.

#### -- Alt devalues life and crushes liberal politics

Kellner 89 (Douglas, Chair of Philosophy – University of California, Los Angeles, Jean Baudrillard, p. 107-108)

Yet does the sort of symbolic exchange which Baudrillard advocates really provide a solution to the question of death? Baudrillard’s notion of symbolic exchange between life and death and his ultimate embrace of nihilism (see 4.4) is probably his most un-Nietzschean moment, the instant in which his thought radically devalues life and focuses with a fascinated gaze on that which is most terrible — death. In a popular French reading of Nietzsche, his ‘transvaluation of values’ demanded negation of all repressive and life- negating values in favor of affirmation of life, joy and happiness. This ‘philosophy of value’ valorized life over death and derived its values from phenomena which enhanced, refined and nurtured human life. In Baudrillard, by contrast, life does not exist as an autonomous source of value, and the body exists only as ‘the caarnality of signs,’ as a mode of display of signification. His sign fetishism erases all materialjty from the body and social life, and makes possible a fascinated aestheticized fetishism of signs as the primary ontological reality. This way of seeing erases suffering, disease, pain and the horror of death from the body and social life and replaces it with the play of signs — Baudrillard’s alternative. Politics too is reduced to a play of signs, and the ways in which different politics alleviate or intensify human suffering disappears from the Baudrillardian universe. Consequently Baudrillard’s theory spirals into a fascination with signs which leads him to embrace certain privileged forms of sign culture and to reject others (that is, the theoretical signs of modernity such as meaning, truth, the social, power and so on) and to pay less and less attention to materiality (that is, to needs, desire, suffering and so on) a trajectory will ultimately lead him to embrace nihilism (see 4.4). Thus Baudrillard’s interpretation of the body, his refusal of theories of sexuality which link it with desire and pleasure, and his valorization of death as a mode of symbolic exchange — which valorizes sacrifice, suicide and other symbolic modes of death — are all part and parcel of a fetishizing of signs, of a valorization of sign culture over all other modes of social life. Such fetishizing of sign culture finds its natural (and more harmless) home in the fascination with the realm of sign culture which we call art. I shall argue that Baudrillard’s trajectory exhibits an ever more intense aestheticizing of social theory and philosophy, in which the values of the representation of social reality, political struggle and change and so on are displaced in favor of a (typically French) sign fetishism. On this view, Baudrillard’s trajectory is best interpreted as an increasingly aggressive and extreme fetishizing of signs, which began in his early works in the late 1 960s and which he was only gradually to exhibit in its full and perverse splendor as aristocratic aestheticism from the mid-1970s to the present. Let us now trace the evolution of his fascination with art, a form of sign culture which Baudrillard increasingly privileges and one which provides an important feature attraction of the postmodern carnival.

#### -- Extinction results

Rorty 98 (Richard, Professor of Comparative Literature – Stanford University, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America, p. 89-94)

At that point, something will crack. The nonsuburban electorate will decide that the system has failed and start looking around for a strongman to vote for someone willing to assure them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid bond salesmen, and postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots. A scenario like that of Sinclair Lewis’ novel It Can’t Happen Here may then be played out. For once such a strongman takes office, nobody can predict what will happen. In 1932, most of the predictions made about what would happen if Hindenburg named Hitler chancellor were wildly overoptimistic. One thing that is very likely to happen is that the gains made in the past forty years by black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, will be wiped out. Jocular contempt for women will come back into fashion. The words "nigger" and "kike" will once again be heard in the workplace. All the sadism which the academic Left has tried to make unaccept­able to its students will come flooding back. All the resent­ment which badly educated Americans feel about having their manners dictated to them by college graduates will find an outlet. But such a renewal of sadism will not alter the effects of selfishness. For after my imagined strongman takes charge, he will quickly make his peace with the international super­rich, just as Hitler made his with the German industrialists. He will invoke the glorious memory of the Gulf War to pro­voke military adventures which will generate short-term prosperity. He will be a disaster for the country and the world. People will wonder why there was so little resistance to his evitable rise. Where, they will ask, was the American Left? Why was it only rightists like Buchanan who spoke to the workers about the consequences of globalization? Why could not the Left channel the mounting rage of the newly dispossessed? It is often said that we Americans, at the end of the twenti­eth century, no longer have a Left. Since nobody denies the existence of what I have called the cultural Left, this amounts to an admission that that Left is unable to engage in national politics. It is not the sort of Left which can be asked to deal with the consequences of globalization. To get the country to deal with those consequences, the present cultural Left would have to transform itself by opening relations with the residue of the old reformist Left, and in particular with the labor unions. It would have to talk much more about money, even at the cost of talking less about stigma. I have two suggestions about how to effect this transition. The first is that the Left should put a moratorium on theory. It should try to kick its philosophy habit. The second is that the Left should try to mobilize what remains of our pride in being Americans. It should ask the public to consider how the country of Lincoln and Whitman might be achieved. In support of my first suggestion, let me cite a passage from Dewey's Reconstruction in Philosophy in which he ex­presses his exasperation with the sort of sterile debate now going on under the rubric of "individualism versus commu­nitarianism." Dewey thought that all discussions which took this dichotomy seriously suffer from a common defect. They are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situa­tions are to be brought. What we want is light upon this or that group of individuals, this or that concrete human being, this or that special institution or social arrangement. For such a logic of inquiry, the tradition­ally accepted logic substitutes discussion of the mean­ing of concepts and their dialectical relationships with one another. Dewey was right to be exasperated by sociopolitical theory conducted at this level of abstraction. He was wrong when he went on to say that ascending to this level is typically a right­ist maneuver, one which supplies "the apparatus for intellec­tual justifications of the established order. "9 For such ascents are now more common on the Left than on the Right. The contemporary academic Left seems to think that the higher your level of abstraction, the more subversive of the estab­lished order you can be. The more sweeping and novel your conceptual apparatus, the more radical your critique. When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been "inadequately theorized," you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of lan­guage, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist ver­sion of economic determinism. Theorists of the Left think that dissolving political agents into plays of differential sub­jectivity, or political initiatives into pursuits of Lacan's im­possible object of desire, helps to subvert the established order. Such subversion, they say, is accomplished by "problematizing familiar concepts." Recent attempts to subvert social institutions by prob­lematizing concepts have produced a few very good books. They have also produced many thousands of books which represent scholastic philosophizing at its worst. The authors of these purportedly "subversive" books honestly believe that they are serving human liberty. But it is almost impossi­ble to clamber back down from their books to a level of ab­straction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate, or a political strategy. Even though what these authors "theorize" is often something very concrete and near at hand-a current TV show, a media celebrity, a re­cent scandal-they offer the most abstract and barren expla­nations imaginable. These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into polit­ical relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left re­treats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice pro­duces theoretical hallucinations. These result in an intellec­tual environment which is, as Mark Edmundson says in his book Nightmare on Main Street, Gothic. The cultural Left is haunted by ubiquitous specters, the most frightening of which is called "power." This is the name of what Edmund­son calls Foucault's "haunting agency, which is everywhere and nowhere, as evanescent and insistent as a resourceful spook."10

**Monocausal explanations impoverish scholarship**

**Martin 90** Brian Martin, Department of Science and Technology Studies, University of Wollongong, Australia, Uprooting War, 1990 edition http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw13.html

In this chapter and in the six preceding chapters I have examined a number of structures and factors which have some connection with the war system. There is much more that could be said about any one of these structures, and other factors which could be examined. Here I wish to note one important point: attention should not be focussed on one single factor to the exclusion of others. This is often done for example by some Marxists who look only at capitalism as a root of war and other social problems, and by some feminists who attribute most problems to patriarchy. The danger of monocausal explanations is that they may lead to an inadequate political practice. The ‘revolution’ may be followed by the persistence or even expansion of many problems which were not addressed by the single-factor perspective. The one connecting feature which I perceive in the structures underlying war is an unequal distribution of power. This unequal distribution is socially organised in many different ways, such as in the large-scale structures for state administration, in capitalist ownership, in male domination within families and elsewhere, in control over knowledge by experts, and in the use of force by the military. Furthermore, these different systems of power are interconnected. They often support each other, and sometimes conflict. This means that the struggle against war can and must be undertaken at many different levels. It ranges from struggles to undermine state power to struggles to undermine racism, sexism and other forms of domination at the level of the individual and the local community. Furthermore, the different struggles need to be linked together. That is the motivation for analysing the roots of war and developing strategies for grassroots movements to uproot them

No alternative to realism- the alt results in civil war

Hussein Solomon Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy Published in African Security Review Vol 5 No 2, 1996 http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html

The post-modern/critical theory challenge to realism has been tested, and proved wanting. Realism remains the single most reliable analytical framework through which to understand and evaluate global change. Post-modernism can provide no practical alternatives to the realist paradigm. We know what a realist world looks like (we are living in one!); but what does a post-modernist world look like? As long as humanity is motivated by hate, envy, greed and egotism, realism will continue to be invaluable to the policy-maker and the scholar. In this regard it has to be pointed out that from the end of World War II until 1992, hundreds of major conflicts around the world have left some twenty million human beings dead.109 Neither has the end of the Cold War showed any sign that such conflict will end. By the end of 1993 a record of 53 wars were being waged in 37 countries across the globe.110 Until a fundamental change in human nature occurs, realism will continue to dominate the discipline of international relations. The most fundamental problem with post-modernism is that it assumes a more optimistic view of human nature. Srebrenica, Bihac, Tuzla, Zeppa, Goma, Chechnya, Ogoniland, and KwaZulu-Natal all bear testimony to the folly of such a view.

#### the strategy of embracing excess is circular---it’s normaive anti-normativity. we should opt for coherent public responsibility, not just excess for excesses sake.

Richard **WOLIN** History @ CUNY Graduate Center **’96** “LEFT FASCISM: GEORGES BATAILLE AND THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY” *Constellations* 2 (3) p. 405-407

Bataille’s understanding of the prospects for a return of the sacred is relatively pluralistic. The revitalization of any one of a number of rites and occult practices that have been summarily banned by the rise of modernity’s “instrumentally rationalist culture” (Weber) will do. Thus, in Bataille’s theory of “expenditure” *(dkpense),* war is only one of a number of possibilities for radical cultural transgression; other possibilities include: luxury, mourning, war, cults, the construction of sumptuary monuments, games, spectacles, arts, perverse sexual activity (i.e., deflected from genital finality)” - all of these are, according to Bataille, “activities which, at least in primitive circumstances, have no end beyond themselves.”~~ Yet, in addition to his endorsement of varieties of non-purposive ritual, Bataille is of sorts a disciple of negative theology. As a counterweight to modernity he is in favor of generalized profanation: any practice that furthers the ends of a “general” rather than “restricted economy” (where “economy” is anthropologically defined in terms of the general circulation of persons, goods, and symbols) will do. All instances of profanation that gratuitously disrupt the smooth functioning of productive consumption - the reign of the *Tuuschprinzip* - are eagerly welcomed. Hence, in Bataille’s work “the heterogeneous” (along with “sovereignty”) can best be defined *ex negativo:* as whatever stands opposed to or helps to undermine our modern cult of the *homogeneous:* contemporary capitalism and its anodyne cultural analogues (such as “art for art’s sake”), which know no wanton expenditure, but instead adhere to the bourgeois principle of equivalent exchange. However, as a result of the ethos of transgression that is propagated in Bataille’s work - a quasi-aestheticist valorization of transgression for transgression’s sake - one encounters serious normative lacunae. One might even go so far as to say, echoing Tony Judt, that aspects of Bataille’s thought are redolent of a more general and long-standing “vacuum at the heart of public ethics in France,” “the marked absence of a concern with public ethics or political morality.”38 I have already spoken of his work as an unsurpassable normative point of reference for much of poststructuralism. Here, “**anti-normativism” itself becomes “normative**,” insofar as rejection of the “norm” becomes itself a source of normativity. In recent years, as poststructuralists have begun meditating on the problem of how one would go about constituting a non-totalitarian political community - a *communautk inavouable* (Blanchot) or *dksoeuvrke* (J-L. Nancy), as it has been called - it is, unsurprisingly, to Bataille’s work that they have immediately turned.39 Yet, as Bernard-Henri LCvy has cautioned in relation to this avowedly illiberal, new “organicism” or “communitarianism”: Organicism. Naturalism. Refusal of universal values. Denial of values purely and simply. . . . It is on these bases, on this mute foundation, that one deploys a cover of horror that is more somber and infinitely more clamorous. . . . I will have attained my objective when I have succeeded in convincing that fascism is not in the first instance barbarism; that is it not essentially and to begin with the apocalypse; that it does not always and of necessity mean storms of iron and blood. Instead, it is in the first instance a type of society, a model of community, a manner of thinking and of organizing the social bond.40 It is precisely Bataille’s ecstatic model of community, his manner of “thinking and of organizing the social bond,” that I wish to call into question. It is a model that, fundamentally and undeniably, seeks to establish the normative basis of social action on an aesthetic foundation. As such its guiding ethos would be an aesthetics of transgression. Bataille’s *ecstatic community* would also be an *aesthetic community:* it would be a community in which the type of social action that would be valued above all would be action that yielded “no return,” action that - in the manner of art for art’s sake - had no end beyond itself. In the last analysis, the celebration of transgression for transgression’s sake remains unnuanced, unqualified, and uncritical. In lieu of a conceptual articulation of how one would begin to differentiate between, shall we say, salutary and retrograde instances of transgression, we are left with an ethos of shock, rupture, and disruption, purely and simply. In essence, Bataille - and those who have followed in his footsteps - seeks to ground an ethics of postmodernity in an avant-garde cultural practice that draws heavily on precapitalist forms of social life, precisely those forms that have been scorned and tabooed by the process of modernization. Indeed, the very desideratum of an adequate “conceptual articulation” of Bataillesque concepts such as “sovereignty,” “heterogeneity,” “expenditure,” and so forth would amount to a *contrudictio in adjecto.* In Bataille’s sense, the very call for principled legitimation would stand convicted a priori of indebtedness to the logic of “productive consumption,” to the values of a society predicated on instrumental reason and equivalent exchange.

#### -- Baudrillard is wrong – reality exists – symbols aren’t everything

Marsh 95 (James, Professor of Philosophy – Fordham University, Critique, Action, and Liberation, p. 292-293)

Such an account, however, is as one-sided or perhaps even more one-sided than that of naive modernism. We note a residual idealism that does not take into account socioeconomic realities already pointed out such as the corporate nature of media, their role in achieving and legitimating profit, and their function of manufacturing consent. In such a postmodernist account is a reduction of everything to image or symbol that misses the relationship of these to realities such as corporations seeking profit, impoverished workers in these corporations, or peasants in Third-World countries trying to conduct elections. Postmodernism does not adequately distinguish here between a reduction of reality to image and a mediation of reality by image. A media idealism exists rooted in the influence of structuralism and poststructuralism and doing insufficient justice to concrete human experience, judgment, and free interaction in the world.4 It is also paradoxical or contradictory to say it really is true that nothing is really true, that everything is illusory or imaginary. Postmodemism makes judgments that implicitly deny the reduction of reality to image. For example, Poster and Baudrillard do want to say that we really are in a new age that is informational and postindustrial. Again, to say that everything is imploded into media images is akin logically to the Cartesian claim that everything is or might be a dream. What happens is that dream or image is absolutized or generalized to the point that its original meaning lying in its contrast to natural, human, and social reality is lost. We can discuss Disneyland as reprehensible because we know the difference between Disneyland and the larger, enveloping reality of Southern California and the United States.5 We can note also that postmodernism misses the reality of the accumulation-legitimation tension in late capitalism in general and in communicative media in particular. This tension takes different forms in different times. In the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, social, economic, and political reality occasionally manifested itself in the media in such a way that the electorate responded critically to corporate and political policies. Coverage of the Vietnam war, for example, did help turn people against the war. In the 1980s, by contrast, the emphasis shifted more toward accumulation in the decade dominated by the “great communicator.” Even here, however, the majority remained opposed to Reagan’s policies while voting for Reagan. Human and social reality, while being influenced by and represented by the media, transcended them and remained resistant to them.6 To the extent that postmodernists are critical of the role media play, we can ask the question about the normative adequacy of such a critique. Why, in the absence of normative conceptions of rationality and freedom, should media dominance be taken as bad rather than good? Also, the most relevant contrasting, normatively structured alternative to the media is that of the “public sphere,” in which the imperatives of free, democratic, nonmanipulable communicative action are institutionalized. Such a public sphere has been present in western democracies since the nineteenth century but has suffered erosion in the twentieth century as capitalism has more and more taken over the media and commercialized them. Even now the public sphere remains normatively binding and really operative through institutionalizing the ideals of free, full, public expression and discussion; ideal, legal requirements taking such forms as public service programs, public broadcasting, and provision for alternative media; and social movements acting and discoursing in and outside of universities in print, in demonstrations and forms of resistance, and on media such as movies, television, and radio.7

#### Perm do the plan and the alt in all other instances

#### The alternative represses death, increasing anxiety

Arthur 2 (Kate, Doctoral Candidate in Theological Ethics – University of St. Michael’s College, “Terror of Death in the Wake of September the 11th: Is This the End of Death Denial?”, 11-16, http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/arthur%20paper.pdf)

I earlier tried to show how denial is a transparent strategy, an exercise of the intellect. Denial is a human response to the outrage of such a sinister and fearful force that can’t be studied, categorized, analyzed or understood by the enlightened mind. But this dismissal is not simply the discreet activity of an inquiring or especially psychologically or philosophically inclined mind. Becker, Ariès and others developed cogent arguments that denial is a societal pathology. Death’s denial is, according to historian Phillipe Ariès, a symptom of industrialization and modernity. Denial (and accompanying erotic fascination, he argued) developed in the 18th Century during the Enlightenment, along with the symbolic ‘removal’ of death from the realm of the living. The “reversal of death” was symbolized by the relocation of cemeteries to the outskirts of town. Death became traumatic, shameful, forbidden and repressed. In our desperation to drive death from life we marginalized it, made it worthy only of clandestine activity. As death was banished, relegated to tabooed territory, the result was what commentator Herman Fiefel says, were profound contradictions in our thinking (Feifel *a*, 1965). The Best Revenge is Living Well An example of such contradictory thinking is the public scorn of death represented by materialists and nihilists. The abiding influence of nihilism is the commonly expressed opinion that death is all that there is (Dollimore, 2000). We live in a pluralistic environment in which a shared vision of an afterlife cannot be assumed. The question of meaning in a post-Christian, post-modern, post-Communist and digitally connected globe often seems to be located in the living of life itself, nowhere else. Especially influential is a kind of European thinking, which encourages a secular nihilist proposition in the face of the problem of the finality of death. This defiant stance promotes human finitude as the sole source of meaning. The aim of this philosophy, and certain psychological schools, is to learn how to die this death, my death, knowing that there is nothing else after this death (Critchley, 2000). If God is dead and I have no postmortem hope, life in the present moment is all that matters. The materialist will not allow the fact of death to poison her enjoyment of life. Freud subscribed, in his own way, to this view and insisted that the aim of all of life is death. Here -5- *Terror of Death in the Wake of September the 11th.* fulfillment is achieved by throwing myself into some temporal absolute or other, whether politics, sexual fulfillment, mind altering substances, fame, material acquisition, or work. So the existentialists, like the Stoics of the ancient world, responded to the fear of death and its attendant unpleasant emotional affect by urging a constant mindfulness of death in life. By realizing the threat of non-existence, Martin Heidegger said, we can attain a fuller understanding of our life, its meaning and free ourselves from fear of death (See Tomer, 1994). This strategy defies death by saying we must refuse death’s meaning and find meaning only in life. If Freud and Becker, and their successors are right, this secular affirmation of life (whether or not in the presence of death) inevitably collapses into the ugly reappearance of repressed unconscious death anxiety (Becker, 1973 and Neimeyer 1997-1998).

#### Perm do the plan and all parts of the alt that don’t consist of reject the aff

#### -- Evaluate consequences – allowing violence for the sake of moral purity is evil

Isaac 2 (Jeffrey C., Professor of Political Science – Indiana-Bloomington, Director – Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, Ph.D. – Yale, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the **clean conscience** of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about **unintended consequences** as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### -- Turn – progressivism –

#### A) The alternative depresses and demobilizes emancipatory politics

Best and Kellner 1 (Steven, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Humanities – University of Texas and Douglas, Philosophy of Education Chair – UCLA, “Dawns, Twilights, and Transitions: Postmodern Theories, Politics, and Challenges”, Democracy and Nature: The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy, 7(1), March, http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/dn/vol7/best\_kellner\_postmodernism.htm)

A postmodern politics began to take shape during the 1960s with the appearance of numerous new political groups and struggles. The development of a postmodern politics is strongly informed by the vicissitudes of social movements in France, the United States, and elsewhere, as well as by emerging postmodern theories. The utopian visions of modern politics proved, in this context, difficult to sustain and were either rejected in favor of cynicism, nihilism, and, in some cases, a turn to the right, or were dramatically recast and scaled down to more "modest" (non-systemic, non-revolutionary) proportions. The modern emphasis on collective struggle, solidarity, and alliance politics gave way to extreme fragmentation, as the "movement" of the 1960s splintered into various competing struggles for rights and liberties. The previous emphasis on transforming the public sphere and institutions of domination gave way to new emphases on culture, personal identity, and everyday life, as macropolitics were replaced by the micropolitics of local transformation and changes in subjectivity. In the aftermath of the 1960s, novel and conflicting conceptions of postmodern politics emerged. Postmodern politics thus take a variety of forms and would include the anti-politics of Baudrillard and his followers, who exhibit a cynical, despairing rejection of the belief in emancipatory social transformation, as well as a variety of efforts to create a new or reconstructed politics. On the extreme and apolitical position of a Baudrillard, we are stranded at the end of history, paralyzed and frozen, as the masses collapse into inertia and indifference, and media simulations and technology triumph over agency. Thus, from Baudrillard's perspective, all we can do is "accommodate ourselves to the time left to us."[4]

## 1ar v Wayne State LM

#### Turns race – warming locks in environmental racism – preventing climate change is a pre-requisite to progressive racial politics

Glantz 6 (Michael H., Senior Scientist – National Center for Atmospheric Research, “Africans, African-Americans and Climate Impacts: Top-down vs. Bottom-up Approach to Capacity Building”, Fragile Ecologies, 7-7, http://www.fragilecologies.com/jul07\_06.html)

Numerous studies document that the poor and people of color in the United States and around the world have borne greater health and environmental risks than the society at large when it comes to workplace hazards, pollution from chemical plants, municipal landfills, incinerators, abandoned toxic waste dumps, lead smelters, and emissions from clogged freeways. The environmental and economic justice movement was born in response to these injustices and disparities. The movement's diverse allies have much to offer policymakers in resolving many of the problems that have resulted from industrial pollution and human settlement patterns. Finding solutions to global climate change is one of the areas that desperately need the input from those populations most likely to be negatively affected, poor people in the developing countries of the South and people of color and the poor in the North. Global climate change looms as a major environmental justice issue of the 21st century. Another recent expression of interest in climate's impacts on the minorities focused specifically on the United States . The US Congressional Black Caucus, a group that includes all African-American members of the US Congress, commissioned a report that focused on the potential impacts of global warming on African Americans. The report (entitled “Black Americans and Global Warming: An Unequal Burden”) was released to the public in July 2004. The report supported Bullard's (among others') contention that minorities (in America , African Americans specifically) are most likely to suffer disproportionately as a result of the foreseeable impacts of climate change (for example, flooding, heat waves and high energy prices). Most likely, they already are suffering disproportionately from the impacts of today's climate variability and extreme events, such as Hurricane Katrina's impacts in New Orleans in 2005 and Hurricane Floyd's impacts in North Carolina in 1999. To be sure, all poor people along with people in other socio-economic strata in these areas, regardless of race, were adversely affected by these events. However, the African-American communities have been the worst affected with regard to adverse impacts (deaths) and in the economic recovery process as well, when compared with other nearby communities and socioeconomic groups. The report of the Caucus seemed to dwell primarily on energy-related issues, especially the impacts of the rising costs to Black consumers of energy (heat, light, gasoline, for example). However, there are many more obvious and subtle climate-related impacts that can adversely affect Black Americans. Some of those adverse impacts were exposed on TV and in newspapers worldwide as Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the US Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005. Poor people, many of whom were African-Americans, were the primary victims of Katrina. They were living in areas known to be most vulnerable to flooding, as much of New Orleans had been built below sea level and protected by levees from invasion of waters from the Gulf of Mexico and Lake Ponchetrain. Making a risky situation even riskier, poorer people in New Orleans were also the least likely to have life or property insurance coverage on their lives and property, transportation or cash in hand for a rapid escape from the potential threats from Hurricane Katrina. A brief comparison of two parts of the city, one predominantly Black and the other White, underscores the demographic differences and disadvantages between these communities: the Lower Ninth Ward (African American) and the Lake District (Caucasian). While reflecting on the discriminatory impacts of Katrina and how it exposed the vulnerabilities of African-American minority residents, I was reminded about the devastating impacts of Hurricane Floyd (September 1999) which, today, few remember. It damaged greatly a predominantly African American town called Princeville, as well as nearby communities. In the first year or two after having been hit by Hurricane Floyd, Princeville still struggled to get support to rebuild itself, whereas other adversely affected communities seemed to have been on the mend at a much faster pace. In 2004 (a year before Katrina), I sought to encourage the development of a “Climate Affairs” program for undergraduates at the Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). This was (and still is) an attempt to develop awareness of and interest among African-Americans (i.e., to build capacity) in climate-related science, impacts and equity issues. This can empower the African-American community to better cope with the obvious and not so obvious ways that climate variability, change and extremes can influence human activities in general and their communities in particular. Keeping Bullard's earlier statement in mind, Finding solutions to global climate change is one of the areas that desperately need the input from those populations most likely to be negatively affected, poor people in the developing countries of the South and people of color and the poor in the North. there are not many African-Americans focused on climate-related impacts. At least, I have not encountered many over the years at various climate-related meetings I have attended. There are some African-American scientists researching the science of climate change, and there are many Africans who have come to the USA to teach science at the university level. The main point of a comparison of Africans and African Americans focused on climate impact assessments is to underscore what I believe is an urgent need to sharply and quickly increase the involvement in climate-related impact assessments of African-Americans, the minority most likely to be adversely affected by global warming. Only by getting involved directly in climate impact studies related to climate change --- whether public health, disaster preparedness, political and legal aspects, risk assessments, and so on --- will African Americans be prepared to do their own bidding in political circles, for the greater protection of the African-American community, not only from global warming but from other climate and weather extremes as well, such as hurricanes, floods, vector-borne diseases (e.g., mosquitoes), and other climate-related problems.

## 2ac v Northwestern MP

### GW

### A2: C02 Good – Generic

**No offense – increase in CO2 will overall lead to decrease in crop production and cause global starvation**

**Strom 7** [Robert Strom, Professor Emeritus of planetary sciences in the Department of Planetary Sciences at the University of Arizona, 2007 (studied climate change for 15 years, the former Director of the Space Imagery Center, a NASA Regional Planetary Image Facility, “Hot House”, SpringerLink, p. 211-216]

Agriculture is critical to **the survival of civilization**. Crops feed not only us but also the domestic animals we use for food. Any disruption in food production means a disruption of the economy, government, and health. The increase in CO2 will result in **some growth** of crops, and rising temperatures will open new areas to crop production at higher latitudes and over longer growing seasons; however, **the overall result** will be **decreased crop production** in most parts of the world. A 1993 study of the effects of a doubling of CO2 (550 ppm) above pre-industrial levels shows that there will be **substantial decreases** in the world food supply (Rosenzweig et al., 1993). In their research they studied the effects of global warming on four crops (wheat, rice, protein feed, and coarse grain) using four scenarios involving various adaptations of crops to temperature change and CO2 abundance. They found that the amount of world food reduction ranged from 1 to 27%. However, the optimistic value of 1% is almost certainly much too low, because it assumed that the amount of degradation would be offset by more growth from "CO2 fertilization." We now know that this is not the case, as explained below and in Chapter 7. The most probable value is a worldwide food reduction between 16 and 27%. These scenarios are based on temperature and CO2 rises that may be too low, as discussed in Chapter 7. However, even a decrease in world food production of 16% would lead to large-scale starvation in many regions of the world. Large-scale experiments called Free-Air Concentration Enrichment have shown that the effects of higher CO2 levels on crop growth is about 50% less than experiments in enclosure studies (Long et al., 2006). This shows that the projections that conclude that rising CO2 will fully offset the losses due to higher temperatures are wrong. The downside of climate change will far outweigh the benefits of increased CO2 and longer growing seasons. One researcher (Prof. Long) from the University of Illinois put it this way: Growing crops much closer to real conditions has shown that increased levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will have roughly half the beneficial effects previously hoped for in the event of climate change. In addition, ground-level ozone, which is also predicted to rise but has not been extensively studied before, has been shown to result in a loss of photosynthesis and 20 per cent reduction in crop yield. Both these results show that we need to seriously re-examine our predictions for future global food production, as they are likely to be far lower than previously estimated. Also, studies in Britain and Denmark show that only a few days of hot temperatures can severely reduce the yield of major food crops such as wheat, soy beans, rice, and groundnuts if they coincide with the flowering of these crops. This suggests that there are certain thresholds above which crops become very vulnerable to climate change. The European heat wave in the summer of 2003 provided a large-scale experiment on the behavior of crops to increased temperatures. Scientists from several European research institutes and universities found that the growth of plants during the heat wave was reduced by nearly a third (Ciais et al., 2005). In Italy, the growth of corn dropped by about 36% while oak and pine had a growth reduction of 30%. In the affected areas of the mid- west and California the summer heat wave of 2006 resulted in a 35% loss of crops, and in California a 15% decline in dairy production due to the heat-caused death of dairy cattle. It has been projected that a 2 °C rise in local temperature will result in a $92 million loss to agriculture in the Yakima Valley of Washington due to the reduction of the snow pack. A 4'C increase will result in a loss of about $163 million. For the first time, the world's grain harvests have fallen below the consumption level for the past four years according to the Earth Policy Institute (Brown, 2003). Furthermore, the shortfall in grain production increased each year, from 16 million tons in 2000 to 93 million tons in 2003. These studies were done in industrialized nations where agricultural practices are the best in the world. In developing nations the impact will be much more severe. It is here that the impact of global warming on crops and domestic animals will be most felt. In general, the world's most crucial staple food crops could fall by as much as one-third because of resistance to flowering and setting of seeds due to rising temperatures. Crop ecologists believe that many crops grown in the tropics are near, or at, their thermal limits. Already research in the Philippines has linked higher night-time temperatures to a reduction in rice yield. It is estimated that for rice, wheat, and corn, the grain yields are likely to decline by 10% for every local 1 °C increase in temperature. With a decreasing availability of food, malnutrition will become more frequent accompanied by damage to the immune system. This will result in a greater susceptibility to spreading diseases. For an extreme rise in global temperature (> 6 'C), it is likely that worldwide crop failures will lead to mass starvation, and political and economic chaos with all their ramifications for civilization.

### A2: C02 Good – Agr/Food Wars

#### Food wars don’t escalate – empirically proven

#### Warming results in less productive plants – initial growth doesn’t outweigh long term consequences

Laeschke 12 (Bernard – Science reporter, George Koch – Professor of Forestry at NAU, Coauthor of Study cited “Global warming: Plants exposed to rising temperatures deteriorate”, 4/10, http://www.global-adventures.us/2012/04/10/global-warming-plants/)

Global warming related to rising average temperatures of Earth's atmosphere, lakes and oceans may initially make the grass greener, but not for long periods of time. Plants begin to deteriorate quickly after the early stages of a warming environment, new research suggests. "We were really surprised by the pattern, where the initial boost in growth just went away," said scientist Zhuoting Wu of Northern Arizona University (NAU), a lead author of the study. "As ecosystems adjusted, the responses changed." Ecologists subjected four grassland ecosystems to simulated climate change during a decade-long study. Plants grew more the first year in the global warming treatment, but this effect progressively diminished over the next nine Drought years and finally disappeared. The research shows the long-term effects of global warming on plant growth, on the plant species that make up a community, and on changes in how plants use or retain essential resources like nitrogen. "The plants and animals around us repeatedly serve up surprises," said Saran Twombly, program director in the National Science Foundation (NSF)'s Division of Environmental Biology. "These results show that we miss these surprises because we don't study natural communities over the right time scales. For plant communities in Arizona, it took researchers 10 years to find that responses of native plant communities to warmer temperatures were the opposite of those predicted." The team transplanted four grassland ecosystems from a higher to lower elevation to simulate a future warmer environment, and coupled the warming with the range of predicted changes in precipitation -more, the same, or less. The grasslands studied were typical of those found in northern Arizona along elevation gradients from the San Francisco Peaks down to the Great Basin Desert. The researchers found that long-term warming resulted in loss of native species and encroachment of species typical of warmer environments, ultimately pushing the plant community toward less productive species. The warmed grasslands also cycled nitrogen more rapidly. This should make more nitrogen available to plants, scientists believed, helping plants grow more. But instead much of the nitrogen was lost, converted to nitrogen gases in the atmosphere or leached out by rainfall washing through the soil. Bruce Hungate, senior author of the paper and an ecologist at NAU, said the study challenges the expectation that warming will increase nitrogen availability and cause a sustained increase in plant productivity. "Faster nitrogen turnover stimulated nitrogen losses, likely reducing the effect of warming on plant growth," Hungate said. "More generally, changes in species, changes in element cycles--these really make a difference. Its classic systems ecology: the initial responses elicit knock-on effects, which here came back to bite the plants. These ecosystem feedbacks are critical--you can't figure this out with plants grown in a greenhouse."

#### CO2 good ev is assuming standard or slightly high levels of C02 – it’s not indicative of the aff’s warming scenario

### Alt Caus - Numerous causes of loss of ocean biodiversity

Spruill 8 (Vikki - President and CEO The Ocean Conservancy, Testifying before the Committee on House Select Energy Independence and Global Warming, CQ Congressional Testimony, April 29, “MPACT OF GLOBAL WARMING ON OCEANS,” CQ Congressional Testimony, lexis)  
  
Today, many marine ecosystems have changed so dramatically that they would be unrecognizable to our grandparents. The world's ocean continues to face an onslaught of stresses, many caused by people: overfishing, pollution, marine debris, poor water quality, and coastal development. Non-climate stresses increase vulnerability of ocean ecosystems to climate change by reducing resilience and adaptive capacity to react to the physical effects of climate change. The threats to the ocean are considerable - overfishing, pollution, poor water quality, marine debris, and coastal development all have huge impacts on marine communities and ecosystems and their effects have been well documented. Climate change will exacerbate the effect of current stresses on the ocean, and the scientific community at-large is concerned that the effects of climate change, acting together with existing threats, will accelerate the rate at which we lose biodiversity. We cannot fully understand or predict the impact that climate change will have on the ocean without first understanding the context - the ocean has long been assaulted by multiple, cumulative human impacts that make its ecosystems and human society more vulnerable to climate change.

### Prolif

### Small Arsenals

**Even if they are simpler other risks make them more destabilizing**

**Feaver ’97** (Peter, Ass. Prof. Pol. Sci. – Duke, Security Studies, “Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation”, 6:4, p. 102-103)

Are small and simple arsenals really more responsive in a crisis? Neooptimists dismiss some of the most damning near-nuclear accidents from the cold war era as merely a consequence of the rigid and complex standard operating procedures associated with the large superpower arsenals. Seng claims, with rather unjustified enthusiasm, that smaller arsenals should be able to "spin on a dime."27 He overstates his case. Given a certain level of operational skill, it is easier to improvise with a smaller than a larger arsenal. Will minor proliferators, however, have the kind of military that is proficient enough to improvise at all? Some will and some will not. Doctrinal skill varies widely across different militaries and even within different subelements of the same military.28 Of course, the nuclear operators may be the better trained elements of the minor proliferator, but not under conditions of opacity. Improvisation and operational flexibility are not simply a matter of size; they must be trained into military units. This argument points to a limitation of small-N comparative static analyses. Holding everything constant and then varying the size of the arsenal yields an expectation that command and control problems will ease. If you take the exact same country with the exact same deployment and skill profile, it will find controlling a smaller arsenal easier than controlling a larger arsenal. Counterfactual reasoning supports this logic, but since there are so few cases of nuclear proliferation to study we cannot be very confident of the magnitude of the effect.29 Since the purpose of neooptimism is to assuage us on the safeness of minor proliferators, it is not sufficient to know whether a certain kind of proliferation is relatively safer than another. We must also know how much safer—that is, whether it is safe enough to compensate for other problems. One must also examine whether the factor that is driving the smallness will also result in changes in other relevant parameters, for instance the alert level of the arsenal or the reliability of the weapon's design. One must also have some sense of the magnitude of effect and of other necessary conditions; the smaller size may only afford a meaningful improvement in nuclear command and control during a crisis if it is coupled with a competent military. Weighing all the factors in the U.S. case, for instance, it is not at all certain that nuclear operations were safer in the late-1950s than in the late-1960s; the arsenal was smaller in the earlier period, but the advantages of size were offset by a variety of unsafe operational practices including airborne alerts, a relatively wide scope of predelegated authority, an absence of use-control devices, and a general ignorance among top-level civilian leaders about operational realities. In sum, neooptimists have helpfully fleshed out the ways in which small size facilitates command and control. In so doing, however, they may be overstating both the virtues of smallness and simplicity and the likelihood that minor proliferators will adopt the specific kinds of small and simple arsenals necessary for the rosy scenario.

### A2: Prolif Slow

#### Prolif slow assumes US leadership – in a world of declining nuclear leadership decisions get made without US involvement – that’s Lovering and means that prolif occurs much faster because other countries stop modeling the NRC

#### And agreements are breaking down which has caused three new states in the past ten years – if we continue to proliferate at that accelerating rate there will be 20 states by 2020 – that’s Blechman

### A2: No Domino Fx

#### We don’t have to win domino effect – use it or lose it pressure means lash out causes extinction that’s Horowitz

#### agreements are breaking down which has caused three new states in the past ten years – if we continue to proliferate at that accelerating rate there will be 20 states by 2020 – the squo proves the domino theory - that’s Blechman

#### And 40 countries could break out – they already have sufficient materials to produce weapons – that’s Toon

### A2: No Impact – Tepperman Style

#### New prolif is worse – their ev doesn’t assume the accelerating rate of prolif in the squo – that’s Blechman – and the use it or lose it pressure which comes from more states having weapons causes a first strike – there’s a fear that if I don’t strike someone else will – that’s Horowitz

### A2: Deterrence Theory

#### Deterrence theory is flawed - modern weapons are small, compact, and immediate – more states causes deterrence to break down that’s Shultz [Toon]

### A2: Prolif Good – Conventional Wars Impact

#### Prolif increases risk of the impact – wars between non-nuclear countries cant escalate to nuclear war

#### Risk of nuclear war outweighs – conventional wars won’t cause exintinction – squo proves

#### Prolif increases the risk of conventional war – high costs encourage conflict

**Kapur ‘7** (S. Paul, Associate Prof. Strategic Research Department @ Naval War College, “Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia”, p. 171)

My study's findings have important implications for our theoretical understanding of nuclear proliferation's effects on international security. As noted, proliferation optimists argue that by threatening to raise the cost of war astronomically, nuclear weapons reduce the likelihood of conflict. My findings, however, indicate that this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, the study shows that the danger of nuclear weapons can in certain circumstances have the opposite effect. By potentially raising the costs of violence, nuclear weapons can make conflict more likely, encouraging a weak, revisionist state both to take territory while insulated from all-out conventional retaliation and to attempt to force third-party diplomatic intervention in ensuing crises. The high cost of nuclear war is precisely what promises to make such a strategy successful; nuclear danger deters adversaries and also attracts outside attention. If nuclear weapons were not so destructive, a weak, revisionist state would get neither of these benefits and would be less likely to engage in aggressive behavior. Thus, the high cost of nuclear war may not lead to lower level stability and can actually increase the likelihood of conflict.

#### Flawed logic – don’t take a risk on the end of the species – case impacts are too huge

### Bioweapons

#### -- Many barriers to smallpox

Newsweek 1 (10-18, p. 21, Lexis)

Acquiring, producing, and delivering the smallpox virus would pose a series of challenging technical hurdles for terrorists, making an attack with the virus unlikely--although potentially catastrophic were it to occur. First, because the smallpox virus no longer exists in nature, terrorists would have to acquire it from a state with undeclared laboratory stocks of the virus, or perhaps from former Soviet bioweapons scientists who had smuggled out samples of the virus. Second, the terrorists would have to grow the virus in eggs or animal cells, which is technically challenging. Third, they would have to find some means of disseminating the virus as a fine, inhalable mist of microscopic particles or droplets (called an aerosol), § Marked 15:38 § which would require specialized technology and know-how. For a low-tech attack, suicide terrorists might consider infecting themselves and spreading the disease, but they would have only a few days to do so before the facial rash became obvious. Moreover, even terrorists prepared for instant martyrdom in an explosion might hesitate before willingly suffering a slow, painful, and hideous death from a disease like smallpox.

No terminal impact, disease won’t cause extinction – human adaptation

### Off Case

### Heidegger 2AC

#### -- Perm – do the plan and non-competitive parts of the alternative. It solves best.

**McWhorter 92** (Ladelle, Assistant Professor of Philosophy – Northeast Missouri State University, Heidegger and the Earth, p. 3)

Heidegger's work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities.

#### -- No extinction – tech and calculation have existed forever – and the world is getting better

#### -- Extinction outweighs – pre-requisite to Being

**Zimmerman 93** (Michael E., Professor of Philosophy – University of Tulane, Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity, p. 119-120)

Heidegger asserted that human self assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being and human Dasein. Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might “bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth.” This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one’s soul by losing ones relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur in an ontological clearing through which life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity’s one dimensional disclosure to entities virtually denies that any “being” at all, the loss of humanity’s openness for being is already occurring. Modernity’s background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material happiness for everyone by reducing nature into pure energy. The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in a nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity’s slow destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided a nuclear war only to survive as contended clever animals, Heidegger believed we would exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth, masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead. **But most** of them **could not agree that the loss of humanity’s relation to being would be worse than nuclear omnicide**, for it is wrong to suppose that the lives of millions of extinct and unknown species are somehow lessened because they were never “disclosed” by humanity.

#### -- Framework – evaluate the aff vs. status quo or a competitive policy option. That’s best for fairness and predictability – there are too many frameworks to predict and they moot all of the 1ac – makes it impossible to be aff. Only our framework solves activism.

#### Alt doesn’t solve the case –

1. doesn’t build nuclear reactors – it rejects tech
2. changing relations to nature doesn’t change temp
3. there’s no spillover between demand we reject tech and people doing it

### Other CP

#### AND - Status quo facilities risk terrorist attacks

**Early et al 9** – assistant professor in the Political Science and Public Administration & Policy Departments at the University at Albany, State University of New York, Former Research Fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Bryan, with Matthew Fuhrmann and Quan Li, 4/30. “Atoms for Terror: The Determinants of Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism.” Social Science Research Network. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1397210)

Second, nuclear facilities present targets of opportunity for terrorist groups. Attacking structures that produce or house radioactive materials, such as nuclear power plants, could cause large-scale radiological contamination or, at least, generate that fear in the public.23 Such attacks may appeal to groups that seek mass-casualties or publicity. Indeed, numerous groups have plotted to target nuclear plants. For example, al-Qaeda possessed ―diagrams of American nuclear power plants‖ and considered using commercial airliners to strike nuclear reactors as part of the 9/11 attacks.24 On a smaller scale, the North African terrorist group Salafia Jihadia plotted to launch a suicide attack against a French nuclear power plant in May 2003.25 The more extensive a state’s civilian nuclear infrastructure, the more potential targets terrorist groups can plan and execute attacks against.

#### SMR’s solve

Carelli, et al. 10 (M.D. (Westinghouse, Science & Technology Center), P. Garone (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering), G. Locatelli (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering), M. Mancini (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering), C. Mycoff (Westinghouse, Science & Technology Center), P. Trucco (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering), M.E. Ricotti (Politecnico di Milano, Department of Energy, CeSNEF-Nuclear Engineering Division) , “Economic features of integral, modular, small-to-medium size reactors”, Progress in Nuclear Energy, Vol. 52, 2010)

Even the technological choices on the design phase can directly affects the economics of NPPs. An integral and modular approach to the design of the nuclear reactors offers the unique possibility to exploit a simpliﬁcation of the plant. This can lead to a reduction of the type and number of components. As an example, the complete integration of all the primary components inside the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) reached by IRIS design (Carelli et al., 2004) avoids large, high pressure piping. This positively affects also the safety of the plant, allowing a dramatic increase of the safety level, via a reduction of the number of safety systems and a simpliﬁcation of the remaining ones. The integration concept increases also the compactness of the plant (volume over power ratio), with a reduction of the containment volume. A further positive effect is that also the security of the NPP is improved, with a small imprinting of the plant on the ground and a limited area of its skyline, leading e.g. to a reduction of terrorist air attack probability. Moreover, the plant lifetime can be increased and the plant quality of performance kept all along its lifetime, since e.g. radiation damage on the RPV is practically avoided by the inherent shielding provided by the large water thickness between the RPV and the core. Considering all these aspects, for a given size, the multiple SMRs option might decrease the Levelized Unit Electricity Cost (LUEC).

#### Even a failed terrorist attack causes extinction

Sid-Ahmed 4, political analyst 04 (Mohamed, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, “Extinction” August 26-September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)

**What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the** new and frightening **world in which we are now living**. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, **tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate**. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is **if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious.** Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. **When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers**.

### States (Not Devolution) CP 2ac

#### Doesn’t solve the aff –

#### Nuke leadership – the Wallace and Williams ev indicates strong federal action to reverse our decline in nuclear leadership is key to send an international signal

#### Specifically Congress is key

Fertel 5 [Marvin Fertel - Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Nuclear Energy Institute “Nuclear Power's Place In A National Energy Policy,” April 28th, 2005, Lexis (CQ Congressional Testimony), Chetan]

Industry and government will be prepared to meet the demand for new emission-free baseload nuclear plants in the 2010 to 2020 time frame only through a sustained focus on the necessary programs and policies between now and then. As it has in the past, strong Congressional oversight will be necessary to ensure effective and efficient implementation of the **federal** government's nuclear energy programs, and to maintain America's leadership in nuclear technology development and its influence over important diplomatic initiatives like nonproliferation.

#### Warming – extend the Lovering evidence, nations see the NRC as the gold standard of licensing practices and are ready to follow their lead on SMR development – international transition to nuclear DEPENDS on NRC action

#### AND - Federal government key to uniformity for climate mitigation

Byrne 7 (Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (CEEP) (John, with Kristen Hughes, Lado Kurdgelashvili, Wilson Rickerson, 2/19. “American policy conflict in the greenhouse: Divergent trends in federal, regional, state, and local green energy and climate change policy.”)

Effective global mitigation of climate change will require strong leadership by national governments, including that of the US. More specifically, national governments remain vital in mandating and enforcing compliance among diverse actors within their jurisdiction. Only national governments can promote uniform standards for compliance and related programs, thus ensuring achievement of policy goals with maximum fairness and minimal costs (Rabe, 2002). National funding also remains vital to underwrite long-term commitments needed to meet ever more challenging climate action targets (Rabe, 2002).

#### -- States fiat is a voter --- steals all the Aff, uniformity circumvents the best literature, its contrived and unpredictable because there isn’t a single solvency advocate for the counterplan, and illogical because no policy-maker can choose between all 50 states doing the plan vs. the federal government doing it.

#### -- Links to politics --- state action create national controversy and draws in Obama – people will equally backlash to him devolving authority to the state

#### Solvency deficits –

#### First – Investor Confidence

#### Extend the Wallace evidence – investors think federal tax credits are necessary to offset risks and generate licensing certainty – only after investors can see that will they be willing to finance future projects

#### AND – Investors will see that states are broke - they won’t trust any incentive without the government

Oliff et al 12 [Phil Oliff, Chris Mai, and Vincent Palacios – Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact”, June 27th, 2012, <http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=711,m>, Chetan]

As a new fiscal year begins, the latest state budget estimates continue to show that states’ ability to fund services remains hobbled by slow economic growth. The budget gaps that states have had to close for fiscal year 2013, the fiscal year that begins July 1, 2012, total $55 billion in 31 states. That amount is smaller than in past years, but still very large by historical standards. States’ actions to close those gaps, in turn, are further delaying the nation’s economic recovery. The budget gaps result principally from weak tax collections. The Great Recession that started in 2007 caused the largest collapse in state revenues on record. Since bottoming out in 2010, revenues have begun to grow again but are still far from fully recovered. As of the first quarter of 2012, state revenues remained 5.5 percent below pre-recession levels, and are not growing fast enough to recover fully soon. Meanwhile, states’ education and health care obligations continue to grow. States expect to educate 540,000 more K-12 students and 2.5 million more public college and university students in the upcoming school year than in 2007-08.[1] And some 4.8 million more people are projected to be eligible for subsidized health insurance through Medicaid in 2012 than were enrolled in 2008, as employers have cancelled their coverage and people have lost jobs and wages.[2] Consequently, even though the revenue outlook is trending upward, states have addressed large budget shortfalls by historical standards as they considered budgets for 2013. The vast majority of these shortfalls have been closed through spending cuts and other measures in order to meet balanced-budget requirements. As of publication all but five states have enacted their budgets, and those five will do so soon. To the extent these shortfalls are being closed with spending cuts, they are occurring on top of past years’ deep cuts in critical public services like education, health care, and human services. The additional cuts mean that state budgets will continue to be a drag on the national economy, threatening hundreds of thousands of private- and public-sector jobs, reducing the job creation that otherwise would be expected to occur. Potential strategies for lessening the impact of deep spending cuts include more use of state reserve funds in states that have reserves, more revenue through tax-law changes, and a greater role for the federal government.

#### Financial protection is the only thing that gets investors on board

Morse 7 – Washington Post Staff Writer (Dan, “Money Matters in Debate Over New Reactor Project; Financing, Rather Than Safety, Appears to Be Key Factor in Whether Plans Proceed” Washington Post Staff Writer 2007, September 5. The Washington Post,p. B.5.  ProQuest)

It's not the greenies who worry those aiming to build a new nuclear reactor in Southern Maryland. It's the green. This seemed perfectly clear at a recent community meeting in Calvert County, where Constellation Energy has proposed the first new reactor project in the United States in nearly 30 years. The price tag: about $4.5 billion. "Without the federal loan guarantees, this whole thing will come to a stop," George Vanderheyden, a Constellation executive, said while standing outside the hotel conference room where the meeting was about to start. Ten feet from him, a row of environmentalists greeted Calvert residents with stacks of brochures. "Threatened Communities," from Greenpeace, showed rows of grave markers next to a nuclear cooling tower. Vanderheyden showed little concern and later said his company could dispel such notions during the long approval process for the reactor. What concerns him more -- and what appears to be the larger factor in whether the Calvert reactor gets built -- is taking place 55 miles away in Washington. There, nuclear companies such as Constellation, along with Wall Street bankers, are lobbying hard to get the federal government to help kick-start construction of a series of reactors. Their argument: Nuclear power is clean energy that can reduce greenhouse gases. Wall Street investors could help finance new reactors. But they're skittish, remembering nuclear projects in the 1970s and 1980s dogged by regulatory delays, cost overruns and the Three Mile Island meltdown. The government, according to the nuclear industry, should protect investors if the initial projects go bad.

#### Second – Regulatory Delays

#### Extend the Gale evidence – federal financing controls the risk factors that give rise to regulatory delays. Private lenders are much more eager to finance projects when they know that regulatory regimes won’t get in the way.

#### Condo is a voter- results in argument irresponsibility, time and strat skews- no cost options in the 1nc make the 2ac impossible- one condo advocacy/ dispo solves your offense

#### Perm do both –

#### states are acting now to provide incentives but it won’t work without a sustained federal commitment

Bowman 8 (President and Chief Executive Officer Nuclear Energy Institute (Frank, CQ Congressional Testimony, “Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction”, 6/19, lexis)

In terms of new nuclear plant construction, one of the most significant financing challenges is the cost of these projects relative to the size, market value and financing capability of the companies that will build them. New nuclear power plants are expected to cost at least $6 to 7 billion. U.S. electric power companies do not have the size, financing capability or financial strength to finance new nuclear power projects on balance sheet, on their own-particularly at a time when they are investing heavily in other generating capacity, transmission and distribution infrastructure, and environmental controls. These first projects must have financing support-either loan guarantees from the federal government or assurance of investment recovery from state governments, or both. The states are doing their part. Throughout the South and Southeast, state governments have enacted legislation or implemented new regulations to encourage new nuclear plant construction. Comparable federal government commitment is essential. The modest loan guarantee program authorized by the 2005 Energy Policy Act was a small step in the right direction, but it does not represent a sufficient response to the urgent need to rebuild our critical electric power infrastructure. We believe the United States will need something similar to the Clean Energy Bank concept now under consideration by a number of members of Congress-a government corporation, modeled on the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, to provide loan guarantees and other forms of financing support to ensure that capital flows to clean technology deployment in the electric sector. Creation of such a financing entity should be an integral component of any climate change legislation. Such a concept serves at least two national imperatives. First, it addresses the challenge mentioned earlier-the disparity between the size of these projects relative to the size of the companies that will build them. In the absence of a concept like a Clean Energy Bank, new nuclear plants and other clean energy projects will certainly be built, but in smaller numbers over a longer period of time. Second, federal loan guarantees provide a substantial consumer benefit. A loan guarantee allows more leverage in a project's capital structure, which reduces the cost of capital, in turn reducing the cost of electricity from the project. Electricity consumers-residential, commercial and industrial-are already struggling with increases in oil, natural gas and electricity prices. The high cost of energy and fuel price volatility has already compromised the competitive position of American industry. We know that the next generation of clean energy technologies will be more costly than the capital stock in place today. In this environment, we see a compelling case for federal financing support that would reduce consumer costs. If it is structured like the loan guarantee program authorized by Title XVII of the 2005 Energy Policy Act, in which project sponsors are expected to pay the cost of the loan guarantee, such a program would be revenue-neutral and would not represent a subsidy. The public benefits associated with a robust energy loan guarantee program-lower cost electricity, deployment of clean energy technologies at the scale necessary to reduce carbon emissions-are significant. That is why the U.S. government routinely uses loan guarantee programs to support activities that serve the public good and the national interest-including shipbuilding, steelmaking, student loans, rural electrification, affordable housing, construction of critical transportation infrastructure, and for many other purposes. Achieving significant expansion of nuclear power in the United States will require stable and sustained federal and state government policies relating to nuclear energy.

#### prevents race to the bottom by imposing a federal floor

Suh 11 (Katrina – Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A. Yale University; J.D. Yale Law School, “CAPTURING INDIVIDUAL HARMS”, Harvard Environmental Law Review 35 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 155, lexis)

Domestic environmental law involves state and, indirectly, local governments in the design and implementation of environmental policy through a cooperative federalism framework that imposes federal minimum standards but largely reserves decisions about implementation to state authorities. n31 One of the chief rationales for this division of authority is that it "allows ... pollution [control] strategies to be tailored to individual geographic areas," n32 thereby (at least potentially) maximizing social welfare and efficiency by allowing policy to incorporate local conditions and local preferences. n33 Proponents of the devolution of even greater authority to the states and local government than that afforded by cooperative federalism also emphasize the benefits of local tailoring. n34 Local tailoring is hypothesized to require state and local involvement because "[a] national bureaucracy like EPA, with its limited resources and knowledge, cannot possibly take into account ... regional and subregional differences." n35 Moreover, "EPA has relatively little incentive to reflect local preferences about how to assign ... pollution reduction burdens -- about whether, for instance, to tighten automobile emissions inspection programs or to impose stricter limits on small businesses." n36 This traditional account of the benefits of cooperative federalism and local tailoring is subject to robust debate. A voluminous environmental federalism literature evidences continuing and deep divisions about the advisability and efficacy of cooperative federalism [\*163] approaches as well as about the appropriate role of local governments in environmental regulation and the benefits of local tailoring.

#### Cant solve prolif – other nations wont perceive nations – China hasn’t seen the Votgle project as US action

#### Can’t build enough – their ev only talks about a few states building even fewer nuclear power plants

#### Counterplan causes race to the bottom – undermines enforcement and the environment

Pursley and Wiseman 11 (Garrick – Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law, and Hannah - Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law, “LOCAL ENERGY”, 2011, Emory Law Journal, 60 Emory L.J. 877, lexis)

In the end, then, the efficiency debate leaves us with no general answer to the institutional-choice question in the context of distributed renewables. Leaving aside the observation that efficiency in the "provision of environmental goods" may not be the best criterion for evaluating environmental policy, n251 there simply is no economic justification for lodging all environmental regulatory power at any one level of government. At best, the literature shows that the question of efficiency in the allocation of regulatory power is complex, that the proper allocation likely varies from one environmental policy area to another - air and water pollutants with effects beyond state boundaries clearly merit federal regulation, for example - and **that races to the bottom remain a risk** at the subnational level. Although there is no empirical evidence to suggest that the economic dynamics differ substantially from the general field of environmental regulation to the specific subject of distributed renewables policy, differences in the nature of technologies and business interests may raise distinct issues. n252 For now, we assume relative similarity between environmental and distributed renewables regulation and that decentralizing regulatory authority to the state or local government level risks a race to the bottom. We address remedies for that risk in Part II.B, below. 2. The Politics Debate A second theoretical dilemma in identifying an optimal level of land-energy governance cautions against too hasty a leap toward vesting primary regulatory authority in state or local governments. This dilemma arises from the literature applying public choice theory to environmental regulation. n253 Public choice theory holds that government policy is disproportionately shaped [\*923] by the preferences of concentrated interest groups that provide significant electoral support for representatives and thereby secure access and influence over those representatives' decisions. n254 It thus highlights the importance of understanding the alignment and actions of relevant interest groups in describing the causes of past policy outcomes and predicting future outcomes. n255 The classical objection is that interest groups that favor lax environmental regulation and have high individual stakes in regulatory outcomes - paradigmatically industry groups - tend to be small and cohesive, but groups favoring stricter environmental regulation tend to be more diffuse and less organized. n256 This disparity in political power, from the perspective of economies of scale in political organization and advocacy of the two camps, **is exacerbated at the state and local government levels**. n257 Diffuse environmental interests may muster the resources to organize and act within a single political forum, but organizing at multiple state or government locations would be too taxing upon their relatively undisciplined and typically underfunded infrastructures. n258 Interests favoring laxer regulation, by contrast, are thought to possess relatively greater capacity to organize and advocate in multiple [\*924] government forums and thus enjoy a comparative advantage. n259 Comparative institutional analysis thus suggests that federal environmental authority is preferable to state or local authority because the federal level is the most efficient receiver of broadly shared but often under-organized public interests in environmental protection, which are needed to counterbalance industrial interests that would otherwise dominate the political process and impose their narrow interests on the unwitting public. n260

#### Fiat doesn’t solve --- implementation will vary

Bryner 2 (Gary C. - Professor, Department of Political Science, Brigham Young University, and Research Associate, Natural Resources Law Center. University of Colorado School of Law., “ARTICLE: Policy Devolution and Environmental Law: Exploring the Transition to Sustainable Development”, Fall, 26 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 1, lexis)

Federal agencies are believed to be insulated enough from resource-depleting communities to ensure preservationist values are pursued. When agencies fail to protect resources or reduce pollution, the solution is to replace them with more ambitious regulators and to strengthen the regulatory authority of federal officials. [2](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=056abf4cf7f767d2655ae1b274fe4dc3&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAB&_md5=3dc0dbf11daf78ff84a8925ba322737c#n2#n2) A number of studies have compared states according to their commitment to environmental protection and found significant variation in expenditures, legal authority, methodologies to determine environmental quality, reporting  [\*3]  requirements, enforcement actions, and in the environmental standards they are authorized to set under federal law. [3](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=056abf4cf7f767d2655ae1b274fe4dc3&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAB&_md5=3dc0dbf11daf78ff84a8925ba322737c#n3#n3)

#### Workers DA -

#### A. Federal funds drive private sector investment and recruiting skilled workers for construction

Kammen 3 - professor of nuclear engineering at Berkeley (Daniel, Federal News Service, Prepared Testimony before the House Committee on Science, 6/12, lexis)

The federal government plays the pivotal role in the encouragement of innovation in the energy sector. Not only are **federal** funds critical, but as my work and that of others has demonstrated6, private funds generally follow areas of public sector support. One particularly useful metric although certainly not the only measure --. of the relationship between funding and innovation is based on patents. Total public sector funding and the number of patents - across all disciplines in the United States have both increased steadily over at least the past three decades (Figure 5). The situation depicted here, with steadily increasing trends for funding and results (measured imperfectly, but consistently, by patents) is not as rosy when energy R&D alone is considered. In that case the same close correlation exists, but the funding pattern has been one of decreasing resources (Figure 6A). Figure 6A shows energy funding levels (symbol: o) and patents held by the national laboratories (symbol: ). The situation need not be as bleak as it seems. During the 1980s a number of changes in U.S. patent law permitted the national laboratories to engage in patent partnerships with the private sector. This increased both the interest in developing patents, and increased the interest by the private sector in pursuing patents on energy technologies. The squares (l) in figure 6 show that overall patents in the energy sector derived. Figure 6B reveals that patent levels in the nuclear field have declined, but not only that, publicprivate partnerships have taken placed (shaded bars), but have not increased as dramatically as in energy field overall (Figure 6A). There are a number of issues here, so a simple comparison of nuclear R&D to that on for example, fuel cells, is not appropriate. But it is a valid to explore ways to increase both the diversity of the R&D. This is a particularly important message for **federal** policy. Novel approaches are needed to encourage new and innovative modes of research, teaching, and industrial innovation in the nuclear energy field. To spur innovation in nuclear science a concerted effort would be needed to increase the types and levels of cooperation by universities and industries in areas that depart significantly from the current 'Generation III+' and equally, away from the 'Generation IV' designs. Similar conclusions were reached by M. Granger Morgan, head of the Engineering and Public Policy Program at Carnegie Mellon University, in his evaluation of the need for innovative in the organization and sociology of the U. S. nuclear power industrys. A second important issue that this Committee might consider is the degree of **federal** support for nuclear fission relative to other nations. Funding levels in the U.S. are significantly lower than in both Japan and France. Far from recommending higher public sector funding, what is arguably a more successful strategy would be to increase the private sector support for nuclear R&D and student training fellowships. Importantly, this is precisely the sort of expanded publicprivate partnership that has been relatively successful in the energy sector generally. It is incorrect, however, to think that this is a process that can be left to the private sector. There are key issues that inhibit private sector innovation. As one example, many nuclear operating companies have large coal assets, and thus are unlikely to push overly hard, in areas that threaten another core business. This emphasis on industry resources used to support and expanded nuclear program - under careful public sector management - has been echoed by a variety of nuclear engineering faculty members: I believe that if you. were to survey nuclear engineering department heads, most would select a national policy to support new nuclear construction, over a policy to increase direct financial support to nuclear engineering departments. A firm commitment by the federal government, to create **incentives** sufficient to ensure the construction of a modest number of new nuclear plants, with the **incentives** reduced for subsequent plants, would be the best thing that could possibly be done for nuclear engineering education and revitalization of the national workforce for nuclear science and technology. - Professor Per Peterson, Chair, Department of Nuclear Engineering, University of California, Berkeley

#### B. Skilled worker shortage will wreck solvency

Bengelsdorf 7 – consultant and former director of both key State and Energy Department offices that are concerned with international nuclear and nonproliferation affair

(HAROLD, “THE U.S. DOMESTIC CIVIL NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE AND U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY”, White Paper prepared for the American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness May, http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/images/COUNCIL\_WHITE\_PAPER\_Final.pdf)

Thus the challenge the U.S. nuclear industry faces today is whether the U.S. civil nuclear infrastructure will be strong enough to support a hoped for nuclear revival in this country, which could entail the construction and commissioning of up to eight nuclear power units during the 2010 to 2017 period. Several studies have been devoted to this question, and the answer is by no means certain. The shortage in skilled labor is expected to double in this country by the year 2020 and the workforce will stop growing as the baby boomers start to retire.

### General Obama Good Elections 2ac

#### Obama will lose –

#### The undecided voters will break for Romney.

**Chambers**, **9/19**/2012 (Dean, Mitt Romney likely win in presidential election shown by three key polls, Examiner, p. http://www.examiner.com/article/mitt-romney-likely-win-presidential-election-shown-by-three-key-polls)

Rasmussen Reports has released today, three key polls that show Mitt Romney's likely win in this year's presidential election over President Obama. The Rasmussen Reports Presidential Daily Tracking Poll released today shows Romney leading 47 percent to 46 percent over Obama. Rasmussen's Daily Swing State Tracking Poll of 11 key swing states won by President Obama in 2008 shows Romney leading them by the exact same percentages. The latest Rasmussen poll of New Hampshire released today shows Romney leading there 48 percent to 45 percent. New Hampshire is a key swing state that could make a difference with its four electoral votes, and George W. Bush would have reached 270 electoral voters in 2000 without having won this state. New Hampshire had narrowly favored Obama in many polls over the last few months and while the analysis conduced here by this columnist has consistently predicted Mitt Romney will win the state (based in part on knowledge of local politics in the state having lived in New England for years), most projected have shaded New Hampshire blue and predicted it will go for Obama. This Rasmussen survey is key in that it likely shows movement in New Hampshire in the direction of Mitt Romney. In the instance of an incumbent president who enjoys just about 100 percent name recognition and is seeking reelection, most of the undecided voters are likely to swing to the challenger by election day. This is especially true when the challenger remains still less known to the public than the incumbent, as is true with former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney. By election day, those other nine percent not favoring Romney or Obama in the Rasmussen Daily Tracking poll are likely include less than one percent voting for third party candidates and five or six percent of those nine will likely vote for Mitt Romney. That would indicate a popular vote win by Romney of about 53 percent to 46 percent, or the reverse of Obama's win in 2008. This would lead to an electoral college total of more than 300 electoral votes for Romney. The 11 swing states tracked by Rasmussen in it's swing state tracking poll show Romney leading 47 percent to 46 percent, where some weeks ago the two candidates were tied at 45 percent in the Rasmussen tracking poll of these 11 key swing states. President Obama won these same states collectively by a 53 percent to 46 percent margin in 2008. Now he is seven percent behind that finish now in these states. Romney is likely to capture most of the undecided votes and could win these states collectively by at least a 52 percent to 47 percent margin. That would likely lead to Romney winning Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia and Wisconsin while having a competitive chance in Michigan and Pennsylvania. If President Obama can only win Michigan and Pennsylvania among those 11 swing states, he can not be reelected to the presidency. As these polls stand today, the election of Mitt Romney as our next president looks likely.

#### -- B) Approval ratings and swing states

**Business Insider**, **8/7**/2012 (The 14 States Obama Really Needs to Worry About This November, p. http://www.businessinsider.com/obama-approval-rating-swing-states-by-state-ohio-florida-pennsylvania-2012-8)

Gallup released its state-by-state approval ratings of President Barack Obama last week, and the numbers show that Obama should be concerned about his prospects in 14 states heading into the November election. Obama's approval ratings sits at 50 percent or above — the level considered safe for re-election — in 13 states and the District of Columbia. But there are 14 states where his job approval is somewhere between the 40 and 50 percent range — Oregon, Nevada, Colorado, New Mexico, Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, Florida, New Hampshire and Maine. Here's a look: All of these states, with the exception of Maine and Oregon, are considered battlegrounds in the 2012 presidential race. Oregon and Maine went to Obama in 2008 and are seen as reliable states for him this time around. Here's how the math breaks down: The 13 states and D.C. give Obama 185 electoral votes. He needs to accumulate 85 more electoral votes to beat Romney. Based on recent polling, Obama tends to lead in all of these states except North Carolina and Florida. But the approval numbers should at least cast some doubt on the President's re-election chances, if history is any indication. Gallup is a stickler on the 50-percent approval mark being an essential statistic for re-election. Managing editor Jeffrey M. Jones explains: The 50% approval mark is significant because post-World War II incumbent presidents who have been above 50% job approval on Election Day were easily re-elected. Presidents with approval ratings below 50% have more uncertain re-election prospects. Historically, two presidents below 50% in their final approval rating before the election -- George W. Bush and Harry Truman -- won, and three, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and George H.W. Bush, lost.

#### -- Not intrinsic – logical policymaker could do the plan and pass Obama’s agenda/not pass Romney’s- key to effective decisionmaking

#### Overwhelming public support for nuclear energy - multiple polls

WNA 12(WNA is the World Nuclear Association. “US Nuclear Power Policy.” August, 2012. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41\_US\_nuclear\_power\_policy.html)

**Public opinion regarding nuclear power has generally been fairly positive, and has grown more so as people have had to think about security of energy supplies. Different polls show** continuing increase **in public opinion favorable to nuclear power in the USA. More than three times as many strongly support nuclear energy than strongly oppose it**. Two-thirds of self-described environmentalists favor it. A May 2008 survey (N=2925) by Zogby International showed 67% of Americans favored building new nuclear power plants, with 46% registering strong support; 23% were opposed[10](http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41_US_nuclear_power_policy.html#References). Asked which kind of power plant they would prefer if it were sited in their community, 43% said nuclear, 26% gas, 8% coal. Men (60%) were more than twice as likely as women (28%) to be supportive of a nuclear power plant. A March 2010 Bisconti-GfK Roper survey showed that strong public support for nuclear energy was being sustained, with 74% in favor of it[11](http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41_US_nuclear_power_policy.html#References). In particular, **87% think nuclear will be important in meeting electricity needs in the years ahead, 87% support license renewal for nuclear plants, 84% believe utilities should prepare to build more nuclear plants,** 72% supported an active federal role in encouraging investment **in "energy technology that reduces greenhouse gases", 82% agree that US nuclear plants are safe and secure, 77% would support adding a new reactor at the nearest nuclear plant, and 70% say that USA should definitely build more plants in the future.** Only 10% of people said they strongly opposed the use of nuclear energy. In relation to recycling used nuclear fuel, 79% supported this (contra past US policy), and the figure rose to 85% if "a panel of independent experts" recommended it. Although 59% were confident that used reactor fuel could be stored safely at nuclear power plant sites, 81% expressed a strong desire for the federal government to move used nuclear fuel to centralized, secure storage facilities away from the plant sites until a permanent disposal facility is ready. Half of those surveyed considered themselves to be environmentalists. A February 2011 Bisconti-GfK Roper survey showed similar figures, and that 89% of Americans agree that all low-carbon energy sources – including nuclear, hydro and renewable energy – should be taken advantage of to generate electricity while limiting greenhouse gas emissions. Just 10% disagreed. Also some **84% of respondents said that they associate nuclear energy "a lot" or "a little" with reliable electricity;** 79% associate § Marked 15:42 § nuclear energy with affordable electricity; 79% associate nuclear energy with economic growth and job creation; and 77% associate nuclear energy and clean air. A more general March 2010 Gallup poll (N=1014) on energy showed 62% in favor of using nuclear power, including 28% strongly so, and 33% against, the most favorable figures since Gallup began polling the question in 1994. However, only 51% of Democrat voters were in favor[12](http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41_US_nuclear_power_policy.html#References). An early March 2011 Gallup poll just before the Fukushima accident showed 57% in favor and 38% against, and in March 2012 (N=1024) still 57% in favor with 40% against (men: 72%-27%, women 42%-51%). **Regarding plant safety, the polls showed consistent 56-58% positive views over 2009-12, but men-women split similar. A survey conducted in September 2011** by Bisconti Research Inc. with GfK Roper **showed that although support for nuclear power decreased following the Fukushima accident** and compared with a year earlier (a survey carried out in March 2010 by Bisconti Research found 74% of Americans favored nuclear power), **62%** of the 1000 **adults** surveyed in the latest poll **were supportive of utilizing nuclear power** while 35% expressed opposition. The survey found that **82% of Americans believed that lessons had been learned from** Fukushima and 67% of respondents considered US nuclear power plants safe (the same level as reported one month before the nuclear accident in Japan occurred). Also **85% of said that an extension of commercial operation should be granted to those plants that comply with federal safety standards**, and 59% believed more nuclear power plants should definitely be built in the future, while 75% contend that “Electric utilities should prepare now so that new nuclear power plants could be built if needed in the next decade.” Finally, further expansion of the site of the nearest already operating nuclear power plant is supported by 67% and opposed by 28%. By February 2012 support had increased slightly to 64% supported using nuclear power, while 33% opposed it. Some 81% of respondents believed that nuclear energy will be important in meeting the USA's future electricity needs (compared with 80% in September), and 82% thought the USA should "take advantage of all low-carbon energy sources, including nuclear, hydro and renewable energy." Significantly, 74% believed that nuclear power plants operating in the USA are safe, up from 67% in both 2011 surveys. However, a Harris survey in February 2012 (N=2056) showed that only 40% of US adults believed that the benefits of nuclear outweigh its risks, while 41% thought the reverse. A similar poll conducted in 2011 before the Fukushima accident occurred, indicated that 42% thought that the benefits outweighed the risks, while 37% believed the opposite. In a 2009 poll, 44% thought the benefits outweighed the benefits, while 34% thought they did not. The southern states had the highest percentage of people believing the benefits outweigh the risks (at 43%), compared with 33% in the East and 41% in the Midwest and West. Some 42% of Americans thought that the benefits of using coal outweighed the risks (up from 38% positive in 2011), while 40% said the risks outweighed the benefits.

#### SMR’s solve meltdown concerns

**Wheeler, 10** – Workforce Planning Manager with Entergy; Producer “This Week in Nuclear” Podcast (John, 11/21. “Small Modular Reactors May Offer Significant Safety & Security Enhancements.” http://thisweekinnuclear.com/?p=1193)

In summary, small modular nuclear reactors offer potential safety and security advantages over larger commercial reactors because they can be designed (1) to have smaller source terms, (2) to have accident scenarios that progress more slowly, (3) to be meltdown proof, (4) to operate at lower pressures, and (5) to have smaller security footprints. These safety and security advantages can result in considerable cost advantages. A large percentage of a nuclear plant’s operating expenses go into emergency planning and security. It is possible that four or five SMRs packaged together to provide the equivalent of a large nuclear unit could operate with a smaller staff size and lower costs. However, because existing rules were written for larger reactors, some changes to NRC regulations will be required for SMRs to take full advantage of their inherent safety and security features. There are groups already working on these changes.

#### **Meltdowns cause extinction**

**Lendman, 11** – Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (Stephe, 3/13. “Nuclear Meltdown in Japan.” The People’s Voice. <http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/03/13/nuclear-meltdown-in-japan>)

Reuters said the 1995 Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly ever natural disaster. This time, from quake and tsunami damage alone, that figure will be dwarfed. Moreover, under a worst case core meltdown, all bets are off as the entire region and beyond will be threatened with permanent contamination, making the most affected areas unsafe to live in. On March 12, Stratfor Global Intelligence issued a "Red Alert: Nuclear Meltdown at Quake-Damaged Japanese Plant," saying: Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already may have happened - the ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s long as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to contain high levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains intact, the melted fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility built around (it) remains intact, the melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster killed nearly one million people worldwide from nuclear radiation exposure. In their book titled, "Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment," Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko said: "For the past 23 years, it has been clear that there is a danger greater than nuclear weapons concealed within nuclear power. Emissions from this one reactor exceeded a hundred-fold the radioactive contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." "No citizen of any country can be assured that he or she can be protected from radioactive contamination. One nuclear reactor can pollute half the globe.Chernobyl fallout covers the entire Northern Hemisphere." Stratfor explained that if Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly likely that the melting fuel will burn through (its) containment system and enter the ground. This has never happened before," at least not reported. If now occurring, "containment goes from being merely dangerous, time consuming and expensive to nearly impossible," making the quake, aftershocks, and tsunamis seem mild by comparison. Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized. Japanese officials said Fukushima's reactor container wasn't breached. Stratfor and others said it was, making the potential calamity far worse than reported. Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said the explosion at Fukushima's Saiichi No. 1 facility could only have been caused by a core meltdown. In fact, 3 or more reactors are affected or at risk. Events are fluid and developing, but remain very serious. The possibility of an extreme catastrophe can't be discounted. Moreover, independent nuclear safety analyst John Large told Al Jazeera that by venting radioactive steam from the inner reactor to the outer dome, a reaction may have occurred, causing the explosion. "When I look at the size of the explosion," he said, "it is my opinion that there could be a very large leak (because) fuel continues to generate heat." Already, Fukushima way exceeds Three Mile Island that experienced a partial core meltdown in Unit 2. Finally it was brought under control, but coverup and denial concealed full details until much later. According to anti-nuclear activist Harvey Wasserman, Japan's quake fallout may cause nuclear disaster, saying: "This is a very serious situation. If the cooling system fails (apparently it has at two or more plants), the super-heated radioactive fuel rods will melt, and (if so) you could conceivably have an explosion," that, in fact, occurred. As a result, massive radiation releases may follow, impacting the entire region. "It could be, literally, an apocalyptic event.

#### -- Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Miller 00 (Morris, Economist, Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Administration – University of Ottawa, Former Executive Director and Senior Economist – World Bank, “Poverty as a Cause of Wars?”, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Winter, p. 273)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that  
exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore **no relationship** to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### -- History proves

Ferguson 6 (Niall, Professor of History – Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, 85(5), September / October, Lexis)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

#### Electricity demand is rising – only nuclear power can meet energy needs

**Fertel, 12** – President and CEO of the Nuclear Energy Institute (Marvin, 2/13. “Licensing Sounds Clarion Call to World.” <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/02/is-america-poised-for-nuclear.php?print=true&printcomment=2161670>)

Still, the long-term fundamentals that will drive the need for new low-carbon energy sources point to expanding nuclear energy. The electric industry is on course to shut down 10 to 20 percent of its coal-fired electric generating capacity. There is value in fuel and technology diversity and, with the expansion of intermittent electric sources, the increasing value that nuclear plants provide to grid stability. The bottom line is that at one percent annual growth in electricity demand – below historical trends – the Energy Information Administration forecasts a need for 220 gigawatts of new electric capacity by 2035. Keep in mind: U.S. electricity demand has grown nearly 25 percent since the last nuclear power plant began operating in Tennessee in 1996. It has risen more than 80 percent since the Nuclear Regulatory Commission last approved a construction permit for a new nuclear energy facility in 1979. A big part of the reason that the nation has been able to meet this rising demand is because electricity production from existing nuclear energy facilities – wrongly portrayed § Marked 15:43 § as “stagnant” – has jumped 40 percent over the past two decades. Nuclear energy supplies 20 percent of the nation’s electricity, even though 104 reactors constitute only 10 percent of the installed electric generating capacity. Our industry is committed to maintaining safe operations and is unique among nuclear operators around the world in the extent to which we’ve planned for extreme events. After 9/11, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and industry assumed a scenario where the plant suffered a large fire or explosion that disabled vital equipment. We purchased portable equipment like generators and pumps for that contingency. The major lesson learned from Japan is that we must be prepared to handle natural catastrophic events simultaneously at multiple reactors. We must also assume access around the site could be a challenge. As with 9/11, the industry and independent regulators at the NRC are taking steps to enhance safety and preparedness. The industry has proposed to the NRC a “FLEX” approach for diverse and flexible coping capability. It involves using additional portable equipment and backup systems – and pre-staging some of this equipment and supplies offsite – to ensure that we can provide an uninterrupted supply of electricity and cooling water to protect critical plant systems at all times. All of this activity, ultimately, will further benefit consumers who depend on affordable electricity from nuclear energy facilities that have proven to be a prudent investment in our nation’s economic and environmental advances. As we embark on the transition to a low-carbon electricity sector that drives the resurgence in America’s economy and growing electrification of the transportation sector, nuclear energy must continue to be a primary provider of 24/7, reliable power.

#### Electricity price spikes are inevitable and crush the economy

**Farrell 7** –President and CEO, Dominion Power (Thomas, 2/19. “Averting a Potential Capital Crisis in the Power Sector”, http://nei.org/newsandevents/speechesandtestimony/2007/narucroundtableextended)

But the word “felicitous” really is appropriate in the present instance. Last fall, I gave a speech in which I described the potential for an “energy train wreck” looming ahead for our country if we do not grapple with some serious challenges. I cited four key issues: First, a growing imbalance between energy supplies and consumer demands. Second, our congested and inadequate energy transportation network. Third, rising environmental costs and uncertainties. And, fourth, the nation’s aging fleet of electric generating stations. Today, I want to expand on that theme. Unfortunately, all of those challenges are still there. If we do not rise to meet these challenges—and do it soon—our country’s economy could derail. § Marked 15:43 § No 21st-century economy can move forward unless it is running along a strong, dynamic and reliable energy infrastructure. When the power stops flowing, both the knowledge economy and the information superhighway shut down. This means that those of us in the electric industry have quite a bit of “track” to lay in the next few decades in the form of new transmission lines. We also have many “engines” to build in terms of new power stations. And we need to determine how to make those engines run cleaner and more efficiently to meet ever-tightening environmental requirements. Most of all, the people in this room—that includes regulators, staff members and industry representatives—will have to work together wisely and innovatively to ensure the capital resources are there to get the job done. I am confident we can do it. We have done it before. But if we do not work together, the challenges may not be met. And then, I am afraid, the energy train wreck could be inevitable. So just how big is the problem? Let me try to quantify it. Nationally, projected demand for energy is expected to jump about 50 percent over the next 25 years. That means our nation will need 245 gigawatts of new electric generating capacity by 2030, according to the Energy Information Administration. A gigawatt is, of course, a thousand megawatts, or enough to power almost 800,000 homes. In the Dominion service area in Virginia, we expect to see demand increase by 4,000 megawatts over just the next 10 years. Conservation and demand-side management programs must and will be a part of this equation, both nationally and in Virginia. But there has been no indication so far that even the best such policies will be able to put much of a dent in the nation’s growing appetite for electricity. Add it all up nationwide, translate it into dollars, and the industry estimates that it could cost more than $275 billion in new generation to meet this growth. Additional tens of billions will be required for transmission and distribution—big wires, small wires, transformers, cross arms, poles—you name it. And there is more: environmentally, the emissions limits continue to tighten. The industry projects about $50 billion in compliance costs for nitrous oxides, sulfur dioxide and mercury from now through 2025. We should expect federal regulation of greenhouse gases in the not-too-distant future, a view reinforced by policy statements from the leadership of both major political parties. Controlling carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels will be very expensive. The bottom-line impact on power generation in the United States for carbon limitations may range anywhere from $70 billion to $300 billion. Now total up all of those dollars—new generation, improvements to transmission and distribution, emissions controls, and now carbon—and the number is staggering. Total investment required by our nation’s electric industry could be somewhere between $400 billion and $650 billion over the next 25 years. Cambridge Energy Research Associates last week issued its own estimate for capital expenditure requirements for the power industry across all of North America. It is just as daunting, maybe more so. CERA estimates that the capital expenditure spending in the U.S., Canada, Mexico and elsewhere on the continent could top $800 billion in just the next 15 years. Let me put our own nation’s predicament in perspective another way: The market capitalization of all of the investor-owned electric utilities in the United States is about $550 billion, give or take a few billion. That is the total value investors place on the shares of all of the publicly owned electric utility companies—and this number includes some like Dominion that have natural gas distribution companies, oil and gas exploration and production units, and other assets. So the investment that electric utilities will need to make over the next 25 years is about equal to their entire worth on the stock market in 2007, maybe substantially more. That is an astounding challenge. If we are given the tools, I am convinced we can get the job done. Our industry has always been good at designing, engineering and constructing the infrastructure to meet the needs of our customers. But we have to get the money to buy the tools so we can lay the track and build the locomotives. What we are facing—potentially—is a crisis in capital. As I said, it will take a huge investment to meet the energy needs of our country—$400 billion to $650 billion. Some of it will be debt; some of it will be equity. Yes, the spending will be strung out over 25 years, but it is still a substantial sum of money—even for a country the size of the United States. Remember, too, that we will not be alone in looking to the capital markets for new funding. Electric utilities compete every day with airlines and computer makers and home builders and every other sort of business to get investors and lenders to look our way. At the end of the day, investors and lenders want only the best risk-based return for their dollars. They cut us no slack just because we provide a basic public necessity.

#### Policies don’t matter - party identification outweighs

Edwards et al 2004, (George C. Edwards, professor at Texas A&M University, Martin P. Wattenberg, professor at University of California Irvine, Robert L. Lineberry, professor at University of Houston, Government in America: People, Politics, and Policy, 11th edition, pg.312-313, ch.10, NI (yes I cut this from a book))

Party identifications are crucial for many voters because they provide a regular prospective through which voters can view the political world. “Presumably” say Niemi and Weisberg, “people choose to identify with a party with which they generally agree…. As a result they need not concern themselves with every issue that comes along, but can generally rely on their party identification to guide them.” Parties tend to rely on groups that lean heavily in their favor to form their basic coalition. Even before an election campaign begins, Republicans usually assume they will not receive much support from African Americans, Jews, and Hispanic Americans. Democrats have an uphill struggle attracting groups that are staunchly Republican in their leanings, such as conservative evangelical Christians or upper-income voters.

#### More than half the country support nuclear expansion – its key to job growth

Whitman 8-13 [Christine Todd Whitman CASEnergy Co-Chair, Former EPA Administrator and New Jersey Governor, “Nuclear Power Garners Bipartisan Support”, August 13th, 2012, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php>, Chetan]

The energy policy that I’ve seen garner consistent support from the left and the right over the years is also one with which I’m deeply familiar. This policy involves building a diverse portfolio of low-carbon energy sources, featuring a renewed investment in nuclear energy. And it’s not just policymakers from both sides of the aisle who support nuclear energy – it’s everyday energy consumers as well. According to a Gallup poll conducted in March of this year, nearly 60 percent of Americans support the use of nuclear energy to meet our nation’s electricity needs, and a majority support expanding America’s use of nuclear power. Next-generation nuclear energy projects are underway in Georgia, South Carolina and Tennessee, thanks in part to steady popular support, as well as support from President Obama, bipartisan congressional leaders and other policymakers at the federal and state levels. An additional 10 combined construction and operating licenses for 16 plants are under review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This support is founded in the fact that nuclear energy, safely managed, provides an efficient, reliable source of energy. In fact, nuclear power is the only baseload source of carbon-free electricity. It provides nearly two-thirds of the nation’s low-carbon electricity, and will continue to be an important source of energy well into the future given the advent of innovative large and small reactor designs. The use of nuclear energy prevents more than 613 million metric tons of carbon dioxide every year – as much CO2 as is emitted by every passenger car in America. Bipartisan support for nuclear energy also stems from the boost that it provides to local job markets and to local and state economies. As nuclear energy expands and as more than half of the industry workforce approaches retirement, the industry offers growing opportunities for well-paying careers. The industry already supports more than 100,000 jobs, and the combination of retirements and the construction of new facilities could create as many as 25,000 new jobs in the near term. What’s more, the construction of a nuclear facility spurs the creation of other local jobs in industries ranging from manufacturing to hospitality. The industry generates between $40 and $50 billion in revenue and electricity sales, or some $470 million in total economic output and $40 million in labor wages at each U.S. facility every year. That’s a powerful economic engine and a positive impact that leaders are embracing. As America refocuses on cleaner energy policies that help boost our economy, nuclear power is becoming a clear and critical part of a secure, sustainable energy portfolio. We need electricity and we want clean air; with nuclear energy we can have both. It’s a source of power that leaders on both sides of the aisle can support.

#### Plan creates jobs – that’s key to swing states

USA Today 12 (Gregory Korte, 4/27. “Politics stands in the way of nuclear plant's future,” <http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/story/2012-04-13/usec-centrifuges-loan-guarantees/54560118/1>)

**The stakes are high: It's an election year, and Ohio is a swing state**. USEC estimates **the project** at its peak **will generate 3,158 jobs in Ohio, and 4,284 elsewhere.** Pike County, home to the centrifuges, has a 13% unemployment rate — the highest in Ohio. The median household income is about $40,000. The average job at USEC pays $77,316. Centrifuge parts are stacked up in Piketon. "It's as shovel-ready as they come," says spokeswoman Angela Duduit. Indeed, **the project has enjoyed bipartisan support.** A USA TODAY review of DOE records shows that no fewer than **46 members of Congress** — 32 Republicans and 14 Democrats — **have pressured the Obama administration to approve the loan guarantee for USEC**. "Quick action is paramount," said one bipartisan letter. "It is imperative that this application move forward now," said another. The congressional **support comes from states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia, Missouri, Alabama, Indiana, Maryland, North Carolina and South Carolina**— an almost exact overlay of the states that would benefit from the 7,442 jobs the company says would be created.

#### Americans like nuclear – believe the benefits outweigh the risks

**NYT, 11** (Michael Cooper and Dalia Sussman, The New York Times. “Nuclear Power Loses Support in New Poll.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/us/23poll.html?\_r=1)

The **new poll found that** nearly **7 in 10 Americans think that nuclear power plants in the United States are** generally **safe**. But nearly two-thirds of those polled said they were concerned that a major nuclear accident might occur in this country — including 3 in 10 who said they were “very concerned” by such a possibility. Fifty-eight percent of those polled said they did not think the federal government was adequately prepared to deal with a major nuclear accident. Still, **47 percent of those polled said that, over all, the benefits of nuclear power outweighed the risks**; 38 percent said they did not. The nationwide telephone poll was conducted March 18-21 among 1,022 adults, and it has a margin of sampling error of plus or minus three percentage points

#### SMRs address the only public concern about nuke power

Worthington 11 [David Worthington – Contributing Editor to SmartPlanet, “Small nuclear reactors: America’s energy future?” December 18th, 2011, <http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/intelligent-energy/small-nuclear-reactors-americas-energy-future/11412>, Chetan]

Small Modular Reactor (SMR) concepts could help make future nuclear power plants in the United States safer and easier to construct while helping to recycle stockpiles of existing uranium fuel waste. The general idea behind SMRs is to cluster together many small reactors to match the output of obsolete coal or nuclear facilities. Steam output from many modules would power a common generator to produce electricity. Each module would be equipped with its own containment assembly that’s housed in a pre-fabricated unit. Think of it as a nuclear assembly line. A module would be small enough to be shipped to a new reactor build by rail or truck rather than assembly components inside of a containment dome onsite. All-in-one fabrication would streamline nuclear power plant construction by several years, said Steve Rus, executive director for nuclear technologies at Black & Veatch. SMRs would be housed in a steel and concrete embedment that resides below grade. B&V has had a sizeable nuclear business since World War II. Small modular reactor designs are also supported by the Obama administration, which sees nuclear power as a way to reduce carbon emissions. However, the public is understandably warier of nuclear power post Fukushima, and would need some reassurances of its safety. The SMR addresses the greatest perceived danger - nuclear meltdowns – a threat that has loomed since the dawn of the nuclear era. It doesn’t require active cooling systems to prevent a meltdown, and would theoretically shut down safely without any outside intervention. Traditional active cooling systems at large scale reactors utilize water pumps and back-up power systems to control residual or decay heat after a reaction is stopped. An external power source and/or coolant are eventually necessary within a matter of days. Recent third generation+ reactor designs incorporate passive cooling technologies with traditional active cooling techniques, but that approach only buys more time until there’s meltdown conditions. Several reactors at Tokyo Electric Power’s Fukushima plants melted down when diesel back-up systems failed and mainland power lines were destroyed in the wake of twin natural disasters. It was reliant on active cooling, and its engineers hadn’t envisioned a tsunami striking far inland. A module reactor’s passive cooling system could theoretically survive that scenario, and non-water cooling systems could further increase margins of safety. “The concept is these could go on almost indefinite periods in passive manner with no intervention relative to the cooling of core and decay/residual heat. Potentially, it could never require any additional intervention,” Rus said. The initial SMRs will continue to utilize water for cooling and uranium fuel, but sodium and lead bismuth alloys could foreseeably replace water in fourth generation models – provided they pass Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review, Russ said. The NRC’s regulators are very familiar with light water reactors, but alternative fuel sources would require different cooling methods, Rus said. Thorium is arguably safer than uranium both in the risk of accidents and for nuclear nonproliferation. “The coolant form is different than water, therefore there’s natural benefits in the way it cools reactor,” Rus explained. A sodium coolant would be liquid under normal operating conditions, but solidify and encase the reactor upon a cold shutdown. Molten salt is also a potential future fuel source. Aside from the NRC’s institutional history, uranium’s other advantage is that there’s also an abundance of fuel in the form of nuclear waste that is being sequestered at nuclear facilities around the United States. Spent fuel rods could become a source of energy for newer generation reactors, Rus suggested. “More than 90 percent of the energy is still in that fuel. One thing that has to come to life is recycling. After reprocessing, waste is significantly less, and then there ultimately needs to be a way to address that waste.”

#### Nuclear power has massive support --- multiple key regions.

Nuclear Energy Institute, 2/23/**2012** (Majority U.S. Public Support for Nuclear Energy Has Stabilized, New Survey Shows, p. <http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/majority-us-public-support-for-nuclear-energy-has-stabilized-new-survey-shows/>)

Nearly a year later, 74 percent of Americans believe that “nuclear power plants operating in the United States” are safe and secure. Eighty-two percent of Americans believe that lessons learned from the Fukushima accident should be applied to existing operations and that the United States should continue to develop nuclear energy plants to meet growing electricity demand. “Attitudes toward nuclear energy stand at approximately the level seen in a large number of the surveys in the past decade, but a bit below a pre-Fukushima peak,” said Ann Bisconti, president of Bisconti Research. “The weight of public opinion toward nuclear energy and the building of new nuclear power plants continues to be favorable.” The new survey shows that two-thirds (65 percent) of Americans would find a new reactor operating at the site of the nearest nuclear energy facility acceptable. This support was **highest in the Midwest and Southeast**—69 percent and 68 percent respectively. But solid majorities also hold that view in the West and Northeast—61 percent each.

## 2ac v Kentucky GR

### GW

### A2: Long TF To Commercialization

#### This doesn’t assume incentives which spur rapid commercialization and accelerate solvency – that’s Rosner and Goldberg

### A2: Can’t Solve Developing Country Emissions

#### Plan gets modeled and spills over to developing countries – that’s Solan crossapply Lovering from the leadership advantage – and US alone solves carbon targets that’s Harvey

#### Warming causes diseases that risk extinction

Zimmerman 96 (Barry and David, M.S. – Long Island University, Killer Germs, p. 132)

Then came AIDS…and Ebola and Lassa fever and Marburg and dengue fever. They came, for the most part, from the steamy jungles of the world. Lush tropical rain forests are ablaze with deadly viruses. And changing lifestyles as well as changing environmental conditions are flushing them out. Air travel, deforestation, global warming are forcing never-before-encountered viruses to suddenly cross the path of humanity. The result—emerging viruses. Today some five thousand vials of exotic viruses sit, freeze-dried, at Yale University—imports from the rain forests. They await the outbreak of diseases that can be ascribed to them. Many are carried by insects and are termed arboviruses (arthropod borne). Others, of even greater concern, are airborne and can simply be breathed in. Some, no doubt, could threaten humanity’s very existence. Joshua Lederberg, 1958 winner of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine and foremost authority on emerging viruses, warned in a December 1990 article in Discover magazine: “It is still not comprehended widely that AIDS is a natural, almost predictable phenomenon. It is not going to be a unique event. Pandemics are not acts of God, but are built into the ecological relations between viruses, animal species and human species…There will be more surprises, because our fertile imagination does not begin to match all the tricks that nature can play…” According to Lederberg, “The survival of humanity is not preordained…The single biggest threat to [hu]man’s continued dominance on the planet is the virus” (A Dancing Matrix, by Robin Marantz Hening).

#### Warming causes the Earth to explode, killing everyone

Chalko 4 (Dr. Tom J., MS, Engineering & PhD, Laser Holography, “No Second Chance? Can the Earth Explode As a Result of Global Warming?”, NU Journal of Discovery, 10-30, http://nujournal.net/core.pdf)

Abstract: The heat generated inside our planet is predominantly of radionic (nuclear) origin. Hence, Earth in its entirety can be considered a slow nuclear reactor with its solid ”inner core” providing a major contribution to the total energy output. Since radionic heat is generated in the entire volume and cooling can only occur at the surface, the highest temperature inside Earth occurs at the center of the inner core. Overheating the center of the inner core reactor due to the so-called greenhouse effect on the surface of Earth may cause a meltdown condition, an enrichment of nuclear fuel and a gigantic atomic explosion. Summary: Consequences of global warming are far more serious than previously imagined. The REAL danger for our entire civilization comes not from slow climate changes, but from overheating of the planetary interior. Life on Earth is possible only because of the efficient cooling of the planetary interior - a process that is limited primarily by the atmosphere. This cooling is responsible for a thermal balance between the heat from the core reactor, the heat from the Sun and the radiation of heat into space, so that the average temperature on Earth’s surface is about 13 degrees Celsius. This article examines the possibility of overheating and the ”meltdown” of the solid planetary core due to the atmospheric pollution trapping progressively more solar heat (the so-called greenhouse effect) and reducing the cooling rate of the planetary interior. The most serious consequence of such a ”meltdown” could be centrifugal segregation of unstable isotopes in the molten part of the spinning planetary core. Such segregation can ”enrich” the nuclear fuel in the core to the point of creating conditions for a chain reaction and a gigantic atomic explosion. Will Earth become another ”asteroid belt” in the Solar system?

### Prolif

### A2: Proliferators Not Aggressive

#### We don’t have to win aggression – our Horowitz 9 evidence indicates that weapons created for economic stability will be used to keep declining governments in power if the economy starts to decline – that’s the lashout scenario

#### And miscalc means conventional weapons could cause a second strike – intent doesn’t matter that’s Cimbala 8

#### Nuclear optimists’ logic is flawed – you shouldn’t take the chance on the end of the species

**Krieger, 9**  (David, Pres. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Councilor – World Future Council, “Still Loving the Bomb After All These Years”, 9-4, <https://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/09/04_krieger_newsweek_response.php?krieger>)

Jonathan Tepperman’s article in the September 7, 2009 issue of Newsweek, “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,” provides a novel but frivolous argument that nuclear weapons “may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous….” Rather, in Tepperman’s world, “The bomb may actually make us safer.” Tepperman shares this world with Kenneth Waltz, a University of California professor emeritus of political science, who Tepperman describes as “the leading ‘nuclear optimist.’” Waltz expresses his optimism in this way: “We’ve now had 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It’s striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states.” Actually, there were a number of proxy wars between nuclear weapons states, such as those in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan, and some near disasters, the most notable being the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Waltz’s logic is akin to observing a man falling from a high rise building, and noting that he had already fallen for 64 floors without anything bad happening to him, and concluding that so far it looked so good that others should try it. Dangerous logic! Tepperman builds upon Waltz’s logic, and concludes “that all states are rational,” even though their leaders may have a lot of bad qualities, including being “stupid, petty, venal, even evil….” He asks us to trust that rationality will always prevail when there is a risk of nuclear retaliation, because these weapons make “the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable.” Actually, he is asking us to do more than trust in the rationality of leaders; he is asking us to gamble the future on this proposition. “The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling,” Tepperman argues, “it’s led to what’s known as the nuclear peace….” But if this is a peace worthy of the name, which it isn’t, it certainly is not one on which to risk the future of civilization. One irrational leader with control over a nuclear arsenal could start a nuclear conflagration, resulting in a global Hiroshima. Tepperman celebrates “the iron logic of deterrence,” but deterrence is a theory that is far from rooted in “iron logic.” It is a theory based upon threats that must be effectively communicated and believed. Leaders of Country A with nuclear weapons must communicate to other countries (B, C, etc.) the conditions under which A will retaliate with nuclear weapons. The leaders of the other countries must understand and believe the threat from Country A will, in fact, be carried out. The longer that nuclear weapons are not used, the more other countries may come to believe that they can challenge Country A with impunity from nuclear retaliation. The more that Country A bullies other countries, the greater the incentive for these countries to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Deterrence is unstable and therefore precarious. Most of the countries in the world reject the argument, made most prominently by Kenneth Waltz, that the spread of nuclear weapons makes the world safer. These countries joined together in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but they never agreed to maintain indefinitely a system of nuclear apartheid in which some states possess nuclear weapons and others are prohibited from doing so. The principal bargain of the NPT requires the five NPT nuclear weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France and China) to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament, and the International Court of Justice interpreted this to mean complete nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. Tepperman seems to be arguing that seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is bad policy, and that nuclear weapons, because of their threat, make efforts at non-proliferation unnecessary and even unwise. If some additional states, including Iran, developed nuclear arsenals, he concludes that wouldn’t be so bad “given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.” Those who oppose Tepperman’s favorable disposition toward the bomb, he refers to as “nuclear pessimists.” These would be the people, and I would certainly be one of them, who see nuclear weapons as presenting an urgent danger to our security, our species and our future. Tepperman finds that when viewed from his “nuclear optimist” perspective, “nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening.” “Nuclear peace,” he tells us, “rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad – conventional war – won’t happen.” But the “extremely bad” thing he asks us to accept is the end of the human species. Yes, that would be serious. He also doesn’t make the case that in a world without nuclear weapons, the prospects of conventional war would increase dramatically. After all, it is only an unproven supposition that nuclear weapons have prevented wars, or would do so in the future. We have certainly come far too close to the precipice of catastrophic nuclear war. As an ultimate celebration of the faulty logic of deterrence, Tepperman calls for providing any nuclear weapons state with a “survivable second strike option.” Thus, he not only favors nuclear weapons, but finds the security of these weapons to trump human security. Presumably he would have President Obama providing new and secure nuclear weapons to North Korea, Pakistan and any other nuclear weapons states that come along so that they will feel secure enough not to use their weapons in a first-strike attack. Do we really want to bet the human future that Kim Jong-Il and his successors are more rational than Mr. Tepperman?

### A2: Waste

#### SMR’s solve the waste problem

**Biello, 12** – associate editor for environment and energy at Scientific American (David, 3/27. “Small Reactors Make a Bid to Revive Nuclear Power.” Scientific American. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=small-reactors-bid-to-revive-nuclear-power)

Small modular reactors may help with two of the biggest challenges facing the nuclear industry: the growing stores of waste from existing reactors and residue from the mass production of nuclear weapons as well as the overall safety of [nuclear power](http://www.scientificamerican.com/topic.cfm?id=nuclear-power). GE's PRISM fast reactor, General Atomic's helium-cooled fast reactor, or Hyperion Power's liquid lead-bismuth cooled reactor could all turn waste into fuel. Hyperion hopes to [demonstrate its reactor](http://www.srs.gov/general/news/top_news/side0.htm), capable of generating 25 megawatts of electricity, at the Savannah River National Laboratory in South Carolina. The site has also signed memorandums of understanding to host prototypes of the NuScale and Holtech reactors. Such nuclear batteries could in principle be sealed, placed in the ground, and run for a decade before being swapped out for an entirely new modular reactor. And if manufactured in a factory, they could also be cheap. "There is no inherent reason why [nuclear power](http://www.scientificamerican.com/topic.cfm?id=nuclear-power) needs to be expensive," Bill Gates, who has invested in the [novel reactor proposed by TerraPower](http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=are-new-types-of-reactors-needed-for-nuclear-renaissance), told the ARPA–e summit on February 28, noting that nuclear's relative expense largely derives from building in safety features.

### A2: Alt Cause: CTBT

#### CTBT is not an alt cause – the aff is specific to fuel innovation in the energy sector – decline in weapons leadership won’t affect the aff – this is probably just a reason that other countries proliferating is bad

#### Won’t Pass – GOP key

**Schneidmiller**, 3/30/**2012** (Chris – editor of Global Security Newswire, U.S. Can Maintain Nuclear Arsenal Without Testing: Expert Report, Global Security Newswire, p. http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-can-maintain-nuclear-arsenal-without-testing-expert-report/)

In a brief statement to Global Security Newswire, the White House noted the release of the report but provided no updates on its plans to formally pursue CTBT ratification on Capitol Hill. Administration officials have said they are first conducting an informational program aimed at strengthening understanding of the issue among lawmakers and the public. Observers have said they do not expect any sort of push for Senate approval before presidential and congressional elections in November. Action after that, though, is likely to require Obama’s re-election and support from some GOP members, as 67 affirmative votes are necessary to secure ratification. Thirteen Republican senators backed Obama’s first major arms control measure, the U.S.-Russian New START nuclear treaty. However, some GOP lawmakers have in recent months expressed deep skepticism about the president’s commitment to sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent, and leaders in the chamber have shown no signs of favoring the test ban (see GSN, March 9 and July 18, 2011).

### Off

### Consumption K

#### Case outweighs – the risk of nuclear war will create power systems which push governments to action and warming and resource wars prevent the ability to focus on depoliticizing – life is a pre-req to the k

#### Perm – do both

#### Case turns the k - nuclear tech is inevitable – other countries view consumption as key – the plan sends a global signal to other countries to use environment-friendly tech.

#### The alternative is a goal - not a mechanism to create that goal – their repoliticization never moves beyond the seminar room

Jones 99 (Richard Wyn, Lecturer in the Department of International Politics – University of Wales, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, CIAO, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html)

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond **grandiose statements of intent**. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the **mechanisms** by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a **fatally flawed** enterprise.

#### The alt doesn’t solve their impact “hyperindustrialization” or it causes dedev -

#### Collapse is worse for every impact – try or die flips aff

**Monbiot 9** (George, Columnist – The Guardian, held visiting fellowships or professorships at the universities of Oxford (environmental policy), Bristol (philosophy), Keele (politics), Oxford Brookes (planning), and East London (environmental science), “Is There Any Point in Fighting to Stave Off Industrial Apocalypse?,” Guardian, 8-17, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change)

The interesting question, and the one that probably divides us, is this: to what extent should we welcome the likely collapse of industrial civilisation? Or more precisely: to what extent do we believe that some good may come of it? I detect in your writings, and in the conversations we have had, an attraction towards – almost a yearning for – this apocalypse, a sense that you see it as a cleansing fire that will rid the world of a diseased society. If this is your view, I do not share it. I'm sure we can agree that the immediate consequences of collapse would be hideous: the breakdown of the systems that keep most of us alive; mass starvation; war. These alone surely give us sufficient reason to fight on, however faint our chances appear. But even if we were somehow able to put this out of our minds, I believe that what is likely to come out on the other side will be worse than our current settlement. Here are three observations: 1 Our species (unlike most of its members) is tough and resilient; 2 When civilisations collapse, psychopaths take over; 3 We seldom learn from others' mistakes. From the first observation, this follows: even if you are hardened to the fate of humans, you can surely see that our species will not become extinct without causing the extinction of almost all others. However hard we fall, we will recover sufficiently to land another hammer blow on the biosphere. We will continue to do so until there is so little left that even Homo sapiens can no longer survive. This is the ecological destiny of a species possessed of outstanding intelligence, opposable thumbs and an ability to interpret and exploit almost every possible resource – in the absence of political restraint. From the second and third observations, this follows: instead of gathering as free collectives of happy householders, survivors of this collapse will be subject to the will of people seeking to monopolise remaining resources. This will is likely to be imposed through violence. Political accountability will be a distant memory. The chances of conserving any resource in these circumstances are approximately zero. The human and ecological consequences of the first global collapse are likely to persist for many generations, perhaps for our species' remaining time on earth. To imagine that good could come of the involuntary failure of industrial civilisation is also to succumb to denial. The answer to your question – what will we learn from this collapse? – is nothing. This is why, despite everything, I fight on. I am not fighting to sustain economic growth. I am fighting to prevent both initial collapse and the repeated catastrophe that follows. However faint the hopes of engineering a soft landing – an ordered and structured downsizing of the global economy – might be, we must keep this possibility alive. Perhaps we are both in denial: I, because I think the fight is still worth having; you, because you think it isn't.

#### Growth is sustainable and solves resource depletion

**Emerson 10** (Patrick, Associate Professor of Economics – Oregon State University, “Economic Growth: The Planet's Poor Need Sustainable Expansion,” Oregon Live, 8-7, http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2010/08/economic\_growth\_the\_planets\_po.html)

Does economic growth represent the biggest threat to the planet, or its salvation? In a recent op-ed ("The fallacy of growth in a finite world," Aug. 1), Jack Hart argues that the goal of economic growth is antithetical to a sustainable world. Hart's views reveal a wealthy-country bias about what growth means and fail to appreciate the perspective of poor countries. His characterization of growth is also inaccurate and perpetuates a common misconception about economic growth -- that it necessarily means resource depletion. Finally, his anti-growth agenda would leave the world more imperiled: Economic growth represents the world's best hope to meet the challenges of the future. What does growth mean for the stark realities of life in a low-income society? High-income countries enjoy an average life expectancy of almost 80 years, while in low-income countries it's just 53 years. In developing countries an estimated 900 million people do not have enough food, 1 billion people have no access to safe drinking water, 2.4 billion people have inadequate sanitation and 10,000 children die every day from diseases caused by contaminated water. The infant mortality rate in high-income countries is 7 per 1,000, compared with 114 in low-income countries. These sobering facts of poverty result from a lack of growth. What economic growth has brought to those of us fortunate to live in a wealthy country is not just big TVs and fancy cars, but a safe, secure and long life for ourselves and our children. These statistics are real measures of despair for most of the world's population. The myth of the happy peasant is an arrogant conceit of the wealthy that has existed for centuries to justify income inequality, and it is no truer today than it was in feudal times. Hart argues that the growth of the 19th and 20th centuries has come largely through the depletion and degradation of the earth's natural resources. Growth does not mean resource depletion, however; this is but one way to accomplish growth. Becoming more efficient -- in other words, conserving our resources -- is another. Anything that provides value produces growth. A better, more energy-efficient light bulb, a time-saving personal computer and a better electric car are all ways through which growth can be achieved. Poverty and population growth are highly correlated because poor families in developing countries need children to provide the social safety net that their governments do not. Societies that have experienced economic growth, however, have seen population growth rates decline precipitously. And more people doesn't necessarily represent a problem; it represents a challenge, an incentive and a resource. More people means an increased emphasis on finding more efficient ways to live; it means more potential talent -- brainpower and creativity -- to help solve the very problems we face. Not only does growth not mean resource depletion, but creating more efficient technologies is necessarily growth-enhancing. This is why growth represents the hope of the future, not the challenge to it. Much of the recent growth in developed countries has been achieved not through resource depletion but through the microcomputer and information technology revolution, through designing more efficient buildings and machines, and through substantial improvements in transportation efficiency. This is what will typify 21st century growth: doing more with less. High-income countries, led by the United States, do use the lion's share of the world's energy. But the U.S. produces a lot more value per unit of energy than does China. And high-income countries are making the biggest investment in renewable-energy technology, because our wealth causes us to place increased value on the environment.

#### Growth is key to solve warming – Kuznets curve prove

**Orubu 11** (Dr. Christopher, Professor of Economics – Delta State University, “Environmental Quality and Economic Growth: Searching for Environmental Kuznets Curves for Air and Water Pollutants in Africa,” Energy Policy, 39(7), July, 4178–4188, ScienceDirect)

The EKC hypothesis places the relationship between environmental quality and economic growth within the framework of the development continuum. Specifically, observed historical facts suggest that economic growth, taking place at the intermediate stage does increase pollution, hence deterioration in environmental quality. However, the capacity to offset this relationship tends to increase in later stages of the growth process. [Grossman and Krueger, 1991] and [Grossman and Krueger., 1995] argue that during the initial stage of the developmental process, when the typical economy is dominated by agriculture and allied activities, pollution intensity will be generally low. But as the economy moves into heavy industry, pollution will tend to increase. Furthermore, as the economy shifts into high technology and services, pollution intensity will tend to fall. What is implied in this observation is that pollution intensity is likely to be increasing in countries at the lowest rung of the development ladder, up to the intermediate stage, before possibly declining after reaching a threshold point. A number of factors are commonly advanced as the proximate determinants of the EKC relationship (Copeland and Taylor, 2004). The most important explanations relate to the scale, composition, and technology effects. The scale effect arises from the fact that increasing the output of the economy requires the use of more inputs in the form of material and natural resources. At the same time, more output implies more wastes and emissions as by-products, which contribute to environmental degradation. Economic growth, which necessarily involves expanding the scale of production therefore, has the potential of adversely affecting the quality of the environment. Scale is ultimately determined by the total amount of material inputs into the process of producing goods and services as well as the volume of output that is consumed and fed into the environment by way of pollution and waste. Essentially, the scale effect encapsulates two types of environmental pressure – one arising from increased use of resources, which has a depletion effect – and the other from increased associated waste, with a pollution effect. It is equally true that the scale effect works to reduce environmental degradation or pollution at higher levels, as certain pollution control measures may not be practicable at small scales of production. More specifically, at higher levels of output (hence income), it becomes relatively cheaper to reduce pollution, and producers are more easily able and willing to adopt pollution-reducing measures and technologies. The composition effect has to do with the proportion of each type of productive activity in the volume of the economy's output. As noted by Stagl (1999), the common trajectory of development has been that societies progress from subsistence agriculture, which is less polluting, to more material and energy-intensive modes of agricultural production, agro-processing and light manufacturing that are relatively more pollution-intense. Pollution intensity is highest as the economy moves into the stage of heavy industry, and finally declines as it shifts toward high technology, knowledge, and service-based industries. Within this compositional continuum, pollution per unit of output will tend to rise as the economy progresses on the development ladder, but eventually falls as structural changes take place over time. During the earlier stages of development; the composition effect tends to reinforce environmental pressures arising from increasing scale, while tending to counteract it at higher levels of development. It could therefore be argued that the composition effect works to reduce environmental degradation over time, by reducing the relative size of those sectors of the economy that produce large residuals, and by expanding those sectors that produce relatively less residuals per unit of output. The technological effect arises from the impact of improvements in the state of technology. Generally, improvements in processing technology reduces pollution indirectly by reducing the consumption of material inputs, while technological advancement makes it possible to adopt better pollution control techniques. Thus the technological effect works through productivity and emissions-related advantages. In these ways, it is possible for a naturally heavily polluting industry to record declining emissions even as output rises, provided the increase in output comes from factories using less polluting production processes. In principle, the technological effect works to improve environmental quality as economic growth progresses by reducing the residuals intensity of production through the invention and adoption of new technologies and standards, which leave smaller amounts of residuals per unit of output produced and through changes in input mixes that result from substituting less environmentally damaging inputs for more injurious types.

\*\*environmental Kuznets curve (EKC)

#### Decline cause miscalculation and conflict – prefer statistically significant evidence

**Royal 10** (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases**,** as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularlyduring periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate externalmilitary conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in theuse of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

#### Perm do plan and all parts that don’t consist of reject the aff

#### No prior questions

**Owen 02** David Owen, 2 Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not **undermine** the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may **provide the best account available to us.** In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the **most important** kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, **it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR.** Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous **grip on** the **action,** event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a **reductionist program’** in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the **preferred model** or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, **this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science** since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, **not to be prejudged** before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of **generality over** that of **empirical validity.** The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and **prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right**, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially **vicious circle arises.**

#### Repolitization does nothing to solve the alt or case

#### Framework – the aff has to prove the plan is better than the status quo or a competitive policy option. That’s best

#### A. Fairness – the aff commits nine minutes to the 1AC. Allowing the neg to moot that speech skews the debate in favor of the neg.

#### B. Predictability – there are an infinite amount of frameworks and alternatives that could be used outside of policymaking. It is impossible for the aff to be prepared for all of them. This results in debates to be won not on the quality of the argument but the unpredictability.

#### Perm do plan and alt in all other instances

#### Plan solves meltdowns

**Wheeler 10** – Workforce Planning Manager with Entergy; Producer “This Week in Nuclear” Podcast (John, 11/21 “Small Modular Reactors May Offer Significant Safety & Security Enhancements.” http://thisweekinnuclear.com/?p=1193)

They are smaller, so the amount of radioactivity contained in each reactor is less. So much less in fact, that even if the worst case reactor accident occurs, the amount of radioactive material released would not pose a risk to the public. In nuclear lingo we say SMRs have a smaller “source term.”  This source term is so small we can design the plant and emergency systems to virtually eliminate the need for emergency actions beyond the physical site boundaries.  Then, by controlling access to the site boundary, we can eliminate the need for off-site protective actions (like sheltering or evacuations). These smaller reactors contain less nuclear fuel.  This smaller amount of fuel (with passive cooling I’ll mention in a minute) slows down the progression of reactor accidents.  This slower progression gives operators more time to take action to keep the reactor cool.  Where operators in large reactors have minutes or hours to react to events, operators of SMRs may have hours or even days. This means the chance of a reactor damaging accident is very, very remote. Even better, most SMRs are small enough that they cannot over heat and melt down. They get all the cooling they need from air circulating around the reactor. This is a big deal because if SMRs can’t melt down, then they can’t release radioactive gas that would pose a risk to the public.  Again, this means the need for external emergency actions is virtually eliminated. Also, some SMRs are not water cooled; they use gas, liquid salt, or liquid metal coolants that operate at low pressures.  This lower operating pressure means that if radioactive gases build up inside the containment building there is less pressure to push the gas out and into the air.  If there is no pressure to push radioactive gas into the environment and all of it stays inside the plant, then it poses no risk to the public. SMRs are small enough to be built underground. This means they will have a smaller physical footprint that will be easier to defend against physical attacks.  This provides additional benefits of lower construction costs because earth, concrete and steel are less costly than elaborate security systems in use today, and lower operating costs (a smaller footprint means a smaller security force).

#### Meltdowns cause extinction

Lendman 11 – Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (Stephe, 3/13. “Nuclear Meltdown in Japan” The People’s Voice <http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/03/13/nuclear-meltdown-in-japan>)

Reuters said the 1995 Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly ever natural disaster. This time, from quake and tsunami damage alone, that figure will be dwarfed. Moreover, under a worst case core meltdown, all bets are off as the entire region and beyond will be threatened with permanent contamination, making the most affected areas unsafe to live in. On March 12, Stratfor Global Intelligence issued a "Red Alert: Nuclear Meltdown at Quake-Damaged Japanese Plant," saying: Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already may have happened - the ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s long as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to contain high levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains intact, the melted fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility built around (it) remains intact, the melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster killed nearly one million people worldwide from nuclear radiation exposure. In their book titled, "Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment," Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko said: "For the past 23 years, it has been clear that there is a danger greater than nuclear weapons concealed within nuclear power. Emissions from this one reactor exceeded a hundred-fold the radioactive contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." "No citizen of any country can be assured that he or she can be protected from radioactive contamination. One nuclear reactor can pollute half the globe.Chernobyl fallout covers the entire Northern Hemisphere." Stratfor explained that if Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly likely that the melting fuel will burn through (its) containment system and enter the ground. This has never happened before," at least not reported. If now occurring, "containment goes from being merely dangerous, time consuming and expensive to nearly impossible," making the quake, aftershocks, and tsunamis seem mild by comparison. Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized. Japanese officials said Fukushima's reactor container wasn't breached. Stratfor and others said it was, making the potential calamity far worse than reported. Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said the explosion at Fukushima's Saiichi No. 1 facility could only have been caused by a core meltdown. In fact, 3 or more reactors are affected or at risk. Events are fluid and developing, but remain very serious. The possibility of an extreme catastrophe can't be discounted. Moreover, independent nuclear safety analyst John Large told Al Jazeera that by venting radioactive steam from the inner reactor to the outer dome, a reaction may have occurred, causing the explosion. "When I look at the size of the explosion," he said, "it is my opinion that there could be a very large leak (because) fuel continues to generate heat." Already, Fukushima way exceeds Three Mile Island that experienced a partial core meltdown in Unit 2. Finally it was brought under control, but coverup and denial concealed full details until much later. According to anti-nuclear activist Harvey Wasserman, Japan's quake fallout may cause nuclear disaster, saying: "This is a very serious situation. If the cooling system fails (apparently it has at two or more plants), the super-heated radioactive fuel rods will melt, and (if so) you could conceivably have an explosion," that, in fact, occurred. As a result, massive radiation releases may follow, impacting the entire region. "It could be, literally, an apocalyptic event.

**Nuclear imagery enhances value to life – the only way to love is to experience fear**

**Fox 85** (Michael Allen, Professor of Philosophy – Queen’s University, Editor – Queen’s Quarterly, and Ph.D. – University of Toronto, Nuclear War: Philosophical Perspectives, Edited by M. Fox and L. Groarke, p. 127)

Nor can we rid ourselves of the conditions that cause the unique fear and anxiety of the nuclear age. It is unlikely that the bomb will go away, and even if it does, the knowledge of how to make it won't; nor will the Russians disappear. There remains but one choice: we must seek a reduction of world tensions, mutual trust, disarmament, and peace." Security is not the absence of fear and anxiety, but a degree of stress and uncertainty with which we can cope and remain mentally healthy. For security, understood in this way, to become a feature of our lives, we must admit our nuclear fear and anxiety and identify the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses. It is necessary to realize that we cannot entrust security to ourselves, but, strange as it seems and however difficult to accept, must entrust it to our adversary. Just as the safety and security of each of us, as individuals, depends upon the good will of every other, any one of whom could harm us at any moment, so the security of nations finally depends upon the good will of other nations, whether or not we willingly accept this fact. The disease for which we must find the cure also requires that we continually come face to face with the unthinkable in image and thought and recoil from it. In this manner we can break its hold over us and free ourselves to begin new initiatives. As Robert Jay Lifton points out, **"**confronting massive death" helps us bring ourselves "more in touch with what we care most about in life. We [will then] find § Marked 12:40 § ourselves in no way on a death trip, but rather responding to a call for personal and professional actions and commitments on behalf of that wondrous and fragile entity we know as human life."37 I have tried to show what we are up against. The first step toward change is to know what constraints are acting on us and to isolate those within our control because they are of our own making. Awareness of these conditions is often the road to their transcendence.

#### Consumption good

Glover and Economides 11 (– http://www.globalwarming.org/2011/12/12/energy-climate-wars-energy-consumption-is-good/

Without modern energy Western civilization would grind to a halt, literally. Your refrigerator would no longer keep cheap food chilled for weeks and months; you would need fresh food daily, with all the extra costs and the journeys that entails. Private cars would be obsolete. You would have to read by candlelight. Your home would have to be heated by burning wood or, if you had a local source of hydrocarbon fuels—what we call primary—burning oil, gas, or coal. In short, you would be subject to the technology of the mid-nineteenth century. At this point, an extreme idealist may naively insist that life was better in former generations than today. A less extreme idealist may claim that hydrocarbon fuels are no longer necessary and that we could switch, with the right social and political will, to alternative energy sources. The argument runs that, if only we could divest ourselves of our “addiction” to oil, gas, and coal (“fossil” fuels) we could, at a stroke, clean up our environment by making a wholehearted commitment to renewable, clean and “free” energy, wind, wave, hydro, solar, and geothermal power to solve our future energy needs. Only one problem with that: there’s more chance of Donald Duck becoming president of the United States. Just try to make that particular energy switchover and stand back and watch the lights go out all over the world. True, some radicals want it that way. They think it would be “quaint” to return to dark ages lifestyle, the same “quaint,” often poverty-stricken, lifestyles to which they would doom other societies who today are desperate to industrialize, as the West has. This is an easy pastime, of course, when you are an armchair eco-liberal enjoying the fruits of a post-industrial society. The reality of doing that which today’s anti-hydrocarbon eco-warriors demand in their relentless, ultimately pointless, war on carbon is that the developed nations would simply find themselves among the ranks of those nations whose low energy consumption meant that they never came out of the “dark ages” in the first place. While some environmental activists may perceive the “old ways” as simple, something to hanker after, they conveniently forget the high infant mortality rates, sickness, pollution, and shortness of life that went with that “quaint” lifestyle, a lifestyle that for many even today is an all too unpleasant, even deadly, daily reality. Ironic, is it not, that in an age when we live longer, healthier, more pollution-free lives than countless previous generations, we should have become even more angst-ridden and obsessive about our health and our environment? Yet such concerns, suffused with an unhealthy self-injected dose of idealism, are not only driving some modern Western governments to make mostly unnecessary and uneconomic social changes, but are also powerfully influencing global and national policies as they affect the world’s most important commodity: energy. The truth is, we owe our longer, greater, healthier life, indeed our economic prosperity in the West generally, to the Industrial Revolution and the economic development that resulted from it. And that prosperity is a direct consequence of our growing energy consumption of energy. Like it or not, the great energy-driven reality of our age is, whatever idealistic social engineers may desire, that modern civilization (and those societies currently undergoing their own industrialization) remain wholly dependent upon the per capita consumption of primary energy of oil, gas, and coal. What is more, they will continue to do so for decades to come…. In the modern world, there is a direct correlation between the level of energy consumption and national wealth creation. Indeed the relative wealth and poverty of nations is entirely definable by its per capita energy consumption. It is equally axiomatic that demand for energy is connected to wealth; the corollary is also true: use of energy promotes and generates wealth. Thus the perennial vilification of the US as the world’s largest consumer of energy (25 percent of global use) is wholly misguided, in that it is largely based on the fallacy that US energy demand is only the result of its wealth. Rather, energy demand is the cause of US wealth, as it is elsewhere. This is vital to understand. Especially in the light of the constant assertions made about the need to cut energy consumption when the right and proper aspiration of any modernizing country and government is to promote and sponsor the wealth, welfare, and prosperity of its constituent peoples. To achieve this, nations clearly have to increase their energy consumption. After all, isn’t an ever-improving standard of living and greater prosperity the goal to which every caring family and nation aspires?

#### --Turn: the alt causes the security sector to be dominated by the most conservative policymakers.

Olav. F. Knudsen, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, ‘1 [*Security Dialogue* 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing  Securitization,” p. 366]

A final danger in focusing on the state is that of building the illusion that  states have impenetrable walls, that they have an inside and an outside, and  that nothing ever passes through. Wolfers’s billiard balls have contributed to  this misconception.   But the state concepts we should use are in no need of  such an illusion. Whoever criticizes the field for such sins in the past needs to  go back to the literature. Of course, we must continue to be open to a frank  and unbiasedassessment of the transnational politics which significantly in-  fluence almost every issue on the domestic political agenda. The first decade  of my own research was spent studying these phenomena – and I disavow  none of my conclusions about the state’s limitations. Yet I am not ashamed to  talk of a domestic political agenda. Anyone with a little knowledge of Euro-  pean politics knows that Danish politics is not Swedish politics is not German  politics is not British politics. Nor would I hesitate for a moment to talk of the  role of the state in transnational politics, where it is an important actor, though  only one among many other competing ones. In the world of transnational  relations, the exploitation of states by interest groups – by their assumption of  roles as representatives of states or by convincing state representatives to  argue their case and defend their narrow interests – is a significant class of  phenomena, today as much as yesterday. Towards a Renewal of the Empirical Foundation  for Security Studies  Fundamentally, the sum of the foregoing list of sins blamed on the Copen-  hagen schoolamounts to a lack of attention paid to just that ‘reality’ of security which Ole Wæver consciously chose to leave aside a decade ago in order  to pursue the politics of securitization instead. I cannot claim that he is void of  interest in the empirical aspects of security because much of the 1997 book is  devoted to empirical concerns. However, the attention to agenda-setting –  confirmed in his most recent work – draws attention away from the important issues we need to work on more closely if we want to contribute to a better understanding of European security as it is currently developing.  That inevitably requires a more consistentinterest in security policy in the  making – not just in the development of alternative security policies. The dan-  ger here is that, as alternative policies are likely to fail grandly on the political  arena, crucial decisions may be made in the ‘traditional’ sector of security  policymaking, unheeded by any but the most uncritical minds.

### States (Not Devolution) CP 2ac

#### Doesn’t solve the aff –

#### Nuke leadership – the Wallace and Williams ev indicates strong federal action to reverse our decline in nuclear leadership is key to send an international signal

#### Specifically Congress is key

Fertel 5 [Marvin Fertel - Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Nuclear Energy Institute “Nuclear Power's Place In A National Energy Policy,” April 28th, 2005, Lexis (CQ Congressional Testimony), Chetan]

Industry and government will be prepared to meet the demand for new emission-free baseload nuclear plants in the 2010 to 2020 time frame only through a sustained focus on the necessary programs and policies between now and then. As it has in the past, strong Congressional oversight will be necessary to ensure effective and efficient implementation of the **federal** government's nuclear energy programs, and to maintain America's leadership in nuclear technology development and its influence over important diplomatic initiatives like nonproliferation.

#### Warming – extend the Lovering evidence, nations see the NRC as the gold standard of licensing practices and are ready to follow their lead on SMR development – international transition to nuclear DEPENDS on NRC action

#### AND - Federal government key to uniformity for climate mitigation

Byrne 7 (Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (CEEP) (John, with Kristen Hughes, Lado Kurdgelashvili, Wilson Rickerson, 2/19. “American policy conflict in the greenhouse: Divergent trends in federal, regional, state, and local green energy and climate change policy.”)

Effective global mitigation of climate change will require strong leadership by national governments, including that of the US. More specifically, national governments remain vital in mandating and enforcing compliance among diverse actors within their jurisdiction. Only national governments can promote uniform standards for compliance and related programs, thus ensuring achievement of policy goals with maximum fairness and minimal costs (Rabe, 2002). National funding also remains vital to underwrite long-term commitments needed to meet ever more challenging climate action targets (Rabe, 2002).

#### -- States fiat is a voter --- steals all the Aff, uniformity circumvents the best literature, its contrived and unpredictable because there isn’t a single solvency advocate for the counterplan, and illogical because no policy-maker can choose between all 50 states doing the plan vs. the federal government doing it.

#### -- Links to politics --- state action create national controversy and draws in Obama – people will equally backlash to him devolving authority to the state

#### Solvency deficits –

#### First – Investor Confidence

#### Extend the Wallace evidence – investors think federal tax credits are necessary to offset risks and generate licensing certainty – only after investors can see that will they be willing to finance future projects

#### AND – Investors will see that states are broke - they won’t trust any incentive without the government

Oliff et al 12 [Phil Oliff, Chris Mai, and Vincent Palacios – Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact”, June 27th, 2012, <http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=711,m>, Chetan]

As a new fiscal year begins, the latest state budget estimates continue to show that states’ ability to fund services remains hobbled by slow economic growth. The budget gaps that states have had to close for fiscal year 2013, the fiscal year that begins July 1, 2012, total $55 billion in 31 states. That amount is smaller than in past years, but still very large by historical standards. States’ actions to close those gaps, in turn, are further delaying the nation’s economic recovery. The budget gaps result principally from weak tax collections. The Great Recession that started in 2007 caused the largest collapse in state revenues on record. Since bottoming out in 2010, revenues have begun to grow again but are still far from fully recovered. As of the first quarter of 2012, state revenues remained 5.5 percent below pre-recession levels, and are not growing fast enough to recover fully soon. Meanwhile, states’ education and health care obligations continue to grow. States expect to educate 540,000 more K-12 students and 2.5 million more public college and university students in the upcoming school year than in 2007-08.[1] And some 4.8 million more people are projected to be eligible for subsidized health insurance through Medicaid in 2012 than were enrolled in 2008, as employers have cancelled their coverage and people have lost jobs and wages.[2] Consequently, even though the revenue outlook is trending upward, states have addressed large budget shortfalls by historical standards as they considered budgets for 2013. The vast majority of these shortfalls have been closed through spending cuts and other measures in order to meet balanced-budget requirements. As of publication all but five states have enacted their budgets, and those five will do so soon. To the extent these shortfalls are being closed with spending cuts, they are occurring on top of past years’ deep cuts in critical public services like education, health care, and human services. The additional cuts mean that state budgets will continue to be a drag on the national economy, threatening hundreds of thousands of private- and public-sector jobs, reducing the job creation that otherwise would be expected to occur. Potential strategies for lessening the impact of deep spending cuts include more use of state reserve funds in states that have reserves, more revenue through tax-law changes, and a greater role for the federal government.

#### Financial protection is the only thing that gets investors on board

Morse 7 – Washington Post Staff Writer (Dan, “Money Matters in Debate Over New Reactor Project; Financing, Rather Than Safety, Appears to Be Key Factor in Whether Plans Proceed” Washington Post Staff Writer 2007, September 5. The Washington Post,p. B.5.  ProQuest)

It's not the greenies who worry those aiming to build a new nuclear reactor in Southern Maryland. It's the green. This seemed perfectly clear at a recent community meeting in Calvert County, where Constellation Energy has proposed the first new reactor project in the United States in nearly 30 years. The price tag: about $4.5 billion. "Without the federal loan guarantees, this whole thing will come to a stop," George Vanderheyden, a Constellation executive, said while standing outside the hotel conference room where the meeting was about to start. Ten feet from him, a row of environmentalists greeted Calvert residents with stacks of brochures. "Threatened Communities," from Greenpeace, showed rows of grave markers next to a nuclear cooling tower. Vanderheyden showed little concern and later said his company could dispel such notions during the long approval process for the reactor. What concerns him more -- and what appears to be the larger factor in whether the Calvert reactor gets built -- is taking place 55 miles away in Washington. There, nuclear companies such as Constellation, along with Wall Street bankers, are lobbying hard to get the federal government to help kick-start construction of a series of reactors. Their argument: Nuclear power is clean energy that can reduce greenhouse gases. Wall Street investors could help finance new reactors. But they're skittish, remembering nuclear projects in the 1970s and 1980s dogged by regulatory delays, cost overruns and the Three Mile Island meltdown. The government, according to the nuclear industry, should protect investors if the initial projects go bad.

#### Second – Regulatory Delays

#### Extend the Gale evidence – federal financing controls the risk factors that give rise to regulatory delays. Private lenders are much more eager to finance projects when they know that regulatory regimes won’t get in the way.

#### Condo is a voter- results in argument irresponsibility, time and strat skews- no cost options in the 1nc make the 2ac impossible- one condo advocacy/ dispo solves your offense

#### Perm do both –

#### states are acting now to provide incentives but it won’t work without a sustained federal commitment

Bowman 8 (President and Chief Executive Officer Nuclear Energy Institute (Frank, CQ Congressional Testimony, “Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction”, 6/19, lexis)

In terms of new nuclear plant construction, one of the most significant financing challenges is the cost of these projects relative to the size, market value and financing capability of the companies that will build them. New nuclear power plants are expected to cost at least $6 to 7 billion. U.S. electric power companies do not have the size, financing capability or financial strength to finance new nuclear power projects on balance sheet, on their own-particularly at a time when they are investing heavily in other generating capacity, transmission and distribution infrastructure, and environmental controls. These first projects must have financing support-either loan guarantees from the federal government or assurance of investment recovery from state governments, or both. The states are doing their part. Throughout the South and Southeast, state governments have enacted legislation or implemented new regulations to encourage new nuclear plant construction. Comparable federal government commitment is essential. The modest loan guarantee program authorized by the 2005 Energy Policy Act was a small step in the right direction, but it does not represent a sufficient response to the urgent need to rebuild our critical electric power infrastructure. We believe the United States will need something similar to the Clean Energy Bank concept now under consideration by a number of members of Congress-a government corporation, modeled on the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, to provide loan guarantees and other forms of financing support to ensure that capital flows to clean technology deployment in the electric sector. Creation of such a financing entity should be an integral component of any climate change legislation. Such a concept serves at least two national imperatives. First, it addresses the challenge mentioned earlier-the disparity between the size of these projects relative to the size of the companies that will build them. In the absence of a concept like a Clean Energy Bank, new nuclear plants and other clean energy projects will certainly be built, but in smaller numbers over a longer period of time. Second, federal loan guarantees provide a substantial consumer benefit. A loan guarantee allows more leverage in a project's capital structure, which reduces the cost of capital, in turn reducing the cost of electricity from the project. Electricity consumers-residential, commercial and industrial-are already struggling with increases in oil, natural gas and electricity prices. The high cost of energy and fuel price volatility has already compromised the competitive position of American industry. We know that the next generation of clean energy technologies will be more costly than the capital stock in place today. In this environment, we see a compelling case for federal financing support that would reduce consumer costs. If it is structured like the loan guarantee program authorized by Title XVII of the 2005 Energy Policy Act, in which project sponsors are expected to pay the cost of the loan guarantee, such a program would be revenue-neutral and would not represent a subsidy. The public benefits associated with a robust energy loan guarantee program-lower cost electricity, deployment of clean energy technologies at the scale necessary to reduce carbon emissions-are significant. That is why the U.S. government routinely uses loan guarantee programs to support activities that serve the public good and the national interest-including shipbuilding, steelmaking, student loans, rural electrification, affordable housing, construction of critical transportation infrastructure, and for many other purposes. Achieving significant expansion of nuclear power in the United States will require stable and sustained federal and state government policies relating to nuclear energy.

#### prevents race to the bottom by imposing a federal floor

Suh 11 (Katrina – Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A. Yale University; J.D. Yale Law School, “CAPTURING INDIVIDUAL HARMS”, Harvard Environmental Law Review 35 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 155, lexis)

Domestic environmental law involves state and, indirectly, local governments in the design and implementation of environmental policy through a cooperative federalism framework that imposes federal minimum standards but largely reserves decisions about implementation to state authorities. n31 One of the chief rationales for this division of authority is that it "allows ... pollution [control] strategies to be tailored to individual geographic areas," n32 thereby (at least potentially) maximizing social welfare and efficiency by allowing policy to incorporate local conditions and local preferences. n33 Proponents of the devolution of even greater authority to the states and local government than that afforded by cooperative federalism also emphasize the benefits of local tailoring. n34 Local tailoring is hypothesized to require state and local involvement because "[a] national bureaucracy like EPA, with its limited resources and knowledge, cannot possibly take into account ... regional and subregional differences." n35 Moreover, "EPA has relatively little incentive to reflect local preferences about how to assign ... pollution reduction burdens -- about whether, for instance, to tighten automobile emissions inspection programs or to impose stricter limits on small businesses." n36 This traditional account of the benefits of cooperative federalism and local tailoring is subject to robust debate. A voluminous environmental federalism literature evidences continuing and deep divisions about the advisability and efficacy of cooperative federalism [\*163] approaches as well as about the appropriate role of local governments in environmental regulation and the benefits of local tailoring.

#### Cant solve prolif – other nations wont perceive nations – China hasn’t seen the Votgle project as US action

#### Can’t build enough – their ev only talks about a few states building even fewer nuclear power plants

#### Counterplan causes race to the bottom – undermines enforcement and the environment

Pursley and Wiseman 11 (Garrick – Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law, and Hannah - Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law, “LOCAL ENERGY”, 2011, Emory Law Journal, 60 Emory L.J. 877, lexis)

In the end, then, the efficiency debate leaves us with no general answer to the institutional-choice question in the context of distributed renewables. Leaving aside the observation that efficiency in the "provision of environmental goods" may not be the best criterion for evaluating environmental policy, n251 there simply is no economic justification for lodging all environmental regulatory power at any one level of government. At best, the literature shows that the question of efficiency in the allocation of regulatory power is complex, that the proper allocation likely varies from one environmental policy area to another - air and water pollutants with effects beyond state boundaries clearly merit federal regulation, for example - and that races to the bottom remain a risk at the subnational level. Although there is no empirical evidence to suggest that the economic dynamics differ substantially from the general field of environmental regulation to the specific subject of distributed renewables policy, differences in the nature of technologies and business interests may raise distinct issues. n252 For now, we assume relative similarity between environmental and distributed renewables regulation and that decentralizing regulatory authority to the state or local government level risks a race to the bottom. We address remedies for that risk in Part II.B, below. 2. The Politics Debate A second theoretical dilemma in identifying an optimal level of land-energy governance cautions against too hasty a leap toward vesting primary regulatory authority in state or local governments. This dilemma arises from the literature applying public choice theory to environmental regulation. n253 Public choice theory holds that government policy is disproportionately shaped [\*923] by the preferences of concentrated interest groups that provide significant electoral support for representatives and thereby secure access and influence over those representatives' decisions. n254 It thus highlights the importance of understanding the alignment and actions of relevant interest groups in describing the causes of past policy outcomes and predicting future outcomes. n255 The classical objection is that interest groups that favor lax environmental regulation and have high individual stakes in regulatory outcomes - paradigmatically industry groups - tend to be small and cohesive, but groups favoring stricter environmental regulation tend to be more diffuse and less organized. n256 This disparity in political power, from the perspective of economies of scale in political organization and advocacy of the two camps, is exacerbated at the state and local government levels. n257 Diffuse environmental interests may muster the resources to organize and act within a single political forum, but organizing at multiple state or government locations would be too taxing upon their relatively undisciplined and typically underfunded infrastructures. n258 Interests favoring laxer regulation, by contrast, are thought to possess relatively greater capacity to organize and advocate in multiple [\*924] government forums and thus enjoy a comparative advantage. n259 Comparative institutional analysis thus suggests that federal environmental authority is preferable to state or local authority because the federal level is the most efficient receiver of broadly shared but often under-organized public interests in environmental protection, which are needed to counterbalance industrial interests that would otherwise dominate the political process and impose their narrow interests on the unwitting public. n260

#### Fiat doesn’t solve --- implementation will vary

Bryner 2 (Gary C. - Professor, Department of Political Science, Brigham Young University, and Research Associate, Natural Resources Law Center. University of Colorado School of Law., “ARTICLE: Policy Devolution and Environmental Law: Exploring the Transition to Sustainable Development”, Fall, 26 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 1, lexis)

Federal agencies are believed to be insulated enough from resource-depleting communities to ensure preservationist values are pursued. When agencies fail to protect resources or reduce pollution, the solution is to replace them with more ambitious regulators and to strengthen the regulatory authority of federal officials. [2](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=056abf4cf7f767d2655ae1b274fe4dc3&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAB&_md5=3dc0dbf11daf78ff84a8925ba322737c#n2#n2) A number of studies have compared states according to their commitment to environmental protection and found significant variation in expenditures, legal authority, methodologies to determine environmental quality, reporting  [\*3]  requirements, enforcement actions, and in the environmental standards they are authorized to set under federal law. [3](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=056abf4cf7f767d2655ae1b274fe4dc3&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAB&_md5=3dc0dbf11daf78ff84a8925ba322737c#n3#n3)

#### Workers DA -

#### A. Federal funds drive private sector investment and recruiting skilled workers for construction

Kammen 3 - professor of nuclear engineering at Berkeley (Daniel, Federal News Service, Prepared Testimony before the House Committee on Science, 6/12, lexis)

The federal government plays the pivotal role in the encouragement of innovation in the energy sector. Not only are **federal** funds critical, but as my work and that of others has demonstrated6, private funds generally follow areas of public sector support. One particularly useful metric although certainly not the only measure --. of the relationship between funding and innovation is based on patents. Total public sector funding and the number of patents - across all disciplines in the United States have both increased steadily over at least the past three decades (Figure 5). The situation depicted here, with steadily increasing trends for funding and results (measured imperfectly, but consistently, by patents) is not as rosy when energy R&D alone is considered. In that case the same close correlation exists, but the funding pattern has been one of decreasing resources (Figure 6A). Figure 6A shows energy funding levels (symbol: o) and patents held by the national laboratories (symbol: ). The situation need not be as bleak as it seems. During the 1980s a number of changes in U.S. patent law permitted the national laboratories to engage in patent partnerships with the private sector. This increased both the interest in developing patents, and increased the interest by the private sector in pursuing patents on energy technologies. The squares (l) in figure 6 show that overall patents in the energy sector derived. Figure 6B reveals that patent levels in the nuclear field have declined, but not only that, publicprivate partnerships have taken placed (shaded bars), but have not increased as dramatically as in energy field overall (Figure 6A). There are a number of issues here, so a simple comparison of nuclear R&D to that on for example, fuel cells, is not appropriate. But it is a valid to explore ways to increase both the diversity of the R&D. This is a particularly important message for **federal** policy. Novel approaches are needed to encourage new and innovative modes of research, teaching, and industrial innovation in the nuclear energy field. To spur innovation in nuclear science a concerted effort would be needed to increase the types and levels of cooperation by universities and industries in areas that depart significantly from the current 'Generation III+' and equally, away from the 'Generation IV' designs. Similar conclusions were reached by M. Granger Morgan, head of the Engineering and Public Policy Program at Carnegie Mellon University, in his evaluation of the need for innovative in the organization and sociology of the U. S. nuclear power industrys. A second important issue that this Committee might consider is the degree of **federal** support for nuclear fission relative to other nations. Funding levels in the U.S. are significantly lower than in both Japan and France. Far from recommending higher public sector funding, what is arguably a more successful strategy would be to increase the private sector support for nuclear R&D and student training fellowships. Importantly, this is precisely the sort of expanded publicprivate partnership that has been relatively successful in the energy sector generally. It is incorrect, however, to think that this is a process that can be left to the private sector. There are key issues that inhibit private sector innovation. As one example, many nuclear operating companies have large coal assets, and thus are unlikely to push overly hard, in areas that threaten another core business. This emphasis on industry resources used to support and expanded nuclear program - under careful public sector management - has been echoed by a variety of nuclear engineering faculty members: I believe that if you. were to survey nuclear engineering department heads, most would select a national policy to support new nuclear construction, over a policy to increase direct financial support to nuclear engineering departments. A firm commitment by the federal government, to create **incentives** sufficient to ensure the construction of a modest number of new nuclear plants, with the **incentives** reduced for subsequent plants, would be the best thing that could possibly be done for nuclear engineering education and revitalization of the national workforce for nuclear science and technology. - Professor Per Peterson, Chair, Department of Nuclear Engineering, University of California, Berkeley

#### B. Skilled worker shortage will wreck solvency

Bengelsdorf 7 – consultant and former director of both key State and Energy Department offices that are concerned with international nuclear and nonproliferation affair

(HAROLD, “THE U.S. DOMESTIC CIVIL NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE AND U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY”, White Paper prepared for the American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness May, http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/images/COUNCIL\_WHITE\_PAPER\_Final.pdf)

Thus the challenge the U.S. nuclear industry faces today is whether the U.S. civil nuclear infrastructure will be strong enough to support a hoped for nuclear revival in this country, which could entail the construction and commissioning of up to eight nuclear power units during the 2010 to 2017 period. Several studies have been devoted to this question, and the answer is by no means certain. The shortage in skilled labor is expected to double in this country by the year 2020 and the workforce will stop growing as the baby boomers start to retire.

### Obama Good/Romney Iran Strikes 2ac

#### Obama will lose –

#### The undecided voters will break for Romney.

**Chambers**, **9/19**/2012 (Dean, Mitt Romney likely win in presidential election shown by three key polls, Examiner, p. http://www.examiner.com/article/mitt-romney-likely-win-presidential-election-shown-by-three-key-polls)

Rasmussen Reports has released today, three key polls that show Mitt Romney's likely win in this year's presidential election over President Obama. The Rasmussen Reports Presidential Daily Tracking Poll released today shows Romney leading 47 percent to 46 percent over Obama. Rasmussen's Daily Swing State Tracking Poll of 11 key swing states won by President Obama in 2008 shows Romney leading them by the exact same percentages. The latest Rasmussen poll of New Hampshire released today shows Romney leading there 48 percent to 45 percent. New Hampshire is a key swing state that could make a difference with its four electoral votes, and George W. Bush would have reached 270 electoral voters in 2000 without having won this state. New Hampshire had narrowly favored Obama in many polls over the last few months and while the analysis conduced here by this columnist has consistently predicted Mitt Romney will win the state (based in part on knowledge of local politics in the state having lived in New England for years), most projected have shaded New Hampshire blue and predicted it will go for Obama. This Rasmussen survey is key in that it likely shows movement in New Hampshire in the direction of Mitt Romney. In the instance of an incumbent president who enjoys just about 100 percent name recognition and is seeking reelection, most of the undecided voters are likely to swing to the challenger by election day. This is especially true when the challenger remains still less known to the public than the incumbent, as is true with former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney. By election day, those other nine percent not favoring Romney or Obama in the Rasmussen Daily Tracking poll are likely include less than one percent voting for third party candidates and five or six percent of those nine will likely vote for Mitt Romney. That would indicate a popular vote win by Romney of about 53 percent to 46 percent, or the reverse of Obama's win in 2008. This would lead to an electoral college total of more than 300 electoral votes for Romney§ Marked 12:42 § . The 11 swing states tracked by Rasmussen in it's swing state tracking poll show Romney leading 47 percent to 46 percent, where some weeks ago the two candidates were tied at 45 percent in the Rasmussen tracking poll of these 11 key swing states. President Obama won these same states collectively by a 53 percent to 46 percent margin in 2008. Now he is seven percent behind that finish now in these states. Romney is likely to capture most of the undecided votes and could win these states collectively by at least a 52 percent to 47 percent margin. That would likely lead to Romney winning Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia and Wisconsin while having a competitive chance in Michigan and Pennsylvania. If President Obama can only win Michigan and Pennsylvania among those 11 swing states, he can not be reelected to the presidency. As these polls stand today, the election of Mitt Romney as our next president looks likely.

#### -- B) Approval ratings and swing states

**Business Insider**, **8/7**/2012 (The 14 States Obama Really Needs to Worry About This November, p. http://www.businessinsider.com/obama-approval-rating-swing-states-by-state-ohio-florida-pennsylvania-2012-8)

Gallup released its state-by-state approval ratings of President Barack Obama last week, and the numbers show that Obama should be concerned about his prospects in 14 states heading into the November election. Obama's approval ratings sits at 50 percent or above — the level considered safe for re-election — in 13 states and the District of Columbia. But there are 14 states where his job approval is somewhere between the 40 and 50 percent range — Oregon, Nevada, Colorado, New Mexico, Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, Florida, New Hampshire and Maine. Here's a look: All of these states, with the exception of Maine and Oregon, are considered battlegrounds in the 2012 presidential race. Oregon and Maine went to Obama in 2008 and are seen as reliable states for him this time around. Here's how the math breaks down: The 13 states and D.C. give Obama 185 electoral votes. He needs to accumulate 85 more electoral votes to beat Romney. Based on recent polling, Obama tends to lead in all of these states except North Carolina and Florida. But the approval numbers should at least cast some doubt on the President's re-election chances, if history is any indication. Gallup is a stickler on the 50-percent approval mark being an essential statistic for re-election. Managing editor Jeffrey M. Jones explains: The 50% approval mark is significant because post-World War II incumbent presidents who have been above 50% job approval on Election Day were easily re-elected. Presidents with approval ratings below 50% have more uncertain re-election prospects. Historically, two presidents below 50% in their final approval rating before the election -- George W. Bush and Harry Truman -- won, and three, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and George H.W. Bush, lost.

#### Overwhelming public support for nuclear energy - multiple polls

WNA 12(WNA is the World Nuclear Association. “US Nuclear Power Policy.” August, 2012. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41\_US\_nuclear\_power\_policy.html)

**Public opinion regarding nuclear power has generally been fairly positive, and has grown more so as people have had to think about security of energy supplies. Different polls show** continuing increase **in public opinion favorable to nuclear power in the USA. More than three times as many strongly support nuclear energy than strongly oppose it**. Two-thirds of self-described environmentalists favor it. A May 2008 survey (N=2925) by Zogby International showed 67% of Americans favored building new nuclear power plants, with 46% registering strong support; 23% were opposed[10](http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41_US_nuclear_power_policy.html#References). Asked which kind of power plant they would prefer if it were sited in their community, 43% said nuclear, 26% gas, 8% coal. Men (60%) were more than twice as likely as women (28%) to be supportive of a nuclear power plant. A March 2010 Bisconti-GfK Roper survey showed that strong public support for nuclear energy was being sustained, with 74% in favor of it[11](http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41_US_nuclear_power_policy.html#References). In particular, **87% think nuclear will be important in meeting electricity needs in the years ahead, 87% support license renewal for nuclear plants, 84% believe utilities should prepare to build more nuclear plants,** 72% supported an active federal role in encouraging investment **in "energy technology that reduces greenhouse gases", 82% agree that US nuclear plants are safe and secure, 77% would support adding a new reactor at the nearest nuclear plant, and 70% say that USA should definitely build more plants in the future.** Only 10% of people said they strongly opposed the use of nuclear energy. In relation to recycling used nuclear fuel, 79% supported this (contra past US policy), and the figure rose to 85% if "a panel of independent experts" recommended it. Although 59% were confident that used reactor fuel could be stored safely at nuclear power plant sites, 81% expressed a strong desire for the federal government to move used nuclear fuel to centralized, secure storage facilities away from the plant sites until a permanent disposal facility is ready. Half of those surveyed considered themselves to be environmentalists. A February 2011 Bisconti-GfK Roper survey showed similar figures, and that 89% of Americans agree that all low-carbon energy sources – including nuclear, hydro and renewable energy – should be taken advantage of to generate electricity while limiting greenhouse gas emissions. Just 10% disagreed. Also some **84% of respondents said that they associate nuclear energy "a lot" or "a little" with reliable electricity;** 79% associate nuclear energy with affordable electricity; 79% associate nuclear energy with economic growth and job creation; and 77% associate nuclear energy and clean air. A more general March 2010 Gallup poll (N=1014) on energy showed 62% in favor of using nuclear power, including 28% strongly so, and 33% against, the most favorable figures since Gallup began polling the question in 1994. However, only 51% of Democrat voters were in favor[12](http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41_US_nuclear_power_policy.html#References). An early March 2011 Gallup poll just before the Fukushima accident showed 57% in favor and 38% against, and in March 2012 (N=1024) still 57% in favor with 40% against (men: 72%-27%, women 42%-51%). **Regarding plant safety, the polls showed consistent 56-58% positive views over 2009-12, but men-women split similar. A survey conducted in September 2011** by Bisconti Research Inc. with GfK Roper **showed that although support for nuclear power decreased following the Fukushima accident** and compared with a year earlier (a survey carried out in March 2010 by Bisconti Research found 74% of Americans favored nuclear power), **62%** of the 1000 **adults** surveyed in the latest poll **were supportive of utilizing nuclear power** while 35% expressed opposition. The survey found that **82% of Americans believed that lessons had been learned from** Fukushima and 67% of respondents considered US nuclear power plants safe (the same level as reported one month before the nuclear accident in Japan occurred). Also **85% of said that an extension of commercial operation should be granted to those plants that comply with federal safety standards**, and 59% believed more nuclear power plants should definitely be built in the future, while 75% contend that “Electric utilities should prepare now so that new nuclear power plants could be built if needed in the next decade.” Finally, further expansion of the site of the nearest already operating nuclear power plant is supported by 67% and opposed by 28%. By February 2012 support had increased slightly to 64% supported using nuclear power, while 33% opposed it. Some 81% of respondents believed that nuclear energy will be important in meeting the USA's future electricity needs (compared with 80% in September), and 82% thought the USA should "take advantage of all low-carbon energy sources, including nuclear, hydro and renewable energy." Significantly, 74% believed that nuclear power plants operating in the USA are safe, up from 67% in both 2011 surveys. However, a Harris survey in February 2012 (N=2056) showed that only 40% of US adults believed that the benefits of nuclear outweigh its risks, while 41% thought the reverse. A similar poll conducted in 2011 before the Fukushima accident occurred, indicated that 42% thought that the benefits outweighed the risks, while 37% believed the opposite. In a 2009 poll, 44% thought the benefits outweighed the benefits, while 34% thought they did not. The southern states had the highest percentage of people believing the benefits outweigh the risks (at 43%), compared with 33% in the East and 41% in the Midwest and West. Some 42% of Americans thought that the benefits of using coal outweighed the risks (up from 38% positive in 2011), while 40% said the risks outweighed the benefits.

#### -- Not intrinsic – logical policymaker could do the plan and pass Obama’s agenda/not pass Romney’s- key to effective decisionmaking

#### Case turns the da- case solves prolif which is why we’d strike Iran

#### No impact-

#### Romney won’t green light Israeli strikes --- doesn’t want to be dragged into a war.

**Blair**, 7/31/**2012** (David, Mitt Romney's green light for an Israeli attack on Iran is just campaign-trail big talk, The Telegraph, p. http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/davidblair/100173701/mitt-romneys-green-light-for-an-israeli-attack-on-iran-is-just-campaign-trail-big-talk/)

So Mitt Romney’s remarkable statement – made via his spokesman – that he would “respect” any Israeli decision to “take action on its own” represents a break with settled US policy adopted by the last Republican administration. Romney is, of course, on the campaign trail – and what politicians do when they take office often bears little resemblance to what they say when they are trying to win votes. My hunch is that if a President Romney were to enter the White House, he would quickly forget his sanguine view of the consequences of an Israeli strike on Iran. Leave aside the arguments for and against going to war with Iran. Just consider the consequences of a unilateral Israeli strike. Iran would almost certainly retaliate by trying to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz – and the US Navy is the only military force in the world with the power to prevent that from happening. So America would almost certainly be dragged into the war pretty quickly. Could any US president live with the idea of becoming embroiled in a war started by an ally? I cannot imagine a leader of the world’s only superpower tolerating – let alone “respecting” – a decision taken by another country that would inevitably drag it into a new conflict. If America is going to fight a war, the president of the day will insist on reserving that decision for himself, rather than ceding it to an ally. Mitt Romney, if he wins with White House, will feel the same way.

#### Iran strikes don’t go nuclear.

**Plesch and Butcher**, September **2007** (Dan – Director of the School of Oriental and African Studies at the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy and Martin – international consultant on security politics, Considering a war with Iran: A discussion paper on WMD in the Middle East, p. http://www.rawstory.com/images/other/IranStudy082807a.pdf)

The US has strategic forces prepared to launch massive strikes on Iran with hours of the order being given. Although there is clear evidence that nuclear weapons use is being given serious political consideration, actual use is unlikely given the lack of effectiveness of nuclear weapons against concealed and buried targets and the negative political consequences of such use. The aim of the new Triad and the Global Strike capability developed under the Bush administration is stated to be making nuclear weapons use less likely.

#### Americans like nuclear – believe the benefits outweigh the risks

**NYT, 11** (Michael Cooper and Dalia Sussman, The New York Times. “Nuclear Power Loses Support in New Poll.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/us/23poll.html?\_r=1)

The **new poll found that** nearly **7 in 10 Americans think that nuclear power plants in the United States are** generally **safe**. But nearly two-thirds of those polled said they were concerned that a major nuclear accident might occur in this country — including 3 in 10 who said they were “very concerned” by such a possibility. Fifty-eight percent of those polled said they did not think the federal government was adequately prepared to deal with a major nuclear accident. Still, **47 percent of those polled said that, over all, the benefits of nuclear power outweighed the risks**; 38 percent said they did not. The nationwide telephone poll was conducted March 18-21 among 1,022 adults, and it has a margin of sampling error of plus or minus three percentage points

#### SMRs address the only public concern about nuke power

Worthington 11 [David Worthington – Contributing Editor to SmartPlanet, “Small nuclear reactors: America’s energy future?” December 18th, 2011, <http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/intelligent-energy/small-nuclear-reactors-americas-energy-future/11412>, Chetan]

Small Modular Reactor (SMR) concepts could help make future nuclear power plants in the United States safer and easier to construct while helping to recycle stockpiles of existing uranium fuel waste. The general idea behind SMRs is to cluster together many small reactors to match the output of obsolete coal or nuclear facilities. Steam output from many modules would power a common generator to produce electricity. Each module would be equipped with its own containment assembly that’s housed in a pre-fabricated unit. Think of it as a nuclear assembly line. A module would be small enough to be shipped to a new reactor build by rail or truck rather than assembly components inside of a containment dome onsite. All-in-one fabrication would streamline nuclear power plant construction by several years, said Steve Rus, executive director for nuclear technologies at Black & Veatch. SMRs would be housed in a steel and concrete embedment that resides below grade. B&V has had a sizeable nuclear business since World War II. Small modular reactor designs are also supported by the Obama administration, which sees nuclear power as a way to reduce carbon emissions. However, the public is understandably warier of nuclear power post Fukushima, and would need some reassurances of its safety. The SMR addresses the greatest perceived danger - nuclear meltdowns – a threat that has loomed since the dawn of the nuclear era. It doesn’t require active cooling systems to prevent a meltdown, and would theoretically shut down safely without any outside intervention. Traditional active cooling systems at large scale reactors utilize water pumps and back-up power systems to control residual or decay heat after a reaction is stopped. An external power source and/or coolant are eventually necessary within a matter of days. Recent third generation+ reactor designs incorporate passive cooling technologies with traditional active cooling techniques, but that approach only buys more time until there’s meltdown conditions. Several reactors at Tokyo Electric Power’s Fukushima plants melted down when diesel back-up systems failed and mainland power lines were destroyed in the wake of twin natural disasters. It was reliant on active cooling, and its engineers hadn’t envisioned a tsunami striking far inland. A module reactor’s passive cooling system could theoretically survive that scenario, and non-water cooling systems could further increase margins of safety. “The concept is these could go on almost indefinite periods in passive manner with no intervention relative to the cooling of core and decay/residual heat. Potentially, it could never require any additional intervention,” Rus said. The initial SMRs will continue to utilize water for cooling and uranium fuel, but sodium and lead bismuth alloys could foreseeably replace water in fourth generation models – provided they pass Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review, Russ said. The NRC’s regulators are very familiar with light water reactors, but alternative fuel sources would require different cooling methods, Rus said. Thorium is arguably safer than uranium both in the risk of accidents and for nuclear nonproliferation. “The coolant form is different than water, therefore there’s natural benefits in the way it cools reactor,” Rus explained. A sodium coolant would be liquid under normal operating conditions, but solidify and encase the reactor upon a cold shutdown. Molten salt is also a potential future fuel source. Aside from the NRC’s institutional history, uranium’s other advantage is that there’s also an abundance of fuel in the form of nuclear waste that is being sequestered at nuclear facilities around the United States. Spent fuel rods could become a source of energy for newer generation reactors, Rus suggested. “More than 90 percent of the energy is still in that fuel. One thing that has to come to life is recycling. After reprocessing, waste is significantly less, and then there ultimately needs to be a way to address that waste.”

#### Policies don’t matter- party identification outweighs

Edwards et al 2004, (George C. Edwards, professor at Texas A&M University, Martin P. Wattenberg, professor at University of California Irvine, Robert L. Lineberry, professor at University of Houston, Government in America: People, Politics, and Policy, 11th edition, pg.312-313, ch.10, NI (yes I cut this from a book))

Party identifications are crucial for many voters because they provide a regular prospective through which voters can view the political world. “Presumably” say Niemi and Weisberg, “people choose to identify with a party with which they generally agree…. As a result they need not concern themselves with every issue that comes along, but can generally rely on their party identification to guide them.” Parties tend to rely on groups that lean heavily in their favor to form their basic coalition. Even before an election campaign begins, Republicans usually assume they will not receive much support from African Americans, Jews, and Hispanic Americans. Democrats have an uphill struggle attracting groups that are staunchly Republican in their leanings, such as conservative evangelical Christians or upper-income voters.

#### More than half the country support nuclear expansion – its key to job growth

Whitman 8-13 [Christine Todd Whitman CASEnergy Co-Chair, Former EPA Administrator and New Jersey Governor, “Nuclear Power Garners Bipartisan Support”, August 13th, 2012, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php>, Chetan]

The energy policy that I’ve seen garner consistent support from the left and the right over the years is also one with which I’m deeply familiar. This policy involves building a diverse portfolio of low-carbon energy sources, featuring a renewed investment in nuclear energy. And it’s not just policymakers from both sides of the aisle who support nuclear energy – it’s everyday energy consumers as well. According to a Gallup poll conducted in March of this year, nearly 60 percent of Americans support the use of nuclear energy to meet our nation’s electricity needs, and a majority support expanding America’s use of nuclear power. Next-generation nuclear energy projects are underway in Georgia, South Carolina and Tennessee, thanks in part to steady popular support, as well as support from President Obama, bipartisan congressional leaders and other policymakers at the federal and state levels. An additional 10 combined construction and operating licenses for 16 plants are under review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This support is founded in the fact that nuclear energy, safely managed, provides an efficient, reliable source of energy. In fact, nuclear power is the only baseload source of carbon-free electricity. It provides nearly two-thirds of the nation’s low-carbon electricity, and will continue to be an important source of energy well into the future given the advent of innovative large and small reactor designs. The use of nuclear energy prevents more than 613 million metric tons of carbon dioxide every year – as much CO2 as is emitted by every passenger car in America. Bipartisan support for nuclear energy also stems from the boost that it provides to local job markets and to local and state economies. As nuclear energy expands and as more than half of the industry workforce approaches retirement, the industry offers growing opportunities for well-paying careers. The industry already supports more than 100,000 jobs, and the combination of retirements and the construction of new facilities could create as many as 25,000 new jobs in the near term. What’s more, the construction of a nuclear facility spurs the creation of other local jobs in industries ranging from manufacturing to hospitality. The industry generates between $40 and $50 billion in revenue and electricity sales, or some $470 million in total economic output and $40 million in labor wages at each U.S. facility every year. That’s a powerful economic engine and a positive impact that leaders are embracing. As America refocuses on cleaner energy policies that help boost our economy, nuclear power is becoming a clear and critical part of a secure, sustainable energy portfolio. We need electricity and we want clean air; with nuclear energy we can have both. It’s a source of power that leaders on both sides of the aisle can support.

#### Plan creates jobs – that’s key to swing states

USA Today 12 (Gregory Korte, 4/27. “Politics stands in the way of nuclear plant's future,” <http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/story/2012-04-13/usec-centrifuges-loan-guarantees/54560118/1>)

**The stakes are high: It's an election year, and Ohio is a swing state**. USEC estimates **the project** at its peak **will generate 3,158 jobs in Ohio, and 4,284 elsewhere.** Pike County, home to the centrifuges, has a 13% unemployment rate — the highest in Ohio. The median household income is about $40,000. The average job at USEC pays $77,316. Centrifuge parts are stacked up in Piketon. "It's as shovel-ready as they come," says spokeswoman Angela Duduit. Indeed, **the project has enjoyed bipartisan support.** A USA TODAY review of DOE records shows that no fewer than **46 members of Congress** — 32 Republicans and 14 Democrats — **have pressured the Obama administration to approve the loan guarantee for USEC**. "Quick action is paramount," said one bipartisan letter. "It is imperative that this application move forward now," said another. The congressional **support comes from states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia, Missouri, Alabama, Indiana, Maryland, North Carolina and South Carolina**— an almost exact overlay of the states that would benefit from the 7,442 jobs the company says would be created.

#### Nuclear power has massive support --- multiple key regions.

Nuclear Energy Institute, 2/23/**2012** (Majority U.S. Public Support for Nuclear Energy Has Stabilized, New Survey Shows, p. <http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/majority-us-public-support-for-nuclear-energy-has-stabilized-new-survey-shows/>)

Nearly a year later, 74 percent of Americans believe that “nuclear power plants operating in the United States” are safe and secure. Eighty-two percent of Americans believe that lessons learned from the Fukushima accident should be applied to existing operations and that the United States should continue to develop nuclear energy plants to meet growing electricity demand. “Attitudes toward nuclear energy stand at approximately the level seen in a large number of the surveys in the past decade, but a bit below a pre-Fukushima peak,” said Ann Bisconti, president of Bisconti Research. “The weight of public opinion toward nuclear energy and the building of new nuclear power plants continues to be favorable.” The new survey shows that two-thirds (65 percent) of Americans would find a new reactor operating at the site of the nearest nuclear energy facility acceptable. This support was highest in the Midwest and Southeast—69 percent and 68 percent respectively. But solid majorities also hold that view in the West and Northeast—61 percent each.

**Their links are wrong- new research proves clean energy is popular**

**Freed et. al**, February **2012** (Josh – Third Way and Matt Bennett – Third Way, Al Quinlan – Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, and Andrew Baumann – Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, Moving Clean Energy to the Center: Insights from Swing Voters in the Midwest and South, p. http://content.thirdway.org/publications/486/Third\_Way\_Report\_-\_Moving\_Clean\_Energy\_to\_the\_Center\_-\_Insights\_from\_Swing\_Voters\_in\_the\_Midwest\_and\_South.pdf)

With the collapse of the 15-year effort on cap-and-trade, the politicization of climate change, and, most recently, the controversy around the bankruptcy of Solyndra, conventional wisdom in Washington is that there’s no viable public path to move the United States to clean energy. On Capitol Hill, no energy reform or climate legislation is moving and the Obama Administration is being forced to shutter some of the programs it designed to help deploy clean energy. This is all happening despite the emergence of a $2.3 trillion global clean energy market that China is trying to corner, rapidly dropping solar prices, instability in the oil markets, and a massive amount of evidence that climate change is already having an impact. The view in political circles is that none of that matters—the public has tuned out, and serious energy reform is dead. The conventional wisdom in Washington, however, is wrong. New focus groups conducted by Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research for Third Way in Ohio and North Carolina\* found that even swing voters in traditional energy states want to get America running on clean energy


### Nat Gas DA

#### Fracking is economically unsustainable – keeps prices well below costs, production declines kill the industry

Richter 12 (Wolf Richter, “Natural Gas: Where Endless Money Went to Die,” 6-20-12,

<http://www.zerohedge.com/contributed/2012-06-20/natural-gas-where-endless-money-went-die>)

The fiasco that is playing out in the natural gas industry doesn’t happen often in a free market, and when it does happen, it’s usually short—and brutal for all involved: namely, prices that are way below production costs. In most industries, hedging strategies might get market participants through the period, while unhedged production, a money-losing activity, gets slashed. If it lasts long enough, it causes a shakeout where less efficient or poorly capitalized producers, and their investors, get wiped out. It’s all part of the capitalist system that weeds out weaker elements through occasional sweeps of creative destruction. As shortages crop up on the horizon, prices return to sustainable levels, and occasionally spike to once again unsustainable levels. For the survivors, or for lucky new entrants, the next step in the cycle has begun. Alas, thanks to the Fed’s zero-interest-rate policy and the trillions it has handed over to its cronies since late 2008, the sweeps of creative destruction have broken down. Instead, boundless sums of money have been searching for a place to go, and they’re chasing yield when there is none, and so they’re taking risks, any kind of risks, in their vain battle to come out ahead. The result is a stunning misallocation of capital to the tune of tens of billions of dollars to an economic activity—drilling for dry natural gas—that has been highly unprofitable for years. It’s where money has gone to die. What’s left is debt, and wells that will never produce enough to make their investors whole. For that whole debacle, read.... Capital Destruction in Natural Gas. But the money has dried up. And drilling for natural gas is collapsing. Last week, there were only 562 rigs drilling for dry natural gas—the lowest number since September 1999. A dizzying downward trajectory:

Producers, if at all possible, are switching to drilling for oil and natural gas liquids (priced like oil), still a profitable activity. Thus, capital is now being channeled to where it can make money. Drilling for dry natural gas will continue to decline as the long delayed sweep of creative destruction is scouring the industry. The largest producer, ExxonMobil, given its monumental size and worldwide focus on oil, will weather the fallout just fine. But the second largest producer, Chesapeake Energy, is struggling. It’s trying to dump assets to raise cash to deal with its mountain of decomposing debt. Other producers that haven’t diversified away from dry natural gas are in a similar quandary. And at current prices, it’s going to be bloody. At $2.53 per million Btu at the Henry Hub, the price of natural gas is up 33% from the April low of $1.90 per million Btu—a number not seen in a decade. But even if it doubled, it would still be below the cost of production. And if it tripled, it might still be below the cost of production for most producers. That’s how mispriced the commodity has become. Misallocation of capital, and the resulting overproduction, is only part of the problem. The other part of the problem is horizontal fracking itself—a drilling method that extracts gas from shale formations. With nasty economics. It’s an expensive method. And once drilled, the well suffers from steep decline rates; after a year or a year-and-a-half, only 10% of the original production might still come to the surface. The breakeven price for natural gas under these conditions—and it differs from well to well—is still partially theoretical since horizontally fracked wells have not yet gone through their entire lifecycle. Here is a detailed discussion and pricing model. The short answer: over $8 per million Btu. Even if that number is off, at the current price of $2.53 per million Btu, the industry is still near its point of maximum pain. There are consequences. Power generators, having switched massively from coal to natural gas, are driving up demand. And production has finally seen a bend, a small one, in the curve that had set new highs month after month. Now, it’s declining. There is a lag between dropping rig count and production. The rig count estimates how many new wells are being drilled. Even if it dropped to zero next week, production would not immediately be impacted because the current wells would continue to produce. Production would then taper off as a function of decline rates per well—and in fracked wells, that lag is expressed in months, not years. While the US doesn’t yet have LNG terminals to liquefy and export natural gas—in the global markets, LNG fetches mouthwatering prices between $10 and $15 per million Btu—it does have a pipeline to Mexico. According to BENTEK Energy (via the EIA), pipeline exports to Mexico hit 1,867 million cubic feet per day, a record in the seven plus years that BENTEK has been tracking it (by comparison, Chesapeake Energy produces about 2,575 MMcf/day). Rising demand and exports are slamming into declining production. What was a record amount of natural gas in storage is coming down rapidly. Fears that storage would reach capacity towards the end of the injection period in the fall, and that natural gas would have to be flared, thus reducing its price to zero, seem ridiculous now. But prices, if they stay in the current ballpark, will continue to demolish producers, drive them away from dry natural gas, and cause financial bloodshed. Until shortages appear on the horizon. But then, production can’t be ramped up quickly, regardless of what the price might be. Expect a spike and more mayhem, but this time in the other direction.

#### -- Chemical industry doesn’t solve sustainability

Elkington 12 (John, executive chairman of Volans and non-executive director at SustainAbility. “Chemical industry isn't doing enough to embrace sustainability,” 9-12-12, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/sustainable-business/sustainability-with-john-elkington/chemical-industry-embrace-sustainability-environment?newsfeed=true>)

One speaker showed a slide headed 'Sustainability is …', spotlighting Shin-Etsu, a Japanese chemical company that suffered a major explosion. Instead of clamming up, as Japanese corporate leaders are wont to do, the CEO took a voluntary pay-cut and went out to apologise to the local community. Apologising to people when you have accidentally blown them up makes sense, most of the time, but in the context of the global challenges we face I struggle to see this as a definitive (indeed, even a legitimate) case of sustainability in practice. Then another speaker, this time from ExxonMobil Chemical, asserted that – based on the latest life-cycle assessment data – shopping bags made out of high density polyethylene (HDPE) are the sustainable option. Paper bags, he insisted, should be dropped because of the energy and water consumption involved. Ah. When the discussion period came, I asked whether the data had taken into account the great swirling gyres of plastic debris that now scar large areas of the world ocean? No, he admitted. For such people, as a speaker from BASF assured us, sustainability means we "are on a journey". Like many others, this German company has talked to a considerable number of stakeholders (350, by their reckoning) and boiled it all down to a shortlist of issues (just 40 of those). The main conclusion seems to be that we must all create more shared value while, simultaneously, shrinking our environmental footprints. Good, but by how much? That's a question that the sector finds it hard to answer, except in areas where there is a legal requirement that the use of particular chemicals be driven to zero, like hexavalent chromium. And, while most participants intensely dislike the idea of further regulation, there were those – including Peter Kunze of the European Automobile Manufacturers Association – who argued for much clearer signals on which chemicals would be banned ultimately, coupled with "smart legislation" to ensure that the process of conversion didn't undermine industrial or regional competitiveness. It was intriguing to see successive speakers through the lenses of vested interests. A panel of four speakers, for example, agreed that renewable feedstocks were very unlikely to make much of an impression on the industry in the next decade or two. Then a colleague from another chemical company whispered in my ear that three of the four companies were backwards-integrated into the oil sector, effectively making them fossil fuel junkies. Hardly surprising, then, that they find it hard to imagine – or at least publicly admit the possibility of – a radically different future. Behind the scenes people spoke quietly of lobbying that is underway by parts of the industry: in the US, for example, chemical companies are fighting tooth-and-nail to ensure suspect chemicals and products like formaldehyde and styrene continue to be allowed in LEED-certified buildings. On the upside, Nicholas Denis of McKinsey & Co reported results of their recent market survey showing that green products are now seen much more positively by both consumers and industry executives, with between 82 and 93% of both categories saying they want to go greener, even though "the road to green chemicals is harder than we thought initially" and the notion of a "green premium is still a Holy Grail for most companies." Procter & Gamble promptly disagreed, to a degree, noting that their efforts to promote greener products like compact detergents had been stymied by the unwillingness of most consumers to change to seemingly smaller products at the same price-point. So the detergent industry went to government, asked for permission to avoid anti-trust rules, and moved as a group of companies to strip non-compact products from the shelves. "I would love it if consumers wanted greener products, mused P&G's Peter Kunze, "because we would then have a business model!"

#### -- Chemical industry resilient

**CNI 8** (Chemical News & Intelligence, “This Week in ICIS Chemical Business”, 8-18, Lexis)

Engineering and construction companies are expanding to specialties and photovoltaics Global engineering and construction companies report that the projects are changing, but the chemical sector continues to show a **surprising amount of resilience** Profitability analysis reveals North American petrochemical industry's demise is **exaggerated** Profits in the North American petrochemical industry are expected to decline sharply following Middle Eastern and Asian capacity additions. But contrary to the prevailing view, fears of its long-term demise will prove to be exaggerated. Shell's Omega MEG process kicks off in South Korea The big goal for a process engineer could be the development of a technology that converts all the raw materials to the desired end product with the minimum theoretical energy consumption, no emissions and the lowest capital cost.

#### No link – the link ev is talking about European countries banning nat gas in favor of the aff

#### Low prices bad:

**1.) Warming –**

#### A. Low prices cause flaring - leads to warming

Henkel 12 (Karl, reporter at The Detroit News, degree from Wayne State University, “Natural gas industry in a crash (and burn),” 4-18-12, <http://www.vindy.com/news/2012/apr/18/crash-and-burn/>)

The nice weather doesn’t seem to be going anywhere, and neither do cheap gas prices. The latter is having an impact on the oil-and-gas industry, which for the past decade has explored and extracted from gas-rich shale plays in Texas and Pennsylvania, to name two. Just three years ago, natural gas was $10 per 1,000 cubic feet, which allowed drillers a comfortable profit margin on their investments, which in unconventional shale plays can reach $10 million per horizontal well. But today, natural-gas prices are below $2 per 1,000 cubic feet for the first time in a decade. Gone is the prospect of gas-only exploration. The operating gas-rig count nationwide was 624 last week, the lowest weekly figure in a decade, according to Houston oil-and gas-services company Baker Hughes. Gone, too, is the gaping profit margin. Energy analysts estimate that $5 per 1,000 cubic feet is the profitability point for most drillers; any price less than that, coupled with a deficient way of transporting or storing, makes for an unfavorable business model. “There are no hard-and-fast rules on that,” said Dan Whitten, spokesman for Americas Natural Gas Alliance. “What you’re seeing is some companies are making those decisions, and I think some of that is areas where there are only dry gas potential.” Low natural-gas prices have changed the strategy for drillers in various ways. First, companies such as Oklahoma City-based Chesapeake Energy Corp., a large mineral-rights holder in Ohio, has decided to back out of natural-gas plays such as the Barnett Shale in Texas and the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania. The company’s rig count in the Barnett, which was 43 in 2008, is just six this year. Meanwhile, the company hopes to have 40 rigs in the Utica Shale by 2015. But drillers must also consider what they want to do with natural gas from current wells. Storage is the most obvious option, but because of the aforementioned mild weather, there’s a surplus of natural gas, and underground storage space is now at a premium. Drillers can “dial back” natural-gas production at well heads, but not nearly to the extent that it could alleviate the gas surplus. That brings in another option: flaring, the process in which gas is elevated and burned. The process has been used for operations reasons for years, but never to the extent it is used today. In North Dakota’s oil-rich Bakken Shale, it is estimated that as much as one-third of all produced natural gas is flared. Natural gas normally accompanies oil in the production and extraction process, which means that even if drillers target oil- and wet-gas-heavy shale plays, natural-gas production still will occur. That is the case in the Utica Shale, where the most heavily oil-producing well in Ohio also produced 1.5 million MCF of natural gas, albeit in just about six months’ time. Chesapeake says it is prepared for Utica Shale exploration and low natural-gas prices. “The purpose of flaring is to safely consume any produced gas before it has reached sufficient conditions to enter a sales pipeline,” said Pete Kenworthy, Chesapeake spokesman. “After the well is connected to the pipeline, if market circumstances warrant, we can wait to turn the well online. In similar conditions, we can also cut back on production.” Environmentalists have criticized natural-gas flaring as an even worse hazard than the actual extraction process, which is done by fracking, or blasting a mix of water, chemicals and sand thousands of feet below the ground to open shale rock formations. “It seems we should slow down the drilling until natural-gas prices rise so that it becomes a smart business model,” said Vanessa Pesec, president of the Network for Oil and Gas Accountability. “[Flaring] contributes to organic compounds in the air that will affect everyone’s health and greenhouse gases,” she added.

## 1ar v Kentucky GR

#### Keystone good - Keystone failure results in more carbon emissions and worse oil spills.

**McNally**, 11/29/**2011** (Scott – research intern for the White House Council on Environmental Quality, Keystone XL? It’s Not an Environmental Question, Scientific American, p. http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/plugged-in/2011/11/29/guest-post-keystone-xl-its-not-an-environmental-question/)

Canada already produces almost two million barrels of oil per day from oil sands (National Energy Board of Canada – www.neb-one.gc.ca) and they aren’t going to just stop doing it because America says no to this pipeline. If the Keystone XL pipeline is blocked, TransCanada can just build a pipeline to the west coast of British Columbia and use tankers to move the oil to Asia. (By the way, they already have a major pipeline to the west coast – The Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain pipeline, and almost a dozen other major pipelines that come into the United States). You might argue, ‘Environmentalists in Canada will stop that pipeline.’ No they won’t. Pipelines and massive oil sands operations already exist. Keystone XL did not meet significant resistance in Canada, and as long as it is routed correctly, neither will a pipeline to the coast. The oil sands are an incredible source of jobs and revenue for Canada, and they will find a way to route the pipeline that does not meet untenable political resistance. Just like Canada will keep producing, we will keep importing. If we don’t import from Canada, we will import more oil from the Middle East or Africa. The same amount of oil will be produced and consumed globally either way, but in the ‘no Keystone’ case, the oil will just have to travel farther, which could mean more carbon emissions because of transportation. The previously referenced Ensys report also mentions that, “Together, growing Canadian oil sands imports and U.S. demand reduction have the potential to very substantially reduce U.S. dependency on non-Canadian foreign oil, including from the Middle East.” Furthermore, we are lucky to get the oil. Canada already exports to Asia, where the market is actually cheaper to access. That is because to export from Canada to China, the required pipeline will be much shorter than to the U.S. Gulf Coast, and pipelines are very expensive (About $1 million per mile). As it was put in the Ensys Keystone XL Report: “costs for transporting [Canadian oil sands] crudes to major markets in northeast Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) via pipeline and tanker are lower than to transport the same crudes via pipeline to the U.S. Gulf Coast.” There is valid concern over pipelines crossing sensitive areas, including aquifers. The pipeline should be routed so that any potential spill will have the least impact possible, as small spills should be expected to occur occasionally. However, the odds that oil spilled from a pipeline will actually contaminate an aquifer are low, and pipeline spills tend to be much less severe than tanker spills. The bottom line is this: if we don’t build a pipeline over land, the alternative to ship, in tankers, across oceans. The pipeline is the less risky environmental choice. For the record, I believe very strongly that we need to reduce carbon emissions. The quickest, easiest, least expensive, least disruptive way to reduce carbon emissions is to stop using so much energy. Stop driving, turn off your air conditioner. If we are serious about reducing carbon emissions, we have to get serious about using less energy and using it more efficiently. Blocking Keystone XL will not get us any closer to solving the climate problem.

#### CHINA

#### Romney is a pragmatist --- he won’t bash China.

**Foster**, 7/25/**2012** (Peter – Telegraph’s US Editor, Mitt Romney wants to put the spine back into US foreign policy, but he's not a warrior. He’s a pragmatist, The Telegraph, p. <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/peterfoster/100172414/mitt-romney-wants-to-put-the-spine-back-into-us-foreign-policy-but-hes-not-a-warrior-hes-a-pragmatist/>)

The Obama campaign will try and cast this as a return to the ‘dark days of Dubya’ when crusading neo-cons waged righteous war after 9/11, leading the free world into a financially ruinous quagmire from which only now, Obama is finally managing to extract us. But we this doesn't ring true for two reasons: first, America is war-weary, and Romney knows it; there is no appetite for adventure right now and second, because ‘Dubya’ himself is nowhere to be seen during this campaign. He is conspicuously and deliberately absent. Romney isn’t a neo-con. He’s a data-drive politician who privately knows the limits of US hard power and, in a time of recession, the public will-power to sustain further conflict – but critically he also knows that in a world in such economic and geopolitical flux, US backbone has never been more important. That is why Romney, for all his huffing and puffing about Obama and Afghanistan, is still planning to have the troops out by 2014. It is why when he talks about Iran, he talks about the iron application of sanctions and not unleashing the bunker-buster at first light. And also why there's no mention of designating China as a currency manipulator on day one of his presidency. Romney is **not saying he plans to take up where Bush left off**, but that he wants America to re-discover its spine and end the Obama administration’s policy of giving “trust where it is not earned, insult where it is not deserved, and apology where it is not due.” Romney recognizes the truth that Russia under Putin and China under the mandarins, are fundamentally transactional and Cold War in their approach to the world. Playing nice has yielded nothing over Syria, just as it didn’t when Obama came to Beijing shortly after being elected and was made a laughing stock by the Chinese. And the result of the Obama doctrine is plain for all to see right now in Syria, a conflict that is crying out for US presidential leadership – not military intervention, note, but leadership.

#### -- Won’t go nuclear

PPG 4 (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania), 9-29, Lexis)

U.S. military capacity is now so overstretched by the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts that a Chinese move to realize its own top strategic objective, the scooping up of Taiwan to complete the hat trick with Hong Kong and Macao, would find the United States hard-pressed to be able to respond at all. A U.S. threat of a nuclear attack on China -- with China's inevitable nuclear counterstrike -- would be so wildly unacceptable in political terms in the United States itself as to be **out of the question** for any U.S. administration. The idea of causing Los Angeles to disappear because China had seized Taiwan would be a trade-off that no American leader would even dare contemplate. America is lucky so far that China has not yet sought to match its economic reach in Asia with a corresponding assertion of political influence. That doesn't mean that Asia will inevitably become a sphere of Chinese dominance. What will happen instead -- what is already happening, in fact -- is that other Asian powers such as Japan, Korea and India will increasingly take steps to check Chinese power by increasing their own military capacity. In other words, what was a situation in which the United States stood between Japan and Korea and the imposition of Chinese influence will now become one in which those countries will become more dependent on their own resources to defend themselves. The response of the Koreans could be said to be a move toward resolving the problems between South and North Korea to enable them to present a united front to the Chinese. The response of Japan that can be expected will be limited remilitarization. The health and peace of the region will depend on the degree to which the competition among these countries will be economic, rather than political and military. What will this modification of the balance of power in Asia mean for the United States? First of all, none of this will happen tomorrow. The extension of China's reach and the Japanese and Korean response will be gradual and spread out across the years, although there may well be some pinpricks at the extremities sooner rather than later. The Chinese themselves will avoid direct confrontation with the United States at all costs. It is not their way. Conflict between the two countries would be asymmetrical in the extreme in any case. Basically, the two can't attack each other. **Nuclear warfare is out**. The million-man People's Liberation Army isn't portable. The Chinese are definitely not into terrorism.

<optional>

#### No trade war --- economic interests outweigh.

**Parameswaran**, 4/11/**2007** (P. – AFP Asian Correspondent, US-China trade spat unlikely to spiral out of control, Agence France Presse, p. Lexis-Nexis)

P. Parameswaran, AFP Asian Correspondent, 4-11-2007, US-China trade spat unlikely to spiral out of control, Agence France Press

Despite ominous signs of an escalating trade row, experts are not overly concerned. Trade frictions between big powers are "part and parcel" of bilateral relations and a full blown trade war between the United States and China is unlikely, said Nicholas Lardy, an expert at the Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics. There is also little room for China to retaliate as Washington's actions are being undertaken through the proper channel -- the WTO -- with no guarantees that all the legal suits will end in US favour, Lardy said. "Contrary to popular opinion, this is not the beginning of a trade war," said Dan Ikenson of the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank in Washington. He thinks some of the trade issues will likely be resolved in bilateral consultations within the next two months. The two nations are scheduled to hold a high-level "strategic economic dialogue" in May. "The stakes are simply way too high for these disputes not to be resolved amicably, and in a manner which puts the relationship on even firmer footing," Ikenson said. The United States is China's largest overseas market and second largest source of foreign direct investment while China is the fourth largest market for US goods and remains the fastest growing major US export market.

#### Jobs Tradeoff – gas drilling doesn’t create long term growth

Levi 12 (Michael, Senior Fellow for Energy and Environment – Council on Foreign Relations “Think Again: The American Energy Boom,” 8-10-12, Foreign Policy, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/think_again_the_american_energy_boom>)

"The U.S. Energy Boom Will Create Millions of New Jobs." Overstated. The U.S. oil and gas boom has come at an auspicious time. With record numbers of Americans out of work, hydrocarbon production is helping create much-needed jobs in communities from Pennsylvania to North Dakota. Shale gas production alone accounted for an estimated 600,000 U.S. jobs as of 2010, according to the consultancy IHS CERA. It's much harder, though, to extrapolate into the future. In a deeply depressed economy, new development can put people to work without reducing employment elsewhere. That's why boom states have benefited massively in recent years. The same is not true, though, in a more normal economy. Unemployment rates are typically determined by fundamental factors such as the ease of hiring and firing and the match between skills that employers need and that workers have. The oil and gas boom won't change these much. That's why we should be skeptical about rosy projections of millions of new jobs. Wood MacKenzie, for example, claims that the energy boom could deliver as many as 1.1 million jobs by 2020, while Citigroup forecasts a whopping 3.6 million. Unless the U.S. economy remains deep in the doldrums for another decade, these will mostly come at the expense of jobs elsewhere. That hardly means all the new oil and gas coming online is worthless. In the near term, it can support hundreds of thousands of workers who would otherwise be unemployed. In the long term, it should deliver a boost to the overall U.S. economy, raising GDP by as much as three percentage points, according to my colleague, Citigroup's Daniel Ahn. But we can't drill our way out of America's job crisis. The numbers just don't add up.

#### No Significant Exports – won’t affect the global market

Phillips 12 (Matthew, Associate editor for Bloomberg Businessweek, “Strange Bedfellows Debate Exporting Natural Gas,” 8-22-12, <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-08-22/strange-bedfellows-debate-exporting-natural-gas#p1>)

None of this is likely to be settled anytime soon. The U.S. is almost sure to enter 2013, and probably 2014, exporting the same amount of natural gas as it currently does: which is almost none. The bulk of what it does export (PDF) gets piped into Canada and Mexico. To reach the really big markets in Asia and India and Europe, natural gas has to get super-chilled to -260F, turned into liquefied natural gas (LNG), and put on a ship. The only LNG export facility in the entire country is a small one up in Alaska called Kenai. ConocoPhillips (COP) is sending small shipments of LNG to Japan from Kenai, but there’s demand for so much more. In the last two years, companies have rushed to apply to the Department of Energy for approval to build terminals to export LNG to non-Free Trade Agreement countries, which is basically everybody. Non-FTA countries account for 91 percent of global GDP. The DOE has received 15 applications (PDF) to export domestic LNG, mostly out of the Gulf Coast. It’s approved just one: Cheniere Energy’s (LNG) $10 billion Sabine Pass terminal—which just happens to be located right next to the import facility the company finished in 2008, back when it looked like the U.S. was going to need huge amounts of imported LNG. The timing couldn’t have been worse. The shale gas revolution started in earnest the following year. That idled import facility is evidence of just how volatile the natural gas market is, and how risky it is to build an export facility. This point may or may not be lost on the companies scrambling for approval. According to Levi from the CFR, that long line of applications may represent false demand: While it costs billions to actually build an export terminal, it only costs $50 to apply for the right to.

## 2ac v NWestern BF

### GW

### A2: Warming =/= Extinction

#### Global warming causes ice sheets to melt which prevents them from sequestrating further C02 and causes feedback loops where more ice melts faster – this causes Sea level rise and surface heating – we’re going to burn everything up until it all collapses – that’s Dreibel

#### C02 turns oceans to acid, killing marine ecosystems

Stern 7 (Nicholas, Head of the British Government Economic Service, Former Head Economist for the World Bank, I.G. Patel Chair – London School of Economics and Political Science, “The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review”, p. 72)

Ocean acidification, a direct result of rising carbon dioxide levels, will have major effects on marine ecosystems, with possible adverse consequences on fish stocks. For fisheries, information on the likely impacts of climate change is very limited – a major gap in knowledge considering that about one billion people worldwide (one-sixth of the world’s population) rely on fish as their primary source of animal protein. While higher ocean temperatures may increase growth rates of some fish, reduced nutrient supplies due to warming may limit growth. Ocean acidification is likely to be particularly damaging. The oceans have become more acidic in the past 200 years, because of chemical changes caused by increasing amounts of carbon dioxide dissolving in seawater.44 If global emissions continue to rise on current trends, ocean acidity is likely to increase further, with pH declining by an additional 0.15 units if carbon dioxide levels double (to 560 ppm) relative to pre-industrial and an additional 0.3 units if carbon dioxide levels treble (to 840 ppm).45 Changes on this scale have not been experienced for hundreds of thousands of years and are occurring at an extremely rapid rate. Increasing ocean acidity makes it harder for many ocean creatures to form shells and skeletons from calcium carbonate. These chemical changes have the potential to disrupt marine ecosystems irreversibly - at the very least halting the growth of corals, which provide important nursery grounds for commercial fish, and damaging molluscs and certain types of plankton at the base of the food chain. Plankton and marine snails are critical to sustaining species such as salmon, mackerel and baleen whales, and such changes are expected to have serious but as-yet-unquantified wider impacts.

#### Extinction results

Craig 3 (Robin Kundis, Associate Prof Law, Indiana U School Law, Lexis)

Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857 More generally, "ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems.Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." n859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. [\*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system. n860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with usu.

### More Generic Warming Bad Ev

More evidence – tipping point, melting, war, and extinction

Burke 8 (Sharon - senior fellow and director of the energy security project at the Center for a New American Security, Chapter 6 of Climatic Cataclysm: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Climate Change, edited by Kurt Campbell, p 157-165)

At the same time, however, the implications of both trends for human society and survival raise the stakes; it is crucial to try to understand what the future might look like in one hundred years in order to act accordingly today.  This scenario, therefore, builds a picture of the plausible effects of catastrophic climate change, and the implications for national security, on the basis of what we know about the past and the present. The purpose is not to "one up" the previous scenarios in awfulness, but rather to attempt to imagine the unimaginable future that is, after all, entirely plausible.  Assumed Climate Effects of the Catastrophic Scenario.  In the catastrophic scenario, the year 2040 marks an important tipping point. Large-scale, singular events of abrupt climate change will start occurring, greatly exacerbated by the collapse of the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (MOC), which is believed to play and important role in regulating global climate, particularly in Europe.8 There will be a rapid loss of polar ice, a sudden rise in sea levels, totaling 2 meters (6.6 feet), and a temperature increase of almost 5.6°C (10.1°F) by 2095.  Developing countries, particularly those at low latitudes and those reliant on subsistence, rain-fed farming, will be hardest and earliest hit.  All nations, however, will find it difficult to deal with the unpredictable, abrupt, and severe nature of climate change after 2040. These changes will be difficult to anticipate, and equally difficult to mitigate or recover from, particularly as they will recur, possibly on a frequent basis. First, the rise in temperatures alone will present a fundamental challenge for human health. Indeed, even now, about 250 people die of heatstroke every year in the United States. In a prolonged heat wave in 1980, more than 10,000 people died of heat-related illnesses, and between 5,000 and 10,00 in 1988.9 In 2003, record heat waves in Europe, with temperatures in Paris hitting 40.4°C (104.7°F) and 47.3°C (116.3°F) in parts of Portugal, are estimated to have cost more than 37,000 lives; in the same summer there were at least 2,000 heat-related deaths in India. Average temperatures will increase in most regions, and the western United States, southern Europe, and southern Australia will be particularly vulnerable to prolonged heat spells. The rise in temperatures will complicated daily life around the world. In Washington, D.C., the average summer temperature is in the low 30s C (high 80s F), getting as high as 40°C (104°F).  With a 5.6°C (10.1°F) increase, that could mean temperatures as high as 45.6°C (114.5°F).  In New Delhi, summer temperatures can reach 45°C (113°F) already, opening the possibility of new highs approaching sO.sOC (123°F). In general, the level of safe exposure is considered to be about 38°C (lOO°F); at hotter temperatures, activity has to be limited and the very old and the very young are especially vulnerable to heat-related ill­ness and mortality. Sudden shifts in temperature, which are expected in this scenario, are particularly lethal. As a result of higher temperatures and lower, unpredictable precipitation, severe and persistent wildfires will become more common, freshwater will be more scarce, and agricultural productivity will fall, particularly in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean, and the western United States. The World Health Organization estimates that water scarcity already affects two- fifths of the world population-s-some 2.6 billion people. In this scenario, half the world population will experience persistent water scarcity. Regions that depend on annual snowfall and glaciers for water lose their supply; hardest hit will be Central Asia, the Andes, Europe, and western North America. Some regions may become uninhabitable due to lack of water: the Mediter­ranean, much of Central Asia, northern Mexico, and South America. The southwestern United States will lose its current sources of fresh water, but that may be mitigated by an increase in precipitation due to the MOC col­lapse, though precipitation patterns may be irregular. Regional water scarcity will also be mitigated by increases in precipitation in East Africa and East and Southeast Asia, though the risk of floods will increase. The lack of rainfall will also threaten tropical forests and their dependent species with extinction. Declining agricultural productivity will be an acute challenge. The heat, together with shifting and unpredictable precipitation patterns and melting glaciers, will dry out many areas, including today's grain-exporting regions. The largest decreases in precipitation will be in North Africa, the Middle East, Cen tral America, the Caribbean, and northeastern South America, including Amazonia. The World Food Program estimates that nearly 1 billion people suffer from chronic hunger today, almost 15 million of them refugees from conflict and natural disasters. According to the World Food Program, "More than nine out of ten of those who die I of chronic hunger] are simply trapped by poverty in remote rural areas or urban slums. They do not make the news. They just die." Mortality rates from hunger and lack of water will skyrocket over the next century, and given all that wiII be happening, that will probably not make the news, either--people will just die. Over the next one hundred years, the "breadbasket" regions of the world will shift northward. Consequently, formerly subarctic regions will be able to support farming, but these regions' traditionally small human populations and lack of infrastructure, including roads and utilities, will make the dra­matic expansion of agriculture a challenge. Moreover, extreme year-to-year climate variability may make sustainable agriculture unlikely, at least on the scale needed. Northwestern Europe, too, will see shorter growing seasons and declining crop yields because it will actually experience colder winters, due to the collapse of the MOC. At the same time that the resource base to support humanity is shrinking, there will be less inhabitable land. Ten percent of the world population now lives in low-elevation coastal zones (all land contiguous with the coast that is 10 meters or less in elevation) that will experience sea level rises of 6.6 feet (2 meters) in this scenario and 9.8 feet (3 meters) in the North Atlantic, given the loss of the MOC. Most major cities at or near sea level have some kind of flood protection, so high tides alone will not lead to the inundation of these cities. Consider, however, that the combined effects of more frequent and severe weather events and higher sea levels could well lead to increased flood­ing from coastal storms and coastal erosion. In any case, there will be saltwa­ter intrusion into coastal water supplies, rising water tables, and the loss of coastal and upstream wetlands, with impacts on fisheries. The rise could well occur in several quick pulses, with relatively stable peri­ods in between, which will complicate planning and adaptation and make any kind of orderly or managed evacuation unlikely. Inundation plus the combined effects of higher sea levels and more frequent tropical storms may leave many large coastal cities uninhabitable, including the largest American cities, New York City and Los Angeles, focal points for the national economy with a combined total of almost 33 million people in their metropolitan areas today. Resettling coastal populations will be a crippling challenge, even for the United States. Sea level rises also will affect food security. Significant fertile deltas will become largely uncultivable because of inundation and more frequent and higher storm surges that reach farther inland. Fisheries and marine eco­systems, particularly in the North Atlantic, will collapse. Locally devastating weather events will be the new norm for coastal and mid-latitude locations-wind and flood damage will be much more intense. There will be frequent losses of life, property, and infrastructure-and this will happen every year*.* Although water scarcity and food security will dis­proportionately affect poor countries-they already do-extreme weather events will be more or less evenly distributed around the world. Regions affected by tropical storms, including typhoons and hurricanes, will include all three coasts of the United States; all of Mexico and Central America; the Caribbean islands; East, Southeast and South Asia; and many South Pacific and Indian Ocean islands. Recent isolated events when coastal storms made landfall in the South Atlantic, Europe, and the Arabian Sea in the last few years suggest that these regions will also experience a rise in the incidence of extreme storms. In these circumstances, there will be an across-the-board decline in human development indicators. Life spans will shorten, incomes will drop, health will deteriorate-including as a result of proliferating diseases-infant mortality will rise, and there will be a decline in personal freedoms as states fall to anocracy (a situation where central authority in a state is weak or non­existent and power has devolved to more regional or local actors, such as tribes) and autocracy. The Age of Survival: Imagining the Unimaginable Future If New Orleans is one harbinger of the future, Somalia is another. With a weak and barely functional central government that does not enjoy the trust and confidence of the public, the nation has descended into clan warfare. Mortality rates for combatants and noncombatants are high. Neighboring Ethiopia has intervened, with troops on the ground in Mogadishu and else­where, a small African Union peacekeeping force is present in the country, and the United States has conducted military missions in Somalia within the last year, including air strikes aimed at terrorist groups that the United States government has said are finding safe haven in the chaos." In a July 2007 report, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia reported that the nation is "lit­erally awash in arms" and factional groups are targeting not only all combat­ants in the country but also noncombatants, including aid groups. Drought is a regular feature of life in Somalia that even in the best of times has been difficult to deal with. These are bad times, indeed, for Somalia, and the mutually reinforcing cycle of drought, famine, and conflict has left some 750,000 Somalis internally displaced and about 1.5 million people-17 per­cent of the population-in dire need of humanitarian relief. The relief is dif­ficult to provide, however, given the lawlessness and violence consuming the country. For example, nearly all food assistance to Somalia is shipped by sea, but with the rise of piracy, the number of vessels willing to carry food to the country fell by 50 percent in 2007.u Life expectancy is forty-eight years, infant mortality has skyrocketed, and annual per capita GDP is estimated to be about six hundred dollars. The conflict has also had a negative effect on the stability of surrounding nations. In the catastrophic climate change scenario, situations like that in Soma­lia will be commonplace: there will be a sharp rise in failing and failed states and therefore in intrastate war. According to International Alert, there are forty-six countries, home to 2,7 billion people, at a high risk of violent con­flict as a result of climate change. The group lists an additional fifty-six nations, accounting for another 1.2 billion people, that will have difficulty dealing with climate change, given other challenges. 12 Over the next hundred years, in a catastrophic future, that means there are likely to be at least 102 failing and failed states, consumed by internal conflict, spewing desperate refugees, and harboring and spawning violent extremist movements. More­over, nations all over the world will be destabilized as a result, either by the crisis on their borders or the significant numbers of refugees and in some cases armed or extremist groups migrating into their territories. Over the course of the century, this will mean a collapse of globalization and transnational institutions and an increase in all types of conflict-most dramatically, intrastate and asymmetric. The global nature of the conflicts and the abruptness of the climate effects will challenge the ability of govern­ments all over the world to respond to the disasters, mitigate the effects, or to contain the violence along their borders. There will be civil unrest in every nation as a result of popular anger toward governments, scapegoating of migrant and minority populations, and a rise in charismatic end-of-days cults, which will deepen a sense of hopelessness as these cults tend to see no end to misery other than extinction followed by divine salvation. Given that the failing nations account for half of the global population, this will also be a cataclysmic humanitarian disaster, with hundreds of mil­lions of people dying from climate effects and conflict, totally overwhelming the ability of international institutions and donor nations to respond. This failure of the international relief system will be total after 2040 as donor nations are forced to turn their resources inward. There will be a worldwide economic depression and a reverse in the gains in standards of living made in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. At the same time, the probability of conflict between nations will rise. Although global interstate resource wars are generally unlikely;" simmering conflicts between nations, such as that between India and Pakistan, are likely to boil over, particularly if both nations are failing. Both India and Pakistan, of course, have nuclear weapons, and a nuclear exchange is possible, perhaps **likely,** either by failing central governments or by extremist and ethnic groups that seize control of nuclear weapons. There will also be competition for the Arctic region, where natural resources, including oil and arable land, will be increasingly accessible and borders are ill defined. It is possible that agreements over Arctic territories will be worked out among Russia, Canada, Norway, the United States, Iceland, and Denmark in the next two decades, before the truly catastrophic climate effects manifest themselves in those nations. If not, there **is a strong probability of conflict over the Arctic**, pos­sibly even armed conflict. In general, though, nations will be preoccupied with maintaining internal stability and will have difficulty mustering the resources for war. Indeed, the greater danger is that states will fail to muster the resources for interstate cooperation. Finally, all nations are likely to experience violent conflict as a result of migration patterns. There will be increasingly few arable parts of the world, and few nations able to respond to climate change effects, and hundreds of millions of desperate people looking for a safe haven-a volatile mix. This will cause considerable unrest in the United States, Canada, Europe, and Russia, and will likely involve inhumane border control practices. Imagining what this will actually mean at a national level is disheartening. For the United States, coastal cities in hurricane alley along the Gulf Coast will have to be abandoned, possibly as soon as the first half of the century, certainly by the end of the century. New Orleans will obviously be first, but Pascagoula and Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, and Houston and Beaumont, Texas, and other cities will be close behind. After the first couple of episodes of flooding and destructive winds, starting with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, the cities will be partially rebuilt; the third major incident will make it clear that the risk of renewed destruction is too high to justify the cost of reconstruction. The abandonment of oil and natural gas production facilities in the Gulf region will push the United States into a severe recession or even depression, probably before the abrupt climate effects take hold in 2040. Mex­ico's economy will be devastated, which will increase illegal immigration into the United States. Other major U.S. cities are likely to become uninhabitable after 2040, including New York City and Los Angeles, with a combined metropolitan population of nearly 33 million people. Resettling these populations will be a massive challenge that will preoccupy the United States, cause tremen­dous popular strife, and absorb all monies, including private donations, which would have previously gone to foreign aid. The United States, Canada, China, Europe, and Japan will have little choice but to become aggressively isolationist, with militarized borders. Given how dependent all these nations are on global trade, this will provoke a deep, persistent eco­nomic crisis. Standards of living across the United States will fall dramatically, which will provoke civil unrest across the country. The imposition of martial law is a possibility. Though the poor and middle class will be hit the hardest, no one will be immune. The fact that wealthier Americans will be able to manage the effects better, however, will certainly provoke resent­ment and probably violence and higher crime rates. Gated communities are likely to be commonplace. Finally, the level of popular anger toward the United States, as the leading historical contributor to climate change, will be astronomical. There will be an increase in asymmetric attacks on the American homeland. India will cease to function as a nation, but before this occurs, Pakistan and Bangladesh will implode and help spur India's demise. This implosion will start with prolonged regional heat waves, which will quietly kill hundreds of thousands of people. It will not immediately be apparent that these are cli­mate change casualties. Massive agricultural losses late in the first half of the century, along with the collapse of fisheries as a result of sea level rise, rising oceanic temperatures, and hypoxic conditions, will put the entire region into a food emergency At first, the United States, Australia, China, New Zealand, and the Nordic nations will be able to coordinate emergency food aid and work with Indian scientists to introduce drought- and saltwater-resistant plant species. Millions of lives will be saved, and India will be stabilized for a time. But a succession of crippling droughts and heat waves in all of the donor nations and the inundation of several populous coastal cities will force these nations to concentrate on helping their own populations. The World Food Program and other international aid agencies will first have trouble operating in increasingly violent areas, and then, as donations dry up, will cease operations. Existing internal tensions in India will explode in the latter half of the century, as hundreds of millions of starving people begin to move, trying to find a way to survive. As noted above, a nuclear exchange between either the national governments or subnational groups in the region is possi­ble and perhaps even likely. By mid-century, communal genocide will rage unchecked in several African states, most notably Sudan and Senegal, where agriculture will com­pletely collapse and the populations will depend on food imports. Both nations will be covered with ghost towns, where entire populations have either perished or fled; **this will increasingly be true across Africa, South Asia, Central Asia, Central America, the Caribbean, South America, and Southeast Asia.** Europe will have the oddity of having to deal with far colder winters, given the collapse of the MOC, which will compromise agricultural productivity.

#### Warming causes diseases that risk extinction

Zimmerman 96 (Barry and David, M.S. – Long Island University, Killer Germs, p. 132)

Then came AIDS…and Ebola and Lassa fever and Marburg and dengue fever. They came, for the most part, from the steamy jungles of the world. Lush tropical rain forests are ablaze with deadly viruses. And changing lifestyles as well as changing environmental conditions are flushing them out. Air travel, deforestation, global warming are forcing never-before-encountered viruses to suddenly cross the path of humanity. The result—emerging viruses. Today some five thousand vials of exotic viruses sit, freeze-dried, at Yale University—imports from the rain forests. They await the outbreak of diseases that can be ascribed to them. Many are carried by insects and are termed arboviruses (arthropod borne). Others, of even greater concern, are airborne and can simply be breathed in. Some, no doubt, could threaten humanity’s very existence. Joshua Lederberg, 1958 winner of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine and foremost authority on emerging viruses, warned in a December 1990 article in Discover magazine: “It is still not comprehended widely that AIDS is a natural, almost predictable phenomenon. It is not going to be a unique event. Pandemics are not acts of God, but are built into the ecological relations between viruses, animal species and human species…There will be more surprises, because our fertile imagination does not begin to match all the tricks that nature can play…” According to Lederberg, “The survival of humanity is not preordained…The single biggest threat to [hu]man’s continued dominance on the planet is the virus” (A Dancing Matrix, by Robin Marantz Hening).

### Prolif

### Small Arsenals

**Even if they are simpler other risks make them more destabilizing**

**Feaver ’97** (Peter, Ass. Prof. Pol. Sci. – Duke, Security Studies, “Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation”, 6:4, p. 102-103)

Are small and simple arsenals really more responsive in a crisis? Neooptimists dismiss some of the most damning near-nuclear accidents from the cold war era as merely a consequence of the rigid and complex standard operating procedures associated with the large superpower arsenals. Seng claims, with rather unjustified enthusiasm, that smaller arsenals should be able to "spin on a dime."27 He overstates his case. Given a certain level of operational skill, it is easier to improvise with a smaller than a larger arsenal. Will minor proliferators, however, have the kind of military that is proficient enough to improvise at all? Some will and some will not. Doctrinal skill varies widely across different militaries and even within different subelements of the same military.28 Of course, the nuclear operators may be the better trained elements of the minor proliferator, but not under conditions of opacity. Improvisation and operational flexibility are not simply a matter of size; they must be trained into military units. This argument points to a limitation of small-N comparative static analyses. Holding everything constant and then varying the size of the arsenal yields an expectation that command and control problems will ease. If you take the exact same country with the exact same deployment and skill profile, it will find controlling a smaller arsenal easier than controlling a larger arsenal. Counterfactual reasoning supports this logic, but since there are so few cases of nuclear proliferation to study we cannot be very confident of the magnitude of the effect.29 Since the purpose of neooptimism is to assuage us on the safeness of minor proliferators, it is not sufficient to know whether a certain kind of proliferation is relatively safer than another. We must also know how much safer—that is, whether it is safe enough to compensate for other problems. One must also examine whether the factor that is driving the smallness will also result in changes in other relevant parameters, for instance the alert level of the arsenal or the reliability of the weapon's design. One must also have some sense of the magnitude of effect and of other necessary conditions; the smaller size may only afford a meaningful improvement in nuclear command and control during a crisis if it is coupled with a competent military. Weighing all the factors in the U.S. case, for instance, it is not at all certain that nuclear operations were safer in the late-1950s than in the late-1960s; the arsenal was smaller in the earlier period, but the advantages of size were offset by a variety of unsafe operational practices including airborne alerts, a relatively wide scope of predelegated authority, an absence of use-control devices, and a general ignorance among top-level civilian leaders about operational realities. In sum, neooptimists have helpfully fleshed out the ways in which small size facilitates command and control. In so doing, however, they may be overstating both the virtues of smallness and simplicity and the likelihood that minor proliferators will adopt the specific kinds of small and simple arsenals necessary for the rosy scenario.

### Krieger

#### Nuclear optimists’ logic is flawed – you shouldn’t take the chance on the end of the species

**Krieger, 9**  (David, Pres. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Councilor – World Future Council, “Still Loving the Bomb After All These Years”, 9-4, <https://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/09/04_krieger_newsweek_response.php?krieger>)

Jonathan Tepperman’s article in the September 7, 2009 issue of Newsweek, “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,” provides a novel but frivolous argument that nuclear weapons “may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous….” Rather, in Tepperman’s world, “The bomb may actually make us safer.” Tepperman shares this world with Kenneth Waltz, a University of California professor emeritus of political science, who Tepperman describes as “the leading ‘nuclear optimist.’” Waltz expresses his optimism in this way: “We’ve now had 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It’s striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states.” Actually, there were a number of proxy wars between nuclear weapons states, such as those in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan, and some near disasters, the most notable being the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Waltz’s logic is akin to observing a man falling from a high rise building, and noting that he had already fallen for 64 floors without anything bad happening to him, and concluding that so far it looked so good that others should try it. Dangerous logic! Tepperman builds upon Waltz’s logic, and concludes “that all states are rational,” even though their leaders may have a lot of bad qualities, including being “stupid, petty, venal, even evil….” He asks us to trust that rationality will always prevail when there is a risk of nuclear retaliation, because these weapons make “the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable.” Actually, he is asking us to do more than trust in the rationality of leaders; he is asking us to gamble the future on this proposition. “The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling,” Tepperman argues, “it’s led to what’s known as the nuclear peace….” But if this is a peace worthy of the name, which it isn’t, it certainly is not one on which to risk the future of civilization. One irrational leader with control over a nuclear arsenal could start a nuclear conflagration, resulting in a global Hiroshima. Tepperman celebrates “the iron logic of deterrence,” but deterrence is a theory that is far from rooted in “iron logic.” It is a theory based upon threats that must be effectively communicated and believed. Leaders of Country A with nuclear weapons must communicate to other countries (B, C, etc.) the conditions under which A will retaliate with nuclear weapons. The leaders of the other countries must understand and believe the threat from Country A will, in fact, be carried out. The longer that nuclear weapons are not used, the more other countries may come to believe that they can challenge Country A with impunity from nuclear retaliation. The more that Country A bullies other countries, the greater the incentive for these countries to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Deterrence is unstable and therefore precarious. Most of the countries in the world reject the argument, made most prominently by Kenneth Waltz, that the spread of nuclear weapons makes the world safer. These countries joined together in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but they never agreed to maintain indefinitely a system of nuclear apartheid in which some states possess nuclear weapons and others are prohibited from doing so. The principal bargain of the NPT requires the five NPT nuclear weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France and China) to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament, and the International Court of Justice interpreted this to mean complete nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. Tepperman seems to be arguing that seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is bad policy, and that nuclear weapons, because of their threat, make efforts at non-proliferation unnecessary and even unwise. If some additional states, including Iran, developed nuclear arsenals, he concludes that wouldn’t be so bad “given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.” Those who oppose Tepperman’s favorable disposition toward the bomb, he refers to as “nuclear pessimists.” These would be the people, and I would certainly be one of them, who see nuclear weapons as presenting an urgent danger to our security, our species and our future. Tepperman finds that when viewed from his “nuclear optimist” perspective, “nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening.” “Nuclear peace,” he tells us, “rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad – conventional war – won’t happen.” But the “extremely bad” thing he asks us to accept is the end of the human species. Yes, that would be serious. He also doesn’t make the case that in a world without nuclear weapons, the prospects of conventional war would increase dramatically. After all, it is only an unproven supposition that nuclear weapons have prevented wars, or would do so in the future. We have certainly come far too close to the precipice of catastrophic nuclear war. As an ultimate celebration of the faulty logic of deterrence, Tepperman calls for providing any nuclear weapons state with a “survivable second strike option.” Thus, he not only favors nuclear weapons, but finds the security of these weapons to trump human security. Presumably he would have President Obama providing new and secure nuclear weapons to North Korea, Pakistan and any other nuclear weapons states that come along so that they will feel secure enough not to use their weapons in a first-strike attack. Do we really want to bet the human future that Kim Jong-Il and his successors are more rational than Mr. Tepperman?

### A2: Proliferators Not Aggressive

#### We don’t have to win aggression – our Horowitz 9 evidence indicates that weapons created for economic stability will be used to keep declining governments in power if the economy starts to decline – that’s the lashout scenario

#### And miscalc means conventional weapons could cause a second strike – intent doesn’t matter that’s Cimbala 8

#### Saudi aggression - Saudi prolif is the highest risk of nuclear war

**Edelman, 11** (Jan/Feb, Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran)

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear **war**. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

### Bioweapons

#### -- Many barriers to bioweapons

Newsweek 1 (10-18, p. 21, Lexis)

Acquiring, producing, and delivering the smallpox virus would pose a series of **challenging technical hurdles** for terrorists, making an attack with the virus unlikely--although potentially catastrophic were it to occur. First, because the smallpox virus no longer exists in nature, terrorists would have to acquire it from a state with undeclared laboratory stocks of the virus, or perhaps from former Soviet bioweapons scientists who had smuggled out samples of the virus. Second, the terrorists would have to grow the virus in eggs or animal cells, which is technically challenging. Third, they would have to find some means of disseminating the virus as a fine, inhalable mist of microscopic particles or droplets (called an aerosol), which would require specialized technology and know-how. For a low-tech attack, suicide terrorists might consider infecting themselves and spreading the disease, but they would have only a few days to do so before the facial rash became obvious. Moreover, even terrorists prepared for instant martyrdom in an explosion might hesitate before willingly suffering a slow, painful, and hideous death from a disease like smallpox.

And the ochs ev is really bad, no warrants to the claim

### A2: Prolif Good – Conventional Wars Impact

#### Prolif increases risk of the impact – wars between non-nuclear countries cant escalate to nuclear war

#### Risk of nuclear war outweighs – conventional wars won’t cause exintinction – squo proves

#### Prolif increases the risk of conventional war – high costs encourage conflict

**Kapur ‘7** (S. Paul, Associate Prof. Strategic Research Department @ Naval War College, “Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia”, p. 171)

My study's findings have important implications for our theoretical understanding of nuclear proliferation's effects on international security. As noted, proliferation optimists argue that by threatening to raise the cost of war astronomically, nuclear weapons reduce the likelihood of conflict. My findings, however, indicate that this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, the study shows that the danger of nuclear weapons can in certain circumstances have the opposite effect. By potentially raising the costs of violence, nuclear weapons can make conflict more likely, encouraging a weak, revisionist state both to take territory while insulated from all-out conventional retaliation and to attempt to force third-party diplomatic intervention in ensuing crises. The high cost of nuclear war is precisely what promises to make such a strategy successful; nuclear § Marked 16:08 § danger deters adversaries and also attracts outside attention. If nuclear weapons were not so destructive, a weak, revisionist state would get neither of these benefits and would be less likely to engage in aggressive behavior. Thus, the high cost of nuclear war may not lead to lower level stability and can actually increase the likelihood of conflict.

### Off

### Heidegger 2AC

#### -- Case turns the K – nuclear tech is inevitable – other countries view nature as a standing reserve – the sends a global signal to other countries to use environment-friendly tech.

#### -- Perm – do the plan and non-competitive parts of the alternative. It solves best.

**McWhorter 92** (Ladelle, Assistant Professor of Philosophy – Northeast Missouri State University, Heidegger and the Earth, p. 3)

Heidegger's work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities.

#### -- No extinction – tech and calculation have existed forever – and the world is getting better

#### -- Extinction outweighs – pre-requisite to Being

**Zimmerman 93** (Michael E., Professor of Philosophy – University of Tulane, Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity, p. 119-120)

Heidegger asserted that human self assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being and human Dasein. Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might “bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth.” This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one’s soul by losing ones relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur in an ontological clearing through which life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity’s one dimensional disclosure to entities virtually denies that any “being” at all, the loss of humanity’s openness for being is already occurring. Modernity’s background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material happiness for everyone by reducing nature into pure energy. The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in a nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity’s slow destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided a nuclear war only to survive as contended clever animals, Heidegger believed we would exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth, masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead. **But most** of them **could not agree that the loss of humanity’s relation to being would be worse than nuclear omnicide**, for it is wrong to suppose that the lives of millions of extinct and unknown species are somehow lessened because they were never “disclosed” by humanity.

#### -- Framework – evaluate the aff vs. status quo or a competitive policy option. That’s best for fairness and predictability – there are too many frameworks to predict and they moot all of the 1ac – makes it impossible to be aff. Only our framework solves activism.

Alt doesn’t solve the case –

1. doesn’t build nuclear reactors – it rejects tech
2. changing relations to nature doesn’t change temp
3. there’s no spillover between demand we reject tech and people doing it

#### -- Perm do both – Alt alone fails – ‘letting be’ and waiting for metaphysical transformation dooms us to extinction

**Santoni 85** (Ronald E., Professor of Philosophy – Denison, Nuclear War, Ed. Fox and Groarke, p. 156-157)

To be sure, Fox sees the need for our undergoing “certain fundamental changes” in our “thinking, beliefs, attitudes, values” and Zimmerman calls for a “paradigm shift” in our thinking about ourselves, other, and the Earth. But it is not clear that what either offers as suggestions for what we can, must, or should do in the face of a runaway arms race are sufficient to “wind down” the arms race before it leads to **omnicide**. In spite of the importance of Fox’s analysis and reminders it is not clear that “admitting our (nuclear) fear and anxiety” to ourselves and “identifying the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses” represent much more than examples of basic, often. stated principles of psychotherapy. Being aware of the psychological maneuvers that keep us numb to nuclear reality may well be the road to transcending them but it must only be a “first step” (as Fox acknowledges), during which we **simultaneously act** to eliminate nuclear threats, break our complicity with the arms race, get rid of arsenals of genocidal weaponry, and create conditions for international goodwill, mutual trust, and creative interdependence. Similarly, in respect to Zimmerman: in spite of the challenging Heideggerian insights he brings out regarding what motivates the arms race, many questions may be raised about his prescribed “solutions.” Given our need for a paradigm shift in our (distorted) understanding of ourselves and the rest of being, are we merely left “to prepare for a possible shift in our self-understanding? (italics mine)? Is this all we can do? Is it necessarily the case that such a shift “cannot come as a result of our own will?” – and work – but only from “a destiny outside our control?” Does this mean we leave to God the matter of bringing about a paradigm shift? Granted our fears and the importance of not being controlled by fears, as well as our “anthropocentric leanings,” should we be as cautious as Zimmerman suggests about our disposition “to want to do something” or “to act decisively in the face of the current threat?” In spite of the importance of our taking on the anxiety of our finitude and our present limitation, does it follow that “we should be willing for the worst (i.e. an all-out nuclear war) to occur”? Zimmerman wrongly, I contend, equates “resistance” with “denial” when he says that “as long as we resist and deny the possibility of nuclear war, that possibility will persist and grow stronger.” He also wrongly perceives “resistance” as presupposing a clinging to the “order of things that now prevails.” Resistance connotes opposing, and striving to defeat a prevailing state of affairs that would allow or encourage the “worst to occur.” I submit, against Zimmerman, that we should not, in any sense, be willing for nuclear war or omnicide to occur. (This is not to suggest that we should be numb to the possibility of its occurrence.) Despite Zimmerman’s elaborations and refinements his Heideggerian notion of “letting beings be” continues to be **too permissive** in this regard. In my judgment, an individual’s decision not to act against and resist his or her government’s preparations for nuclear holocaust is, as I have argued elsewhere, to be **an early accomplice to** the most horrendous crime against life imaginable – its **annihilation**.

#### Plan solves meltdowns

**Wheeler 10** – Workforce Planning Manager with Entergy; Producer “This Week in Nuclear” Podcast (John, 11/21 “Small Modular Reactors May Offer Significant Safety & Security Enhancements.” http://thisweekinnuclear.com/?p=1193)

They are smaller, so the amount of radioactivity contained in each reactor is less. So much less in fact, that even if the worst case reactor accident occurs, the amount of radioactive material released would not pose a risk to the public. In nuclear lingo we say SMRs have a smaller “source term.”  This source term is so small we can design the plant and emergency systems to virtually eliminate the need for emergency actions beyond the physical site boundaries.  Then, by controlling access to the site boundary, we can eliminate the need for off-site protective actions (like sheltering or evacuations). These smaller reactors contain less nuclear fuel.  This smaller amount of fuel (with passive cooling I’ll mention in a minute) slows down the progression of reactor accidents.  This slower progression gives operators more time to take action to keep the reactor cool.  Where operators in large reactors have minutes or hours to react to events, operators of SMRs may have hours or even days. This means the chance of a reactor damaging accident is very, very remote. Even better, most SMRs are small enough that they cannot over heat and melt down. They get all the cooling they need from air circulating around the reactor. This is a big deal because if SMRs can’t melt down, then they can’t release radioactive gas that would pose a risk to the public.  Again, this means the need for external emergency actions is virtually eliminated. Also, some SMRs are not water cooled; they use gas, liquid salt, or liquid metal coolants that operate at low pressures.  This lower operating pressure means that if radioactive gases build up inside the containment building there is less pressure to push the gas out and into the air.  If there is no pressure to push radioactive gas into the environment and all of it stays inside the plant, then it poses no risk to the public. SMRs are small enough to be built underground. This means they will have a smaller physical footprint that will be easier to defend against physical attacks.  This provides additional benefits of lower construction costs because earth, concrete and steel are less costly than elaborate security systems in use today, and lower operating costs (a smaller footprint means a smaller security force).

#### Meltdowns cause extinction

Lendman 11 – Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (Stephe, 3/13. “Nuclear Meltdown in Japan” The People’s Voice <http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/03/13/nuclear-meltdown-in-japan>)

Reuters said the 1995 Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly ever natural disaster. This time, from quake and tsunami damage alone, that figure will be dwarfed. Moreover, under a worst case core meltdown, all bets are off as the entire region and beyond will be threatened with permanent contamination, making the most affected areas unsafe to live in. On March 12, Stratfor Global Intelligence issued a "Red Alert: Nuclear Meltdown at Quake-Damaged Japanese Plant," saying: Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already may have happened - the ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s long as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to contain high levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains intact, the melted fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility built around (it) remains intact, the melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster killed nearly one million people worldwide from nuclear radiation exposure. In their book titled, "Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment," Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko said: "For the past 23 years, it has been clear that there is a danger greater than nuclear weapons concealed within nuclear power. Emissions from this one reactor exceeded a hundred-fold the radioactive contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." "No citizen of any country can be assured that he or she can be protected from radioactive contamination. One nuclear reactor can pollute half the globe.Chernobyl fallout covers the entire Northern Hemisphere." Stratfor explained that if Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly likely that the melting fuel will burn through (its) containment system and enter the ground. This has never happened before," at least not reported. If now occurring, "containment goes from being merely dangerous, time consuming and expensive to nearly impossible," making the quake, aftershocks, and tsunamis seem mild by comparison. Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized. Japanese officials said Fukushima's reactor container wasn't breached. Stratfor and others said it was, making the potential calamity far worse than reported. Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said the explosion at Fukushima's Saiichi No. 1 facility could only have been caused by a core meltdown. In fact, 3 or more reactors are affected or at risk. Events are fluid and developing, but remain very serious. The possibility of an extreme catastrophe can't be discounted. Moreover, independent nuclear safety analyst John Large told Al Jazeera that by venting radioactive steam from the inner reactor to the outer dome, a reaction may have occurred, causing the explosion. "When I look at the size of the explosion," he said, "it is my opinion that there could be a very large leak (because) fuel continues to generate heat." Already, Fukushima way exceeds Three Mile Island that experienced a partial core meltdown in Unit 2. Finally it was brought under control, but coverup and denial concealed full details until much later. According to anti-nuclear activist Harvey Wasserman, Japan's quake fallout may cause nuclear disaster, saying: "This is a very serious situation. If the cooling system fails (apparently it has at two or more plants), the super-heated radioactive fuel rods will melt, and (if so) you could conceivably have an explosion," that, in fact, occurred. As a result, massive radiation releases may follow, impacting the entire region. "It could be, literally, an apocalyptic event.

#### Implementation before ontology

**Jarvis 2k** – IR lecturer, Sydney (Darryl, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, p 128-9, AG)

More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. **Certainly it is** right and **proper that we** ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, **engage in epistemological and ontological debate**, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. **But to suppose that this is the only task** of international theory, let alone the most important one, **smacks of intellectual elitism** and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emigres of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But **to suppose that problem-solving** technical theory **is** not necessary—or is in some way **bad**—is a contemptuous position that **abrogates any hope of solving some of the** nightmarish **realities that millions confront** daily. As Holsti argues, **we need ask** of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, "**So what?" To what purpose do they** deconstruct, **problematize**, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle **modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition**? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.

#### -- Case outweighs and turns – only nuke power can prevent runaway warming, changing our relationship to nature doesn’t change the temperature

#### No prior questions

**Owen 02** David Owen, 2 Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not **undermine** the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may **provide the best account available to us.** In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the **most important** kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, **it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR.** Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous **grip on** the **action,** event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a **reductionist program’** in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the **preferred model** or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, **this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science** since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, **not to be prejudged** before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of **generality over** that of **empirical validity.** The third danger is § Marked 16:10 § that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and **prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right**, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially **vicious circle arises.**

#### -- Valuing nature as standing reserve of natural resources for human benefit is essential to the survival of all species

**Younkins 4** (Professor of Business Administration, Wheeling Jesuit (Edward, The Flawed Doctrine of Nature's Intrinsic Value, Quebecois Libre 147, http://www.quebecoislibre.org/04/041015-17.htm, gender modified, AG)

Environmentalists erroneously assign human values and concern to an amoral material sphere. When environmentalists talk about the nonhuman natural world, they commonly attribute human values to it, which, of course, are completely irrelevant to the nonhuman realm. For example, “nature” is incapable of being concerned with the possible extinction of any particular ephemeral species. **Over 99 percent of all species of life that have ever existed on earth have been estimated to be extinct with the great majority of these perishing because of nonhuman factors. Nature cannot care about “biodiversity.” Humans happen to value biodiversity because it reflects the state of the natural world in which they currently live. Without humans, the beauty and spectacle of nature would not exist – such ideas can only exist in the mind of a rational valuer**. These environmentalists fail to realize that value means having value to some valuer. To be a value some aspect of nature must be a value to some human being. **People have the capacity to assign and to create value with respect to nonhuman existents. Nature, in the form of natural resources, does not exist independently** of man. Men, choosing to act on their ideas, transform nature for human purposes. **All resources are [hu]man-made. It is the application of human valuation to natural substances that makes them resources. Resources thus can be viewed as a function of human knowledge and action. By using their rationality and ingenuity, [humans]** men **affect nature, thereby enabling them to achieve progress**. Mankind’s **survival and flourishing depend upon the study of nature that includes all things**, even man himself. **Human beings are the highest level of nature in the known universe**. Men are a distinct natural phenomenon as are fish, birds, rocks, etc. Their proper place in the hierarchical order of nature needs to be recognized. **Unlike plants and animals, human beings have a conceptual faculty, free will, and a moral nature. Because morality involves the ability to choose, it follows that moral worth is related to human choice and action and that the agents of moral worth can also be said to have moral value**. By rationally using his conceptual faculty, man can create values as judged by the standard of enhancing human life. **The highest priority must be assigned to actions that enhance the lives of individual human beings. It is therefore morally fitting to make use of nature**. Man’s environment includes all of his surroundings. When he creatively arranges his external material conditions, he is improving his environment to make it more useful to himself. **Neither fixed nor finite, resources are, in essence, a product of the human mind through the application of science and technology. Our resources have been expanding over time as a result of our ever-increasing knowledge. Unlike plants and animals, human beings do much more than simply respond to environmental stimuli. Humans are free from nature’s determinism and thus are capable of choosing. Whereas plants and animals survive by adapting to nature, [humans]** men **sustain their lives by employing reason to adapt nature to them**. People make valuations and judgments. Of all the created order, **only the human person is capable of developing other resources, thereby enriching creation**. The earth is a dynamic and developing system that we are not obliged to preserve forever as we have found it. Human inventiveness, a natural dimension of the world, has enabled us to do more with less. Those who proclaim the intrinsic value of nature view man as a destroyer of the intrinsically good. Because it is man’s rationality in the form of science and technology that permits him to transform nature, he is despised for his ability to reason that is portrayed as a corrupting influence. The power of reason offends radical environmentalists because it leads to abstract knowledge, science, technology, wealth, and capitalism. This **antipathy for human achievements and aspirations involves the negation of human values and betrays an underlying nihilism of the environmental movement.**

#### -- Perm: do the plan and reject technological thought in all other instances

#### No alt solvency - only they have forgotten Being by forgetting its existence in science and technology

Latour 91 [Bruno Latour teaches sociology at the E´ cole des Mines in Paris **We have never been modern,** p. 65-67 GAL] x

But immediately the philosopher loses this well-intentioned simplicity. Why? Ironically, he himself indicates the reason for this, in an apologue on Heraclitus who used to take shelter in a baker's oven. *'Emm gar kai entautha theous\* —* 'here, too, the gods are present,\* said Heraclitus to visitors who were astonished to see him warming his poor carcass like an ordinary mortal (Heidegger, 1977b, p. 233). *'Auch bier namlich wesen Gotter an.'* But **Heidegger** is taken in as much as those naive visitors, since he **and his epigones do not expect to find Being except along the Black Forest** Holzwege. **Being cannot reside in ordinary beings**. Every­where, there is desert. **The gods cannot reside in technology** — **that pure Enframing** (Zimmerman, 1990) **of being** *[Ge-Stelf],* that ineluctable fate [Geschick], that supreme danger [Gefahr]. **They are not to be sought in science, either, since science has no other essence but that of technology** (Heidegger, 1977b). **They are absent from politics, sociology, psychol­ogy, anthropology, history** - which is the history of Being, and counts its epochs in millennia. **The gods cannot reside in economics — that pure calculation forever mired in beings and worry**. **They are not to be found in philosophy, either, or in ontology, both of which lost sight of their destiny** 2,500 years ago. **Thus Heidegger treats the modern world** as the visitors treat Heraclitus: **with contempt**. **And yet — 'here too the gods are present**\*: **in a hydroelectric plant** on the banks of the Rhine, **in subatomic particles, in Adidas shoes** as well as in the old wooden clogs hollowed out by hand, in **agribusiness** as well as in timeworn landscapes, in shopkeepers\* **calculations** as well as in Holderlin's heartrending verse. **But why do those philosophers no longer recognize them?** Because they believe what the modern Constitution says about itself! This paradox should no longer astonish us. **The moderns indeed declare that technology is nothing but pure instrumental mastery**, science pure Enframing and pure Stamping [Das Ge-Stell], **that econo­mics is pure calculation, capitalism pure reproduction,** the subject pure consciousness. **Purity everywhere**! They claim this, but **we must be careful not to take them at their word, since what they are asserting is only half of the modern world, the work of purification that distils what** the work of **hybridization supplies**. **Who has forgotten Being?** No one**, no one ever has**, **otherwise Nature would be truly available as a pure 'stock**\*. Look around you: **scientific objects are circulating simultaneously as subjects objects and discourse. Networks are full of Being**. As for **machines**, they **are laden with subjects and collectives. How could a being** **lose** its difference, its incompleteness, its mark, **its trace of Being**? **This is never in anyone's power**; otherwise we should have to imagine that we have truly been modern, we should be taken in by the upper half of the modern Constitution. **Has someone**, however, **actually forgotten Being**? **Yes: anyone who really thinks that Being has really been forgotten.** As Levi-Strauss says, 'the barbarian is first and foremost the man who believes in barbarism.' (Levi-Strauss, [1952] 1987, p. 12). **Those who have failed to undertake empirical studies of sciences, technologies, law, politics, economics, religion or fiction have lost the traces of Being that are distributed everywhere among beings. If, scorning empiricism**, you opt out of the exact sciences, then the human sciences, then traditional philosophy, then the sciences of language, and **you hunker down in your forest - then you will indeed feel a tragic loss. But what is missing is you yourself, not the world!** **Heidegger's epigones have converted that glaring weakness into a strength. 'We don't know anything empirical, but that doesn't matter, since your world is empty of Being. We are keeping the little flame of Being safe from everything, and you, who have all the rest, have nothing**.' **On the contrary: we have everything, since we have Being, and beings, and we have never lost track of the difference between Being and beings**. **We are carrying out the impossible project undertaken by Heidegger**, who believed what the modern Constitution said about itself without understanding that what is at issue there is only half of a larger mechanism which has never abandoned the old anthropological matrix. **No one can forget Being, since there has never been a modern world, or,** by the same token, **metaphysics**. **We have always remained pre-Socratic, pre-Cartesian, pre-Kantian, pre-Nietzschean**. No radical revolution can separate us from these pasts, so there is no need for reactionary counter­revolutions to lead us back to what has never been abandoned. Yes, Heraclitus is a surer guide than Heidegger: *'Einai gar kai entautha theous?*

#### Heidegger’s Nazism flows directly from his obsession with ontology, not in spite of it

**Zizek 2k** p. 113-114 (The Ticklish Subject)

Here **one should avoid the trap that caught Heidegger’s defenders, who dismissed Heidegger’s Nazi engagement as a** **simple anomaly**, a fall into the ontic level, in blatant contradiction to his thought, which teaches us not to confuse ontological horizon with ontic choices (as we have already seen, Heidegger is at his strongest when he demonstrates how, on a deeper structural level, ecological, conservative, and so on, oppositions to the modern universe of technology are already embedded in the horizon of what they purport to reject: the ecological critique of the technological exploitation of nature ultimately leads to a more ‘environmentally sound’ technology, etc.). **Heidegger did not engage in the Nazi political project ‘in spite of’ his ontological philosophical approach, but *because of* it; this engagement was not ‘beneath’ his philosophical level- on the contrary, if one is to understand Heidegger, the key point is to grasp** the complicity (in Hegelese: ‘speculative identity’) between **the elevation above ontic concerns and the passionate ‘ontic’ Nazi political engagement**.

### Cap and Trade

#### Doesn’t solve case – it doesn’t immediately result in SMRs – deliberate signal is key

#### All of our cards that say money is key prove in a non-subsidized world SMRs won’t happen – that’s rosner and goldberg

**Cap and trade cant solve**

Swezey 11 (Devon, contributor for Forbes, “The Carbon Tax, Then and Now,” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2011/09/20/the-carbon-tax-then-and-now/>) KA

In the debate over climate legislation in 2009 and 2010, it was conventional wisdom that a price on carbon was the sine qua non of effective climate policy. All Very Serious People knew that you could not reduce carbon emissions or drive clean energy innovation without a price on carbon, either through a carbon tax or a cap and trade system. Indeed, leading venture capitalist John Doerr used to travel around the country hammering home the three top things that the government needed to do to catalyze a clean energy revolution. In order, they were: 1) put a price on carbon, 2) put a price on carbon and 3) put a price on carbon. How the times have changed. In a piece posted over the weekend, Tyler Cowen, a prolific blogger and card- carrying economist at George Mason University, writes that there are a number of reasons–10, in fact–why the case for a carbon tax is not as airtight as its advocates claim: 1. Other countries won’t follow suit and then we are doing something with almost zero effectiveness. 2. It may push dirty industries to less well regulated countries and make the overall problem somewhat worse. 3. There is Jim Manzi’s point that Europe has stiff carbon taxes, and is a large market, but they have not seen a major burst of innovation, just a lot of conservation and some substitution, no game changers. Denmark remains far more dependent on fossil fuels than most people realize and for all their efforts they’ve done no better than stop the growth of carbon emissions; see Robert Bryce’s Power Hungry, which is in any case a useful contrarian book for considering this topic. 4. Especially for large segments of the transportation sector, there simply aren’t plausible substitutes for carbon on the horizon. 5. A tax on energy is a sectoral tax on the relatively productive sector of the economy — making stuff — and it will shift more talent into finance and other less productive sectors. 6. Oil in particular will become so expensive in any case that a politically plausible tax won’t add much value (careful readers will note that this argument is in tension with some of those listed above). 7. A carbon tax won’t work its magic until significant parts of the energy and alternative energy sector are deregulated. No more NIMBY! But in the meantime perhaps we can’t proceed with the tax and expect to get anywhere. Had we had today’s level of regulation and litigation from the get-go, we never could have built today’s energy infrastructure, which I find a deeply troubling point. 8. A somewhat non-economic argument is to point out the regressive nature of a carbon tax. 9. Jim Hamilton’s work suggests that oil price shocks have nastier economic consequences than many people realize. 9b. A more prosperous economy may, for political and budgetary reasons, lead to more subsidies for alternative energy, and those subsidies may do more good than would the tax. Maybe we won’t adopt green energy until it’s really quite cheap, in which case let’s just focus on the subsidies. 10. The actual application of such a tax will involve lots of rent-seeking, privileges, exemptions, inefficiencies, and regulatory arbitrage.

#### Case is a da – the CP does not lead to SMRs. SMRs are uniquely key to solve our advantages – signal and it’s the only tech that solves emissions but lack of investment makes it impossible

#### Perm do the CP and ban all subsidies except the plan and then pass the plan

solves the net benefit better by generating more revenue for clean technology through the plan’s increased nuclear energy supply

#### Public hates cap and trade and vote accordingly

Danner 10 (Dan Danner, president and CEO of National Federation of Independent Business, <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-a-environment/77553-surveys-show-americans-are-against-cap-and-trade>)

Proposals known as “cap-and-trade,” intended to combat global warming and revamp America’s energy policy, are deeply unpopular with both the voting public and the entrepreneurs who create most of the nation’s new jobs.¶ Recent polls that my organization released are clear: An overwhelming majority of small business owners oppose cap-and-trade legislation that has passed the House of Representatives. More than 70 percent of the business owners we surveyed think that the legislation will raise energy costs, and similarly large majorities don’t buy supporters’ claim that it will create new jobs or improve economic growth. And virtually none said that regulating greenhouse gas emissions should rank as a top national priority.¶ And American voters, who we surveyed separately, agree with them: Most oppose cap and trade, would be more likely to vote against politicians who supported it, and don’t believe that control of greenhouse gas emissions is a top national priority. More than 60 percent don’t believe job creation claims, and just about as many believe that energy costs would rise.¶ We did additional sampling in 16 states and got similar results. Quite simply, small business owners—who create between 60 and 80 percent of all new jobs—don’t want cap and trade and neither do voters.

#### Perm do the plan and then the CP after plan solvency

#### Cap and trade obvi links to elections—public opposes

NFIB 12 (National Federation of Independent Business, “Cap and Trade,” http://www.nfib.com/advocacy/item/cmsid/49409)

NFIB released two national surveys indicating that the views of small businesses and the general public are aligned in their opposition to a cap and trade system. The surveys were conducted in the past month, and asked respondents about their views on the issues surrounding the cap and trade debate. ¶ "Small business owners and the public both agree that a cap and trade system would have a negative impact on jobs, energy costs and economic growth," said Dan Danner, president and CEO of NFIB.¶ Respondents overwhelmingly listed the economy and jobs as the most important issues, with 71% of business owners and 57% of the public thinking that a cap and trade policy will increase the cost of energy.

#### Condo is a voter- results in argument irresponsibility, time and strat skews- no cost options in the 1nc make the 2ac impossible- one condo advocacy/ dispo solves your offense

#### SMR’s are key to successful desalination – solves water wars

Solan et al 10 – Assistant Professor of Public Policy & Administration and Director of the Energy Policy Institute at Boise State University (David, June. “Economic and Employment Impacts of Small Modular Nuclear Reactors.” Energy Policy Institute, Center for Advanced Energy Studies. http://epi.boisestate.edu/media/3494/economic%20and%20employment%20impacts%20of%20smrs.pdf)

Besides electricity generation, additional applications may be well-suited for SMR systems in the future. While the applicability of nuclear energy to additional applications is not dependent on facility size, the actual use of large nuclear facilities does not occur due to economic considerations. Currently, only a few countries utilize nuclear energy for non-generation purposes, primarily desalination and district heating (IAEA, 2008). A brief overview of the application possibilities for SMRs is provided below. Desalination.&&The IAEA has identified desalination as possibly the leading non-electric civilian use for nuclear energy. Water scarcity is becoming an increasingly problematic global issue in both developed and developing countries. As noted in an IAEA (2007) report, Because of population growth, surface water resources are increasingly stressed in many parts of the world, developed and developing regions alike. Water stress is counter to sustainable development; it engenders disease; diverts natural flows, endangering flora and fauna of rivers, lakes wetlands, deltas and oceans; and it incites regional conflicts over water rights. In the developing world, more than one billion people currently lack access to safe drinking water; nearly two and a half billion lack access to adequate sanitation services. This would only get worse as populations grow. Water stress is severe in the developed world as well…In light of these trends, many opportunities in both developed and developing countries are foreseen for supply of potable water generated using nuclear process heat or off-peak electricity (p. 23).

#### Nuclear War

Weiner 90 (Jonathan, Pulitzer Prize winning author, “The Next One Hundred Years”, p. 270)

If we do not destroy ourselves with the A-bomb and the H-bomb, then we may destroy ourselves with the C-bomb, the Change Bomb. And in a world as interlinked as ours, one explosion may lead to the other. Already in the Middle East, from North Africa to the Persian Gulf and from the Nile to the Euphrates, tensions over dwindling water supplies and rising populations are reaching what many experts describe as a flashpoint. A climate shift in that single battle-scarred nexus might trigger international tensions that will unleash some of the 60,000 nuclear warheads the world has stockpiled since Trinity.

#### Carbon tax fails – can’t predict its effect on the market

Gorrie 8 (Peter Gorrie, Toronto Star, “To work, carbon tax must sting,” 08, http://www.thestar.com/sciencetech/Environment/article/295677)

The report concludes we must start paying for the carbon we consume when we burn coal, oil, natural gas or gasoline, or use plastics. It proposes imposing a tax based on carbon content, putting a price on carbon dioxide emissions and allowing them to be traded, or a combination of the two. The basic idea: Boosting the cost of anything containing carbon – the main greenhouse gas – would compel industries and consumers to seek cheaper alternatives. They'd switch to cleaner fuels or consume less – either by adopting more efficient technologies or simply reducing their activity. Presumably, the alternatives would be better for the environment. The problem: No government appears willing to impose a cost high enough to actually change behaviour. And while several industry groups argue pricing carbon is a good idea, their enthusiasm is less than it seems. It's not clear how big the increase must be, although judging by the limited response to the near doubling of gasoline prices over the past five years, it would have to be huge. There's been little analysis, and evidence from the real world is flimsy. Carbon pricing has been attempted in only a handful of places, including Quebec – in each case too cautiously or with too many loopholes to be meaningful. "There is no doubt (that) a great deal of uncertainty exists regarding the price of greenhouse gas abatement," the Round Table report states. "At higher carbon prices, there is no way to accurately predict how the markets will react or how innovation will accelerate in response."

#### Carbon tax doesn’t solve – only hurts manufacturing and it still picks winers

Morgan 12 (Derrick – Heritage Foundation, “A Carbon Tax Would Harm U.S. Competitiveness and Low-Income Americans Without Helping the Environment”, 8/21, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/a-carbon-tax-would-harm-us-competitiveness-and-low-income-americans-without-helping-the-environment)

Even if one concludes that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are leading to increased temperatures—and there is robust debate and far from a public consensus on the magnitude of man-made warming, particularly among conservatives—a carbon tax would be counterproductive because it would do next to nothing to lower global temperature, while it would harm American manufacturing competitiveness, create a new revenue stream based on behavior modification, and harm low-income Americans. Free-market conservatives in particular should denounce a new carbon tax as more meddling by the federal government. Specifically, they should urge Congress and the President to: Categorically reject a new carbon tax, which would have little environmental impact, harm manufacturing, be another tax seeking to control behavior, and disproportionately harm the poor; Work to stop EPA regulations of greenhouse gases, which will wreak havoc on the economy and have no appreciable impact on the stated environmental goal of reducing global GHGs; and Work toward tax reform that results in a system that will raise the revenue to fund necessary government operations in ways that cause the least possible economic damage and not pick winners and losers with preferential or punitive policies. A carbon tax is in essence a perpetuation of a disastrous policy of picking winners and losers from Washington instead of allowing families to choose which energy sources work best for them. From ethanol subsidies to grants awarded to now-defunct solar manufacturers like Solyndra, these policies have increased costs to American families and wasted taxpayer dollars. Energy, like other sectors, should not become a playground for connected lobbyists to collude with government for special treatment. The bottom line in energy is that supplies can be delivered and new supplies created through the private sector rather than through mandates, regulations, taxes, and subsidies ordered by government.

#### Picking winners won’t turn case – nuclear tech is inevitable that’s wallace

#### Nuke power key to lower electricity prices

Nestle 12 – has longstanding professional experience in the area of energy policy due to his work with the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) (Uwe, February. “Does the use of nuclear power lead to lower electricity prices? An analysis of the debate in Germany with an international perspective” Energy Policy, Volume 41, Pages 152–160)

The call for an increased use of nuclear power is heard in many countries—even after the nuclear accidents in Fukushima, Japan. Supporters of nuclear power argue that this will reduce electricity prices, compared to using less nuclear energy. Furthermore they claim that lower prices will boost economic activity and thus lead to more jobs. In this line of argument the effect of extended nuclear plant life spans on electricity prices is politically of the utmost importance. Electricity price levels finally are not only a matter of concern for single households but in particular for sectors. For the relatively few companies for which higher prices could lead to competitive disadvantages in international trade it might be decisive. In 2000, the German Federal Government signed a contract with the nuclear industry to phase out nuclear energy by 2022. In the amendment of the nuclear power act in 2001 this timetable to phase out nuclear energy entered into force. Only few years later, the discussion on the future of nuclear energy in Germany restarted. One of the major arguments was that prices would be lower if the phase out of nuclear energy is delayed. Electricity prices depend on a variety of factors, one factor might be the availability of nuclear power in the energy mix of a country. It is difficult to predict how these factors interact. In Germany different approaches for assessing the impact of extended nuclear plant life spans are used. Scientific reports on this issue for the Government, industry, or other interest groups often reverts to complex models that represent the electricity market. On the basis of certain assumptions they try to predict the electricity price for decades ahead. In these models nuclear plant life span is one assumption that can be varied. In contrast to such exact quantitative approaches indicators can be used for either revealing general tendencies or for scrutinising the predictions of complex electricity market models. In 2009 and 2010 a number of studies were undertaken using complex theoretical electricity market models. They all concluded that extended nuclear plant life spans will lead to reduced prices for electricity, an increase in GDP, and more jobs. One of these studies was commissioned by the German Federal Government. In October 2010 its results were used to justify delaying the nuclear phase out in Germany from 2022 – as decided in 2000 and 2001 – to at least 2036.

#### Solves the economy

Perry 12 (Mark, Prof of Economics @ Univ. of Michigan, "America's Energy Jackpot: Industrial Natural Gas Prices Fall to the Lowest Level in Recent History," http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2012/07/americas-energy-jackpot-industrial.html)

Building petrochemical plants could suddenly become attractive in the United States. Manufacturers will "reshore" production to take advantage of low natural gas and electricity prices. Energy costs will be lower for a long time, giving a competitive advantage to companies that invest in America, and also helping American consumers who get hit hard when energy prices spike. After years of bad economic news, the natural gas windfall is very good news. Let's make the most of it." The falling natural gas prices also make the predictions in this December 2011 study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, "Shale gas: A renaissance in US manufacturing?"all the more likely: U.S. manufacturing companies (chemicals, metals and industrial) could employ approximately one million more workers by 2025 because of abundant, low-priced natural gas. Lower feedstock and energy cost could help U.S. manufacturers reduce natural gas expenses by as much as $11.6 billion annually through 2025. MP: As I have emphasized lately, America's ongoing shale-based energy revolution is one of the real bright spots in an otherwise somewhat gloomy economy, and provides one of the best reasons to be bullish about America's future. The shale revolution is creating thousands of well-paying, shovel-ready jobs in Texas, North Dakota and Ohio, and thousands of indirect jobs in industries that support the shale boom (sand, drilling equipment, transportation, infrastructure, steel pipe, restaurants, etc.). In addition, the abundant shale gas is driving down energy prices for industrial, commercial, residential and electricity-generating users, which frees up billions of dollars that can be spent on other goods and services throughout the economy, providing an energy-based stimulus to the economy. Cheap natural gas is also translating into cheaper electricity rates, as low-cost natural gas displaces coal. Further, cheap and abundant natural gas is sparking a manufacturing renaissance in energy-intensive industries like chemicals, fertilizers, and steel. And unlike renewable energies like solar and wind, the natural gas boom is happening without any taxpayer-funded grants, subsidies, credits and loans. Finally, we get an environmental bonus of lower CO2 emissions as natural gas replaces coal for electricity generation. Sure seems like a win, win, win, win situation to me.

**Competitiveness**

#### CP causes exporting – turns competitiveness

**Nowicki 11** (Meghan, JD – University of Alabama, “Note: Implementing Sustainable Industrial Development in the United States and Abroad: the Need for Legislation and International Cooperation,” Alabama Law Review, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 1093, Lexis)

3. Lack of Uniformity One of the main failures of international efforts to implement sustainable industrial development is a lack of uniform laws and regulations around the globe that discourage unsustainable activities and encourage sustainable activities. The lack of uniformity causes a phenomenon known as "carbon exporting" or "leakage." n92 When one country implements carbon taxes, for example, businesses may find it cheaper to move production to a country that does not impose carbon taxes. The well-intended policy implemented by the environmentally-conscious government then has the unfortunate effect of transferring the pollution to another part of the world. n93 Not only are emissions not reduced, but the local economy loses [\*1105] business. n94 This phenomenon is not limited to carbon taxes and emissions regulations, but occurs when a country attempts to regulate in any area of the environment. For this reason, many countries have been slow to implement policies that might encourage businesses to take their activities elsewhere. The lack of signals to investors and consumers n95 exacerbates this problem because corporations are typically not held accountable by consumers or investors for shifting unsustainable and environmentally costly activities to other nations. n96 This is exactly what has occurred in China in recent years. Under the current U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, emissions released during the production of internationally traded products are attributed to the producing nation. n97 This framework permits "carbon exporting" n98 and "leakage." n99 Corporations move production to countries such as China that do not have binding carbon emissions targets and then ship their products back into the countries that do implement carbon emissions targets. Consumers buy and use the same products, yet the carbon emissions released during the production of the products are exported to another country. More than one third of China's total economic output comes from exports alone, which is a higher percentage than any other similarly sized economy. n100 In 2006, nearly fifty-eight percent of China's exports were produced by multinational ventures, and of foreign investment in the Chinese economy, nearly seventy percent went towards production. n101 Two-thirds of the growth in carbon emissions since 2000 is attributable to China. n102 This evidence "show[s] that consumers in industrial countries are indirectly responsible for a significant proportion of China's carbon emissions." n103 The situation with China exemplifies the importance of implementing uniform sustainability policies. Without an international effort, industrial development will never become truly sustainable, but will instead shift emissions and harmful activities to other parts of the world. Without the proper signals to consumers and investors, individuals will continue to consume products produced in countries with low sustainability standards [\*1106] and the net effect of the local nations' efforts will be zero. Not only will the local nations' efforts be stifled, but local industries will suffer because they will be forced to compete with corporations that produce in nations with substandard regulations. n104

#### -- Competitiveness high

JP 9 (Jakarta Post, “Impact of President-Elect Obama on US Competitiveness”, 1-14, Lexis)

The United States, still in the leading position in IMD's World Competitiveness Yearbook (for the 14th consecutive year), is currently in dire straits. What could be the impact of Obama's campaign promises on U.S. competitiveness? Firstly, he will have to deal with Priority No. 1 - the consequences of the financial crisis on the American economy. President-elect Obama is supporting an important fiscal stimulus to jumpstart the economy in parallel with the monetary easing of the Fed (interest rates are approaching zero). This fiscal boost would encompass tax breaks to the middle 20% of taxpayers and roll back the tax cuts implemented under the Bush administration for families earning more than $250,000.

#### -- Competitiveness isn’t key to heg or the economy

Krugman 94 (Paul, Professor of Economics – Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obession”, Foreign Affairs, March / April, Lexis)

Unfortunately, his diagnosis was deeply misleading as a guide to what ails Europe, and similar diagnoses in the United States are equally misleading. The idea that a country's economic fortunes are largely determined by its success on world markets is a hypothesis, not a necessary truth; and as a practical, empirical matter, that hypothesis is flatly wrong. That is, it is simply not the case that the world's leading nations are to any important degree in economic competition with each other, or that any of their major economic problems can be attributed to failures to compete on world markets. The growing obsession in most advanced nations with international competitiveness should be seen, not as a well-founded concern, but as a view held in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence. And yet it is clearly a view that people very much want to hold -- a desire to believe that is reflected in a remarkable tendency of those who preach the doctrine of competitiveness to support their case with careless, flawed arithmetic. This article makes three points. First, it argues that concerns about competitiveness are, as an empirical matter, almost completely unfounded. Second, it tries to explain why defining the economic problem as one of international competition is nonetheless so attractive to so many people. Finally, it argues that the obsession with competitiveness is not only wrong but dangerous, skewing domestic policies and threatening the international economic system. This last issue is, of course, the most consequential from the standpoint of public policy. Thinking in terms of competitiveness leads, directly and indirectly, to bad economic policies on a wide range of issues, domestic and foreign, whether it be in health care or trade.

#### Warming turns competitiveness

Smith 11– professor of Security Strategies at the Naval War College, former associate/assistant professor with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (Paul, “ The geopolitics of climate change: power transitions, conflict and the future of military activities,” Conflict, Security, & Development, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2011.593810>, )

In particular, extreme weather events could create social, economic and political disruption for developed countries and, in some cases, undermine public morale and confidence. Recent extreme weather events demonstrate the persistent vulnerability of richer, powerful states to such scenarios. In Japan, a heat wave in the summer of 2010 killed 66 people and resulted in more than 15,000 hospitalisations.62 In 2003, a heat wave in Europe killed at least, 35,000 people during a two-week period. Two years later, Hurricane Katrina not only nearly destroyed an American city, it killed roughly 1,800 people, left thousands homeless and displaced tens of thousands. Moreover, Hurricane Katrina had a deleterious effect on Americans' psyche, just as the country was engaged in ‘state-building’ efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The storm put the United States into an awkward position of having been transformed into a major recipient of foreign financial assistance, for which the American bureaucracy was ill-prepared.63 As in the case of the BRICS countries, adaptive capacity will determine the degree to which climate change (and its varied effects) will influence current major powers. In general, it is assumed that wealthier countries have, by virtue of available capital and other factors, high adaptive capacity and that such capacities can effectively immunise these countries from the effects of climate change. In reality, however, **extreme climate change events can exceed adaptation measures**, **even in wealthier, developed countries**.64 Even when such investments are planned, they will compete against other fiscal priorities, at a time when public debt-to-GDP ratios in richer, developed countries are soaring.65 Thus, climate change potentially could affect the major powers by undermining national resilience and public confidence. At the very least§ Marked 16:12 § , the effects of climate change (such as extreme weather events) **could provoke a more inward political orientation** in the United States, European Union or Japan, as their respective populations demand their governments deploy national assets (including military forces) solely for domestic disaster assistance or reconstruction missions. This would also imply less willingness to act in the global commons or in countries (or continents) confronting far less favourable conditions brought about by climate change.

### General Obama Good Elections 2ac

#### Obama will lose –

#### The undecided voters will break for Romney.

**Chambers**, **9/19**/2012 (Dean, Mitt Romney likely win in presidential election shown by three key polls, Examiner, p. http://www.examiner.com/article/mitt-romney-likely-win-presidential-election-shown-by-three-key-polls)

Rasmussen Reports has released today, three key polls that show Mitt Romney's likely win in this year's presidential election over President Obama. The Rasmussen Reports Presidential Daily Tracking Poll released today shows Romney leading 47 percent to 46 percent over Obama. Rasmussen's Daily Swing State Tracking Poll of 11 key swing states won by President Obama in 2008 shows Romney leading them by the exact same percentages. The latest Rasmussen poll of New Hampshire released today shows Romney leading there 48 percent to 45 percent. New Hampshire is a key swing state that could make a difference with its four electoral votes, and George W. Bush would have reached 270 electoral voters in 2000 without having won this state. New Hampshire had narrowly favored Obama in many polls over the last few months and while the analysis conduced here by this columnist has consistently predicted Mitt Romney will win the state (based in part on knowledge of local politics in the state having lived in New England for years), most projected have shaded New Hampshire blue and predicted it will go for Obama. This Rasmussen survey is key in that it likely shows movement in New Hampshire in the direction of Mitt Romney. In the instance of an incumbent president who enjoys just about 100 percent name recognition and is seeking reelection, most of the undecided voters are likely to swing to the challenger by election day. This is especially true when the challenger remains still less known to the public than the incumbent, as is true with former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney. By election day, those other nine percent not favoring Romney or Obama in the Rasmussen Daily Tracking poll are likely include less than one percent voting for third party candidates and five or six percent of those nine will likely vote for Mitt Romney. That would indicate a popular vote win by Romney of about 53 percent to 46 percent, or the reverse of Obama's win in 2008. This would lead to an electoral college total of more than 300 electoral votes for Romney§ Marked 16:13 § . The 11 swing states tracked by Rasmussen in it's swing state tracking poll show Romney leading 47 percent to 46 percent, where some weeks ago the two candidates were tied at 45 percent in the Rasmussen tracking poll of these 11 key swing states. President Obama won these same states collectively by a 53 percent to 46 percent margin in 2008. Now he is seven percent behind that finish now in these states. Romney is likely to capture most of the undecided votes and could win these states collectively by at least a 52 percent to 47 percent margin. That would likely lead to Romney winning Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia and Wisconsin while having a competitive chance in Michigan and Pennsylvania. If President Obama can only win Michigan and Pennsylvania among those 11 swing states, he can not be reelected to the presidency. As these polls stand today, the election of Mitt Romney as our next president looks likely.

#### -- B) Approval ratings and swing states

**Business Insider**, **8/7**/2012 (The 14 States Obama Really Needs to Worry About This November, p. http://www.businessinsider.com/obama-approval-rating-swing-states-by-state-ohio-florida-pennsylvania-2012-8)

Gallup released its state-by-state approval ratings of President Barack Obama last week, and the numbers show that Obama should be concerned about his prospects in 14 states heading into the November election. Obama's approval ratings sits at 50 percent or above — the level considered safe for re-election — in 13 states and the District of Columbia. But there are 14 states where his job approval is somewhere between the 40 and 50 percent range — Oregon, Nevada, Colorado, New Mexico, Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, Florida, New Hampshire and Maine. Here's a look: All of these states, with the exception of Maine and Oregon, are considered battlegrounds in the 2012 presidential race. Oregon and Maine went to Obama in 2008 and are seen as reliable states for him this time around. Here's how the math breaks down: The 13 states and D.C. give Obama 185 electoral votes. He needs to accumulate 85 more electoral votes to beat Romney. Based on recent polling, Obama tends to lead in all of these states except North Carolina and Florida. But the approval numbers should at least cast some doubt on the President's re-election chances, if history is any indication. Gallup is a stickler on the 50-percent approval mark being an essential statistic for re-election. Managing editor Jeffrey M. Jones explains: The 50% approval mark is significant because post-World War II incumbent presidents who have been above 50% job approval on Election Day were easily re-elected. Presidents with approval ratings below 50% have more uncertain re-election prospects. Historically, two presidents below 50% in their final approval rating before the election -- George W. Bush and Harry Truman -- won, and three, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and George H.W. Bush, lost.

#### -- Not intrinsic – logical policymaker could do the plan and not encroach on russia’s sphere

#### Overwhelming public support for nuclear energy - multiple polls – our evidence assumes their chilling effect claims

WNA 12(WNA is the World Nuclear Association. “US Nuclear Power Policy.” August, 2012. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41\_US\_nuclear\_power\_policy.html)

**Public opinion regarding nuclear power has generally been fairly positive, and has grown more so as people have had to think about security of energy supplies. Different polls show** continuing increase **in public opinion favorable to nuclear power in the USA. More than three times as many strongly support nuclear energy than strongly oppose it**. Two-thirds of self-described environmentalists favor it. A May 2008 survey (N=2925) by Zogby International showed 67% of Americans favored building new nuclear power plants, with 46% registering strong support; 23% were opposed[10](http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41_US_nuclear_power_policy.html#References). Asked which kind of power plant they would prefer if it were sited in their community, 43% said nuclear, 26% gas, 8% coal. Men (60%) were more than twice as likely as women (28%) to be supportive of a nuclear power plant. A March 2010 Bisconti-GfK Roper survey showed that strong public support for nuclear energy was being sustained, with 74% in favor of it[11](http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41_US_nuclear_power_policy.html#References). In particular, **87% think nuclear will be important in meeting electricity needs in the years ahead, 87% support license renewal for nuclear plants, 84% believe utilities should prepare to build more nuclear plants,** 72% supported an active federal role in encouraging investment **in "energy technology that reduces greenhouse gases", 82% agree that US nuclear plants are safe and secure, 77% would support adding a new reactor at the nearest nuclear plant, and 70% say that USA should definitely build more plants in the future.** Only 10% of people said they strongly opposed the use of nuclear energy. In relation to recycling used nuclear fuel, 79% supported this (contra past US policy), and the figure rose to 85% if "a panel of independent experts" recommended it. Although 59% were confident that used reactor fuel could be stored safely at nuclear power plant sites, 81% expressed a strong desire for the federal government to move used nuclear fuel to centralized, secure storage facilities away from the plant sites until a permanent disposal facility is ready. Half of those surveyed considered themselves to be environmentalists. A February 2011 Bisconti-GfK Roper survey showed similar figures, and that 89% of Americans agree that all low-carbon energy sources – including nuclear, hydro and renewable energy – should be taken advantage of to generate electricity while limiting greenhouse gas emissions. Just 10% disagreed. Also some **84% of respondents said that they associate nuclear energy "a lot" or "a little" with reliable electricity;** 79% associate nuclear energy with affordable electricity; 79% associate nuclear energy with economic growth and job creation; and 77% associate nuclear energy and clean air. A more general March 2010 Gallup poll (N=1014) on energy showed 62% in favor of using nuclear power, including 28% strongly so, and 33% against, the most favorable figures since Gallup began polling the question in 1994. However, only 51% of Democrat voters were in favor[12](http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41_US_nuclear_power_policy.html#References). An early March 2011 Gallup poll just before the Fukushima accident showed 57% in favor and 38% against, and in March 2012 (N=1024) still 57% in favor with 40% against (men: 72%-27%, women 42%-51%). **Regarding plant safety, the polls showed consistent 56-58% positive views over 2009-12, but men-women split similar. A survey conducted in September 2011** by Bisconti Research Inc. with GfK Roper **showed that although support for nuclear power decreased following the Fukushima accident** and compared with a year earlier (a survey carried out in March 2010 by Bisconti Research found 74% of Americans favored nuclear power), **62%** of the 1000 **adults** surveyed in the latest poll **were supportive of utilizing nuclear power** while 35% expressed opposition. The survey found that **82% of Americans believed that lessons had been learned from** Fukushima and 67% of respondents considered US nuclear power plants safe (the same level as reported one month before the nuclear accident in Japan occurred). Also **85% of said that an extension of commercial operation should be granted to those plants that comply with federal safety standards**, and 59% believed more nuclear power plants should definitely be built in the future, while 75% contend that “Electric utilities should prepare now so that new nuclear power plants could be built if needed in the next decade.” Finally, further expansion of the site of the nearest already operating nuclear power plant is supported by 67% and opposed by 28%. By February 2012 support had increased slightly to 64% supported using nuclear power, while 33% opposed it. Some 81% of respondents believed that nuclear energy will be important in meeting the USA's future electricity needs (compared with 80% in September), and 82% thought the USA should "take advantage of all low-carbon energy sources, including nuclear, hydro and renewable energy." Significantly, 74% believed that nuclear power plants operating in the USA are safe, up from 67% in both 2011 surveys. However, a Harris survey in February 2012 (N=2056) showed that only 40% of US adults believed that the benefits of nuclear outweigh its risks, while 41% thought the reverse. A similar poll conducted in 2011 before the Fukushima accident occurred, indicated that 42% thought that the benefits outweighed the risks, while 37% believed the opposite. In a 2009 poll, 44% thought the benefits outweighed the benefits, while 34% thought they did not. The southern states had the highest percentage of people believing the benefits outweigh the risks (at 43%), compared with 33% in the East and 41% in the Midwest and West. Some 42% of Americans thought that the benefits of using coal outweighed the risks (up from 38% positive in 2011), while 40% said the risks outweighed the benefits.

#### Romney will maintain a working relationship with Russia.

Business Insider, 9/1/**2012** (Romney Could Screw Up US Relations With Russia, p. <http://www.businessinsider.com/mitt-romneys-foreign-policy-chops-come-into-light-2012-9>)

At the same time, the potential impact of a Romney presidency should not be exaggerated. Mr Romney is not an ideological politician, and he will have solid reasons to maintain a working relationship with Russia. These include reliance on Russian transit corridors to support US forces in Afghanistan to 2015 and beyond, Russia's veto in the UN Security Council, and its potential to act as interlocutor between the US and rogue states. Finally, there is a significant element of uncertainty that stems from the lack of clarity about what Mr Romney, who has often changed his position, actually stands for. In particular, the extent of the influence on him of several competing Republican foreign policy schools (neo-conservativism, populist isolationism, realism, liberal internationalism) is unclear.

#### Policies don’t matter- party identification outweighs

Edwards et al 2004, (George C. Edwards, professor at Texas A&M University, Martin P. Wattenberg, professor at University of California Irvine, Robert L. Lineberry, professor at University of Houston, Government in America: People, Politics, and Policy, 11th edition, pg.312-313, ch.10, NI (yes I cut this from a book))

Party identifications are crucial for many voters because they provide a regular prospective through which voters can view the political world. “Presumably” say Niemi and Weisberg, “people choose to identify with a party with which they generally agree…. As a result they need not concern themselves with every issue that comes along, but can generally rely on their party identification to guide them.” Parties tend to rely on groups that lean heavily in their favor to form their basic coalition. Even before an election campaign begins, Republicans usually assume they will not receive much support from African Americans, Jews, and Hispanic Americans. Democrats have an uphill struggle attracting groups that are staunchly Republican in their leanings, such as conservative evangelical Christians or upper-income voters.

#### More than half the country support nuclear expansion – its key to job growth

Whitman 8-13 [Christine Todd Whitman CASEnergy Co-Chair, Former EPA Administrator and New Jersey Governor, “Nuclear Power Garners Bipartisan Support”, August 13th, 2012, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php>, Chetan]

The energy policy that I’ve seen garner consistent support from the left and the right over the years is also one with which I’m deeply familiar. This policy involves building a diverse portfolio of low-carbon energy sources, featuring a renewed investment in nuclear energy. And it’s not just policymakers from both sides of the aisle who support nuclear energy – it’s everyday energy consumers as well. According to a Gallup poll conducted in March of this year, nearly 60 percent of Americans support the use of nuclear energy to meet our nation’s electricity needs, and a majority support expanding America’s use of nuclear power. Next-generation nuclear energy projects are underway in Georgia, South Carolina and Tennessee, thanks in part to steady popular support, as well as support from President Obama, bipartisan congressional leaders and other policymakers at the federal and state levels. An additional 10 combined construction and operating licenses for 16 plants are under review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This support is founded in the fact that nuclear energy, safely managed, provides an efficient, reliable source of energy. In fact, nuclear power is the only baseload source of carbon-free electricity. It provides nearly two-thirds of the nation’s low-carbon electricity, and will continue to be an important source of energy well into the future given the advent of innovative large and small reactor designs. The use of nuclear energy prevents more than 613 million metric tons of carbon dioxide every year – as much CO2 as is emitted by every passenger car in America. Bipartisan support for nuclear energy also stems from the boost that it provides to local job markets and to local and state economies. As nuclear energy expands and as more than half of the industry workforce approaches retirement, the industry offers growing opportunities for well-paying careers. The industry already supports more than 100,000 jobs, and the combination of retirements and the construction of new facilities could create as many as 25,000 new jobs in the near term. What’s more, the construction of a nuclear facility spurs the creation of other local jobs in industries ranging from manufacturing to hospitality. The industry generates between $40 and $50 billion in revenue and electricity sales, or some $470 million in total economic output and $40 million in labor wages at each U.S. facility every year. That’s a powerful economic engine and a positive impact that leaders are embracing. As America refocuses on cleaner energy policies that help boost our economy, nuclear power is becoming a clear and critical part of a secure, sustainable energy portfolio. We need electricity and we want clean air; with nuclear energy we can have both. It’s a source of power that leaders on both sides of the aisle can support.

#### Plan creates jobs – that’s key to swing states

USA Today 12 (Gregory Korte, 4/27. “Politics stands in the way of nuclear plant's future,” <http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/story/2012-04-13/usec-centrifuges-loan-guarantees/54560118/1>)

**The stakes are high: It's an election year, and Ohio is a swing state**. USEC estimates **the project** at its peak **will generate 3,158 jobs in Ohio, and 4,284 elsewhere.** Pike County, home to the centrifuges, has a 13% unemployment rate — the highest in Ohio. The median household income is about $40,000. The average job at USEC pays $77,316. Centrifuge parts are stacked up in Piketon. "It's as shovel-ready as they come," says spokeswoman Angela Duduit. Indeed, **the project has enjoyed bipartisan support.** A USA TODAY review of DOE records shows that no fewer than **46 members of Congress** — 32 Republicans and 14 Democrats — **have pressured the Obama administration to approve the loan guarantee for USEC**. "Quick action is paramount," said one bipartisan letter. "It is imperative that this application move forward now," said another. The congressional **support comes from states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia, Missouri, Alabama, Indiana, Maryland, North Carolina and South Carolina**— an almost exact overlay of the states that would benefit from the 7,442 jobs the company says would be created.

#### Americans like nuclear – believe the benefits outweigh the risks

**NYT, 11** (Michael Cooper and Dalia Sussman, The New York Times. “Nuclear Power Loses Support in New Poll.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/us/23poll.html?\_r=1)

The **new poll found that** nearly **7 in 10 Americans think that nuclear power plants in the United States are** generally **safe**. But nearly two-thirds of those polled said they were concerned that a major nuclear accident might occur in this country — including 3 in 10 who said they were “very concerned” by such a possibility. Fifty-eight percent of those polled said they did not think the federal government was adequately prepared to deal with a major nuclear accident. Still, **47 percent of those polled said that, over all, the benefits of nuclear power outweighed the risks**; 38 percent said they did not. The nationwide telephone poll was conducted March 18-21 among 1,022 adults, and it has a margin of sampling error of plus or minus three percentage points

#### SMRs address the only public concern about nuke power

Worthington 11 [David Worthington – Contributing Editor to SmartPlanet, “Small nuclear reactors: America’s energy future?” December 18th, 2011, <http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/intelligent-energy/small-nuclear-reactors-americas-energy-future/11412>, Chetan]

Small Modular Reactor (SMR) concepts could help make future nuclear power plants in the United States safer and easier to construct while helping to recycle stockpiles of existing uranium fuel waste. The general idea behind SMRs is to cluster together many small reactors to match the output of obsolete coal or nuclear facilities. Steam output from many modules would power a common generator to produce electricity. Each module would be equipped with its own containment assembly that’s housed in a pre-fabricated unit. Think of it as a nuclear assembly line. A module would be small enough to be shipped to a new reactor build by rail or truck rather than assembly components inside of a containment dome onsite. All-in-one fabrication would streamline nuclear power plant construction by several years, said Steve Rus, executive director for nuclear technologies at Black & Veatch. SMRs would be housed in a steel and concrete embedment that resides below grade. B&V has had a sizeable nuclear business since World War II. Small modular reactor designs are also supported by the Obama administration, which sees nuclear power as a way to reduce carbon emissions. However, the public is understandably warier of nuclear power post Fukushima, and would need some reassurances of its safety. The SMR addresses the greatest perceived danger - nuclear meltdowns – a threat that has loomed since the dawn of the nuclear era. It doesn’t require active cooling systems to prevent a meltdown, and would theoretically shut down safely without any outside intervention. Traditional active cooling systems at large scale reactors utilize water pumps and back-up power systems to control residual or decay heat after a reaction is stopped. An external power source and/or coolant are eventually necessary within a matter of days. Recent third generation+ reactor designs incorporate passive cooling technologies with traditional active cooling techniques, but that approach only buys more time until there’s meltdown conditions. Several reactors at Tokyo Electric Power’s Fukushima plants melted down when diesel back-up systems failed and mainland power lines were destroyed in the wake of twin natural disasters. It was reliant on active cooling, and its engineers hadn’t envisioned a tsunami striking far inland. A module reactor’s passive cooling system could theoretically survive that scenario, and non-water cooling systems could further increase margins of safety. “The concept is these could go on almost indefinite periods in passive manner with no intervention relative to the cooling of core and decay/residual heat. Potentially, it could never require any additional intervention,” Rus said. The initial SMRs will continue to utilize water for cooling and uranium fuel, but sodium and lead bismuth alloys could foreseeably replace water in fourth generation models – provided they pass Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review, Russ said. The NRC’s regulators are very familiar with light water reactors, but alternative fuel sources would require different cooling methods, Rus said. Thorium is arguably safer than uranium both in the risk of accidents and for nuclear nonproliferation. “The coolant form is different than water, therefore there’s natural benefits in the way it cools reactor,” Rus explained. A sodium coolant would be liquid under normal operating conditions, but solidify and encase the reactor upon a cold shutdown. Molten salt is also a potential future fuel source. Aside from the NRC’s institutional history, uranium’s other advantage is that there’s also an abundance of fuel in the form of nuclear waste that is being sequestered at nuclear facilities around the United States. Spent fuel rods could become a source of energy for newer generation reactors, Rus suggested. “More than 90 percent of the energy is still in that fuel. One thing that has to come to life is recycling. After reprocessing, waste is significantly less, and then there ultimately needs to be a way to address that waste.”

#### Nuclear power has massive support --- multiple key regions.

Nuclear Energy Institute, 2/23/**2012** (Majority U.S. Public Support for Nuclear Energy Has Stabilized, New Survey Shows, p. <http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/majority-us-public-support-for-nuclear-energy-has-stabilized-new-survey-shows/>)

Nearly a year later, 74 percent of Americans believe that “nuclear power plants operating in the United States” are safe and secure. Eighty-two percent of Americans believe that lessons learned from the Fukushima accident should be applied to existing operations and that the United States should continue to develop nuclear energy plants to meet growing electricity demand. “Attitudes toward nuclear energy stand at approximately the level seen in a large number of the surveys in the past decade, but a bit below a pre-Fukushima peak,” said Ann Bisconti, president of Bisconti Research. “The weight of public opinion toward nuclear energy and the building of new nuclear power plants continues to be favorable.” The new survey shows that two-thirds (65 percent) of Americans would find a new reactor operating at the site of the nearest nuclear energy facility acceptable. This support was highest in the Midwest and Southeast—69 percent and 68 percent respectively. But solid majorities also hold that view in the West and Northeast—61 percent each.

## 1ar v Nwestern BF

#### The plan is a pragmatic response to modern reality. It’s not colonialist

Pommersheim 99 (Frak, Professor of Law at the University of South Dakota School of Law, Arizona State Law Journal, Summer, 31 Ariz. St. L.J. 439, Lexis)

While any discussion of colonialism in contemporary American law may seem increasingly anachronistic in today's mainstream scholarship, it isn't really so. The issue of colonialism and the imposition of dominant "outsider" values as against indigenous "insider" values remains vital and unresolved. Of course, it is more complicated than any mere dichotomy suggests and it consistently involves making hard choices among many shadings along the continuum from "indigenous" to "dominant." Yet a perspective that draws from the wide (non-legal) scholarship on colonialism holds substantial theoretical insight and practical guidance for many tribal governments and their institutions. In this area it is important to note that tribal choices are not simply contemporary public policy matters but also have deep historical and cultural foundations. For example, in a discussion of the (de)colonization of India it has been pointed out that, "the roots of the discontent lie deeper, in loneliness, in a sense of isolation, in the destruction of that solidarity which only homogeneous close-knit societies give to their members." The march of colonialism leads to the "disintegration of society, to degradation of the deepest human values-affection, loyalty, fraternity, a sense of common purpose-all in the name of progress, identified with order, efficiency, discipline, protection." While often flatly denied by the dominant, "democratic" majority, this poisonous course ultimately produces its own antibodies: the demand to be treated as both human and equal. In nation states it takes one of two forms. One response is a kind of aggressive assimilative ethos marked by an awareness of shortcomings, a conviction of backwardness or inadequacy, and an anxiety to learn from the superior culture or nation, so as to emulate it and reach equality . . . to catch up with, and overtake, to acquire whatever the modern age requires-industrial might, political unification, technological and cultural knowledge-until "they" can no longer afford to look down their long noses at "us." This is, of course, the classic United States' model held out to minorities. The second response is a kind of determined isolationism characterized by: a desire to leave the unequal contest, and concentrate on one's own virtues, which one discovers to be vastly superior to the vaunted qualities of the admired or fashionable rival. . . . Our own past, our own heritage contains far finer and richer things than the gimcrack goods of the foreigner-to run after the foreigner is in any case undignified, and treason to our own past; we can recover our spiritual and material health only by returning to the ancient springs which once upon a time, perhaps in some dim, scarcely discernible past, had made us powerful, admired and envied. Neither of these responses-in their purist form-is tenable in a modern, interdependent world. The former path and its "foreign models expose a society to the danger of breeding apes and parrots, and killing native gifts, or at any rate distorting their proper path of development in the service of alien gods." Yet in the modern world the competing question is whether an ancient culture [is] sufficient to keep a modern people going. The answer- easier said than done-is that the new must be grafted on the old, that is the only alternative to petrification, or the miserable aping of some ill understood original. A nation cannot be treated as an exotic plant for long if it is to grow: it can only grow in the open air, in the public world that is common to all. In essence, there is need to identify a "difficult middle path, drifting neither to the Scylla of radical modernism, nor to the Charybdis of proud and gloomy traditionalism."

### Ext Alt doesn’t solve

#### Ext the Alt Doesn’t solve

#### The alternative is a goal - not a mechanism to create that goal – their repoliticization never moves beyond the seminar room

Jones 99 (Richard Wyn, Lecturer in the Department of International Politics – University of Wales, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, CIAO, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html)

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond grandiose statements of intent. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the mechanisms by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a fatally flawed enterprise.

### 1AR – Uniqueness

#### Romney will win --- he is leading in key swing state polls, gaining in New Hampshire and the undecideds will break for him. That’s the 1NC Chambers 9/19 evidence. Prefer it because it’s predictive and substantiates the claim with electoral votes.

#### Undecideds will vote for Romney --- this results in a win.

Geraghty, 9/20/2012 (Jim – writer for the Campaign Spot on National Review Online, Measuring the Undecideds, p. <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/327856/measuring-undecideds-jim-geraghty>)

For much of the year, head-to-head polls of President Obama and Mitt Romney have generated eerily consistent results: Obama garners a percentage in the high 40s but not at 50 percent, with Romney either tied or slightly behind. A small total — about 5 to 8 percent — remain undecided. Those voters could determine who wins the popular vote — a

nd while the Electoral College vote and the popular vote can differ, it’s pretty rare. So how will those remaining voters end up splitting? Their refusal to back the incumbent suggests a disappointment with Obama’s record that is not easily overcome, but clearly Romney has yet to “close the sale” and persuade these key voters that he can do a better job. “Right now the undecideds are motivated by their disapproval of the president,” says Republican pollster John McLaughlin. “They want to vote against the president. However, Romney has to give them a reason to vote for him and make the Obama disapproval stick. The Obama campaign’s negative attacks on Romney have been brilliant to stall the normal anti-incumbent vote. If they can’t get them to vote for Obama, they would prefer they just disappear. Convincing them falsely or prematurely that Romney will lose can work just as well.” For many years, politics watchers cited a rule that “undecideds split against the incumbent” with confidence — and they did have a solid amount of data to support the idea. In 1989, Nick Panagakis, a member of the National Council on Public Polls, wrote in the “Polling Report” that “our analysis of 155 polls reveals that, in races that include an incumbent, 80 percent of the time, most or all of the undecideds voted for the challenger.” In nine of the 155 races, the undecided voters split evenly; in 19, they split in favor of the incumbent. In a less-crowded media environment, the “incumbent rule” makes a lot of sense, particularly when discussing voters who don’t examine the candidates in depth or pay attention until just before Election Day. They already know what they’re getting from the incumbent and have deemed it unsatisfactory, so they take their chances with the other major party’s option. But there are exceptions, and the 2004 presidential race offered one of the most vivid examples. As the campaign drew to a close with a small lead for incumbent president George W. Bush, many Democrats felt confident that challenger John Kerry would finish over the top by getting about two-thirds of the remaining undecideds. But things didn’t turn out that way: “John Kerry and George Bush split the undecideds evenly, 1.1 points each, from the average of the final polls.” “The undecideds are all ‘get-able’ for the challenger,” says former Virginia congressman Tom Davis, now head of the Republican Main Street Partnership. “That doesn’t mean they’re definitely going to vote for him, but the challenger starts with those voters being open to the option of voting for him.” But Davis warns, “In presidential races, it’s more complicated; voters are more sophisticated about the choice at that level.” In Bush’s case, he and his campaign persuaded enough of the remaining undecideds that Kerry was an unacceptable alternative — an approach the Obama campaign is obviously emulating. In retrospect, the challenger’s advantage in most of the races where they won the bulk of the remaining votes was to be a blank slate, a generic alternative who hadn’t given the voters any reason to vote against them. With an economic record much worse than many Democrats expected or hoped to see in 2008, the Obama campaign’s remaining option has been to make Romney unacceptable. The campaign has been quite open about this approach. A “prominent Democratic strategist aligned with the White House” told Politico in August 2011: “Unless things change and Obama can run on accomplishments, he will have to kill Romney.” Thus, Obama’s campaign and its allies shout at the remaining undecided voters that Romney is a job-killing vampire and tax felon who killed a steelworker’s wife. Democratic pollster Peter Hart and Republican pollster Bill McInturff conducted the NBC News/Wall Street Journal survey and isolated the respondents whom they classified as “up for grabs” — either undecided or leaning only slightly to one of the candidates. Several demographic indicators suggest that the remaining voters are ripe for the picking for Romney: 68 percent are white, 57 percent are married, 53 percent are men, 70 percent think the country is headed in the wrong direction, and 60 percent disapprove of how Obama is doing his job. “They suck lemons,” Hart said with a chuckle on MSNBC’s Daily Rundown on Wednesday morning. “I mean, they are the sourest people I have ever — beyond really negative. ‘Neither’ is their favorite answer. . . . We’re talking about ‘up for grabs’ people, but in reality, a lot of these people are not going to vote.” Unsurprisingly, McInturff sees a bigger opportunity for Romney. “What tends to happen is the vote decision is driven by two things,” McInturff said. “Your feeling about the direction of the country — where 70 percent say the country is on the wrong track — and their feelings about the president’s performance, which is very negative. I don’t think Romney will get 100 percent of this vote, but I do think a chunk will vote and they will disproportionately break to Romney.” Just about any Republican presidential candidate would be thrilled to face an election where victory comes down to persuading white married voters who think the country is on the wrong track and the Democratic incumbent is disappointing to vote for him.

#### Their evidence oversamples Democrats.

**Chambers**, **9/19**/2012 (Dean, Mitt Romney likely win in presidential election shown by three key polls, Examiner, p. http://www.examiner.com/article/mitt-romney-likely-win-presidential-election-shown-by-three-key-polls)

This picture differs with the perception being created by the results of some media-released national polls of the race that are skewed in favor of Obama because the survey results are realized by over-sampling Democrats. Two Democratic pollsters explained this and exposed how these polls are skewed.

### 1AR – Link Turn

#### Now the link debate – it’s popular

#### A. Polls – our WNA evidence indicates that multiple polls confirm increasing popularity of nuclear power with more than 80% agreeing that it’ll be important for energy needs and that they’re safe – our ev assumes the effect Fukushima had. The Worthington ev indicates that SMRs specifically address their concerns about Fukushima because they can’t meltdown

#### Our links matter more than uniqueness --- polls will constantly fluctuate but the link shapes the outcome.

Chicago Tribune, 9/20/2012 (How to read polling data, p. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-09-20/news/ct-nw-presidential-polls-sidebar-20120919\_1\_national-polls-public-polls-battleground-states)

Don't obsess about small shifts in those horse race numbers. Right now, Obama vs. Romney is a close election, and it's likely to be so till Election Day. The numbers will bounce around from week to week, and "analysts" will come up with reasons to explain the "movement," much of which is caused by nothing more than the natural variations of any statistical sample. Instead, pay attention to the "internals." What issues are moving voters? Which subgroups are favoring one candidate or another? That's data that actually mean something.

#### Polls prove nuclear is popular

The Hill 11 [Poll: 71 percent in U.S. support nuclear power”, February 23rd, 2011, <http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/145675-poll-71-percent-of-americans-support-nuclear-energy>, Chetan]

A new poll commissioned by the nuclear industry shows that 71 percent of people in the United States support including nuclear power in the country’s energy portfolio. The poll, commissioned by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), comes as President Obama has called for expanding the country’s reliance on nuclear power as part of a broad strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The president’s fiscal 2012 budget request set aside more than $800 million for nuclear energy research and tripled the amount of money authorized for nuclear loan guarantees. About 71 percent of respondents said they support “the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity in the United States,” while 26 percent are opposed, NEI said. At the same time, the poll shows broad public support for a proposal floated by Obama to get large amounts of the country’s electricity from low-carbon sources. The poll finds that 89 percent of Americans think, “We should take advantage of all low-carbon energy sources, including nuclear, hydro and renewable energy, to produce the electricity we need while limiting greenhouse gas emissions.” Obama laid out a proposal in last month's State of the Union address to get 80 percent of the country’s electricity from low-carbon sources like nuclear, wind, solar and natural gas by 2035. Obama is working closely with Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Chairman Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.) to hash out the details of the proposal. Meanwhile, 79 percent of Americans say they support the government providing loan guarantees for a range of low-carbon energy technologies like nuclear, wind and solar. Obama’s 2012 budget request calls for adding $36 billion in loan guarantee authority for nuclear power plants. The proposal is already coming under fire from anti-nuclear activists, who argue that nuclear power plants are far too expensive to receive government support.

#### Specifically SMR safety features solve public fears

NEA 8 (Nuclear Energy Agency “Why SMRs are being developed” Brief 7. http://www.oecd-nea.org/brief/brief-07.html)

SMRs seem to respond well to these requirements, because they allow for design simplification and for introduction of new features, such as passive components and processes that avoid the need for early action by the operator in an abnormal situation. The design of some SMRs also makes it possible to set clearer and more precise safety criteria that may be easier for the public to understand, for example the exclusion of any possibility of a radioactive release to the environment. Some experts contend that the engineering principles are more readily explainable to the non-specialist, which should improve public acceptance.

Plan is key to jobs

DOC 11 [Department of Commerce – “The Commercial Outlook for U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors”, February 2011, <http://trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/@nuclear/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003185.pdf>, Chetan]

A serious obstacle to the resurgence of traditional nuclear power in the United States is the eroded domestic manufacturing capacity for the major nuclear components. A robust program of building SMRs, however, could make use of existing domestic capacity that is already capable of completely constructing most proposed SMR designs. SMRs would not require the ultra-heavy forgings that currently can only be made overseas. U.S. suppliers say that firms could retool using existing capabilities and resources and could source most of the components of SMRs here in the United States. This ability could mean tremendous new commercial opportunities for U.S. firms and workers. A substantial SMR deployment program in the United States could result in the creation of many new jobs in manufacturing, engineering, transportation, construction (for site preparation and installation) and craft labor, professional services, and ongoing plant operations. As SMR manufacturers prove their designs in the domestic market, they will likely consider export opportunities. The modular nature of SMRs and their relative portability means that locating export-oriented SMR manufacturing and assembly could make sense for U.S. companies, as opposed to the localization that is typically necessary for building larger reactors.

#### -- No risk of Russia war

Ball 5 (Desmond, Professor – Strategic Defence Studies Centre at Australian National University, “The Probabilities of ‘On the Beach’ Assessing Armageddon Scenarios in the 21st Century, May, <http://www.manningclark.org.au/papers/se05_ball.html>)

The prospects of a nuclear war between the US and Russia must now be deemed **fairly remote**. There are now no geostrategic issues that warrant nuclear competition and **no inclination** in either Washington or Moscow to provoke such issues. US and Russian strategic forces have been taken off day-to-day alert and their ICBMs 'de-targeted', greatly reducing the possibilities of war by accident, inadvertence or miscalculation. On the other hand, while the US-Russia strategic competition is in abeyance, there are several aspects of current US nuclear weapons policy which are profoundly disturbing. In December 2001 President George W. Bush officially announced that the US was withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, one of the mainstays of strategic nuclear arms control during the Cold War, with effect from June 2002, and was proceeding to develop and deploy an extensive range of both theatre missile defence (TMD) and national missile defence (NMD) systems. The first anti-missile missile in the NMD system, designed initially to defend against limited missile attacks from China and North Korea, was installed at Fort Greely in Alaska in July 2004. The initial system, consisting of 16 interceptor missiles at Fort Greely and four at Vandenberg Air Force in California, is expected to be operational by the end of 2005. The Bush Administration is also considering withdrawal from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and resuming nuclear testing. (The last US nuclear test was on 23 September 1992). In particular, some key Administration officials believe that testing is necessary to develop a 'new generation' of nuclear weapons, including low-yield, 'bunker-busting', earth-penetrating weapons specifically designed to destroy very hard and deeply buried targets (such as underground command and control centres and leadership bunkers).

#### -- Relations resilient

Kortunov 96 (Andrei, Russian Science Foundation, Comparative Strategy, p. 335)

However, surprisingly enough there seemed to be no visible, qualitative deterioration in the relationship in 1995-96. Indeed, at some points it looked as if the relations were sliding into a mini-cold war (e.g., after the notorious Yeltsin-Clinton encounter at Budapest in fall 1994 or when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) started its air strikes against Bosnian Serbs without first consulting Moscow). But, at every juncture, each side was able to bounce back minimizing the negative impact of tensions in particular fields on the overall relationship.

#### -- No escalation

Newsday 5 (2-27, Lexis)

Relations between Washington and Moscow are now more like a marriage of convenience. It's no longer the antagonistic, hostile rivalry of the Cold War, and it's **unlikely ever to revert** to that. One reason is that the United States remains a superpower and Russia is **only a shell** of the old Soviet Union. Instead, it has turned into a wary relationship defined by a need to cooperate on mutually useful issues and by fundamental disagreements not easily resolved.

# Neg

## 1nc v Emory LS

### Off

#### Interpretation – “financial incentive” is a distinct category that requires a cash transfer – tax incentives are not included.

Christiansen & Böhmer 5 (Hans, Senior Economist in the OECD Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, & Alexander, co-ordinator of the MENA-OECD Investment Programme in the OECD’s Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Investment Division, “Incentives and Free Zones In The MENA Region: A Preliminary Stocktaking,” MENA-OECD Investment Programme, OECD, Working Group 2, p. 4-5, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/22/36086747.pdf)

I. Toward a common definition of incentives and FEZs¶ a) Investment incentives¶ 3. There is a grey area between, on the one hand, investment promotion and facilitation, and investment incentives on the other. Investment promoters may make information about their host location, relevant laws and administrative procedures available as a public good, but as soon as they offer facilitation and matchmaking tailored to the needs of individual investors then they are effectively subsidising these investors. The monetary value to investors of such assistance may in some cases exceed the value of outright investment incentives. Conversely, actual investment incentives are normally considered as falling into three categories, namely “regulatory”, “fiscal” and “financial” incentives1:¶ • Regulatory incentives are policies of attracting investment projects by offering derogations from national or sub-national rules and regulation. Where such derogations are offered on an economy-wide basis they tend to focus on the environmental, social and labour-market related requirements placed on investors. In the context of FEZs, they often consist in the relaxation of direct investment regulations (e.g. nationality requirements; screening and authorisation procedures) in place elsewhere in the host economy.¶ • Fiscal incentives consist of an easing of the tax burden on the investing companies or their employees. Unlike many other incentives they are most commonly rules-based as changes in taxation in most cases require legislative action. General fiscal incentives normally take the form of reduced corporate tax rates or tax holidays; encouragement of capital formation (e.g. investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation allowances); and preferential treatment of foreign operators (e.g. lower tax on remittances; reduced personal income tax rates on expatriates). In FEZs fiscal incentives, virtually by definition, also include lower import and export taxes and tariffs.¶ • Financial incentives consist of out of hand public spending to attract companies or induce them to invest. They are often formally justified by a need to compensate investors for the perceived disadvantages of a particular location (“site equalisation outlays”), or may take the form of tailoring the infrastructure of a prospective location to the needs of investors. Other financial incentives include subsidising the actual costs of relocating corporate units (e.g. job training cost; expatriation support; and temporary wage subsidies).

#### Violation – that excludes tax credits

Chi and Hoffman 2k (Keon S., Senior Fellow – CSG, and Daniel J., Research Associate, “State Business Incentives: Trends and Options for the Future,” The Council of State Governments, http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/Misc00BusinessIncentives.pdf)

In this report, the term “business incentives” is broadly defined as public subsidies, including, but not limited to, tax abatement and financial assistance programs, designed to create, retain or lure businesses for job creation. The term is used interchangeably as “industrial” or “development incentives.” The term “tax incentives” broadly refers to any credits or abatements of corporate income, personal income, sales-and-use, property or other taxes to create, retain or lure business. **The term “financial incentives” broadly refers to any type of direct loan, loan guarantee grant, infrastructure development, or job training assistance** offered to help create, retain or lure businesses.

#### Voting issue –

#### A. Limits – each category is massive, they explode the topic by allowing hundreds of new, conceptually distinct incentives – makes neg research impossible.

#### B. Ground – different generics apply by category – forcing the aff to spend government money is the only stable mechanism for disad links and counterplan competition.

### Off

#### Energy production through modern technology places nature as a standing reserve – to be dominated and ordered by humanity

DeLuca 5 (Kevin Michael – Professor of Communications at University of Utah, “Thinking with Heidegger: Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice”, 2005, Ethics and the Environment, Vol. 10, No. 1, JSTOR)

In addition to meditating on media and public relations practices, a careful reading of Heidegger would compel environmentalism to meditate on its relations to technology and to images. To address the issue of tech- nology first, environmental groups often rely on modern technology while writing off such use as a necessary cost of 'doing business' in a mod- ern, mass media public sphere. That may be true, but Heidegger's writings caution us against gliding over the writing off. What are the costs of using modern technology? Besides relying on the technological infrastructure of the communication industry (computers, telephones, video camcorders, etc. . . .) to appear on TV, issue press releases, maintain web sites, lobby politicians, and raise money, environmentalists in the course of working and living rely on cars, planes, air conditioning, highways, microwaves, electricity, and a plethora of plastic products. In short, environmentalists are implicated and imbricated in the technosphere. Now Heidegger's meditation on the essence of technology and the essence of humanity's relation to technology serves to displace the conventional questions concerning technology. Heidegger refuses the question of whether technology is good or bad or neutral. As he puts it, "Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology" (1993, 311-12). Instead, Heidegger is asking after the essence of technology, which, he famously declares, "is by no means anything technological" (1993, 311). Rejecting the understand- ing of technology as a "mere means" that humans can master, what he terms the merely correct but not true "instrumental and anthropological definition of technology" (1993, 312), Heidegger proposes technology as "a way of revealing" (1993, 318). Avoiding the romanticism of a return to the Pleistocene or the utopi- anism of embracing a Star Trek futurism, from a Heideggerian perspective the question becomes, "What sort of revealing does a particular regime of technology make possible?" More prosaically, what sort of relationships to the earth and world does a technology enable? To this question, Heidegger provides a stinging critique of modern technology [albeit, admittedly, tempered by an ontological hope (see 1993, 333-41)]. The way of revealing of modern technology is Gestell or enframing: "The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. ... a challenging, which **puts to nature** the unreasonable demand that it supply energy **which can be extracted and stored** as such" (1993, 321, 320). Nature, then, is reduced to a "standing-reserve ... a calculable coherence of forces" (1993, 322, 326),6 so that "nature reports itself in some way or other **that is identifiable through calculation and that it remains orderable** as a system of information" (1993, 328).7 Heidegger gives examples from the fields of agriculture and energy that ring even more true today (see 1993, 320-21). Of farming, Heidegger writes: The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In sow- ing grain it places seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agricul- ture is now the mechanized food industry. (1993, 320) Of course, the all-too-immediate reaction to such an example is to charge Heidegger with a dangerous romanticism. With the benefit of a few decades experience around the world with the products of the mecha- nized food industry, from tasteless food, soil erosion, and ubiquitous pesticides to emptied communities, alienated consumers, and green impe- rialism, in retrospect Heidegger's critique seems understated. More significantly, though, the question is not a moral one of good or bad but an exploration of **what possible ways of relating to nature are opened and foreclosed** with different practices of revealing. Heidegger himself dis- misses the possibility of romanticism in response to the giganticism and the progress of science, "whose onset can neither be hindered nor even held up in any way, by any romantic remembering of what was earlier and different" (1999, 108). Indeed, Heidegger's fundamental critique of modern technology is not directed at the world it reveals **but the world it erases**: Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of revealing. Above all, enframing conceals that revealing which, in the ~~^ 79 sense of poiesis, lets what presences come forth into appearance. As compared with that other revealing, the setting-upon that challenges forth thrusts man into a relation to whatever is that is at once antithet- ical and rigorously ordered. Where enframing holds sway, **regulating and securing of the standing-reserve** mark all revealing. (1993, 332) The problem, then, is not that nature is seen as "standing-reserve," a "cal- culable coherence of forces," but that that is all it can be seen as.

#### This causes planetary extinction—it divorces our relationship with the natural world and makes ecocide inevitable

Gottlieb 94 (Roger S. Gottlieb – Professor of Humanities at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Brandeis University, “Ethics and Trauma: Levinas, Feminism, and Deep Ecology,” Crosscurrents: A Journal of Religion and Intellectual Life, 1994, Summer, http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm)

Here I will at least begin in agreement with Levinas. As he rejects an ethics proceeding on the basis of self-interest, so I believe the anthropocentric perspectives of conservation or liberal environmentalism cannot take us far enough. Our relations with nonhuman nature are poisoned and not just because we have set up feedback loops that already lead to mass starvations, skyrocketing environmental disease rates, and devastation of natural resources. The problem with ecocide is not just that it hurts human beings. Our uncaring violence also violates the very ground of our being, our natural body, our home. Such violence is done not simply to the other – as if the rainforest, the river, the atmosphere, the species made extinct are totally different from ourselves. Rather, we have crucified ourselves**-in-relation-to-the-other, fracturing a mode of being** in which self and other can no more be conceived as fully in isolation from each other than can a mother and a nursing child. We are that child, and nonhuman nature is that mother. If this image seems too maudlin, let us remember that other lactating women can feed an infant, but we have only one earth mother. What moral stance will be shaped by our personal sense that we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and so many kindred spirits of the air, water, and forests? To begin, we may see this tragic situation as setting the limits to Levinas's perspective. The other which is nonhuman nature is not simply known by a "trace," nor is it something of which all knowledge is necessarily instrumental. This other is inside us as well as outside us. We prove it with every breath we take, every bit of food we eat, every glass of water we drink. We do not have to find shadowy traces on or in the faces of trees or lakes, topsoil or air: we are made from them. Levinas denies this sense of connection with nature. Our "natural" side represents for him a threat of simple consumption or use of the other, a spontaneous response which must be obliterated by the power of ethics in general (and, for him in particular, Jewish religious law(23) ). A "natural" response lacks discipline; without the capacity to heed the call of the other, unable to sublate the self's egoism. Worship of nature would ultimately result in an "everything-is-permitted" mentality, a close relative of Nazism itself. For Levinas, to think of people as "natural" beings is to assimilate them to a totality, a category or species which makes no room for the kind of individuality required by ethics.(24) He refers to the "elemental" or the "there is" as unmanaged, unaltered, "natural" conditions or forces that are essentially alien to the categories and conditions of moral life.(25) One can only lament that Levinas has read nature -- as to some extent (despite his intentions) he has read selfhood -- through the lens of masculine culture. It is precisely our sense of belonging to nature as system, as interaction, as interdependence, which can provide the basis for an ethics appropriate to the trauma of ecocide. As cultural feminism sought to expand our sense of personal identity to a sense of inter-identification with the human other, so this ecological ethics would expand our personal and species sense of identity into an inter-identification with the natural world. Such a realization can lead us to an ethics appropriate to our time, a dimension of which has come to be known as "deep ecology."(26) For this ethics, we do not begin from the uniqueness of our human selfhood, existing against a taken-for-granted background of earth and sky. Nor is our body somehow irrelevant to ethical relations, with knowledge of it reduced always to tactics of domination. Our knowledge does not assimilate the other to the same, but reveals and furthers the continuing dance of interdependence. And our ethical motivation is neither rationalist system nor individualistic self-interest, but a sense of connection to all of life. The deep ecology sense of self-realization goes beyond the modern Western sense of "self" as an isolated ego striving for hedonistic gratification. . . . . Self, in this sense, is experienced as integrated with the whole of nature.(27) Having gained distance and sophistication of perception [from the development of science and political freedoms] we can turn and recognize who we have been all along. . . . we are our world knowing itself. We can relinquish our separateness. We can come home again -- and participate in our world in a richer, more responsible and poignantly beautiful way.(28) Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory. [This] knowledge is ecological and plural, reflecting both the diversity of natural ecosystems and the diversity in cultures that nature-based living gives rise to. The recovery of the feminine principle is based on inclusiveness. It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving. In nature it implies seeing nature as a live organism. In woman it implies seeing women as productive and active. Finally, in men the recovery of the feminine principle implies a relocation of action and activity to create life-enhancing, not life-reducing and life-threatening societies.(29) In this context, the knowing ego is not set against a world it seeks to control, but one of which it is a part. To continue the feminist perspective, the mother knows or seeks to know the child's needs. Does it make sense to think of her answering the call of the child in abstraction from such knowledge? Is such knowledge necessarily domination? Or is it essential to a project of care, respect and love, precisely because the knower has an intimate, emotional connection with the known?(30) Our ecological vision locates us in such close relation with our natural home that knowledge of it is knowledge of ourselves. And this is not, contrary to Levinas's fear, reducing the other to the same, but a celebration of a larger, more inclusive, and still complex and articulated self.(31) The noble and terrible burden of Levinas's individuated responsibility for sheer existence gives way to a different dream, a different prayer: Being rock, being gas, being mist, being Mind, Being the mesons traveling among the galaxies with the speed of light, You have come here, my beloved one. . . . You have manifested yourself as trees, as grass, as butterflies, as single-celled beings, and as chrysanthemums; but the eyes with which you looked at me this morning tell me you have never died.(32) In this prayer, we are, quite simply, all in it together. And, although this new ecological Holocaust -- this creation of planet Auschwitz – is under way, it is not yet final. We have time to step back from the brink, to repair our world. But **only if we see that world not as an other** across an irreducible gap of loneliness and unchosen obligation, but as a part of ourselves as we are part of it, to be redeemed not out of duty, but out of love**; neither for our selves nor for the other, but for us all**.

#### Vote Neg to recognize humanity’s solidarity with nature – this can repair our relationship with both nature and our own being

**Best and Nocella 6** (Associate professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso, “Igniting a Revolution: Voices in Defense of the Earth”, p. 82-84)

Yet, for both Heidegger and revolutionary environmentalists, **there exist possibilities for transformation despite the destructiveness of Enframing**. In the midst of technological peril – indeed, precisely because the peril strikes at and thus awakens us to the bond between human and nonhuman life – there emerges a sense of solidarity of human with nonhuman beings. Looking at the well-heeled, bureaucratic discourse of “human resource management” and “personnel resources,” the challenging forth of human beings into standing reserve is fairly evident. Factory-farmed cows, pigs, and chickens obviously have it far worse than people, but in both cases the purpose is to harness resources for maximum efficiency and profit. Ultimately human and nonhuman beings are similarly enframed within one giant “gasoline station.” It is precisely the experience of this solidarity which must be constantly rearticulated – in arts, poetry, ceremony, music, and especially in socioeconomic and political action – in order to provide a historically and ontologically authentic break with the metaphysics of technical control and capitalist exploitation. Action **will only be truly revolutionary if it revolves around engagement in solidarity with nature**, where liberation is always seen both as human liberation from the confines of Enframing and simultaneously as liberation of animal nations and eco-regions from human technics. **Anything less will always lapse back into the false and** oppressive hierarchy of “man” over “nature” and “man” over animals with attendant effects of technological, disciplinary control over humans, nonhumans, and the Earth. Using a familiar title from the anarchist Crimethinc collective, revolutionary environmentalism is truly an instance of “fighting for our lives” where the pronoun refers to all life not just human life. Heidegger describes the possibility of transformation through a return of Being as a re-figured humanism. It is the possibility of suspending the will and attaining a lucid sense of the free play of Being within which all of life emerges and is sustained. A human being, like any entity, *is* – s/he stands forth as present. But “his distinctive feature lies in [the fact] that he, as the being who thinks, is open to Being….Man is essentially this relationship of responding to Being. Such experience is the clearing of a space (symbolically represented, for example, in the building of an arbor for a ceremony or in the awesome silence created by the space within a cathedral or a grove of old-growth Redwoods), and the patient readiness for Being to be brought to language. Given the appropriate bearing and evocation through language, human beings can become aware of dwelling, along with all other existent beings, within Being – the open realm within which entities are “released” into presence (Gelassenhait – or “releasement”). What comes to the fore in suspension of willed manipulation is an embrace of other beings and the enduring process of evolution within which all beings emerge and develop. By reflecting on or experiencing oneself within the dimension of freedom that is the domain through which all beings pass, human beings can repair the willed manipulation **inherent in calculative thinking and realize a patient equanimity toward Life**. It is only in the context of this reawakened sense of the unity of life that revolutionary action gains an authentic basis. It is the engagement with “the Other” that shows the ELF actions are truly about defense of plant and animal life, and they demonstrate genuine liberation concerns that typically are trapped within Enframing. That is to say, ELF (and similar) actions, show themselves as part of a dynamic and necessary historical evolution and transformation process, not merely a gesture of opposition and negation, because of their profound solidarity with animals and the Earth. Such guidance solidarity thus serves as a general basis for a post-Enframing, post-capitalist order, an ecological, not a capitalist society. What will change is, first, the preeminence of Enframing as that which animates the epoch and, correspondingly, our relationship to technology. No longer will technical solutions be sought after in realms of activity where technique is not applicable. No longer will everyday activities be pervaded by the standardization and frenzied pace of technology. **No longer will nature be looked upon as a homogenous field of resources to be extracted and exploited**. No longer will resource-intensive and polluting technologies be utilized simply because they serve the blind interests of corporations over the needs of the Earth. No longer will human beings take from the Earth without thought of the far-reaching consequences of such actions on all present and future forms of life. Critics would wrongly denounce this position as atavistic, primitivist, or anti-science/technology. But as the turning toward the re-emergence of Being unfolds, both through revolutionary action rooted in solidarity with nature and through new, non-exploitative modes of acting in the world, technics will not disappear; instead, the limits of technology as a mode of revealing will begin to be discerned so that new forms and uses of technology can emerge. Questions about technology will center on whether a given technology can be developed and used so that plant and animal life can appear as it is and not be reduced to standing reserve. The question, for Heidegger, is not whether technology, in the sense of a set of tools, is done away with, but whether Enframing is surmounted. It is in this sense of releasement Heidegger writes, “Mortals dwell in that they save the earth….Saving does not only snatch something from a danger. To save really means to set something free intro its own presencing. I take this as the literal equivalent of the masked ALF activist reclaiming a puppy from a research lab so that it can become a dog rather than a unit of research, or an ELF activist who stops the destruction of an aquifer or forest so that it can remain an aquifer or forest rather than become a water or wood resource. It is just this new ethos which must guide a revolutionary reconstruction of society on grounds that preserve the openness to Being and the ability of each kind of being to become what it is in its essence. For those who charge Heidegger with merely recycling, and not transcending, Western anthropocentrism, it is important to note that there are possibilities here for an emerging post-humanism – a new orientation to nature beyond egocentric forms of human agency and **towards interrelation with other beings and Being itself**. Heidegger’s philosophy allows for multiple modes of engagement with others and nature as equals, all of them rooted in a relationship of solidarity, respect, and concern. I call this kind of pluralistic, egalitarian, and ecological outlook ontological anarchism. It begins with the rejection of illegitimate “rule” of metaphysical constructs that have served to justify unlimited technological appropriation of the world. In place of Enframing with its subjectivist metaphysical underpinnings, ontological anarchism proclaims a multiplicity of forms of experience in which a sense of revealing comes to the fore – such as in art, music, religion, and philosophy. One such experience, a pre-dominant theme of spiritual re-awakening in the ELF communiques, is found in Native American philosophy and practice.

### Off

#### Obama will win --- a consensus of polls and forecasts prove.

**Silver**, **9/20**/2012 (Nate, Sept. 19: A Wild Day in the Polls, but Obama Ends Up Ahead, Five Thirty Eight, New York Times, p. <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/sept-19-a-wild-day-in-the-polls-but-obama-ends-up-ahead/#h>[])

There are also going to be some outliers — sometimes because of unavoidable statistical variance, sometimes because the polling company has a partisan bias, sometimes because it just doesn’t know what it’s doing. (And sometimes: because of all of the above.) By the end of Wednesday, however, it was clear that the preponderance of the evidence favored Mr. Obama. He got strong polls in Ohio, Florida, Michigan, Wisconsin and Virginia, all from credible pollsters. Mr. Obama, who had been slipping in our forecast recently, rebounded to a 75.2 percent chance of winning the Electoral College, up from 72.9 percent on Tuesday. The most unambiguously bearish sign for Mr. Romney are the poor polls he has been getting in swing states from pollsters that use a thorough methodology and include cellphones in their samples. There have been 16 such polls published in the top 10 tipping point states since the Democratic convention ended, all conducted among likely voters. Mr. Obama has held the lead in all 16 of these polls. With the exception of two polls in Colorado — where Mr. Obama’s polling has been quite middling recently — all put him ahead by at least four points. On average, he led by 5.8 percentage points between these 16 surveys. If this is what the post-convention landscape looks like, then Mr. Romney is in a great deal of trouble. Perhaps these polls imply that Mr. Obama’s lead is somewhere in the range of five percentage points in the popular vote — national polls suggest that it’s a bit less than that, but state polls provide useful information about the national landscape. Or perhaps they imply that Mr. Obama is overperforming slightly in the swing states. Either way, that’s a pretty big deficit for Mr. Romney to overcome. What’s more, Mr. Obama was at 49.4 percent of the vote on average between these 16 surveys, meaning that he’d need to capture only a tiny sliver of the undecided vote to get to an outright majority. (If we’re being technical, 49.4 percent might be sufficient for him to win these states on its own, since perhaps 1 or 2 percent of the vote will go to third-party candidates.) To be clear: I do not recommend that this is the only data you look at. The forecast model also evaluates polls that exclude cellphones, although it gives them slightly less weight. Those have not necessarily shown a great deal of strength for Mr. Obama. And just as the model looks at state polls to infer the national trend, it also does the reverse, using the national polls (and essentially the assumption of ”uniform swing”) to infer where the states stand. The national polls show a spread right now from an effective tie to an eight-point lead for Mr. Obama. Taken as a whole, they seem to imply more like a three or four point lead for Mr. Obama rather than something in the range of five points. (These distinctions really do make a difference, especially with so few undecided voters left.) The other questions, of course, are whether Mr. Obama’s bounce is fading, and if it might fade further. His FiveThirtyEight forecast remains off its high of about an 80 percent chance of victory, that he achieved late last week.

#### Carbon Capture is a divisive issue

Pipeline & Gas Journal, 12 ("Natural gas credits for electric utilities at issue in new senate clean energy bill", Pg. 10 Vol. 239 No. 7, lexis)

Introduction of a new clean energy standard bill in the Senate has set off a debate on how to treat natural gas. The Clean Energy Standard Act (S. 2146) introduced in May by 11 Democrats, including Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-NM), retiring chairman of the Senate Energy Committee, would require that, beginning in 2015, the nation's utilities sell a percentage of their electricity from clean energy sources--including renewable energy, nuclear power, biomass, coal with carbon capture and sequestration, and natural gas. The legislation gives "credit values" to various forms of non-coal inputs. Zero-carbon sources such as new nuclear and renewables would get a full credit per kilowatt-hour produced. Advanced coal technologies, such as oxyfuel combustion, will get partial credit. Natural gas would get about a half-credit. Utilities that sell electricity at retail will acquire and turn those credits in to meet a standard that, overall, will start off being fairly easy to meet. But at hearings in the Bingaman committee on May 17, Keith Trent, group executive and president of Duke Energy's commercial businesses, said, "We have concerns with the concept of including natural gas in the program since it could lead to an overreliance on this single fuel." Duke is the third-largest operator of coal-fueled and nuclear-powered generation in the country. Trent said it is projected that between 30,000 and 60,000 megawatts of the country's aging coal-fueled generation fleet will be retired by 2015 or shortly thereafter to meet existing and new environmental regulations. "Construction of new nuclear units--which we know are highly competitive in the long run--and zero-emission wind and solar power plants will suffer if Congress gives natural gas another leg up," Trent added. Duke is pursuing a license with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to build a new nuclear power plant in South Carolina. Short-term the Senate bill has **no chance of passage**. Long-term, the bill could have wings should Democrats reclaim the House in the 2012 elections and President Obama wins a second term. If Trent's position on natural gas characterizes the view of the entire electric utility industry, gas producers and pipelines will have a major political fight on their hands.

#### Support for Big Oil causes a populist backlash --- costs Obama the election.

**Cillizza**, 4/8/**2012** (Chris – reporter for the Washington Post, writer for The Fix, ‘Big’ is bad for politicians this election year as populist sentiment prevails, Washington Post, p. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-politics-big-is-bad/2012/04/08/gIQAKE8q3S\_story.html)

Big is out. Big Oil. Big Government. Big Media. Put “Big” (the capitalization is key) in front of just about anything these days in politics and you can be certain that voters aren’t going to like it. We are in a populist time when distrust of institutions — banks, Congress — is at an all-time high and the chasm between the haves and the have-nots is growing wider. People believe the system is rigged — and they are angry. “A common thread that reflects this populism is the anger at out-of-control big government echoed by the tea party and the anger at out-of-control big business echoed by the Occupy movement,” said Dave Beattie, a Democratic pollster. “The commonality of ‘anti-big’ ties both together.” Channeling that populist ire is a political gold mine in 2012. Need evidence? The rise of former Pennsylvania senator Rick Santorum was built, in no small part, on a populist economic pitch centered on his upbringing in western Pennsylvania. “Santorum’s miner grandfather shtick has been the best stump material of the year,” said Rob Stutzman, a California-based Republican consultant. And yet, the two candidates likely to face off in the general election are decidedly awkward vessels for the sort of David-vs.-Goliath populism that the country is feeling. While President Obama’s personal story should have some appeal for voters looking for someone who understands their problems, he’s never worn the cloak of populism easily or well. Obama is, at heart, a college professor in his approach to politics — clinically, not emotionally, studying all sides of an issue. It’s no accident that when Obama is at his best, he’s personalizing his politics. His speech at the memorial service for victims of the Tucson shooting rampage and his remarks regarding Georgetown Law student Sandra Fluke, who was verbally attacked by Rush Limbaugh, are two good examples. Former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney is the furthest thing from a populist the GOP could pick in this nomination process. Romney’s background (his father served as governor of Michigan), his personal wealth and his overall demeanor (businessman through and through) scream whatever the opposite of populism is. (Imagine, for a moment if former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee ran for president in 2012. Huckabee, marinated in the tradition of Southern populism, would have been a remarkably good fit for the Republican primary electorate. Just saying.) Polling suggests that Obama starts with an edge over Romney when it comes to understanding the problems of average Americans — the closest measure we have to judge a politician’s populist connectivity. In a New York Times/CBS survey conducted last month, 55 percent of registered voters — including more than half of electorally critical independents — said that Obama understood their “needs” and “problems.” Just 31 percent said the same of Romney, the lowest of any of the four candidates remaining in the GOP presidential race. (Santorum led the Republican field with 40 percent saying he understood their needs and problems.) The challenge before Obama and especially Romney is to find ways to play into the populist sentiment coursing through the country, without appearing inauthentic. (The only thing worse than a politician who doesn’t understand “the little guy” is a politician who fakes like he understands the little guy.) Beattie said his party needs “to continue to make the election broadly about protecting and expanding the middle class.” “Many voters are angry that a handful of big companies and wealthy individuals seem to get special treatment or get bailed out while they struggle to get by,” Beattie said. Obama and his campaign team are following that advice. Ads launched in swing states last week attack Romney for siding with “Big Oil” — “Mitt Romney stood with Big Oil . . . for their tax breaks . . . attacking higher mileage standards and renewables,” says the ad’s narrator. The populist problem is more acute for Romney and, therefore, harder to solve. Ed Goeas, a Republican pollster, argued that Romney needs to show that Democratic solutions “are ideologically driven and our solutions are driven by results that will make voters’ lives better.” He added that Obama has more work to do on this front than Democrats like to believe. “Obama is working from the weaker position initially, because he originally touched those emotions with many voters and then lost that connection,” Goeas said. Dave Carney, who served as a senior adviser to Texas Gov. Rick Perry’s presidential campaign, is even more blunt about the contrast Romney needs to draw with Obama on matters of populism. Voters “want a leader who does not want farm dust to be regulated by the [Environmental Protection Agency] or one that does not wish gas were priced even higher at the pump,” he said. Neither Obama nor Romney is a natural populist. But both men will need to dig deep and find ways to connect with the anger and frustration of the electorate if they want to win. The 2012 election is a populist’s paradise.

#### Obama reelection maintains the US/Russian reset --- Romney will collapse relations

**Weir**, 3/27/**2012** (Fred, Obama asks Russia to cut him slack until reelection, Minnesota Post, p. <http://www.minnpost.com/christian-science-monitor/2012/03/obama-asks-russia-cut-him-slack-until-reelection>)

Russian experts say there's little doubt the Kremlin would like to see Obama re-elected. Official Moscow has been pleased by Obama's policy of "resetting" relations between Russia and the US, which resulted in the new START treaty and other cooperation breakthroughs after years of diplomatic chill while George W. Bush was president. The Russian media often covers Obama's lineup of Republican presidential challengers in tones of horror, and there seems to be a consensus among Russian pundits that a Republican president would put a quick end to the Obama-era thaw in relations. "The Republicans are active critics of Russia, and they are extremely negative toward Putin and his return to the presidency," says Dmitry Babich, a political columnist with the official RIA-Novosti news agency. "Democrats are perceived as more easygoing, more positive toward Russia and Putin." Speaking on the record in Seoul, Mr. Medvedev said the years since Obama came to power "were the best three years in the past decade of Russia-US relations.… I hope this mode of relations will maintain between the Russian Federation and the United States and between the leaders." During Putin's own election campaign, which produced a troubled victory earlier this month, he played heavily on anti-Western themes, including what he described as the US drive to attain "absolute invulnerability" at the expense of everyone else. But many Russian experts say that was mostly election rhetoric, and that in office Putin will seek greater cooperation and normal relations with the West. "Russian society is more anti-American than its leaders are," says Pavel Zolotaryov, deputy director of the official Institute of USA-Canada Studies in Moscow. "Leaders have to take popular moods into account. But it's an objective fact that the US and Russia have more points in common than they have serious differences. If Obama wins the election, it seems likely the reset will continue."

#### US/Russian relations prevent nuclear war

**Elliott**, 5/15/**1995** (Michael, Why Russia Still Matters to America, Newsweek, p. lexis)

"Russia," says Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "is a big country." That it is; lop off the newly independent states born within the old Soviet husk and you've still got a lot left -- a highly educated work force sitting on top of some of the globe's most valuable resources. True, much of that vast territory has an awful climate (climate matters-for different reasons than Russia's, it explains why Australia will never be a great power). But unlike India and China, two other "giant" states, Russia will be able to husband its vast resources without the additional strain of feeding -- and employing-more than a billion souls. It also, of course, is the only country that can launch a **devastating nuclear attack** on the United States. That kind of power demands respect. And sensitive handling. Stephen Sestanovich, head Russia watcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, argues that present U.S. policy is geared too much to "dismantling Russian military might" -- a policy that, since it breeds Russian resentment of Western meddling, is self-defeating. "We have to reorient Russian power," says Sestanovich, "not eliminate it. Because we can't eliminate it." Indeed, Washington should prefer a strong Russia. A Russia so weak, for example, that it could not resist a Chinese land grab of its Far East **without resorting to nuclear weapons** is a 21st-century nightmare. **All this implies a close U.S. -- Russian relationship** stretching into the future. American officials say it will be a "pragmatic" one, recognizing that Russian and U.S. national interests will sometimes collide. The danger, for the United States, is that a pragmatic relationship could be dominated by security issues. In Western Europe, some futurists say that in the coming decades Russia will talk to the United States about nuclear weapons but to the European Union about everything else-trade, economic development and the rest.

### Off

#### Text: The United States Federal Government should grant authority for decision making over tertiary recovery tax credits to the states. The fifty state governments of the United States should provide a tax credit for tertiary recovery that uses industrial carbon dioxide. We’ll clarify.

#### Devolving control of regulating energy solves better and promotes more efficient production

Bryner 2 (Gary C. - Professor, Department of Political Science, Brigham Young University, and Research Associate, Natural Resources Law Center. University of Colorado School of Law., “ARTICLE: Policy Devolution and Environmental Law: Exploring the Transition to Sustainable Development”, Fall, 26 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 1, lexis)

Devolution theory calls for increased policy authority and discretion to be delegated to state governments in order to improve the efficiency of public policies, ensure they effectively resolve specific problems, and foster political accountability. Devolution also gives different communities the opportunity to strike their own balance among the competing policy objectives of economic growth and reducing environmental risks. n10 Devolution to regulated industries promises **to reduce the cost of regulation**, **create incentives for sources of pollution** **to find** the most efficient and effective means **of reducing emissions**, encourage reductions that go beyond minimum mandates, and allow for flexibility in business decision making. Devolution to citizens is championed as a way to get the public involved in regulatory initiatives that will change the behavior of citizens. Reducing emissions through energy conservation and increased use of [\*5] mass transit, for example, require major commitments on the part of citizens to change their behavior, and that commitment **cannot simply be mandated from the top down**. Other forms of participatory policy making have been proposed to respond to the demands of citizens for a role in decisions that affect their health and quality of life.¶ Advocates of devolution argue that the current federal regulatory structure is plagued by burdensome procedures and a cumbersome chain of command. The combination of environmental statutes, EPA regulations, and guidance documents result in an impenetrable pyramid of paperwork, planning, and reports. A tremendous amount of effort at all levels of governments is required to manage this process. Compliance with these requirements often replaces energy and resources that could be used to actually reduce pollution and improve environmental quality. Accountability is difficult to identify since so many policy makers compete and jostle for influence, that citizens do not know who to hold accountable when environmental goals are not achieved. Federal officials lay claim to credit for issuing ambitious environmental goals, while state and local officials bear the brunt of criticism for imposing regulatory burdens. The EPA seeks vainly to develop and impose national requirements on conditions that vary widely throughout the nation. n11¶ Critics have identified a host of problems with centralized, command and control regulation: it has not only failed to remedy many environmental problems and threats, but **it has engendered** significant opposition because of the restraints on freedom it imposes, the costs and burdens of compliance, and the apparent ease by which some businesses are able to escape liability and responsibility for their actions. n12 There are real limits to the power of government to promote and ensure the preservation of air, water, land, and other resources. Government agencies alone cannot accomplish these environmental goals, but must be combined with clear and effective economic incentives and with a widely held ethic of care for the land and resources on which all life is so dependent. But the dominant role the federal government plays in environmental policy making focuses too much attention on Washington, and fails to encourage more local efforts. n13¶ Other critics of the current structure of regulatory federalism argue that some state and local governments had a long tradition of ambitious environmental regulation and enacted ambitious pollution control legislation well before Congress or the executive branch acted. The first clean air laws in the United States were enacted by cities in the 1880s, [\*6] some 75 years before the first federal program aimed at air pollution. n14 Many states passed water pollution laws in the 1920 and 30s, and by 1948, every state had an environmental protection agency. n15 While it is true that many federal initiatives for air and water pollution predated the 1970 Earth Day, when the modern era of environmental regulation began, states are not newcomers to environmental regulation. Nor is federal regulation a clear success story. Federal environmental policy has been, in many areas, problematic, and has threatened environmental quality. Federal subsidies for road building in national forests, grazing on public lands, the development of fossil fuels, and the emptying of rivers and streams into reservoirs for irrigation, for example, have taken a tremendous toll on natural systems and resources and have encouraged waste, unsustainable consumption, and pollution. n16 One of the consequences of environmental federalism has been to place limitations on more aggressive state regulations. A major impetus for federal air pollution regulation, for example, was a concern by the auto industry that states would impose different emission standards on new vehicles; this fear of having to meet a maze of state regulatory requirements prompted Detroit to lobby for federal regulation of new vehicle emissions. n17 Another example, from the mid-1990s, is the development of federal emission standards for hazardous emissions from coke ovens that were less stringent than those devised in some states, such as Pennsylvania, where environmental advocates had pushed for and won more ambitious limits. n18¶ One way of responding to this debate over policy devolution is to try to sort out federal/local roles in environmental policy on a statute-by-statute basis. In the case of air pollution, for example, some regulatory goals require efforts that go beyond the capacity of individual states. The Clean Air Act provides for regional efforts to deal with the long-range transport of ozone pollution from motor vehicles and with haze in national parks and wilderness areas. Pollution problems that cross state [\*7] boundaries and involve interstate transfers can be similarly addressed by several states working together, under the EPA's umbrella. The EPA can maintain responsibility for emission standards for products that are sold in national and international markets, such as motor vehicles. n19 In other areas of implementation, such as permitting, inspection, enforcement, and monitoring, however, the EPA could cut back significantly what it does and help direct political accountability to state and local governments for local environmental quality. It could provide technical assistance, draft model state environmental laws, and disseminate more information about environmental problems and conditions and about innovative policy efforts. n20 The EPA could take on fewer tasks, and then perform those functions more expeditiously.¶ The debate over policy devolution is difficult to resolve in ways that provide clear guidance for what specific policies should be pursued at what level of government. Devolution is not without risks. Political boundaries often conflict with the extension of ecosystems and environmental effects spill over political borders. Urban air pollution problems, for example, are a function of local sources as well as those that are transported long distances. Policy devolution in one area, such as the formulation of local air pollution clean up programs, as is currently provided for by law, must be combined with regional and national programs to deal with the transport of air pollution and emissions from motor vehicles. The goal of giving communities the choice of what mix of risk reduction and economic growth strategies to pursue conflicts with the expectations of a national commitment to protect the health of all Americans, regardless of where they live. There may be some backsliding in some states as more autonomy is delegated to them, and polluting industries may find ways to exercise their political clout more ambitiously in local governments in ways that reduce their regulatory obligations. Proponents of less environmental regulation, of unbridled economic growth and consumption may use devolution arguments to pursue their anti-government agenda. But, in the long run, a more ambitious, pollution-preventing approach to regulation requires more participation and involvement by those whose behaviors are targeted for change, and state and local-level government forums are required for citizens, industry officials, and policy makers to work closely together. Any losses in short-run regulatory stringency (if that is an accurate description of current regulatory efforts) will likely be offset by more fundamental, long-term gains.¶ Despite these problems there is significant support for devolution in environmental policy making. There is clearly some role in environmental [\*8] policy making for all levels of government. International commitments require national legislation, but state and local governments can also contribute to implementation of these agreements. Interstate commerce and pollution flows also require at least a multi-state response. Beyond that, there is a compelling case for allowing states to tailor the implementation of national goals to meet differing ecological, economic, social, and political differences. n21 Economic theories suggest that decentralization of decisionmaking "increases social well-being as compared with a centralized solution requiring more uniform level of public services across all jurisdictions" because of the resultant freedom of people to choose for themselves how to balance competing concerns. n22 Competition among businesses and among states is essential in encouraging innovation, experimentation, and improved policy making. Progressives have also joined the call for devolution, arguing that shifts in power to states can be harnessed to enact better public policies and also nourishes democracy and the opening up of politics to groups that have had little success, at least recently, in shaping national policies. n23¶ Nevertheless, Congressional leaders have largely abandoned, with a few exceptions such as in welfare reform, the promises made in 1994 and 1995 to deliver a smaller federal government and devolve more power to states. n24 Instead, legislation **to strengthen the federal role in** taxing Internet commerce, property rights, **electric industry** deregulation, telecommunications, and a host of other areas demonstrate strong Congressional interest in maintaining and even expanding federal power. n25 Members of Congress appear to be much more interested in responding to the demands of business that they be given one set of federal standards to meet, rather than 50 different state requirements. The globalization of the economy and the emphasis on uniform standards provides strong pressure for increased federal policy making rather than policy devolution. n26 The exception of welfare policy seems to prove the rule: in areas where there is strong industry interest in uniform standards, including environmental policy making, there is little devolution; in areas [\*9] where industry has little interest, like welfare, Congress has responded to state demands for more flexibility and discretion.¶ III. RETHINKING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT¶ An alternative approach to sorting out the debate over policy devolution and national regulatory programs is to consider what kinds of changes are needed in environmental laws and policies in order to encourage the transition from the current command and control approach to the idea of sustainable development. However, the next generation of environmental laws and regulatory programs, if they are to be more efficient and effective than their predecessors in preventing pollution, integrating economic and environmental values, and promoting sustainability, **will still need to address the arguments made by proponents of devolution**. The balance of this paper examines the definition of sustainable development, reviews the case for reshaping environmental regulation toward that goal, and explores the implications of the theory of sustainable development for policy devolution.

#### State-level financial incentives for EOR solve – reduce capital costs, provide financial certainty, and incentivize tech investment and adoption

NEORI 12 (National Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative along with Center for Climate and Energy Solutions and the Great Plains Initiative, "CARBON DIOXIDE ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY: A CRITICAL DOMESTIC ENERGY,

ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL OPPORTUNITY," February, http://www.neori.org/NEORI\_Report.pdf)

C. OVERVIEW OF MODEL STATE INCENTIVES FOR ¶ CO2¶ -EOR DEPLOYMENT TO COMPLEMENT FEDERAL ¶ SUPPORT¶ Several states have incentives to encourage CO2¶ capture ¶ and transport from power plants and industrial facilities, ¶ which complement federal grants, tax credits, and other support mechanisms. States with these incentives have ¶ provided critical support for projects to advance toward ¶ deployment. Furthermore, as with the new federal tax ¶ credit recommended in this report, state incentives for ¶ commercial CO2¶ capture and pipeline projects have the ¶ potential to be revenue positive, stimulate local oil production, and spur economic activity at a time when most ¶ states face profound fiscal challenges. ¶ NEORI recommends consideration, adoption or ¶ adaptation of the following state policies to complement ¶ federal policy and encourage commercial deployment of ¶ CO2¶ capture and transport technologies.¶ Severance tax reduction and/or extension of existing ¶ severance tax reduction for oil produced with CO2¶ from ¶ anthropogenic sources. This policy provides a percentage reduction in the severance tax for oil production, ¶ if the taxpayer uses CO2¶ -EOR techniques and/or uses ¶ anthropogenic CO2¶ for EOR. It creates an incentive to ¶ pursue CO2¶ -EOR and use CO2¶ from man-made sources, ¶ although it would only work for states with a production ¶ or severance tax. ¶ Cost recovery approval for regulated entities. This ¶ policy enables regulatory approval by public utility commissions for a utility to recover certain costs associated ¶ with CO2¶ capture through rates paid by customers. Cost ¶ recovery approval provides significant financial certainty ¶ to attract the private investment necessary for a project ¶ to proceed to construction and commercial operation.¶ Off-take agreements. This policy enables projects to ¶ enter into long-term contracts for supply of a project’s ¶ output (e.g., electricity). Long-term off-take agreements ¶ provide significant financial certainty, similar to regulatory cost recovery.¶ Tax credits, exemptions, or abatements. This policy ¶ provides credits, exemptions, and abatements for taxes ¶ that would otherwise be incurred, such as property tax ¶ abatement, franchise tax credits, and sales tax exemption ¶ for sale of captured CO2¶ . Such tax policies reduce the ¶ incremental capital cost of capture, compression, infrastructure, and purchase of manmade CO2¶ .¶ State-level bonding of CO2¶ pipeline projects and/or ¶ capture and compression facilities. This policy supports ¶ project financing, development, and planning of infrastructure or facilities deemed to be in the public interest. ¶ Public infrastructure authorities commonly may issue ¶ bonds, make grants/loans, plan/coordinate infrastructure, or participate in infrastructure build-out (e.g., own, ¶ construct, maintain, and operate a facility). ¶ Inclusion in Portfolio Standards. This policy requires ¶ that a certain percentage of all electricity generated in ¶ a state must come from specific sources, such as power ¶ plants with CCS. Portfolio standards that include CCS ¶ are an effective tool to establish financial certainty ¶ through state policy requirements, by allowing for regulatory cost recovery of investments made to meet statutory obligations.¶ A more detailed description of model state policies ¶ can be found in Appendix C, including state-by-state ¶ links to specific policies to serve as a resource to state ¶ policy-makers.

### Solvency

#### Reserves aren’t sufficient to alter prices or solve demand

**Baker 11**

[ Dean Baker, PhD, Co-Director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research , 3/23/11, <http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/the-imaginary-world-in-which-washington-lives>]

According to the Energy Information Agency, the United States has proven reserves of 22.3 billion barrels of oil. Given our current rate of consumption of 6.9 billion barrels a year, U.S. reserves could meet our demand for oil for less than 3.5 years. That means if we could somehow drill here, now, and everywhere, we could be energy independent until the middle of 2014 and then we would be 100 percent dependent on imported oil. Of course, we cannot suddenly suck all the oil out of the ground at once, it takes time to explore and drill wells and then the oil must be drilled out over time. If we decided that we want to destroy every last national park and coastal region, we may be able to increase production by 1.0-1.5 million barrels a day in 5-10 years. At the high end, this would be a bit less than 2 percent of world supply. Given normal assumptions about how demand responds to price, we would be very lucky to see a 6 percent decline in the price of oil. This means that in the most optimistic "drill everywhere" scenario we would save less than 20 cents from our $4 a gallon gas. More likely the savings would be less than half this size. In other words, when a politician says that they want to end environmental restrictions on drilling in order to end U.S. dependence on foreign oil or bring the price of gas down, they are speaking utter nonsense. The correct response of a reporter to such assertions would be to say something like: “Senator, you know that the United States does not have nearly enough oil to be energy independent or to substantially reduce the price of gas.”

#### Carbon capture isn’t commercialized in the squo – tech theoretically existing doesn’t make deployment possible – they can’t solve – this is cross-x

#### Saudi Oil imports now

IER 8/28

[Institute for Energy Research, 8/28/12, <http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2012/08/28/u-s-oil-imports-from-the-persian-gulf-and-saudi-arabia-grow-in-2012-and-administration-policies-may-be-to-blame/>]

The Obama Administration is touting that our “dependence on foreign oil has gone down every year during the Obama Administration, including a reduction in net oil imports by ten percent—or one million barrels a day—in the last year alone.”[i] While good news, this trend is happening not because of policies or actions taken by the Obama administration, but because of 1) a poor economy and high oil prices resulting in a lower demand for oil, 2) an increase in oil production on private and state lands (not federal lands) due to less bureaucratic red tape in leasing and permitting on private and state lands, and 3) an increase in biofuel (mainly ethanol) production due to the mandates from the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The bad news is that while we have reduced our dependence on imports, we are getting more dependent on oil imports from the Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia. During the first five months of this year, oil imports from the Persian Gulf increased by 33 percent compared to the first five months of 2011. This was mainly due to an increase of oil imports from Saudi Arabia of 29 percent. At the same time, our total oil imports fell by 6 percent. Thus, the Persian Gulf’s share of U.S. oil imports is up 6 percentage points—from 15 percent for the first 5 months of last year to 21 percent for the first 5 months of this year—and the share of our oil imports from Saudi Arabia is up 4 percentage points, from 10 percent to 14 percent.[ii] According to data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the United States imported a daily average of almost 1.5 million barrels of Saudi Arabian crude over the first five months of this year, compared to a daily average of about 1.1 million barrels over the same period last year. The corresponding numbers for oil imports from the Persian Gulf oil are an average of 2.2 million barrels per day for the first 5 months of this year compared to 1.7 million barrels per day for the first 5 months of last year. The increase in oil exports from Saudi Arabia to the United States began slowly last summer and has increased this year. Even though domestic oil production is increasing, the Obama administration is finding it difficult to lower its dependence on Persian Gulf oil, especially the heavy grades of crude oil that Saudi Arabia exports and that our refineries in the Gulf of Mexico use. Some oil analysts indicate that this increasing dependency may only last a few years—until more Canadian and Gulf of Mexico production comes on line. These are issues that have been caused by the Obama administration. First, their moratorium and “permitorium” on offshore drilling after the Macondo accident resulted in 17 percent less oil production in offshore federal waters in fiscal year 2011 than the year before. Then, their failure to permit the Keystone XL pipeline that would bring heavy crude oil from Canada postponed new supplies from our Northern Ally. David L. Goldwyn, former State Department coordinator for international energy affairs in the Obama administration, stated “Until we have the ability to access more Canadian heavy oil through improved infrastructure, the vulnerability will remain.”[iii] But, the Obama Administration is not worried because it can tap into the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in the event of a self-defined crisis, it sees domestic oil production continuing to grow, and it believes Gulf area refineries can adjust their equipment to use sweeter crude oil if need be. Most of our new domestic production comes from shale oil fields in North Dakota and Texas that produce high-quality sweet grades of oil while refineries on the Gulf of Mexico coast are designed to refine the heavier oils that the United States traditionally imports from Canada, Mexico and Venezuela. Refiners are importing more oil from the Persian Gulf to replace the declining production and imports from Mexico and Venezuela and the reduced production output from the Gulf of Mexico due to the moratorium and de facto moratorium on drilling. There is also insufficient pipeline capacity from Canada to replace those losses with Canadian crude, accentuating the need for the Keystone XL pipeline. In recent years, U.S. oil imports have been declining due to increased domestic production on private and state lands, production of shale oil using hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling technology, increased production of corn-based ethanol and government mandates requiring its increased usage by refineries, and lower oil demand due to high oil prices and a poor economy. Before the Macondo accident in the Gulf of Mexico, monthly oil production from the Gulf was as high as 1.71 million barrels a day and growing, but because of the moratorium on new drilling, monthly oil production from the Gulf after the accident was as low as 1.09 million barrels per day with much of that lower oil production being replaced by imports of Saudi crude oil. Oil production from the Gulf is not expected to regain its higher production levels through 2013, according to EIA, whose forecast for offshore Gulf of Mexico oil production for this year and next is averaging about 1.35 million barrels per day.

#### Lessening dependency causes Saudi backlash

**Hulbert 9/11**

[Matthew, Forbes Contributor, 9/11/12, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/09/11/saudi-oil-snub-dont-take-riyadh-for-granted-mr-president/>]

Admittedly, the independence line might win domestic votes, but it loses America international friends. OPEC – and especially Saudi Arabia – is painfully aware of the 22mb/d liquid potential North America holds over the next ten to fifteen years. They hardly need reminding of that when they’re being asked to dump more oil onto a well-supplied market for U.S. electoral gain. Just to rub it in, the unofficial architect of the Romney energy plan (Citigroup’s Ed Morse), noted in international media today that ‘the U.S. need no longer sacrifice a moral foreign policy based on human rights and democracy to secure co-operation from resource-rich despotic regimes’. Such hyperbole is neither constructive nor wise. The best revolutions are always the silent ones. The louder America shouts about its energy revolution, the bumpier any transition from a world of perceived scarcity to one of ‘total abundance’ will be. Saudi Arabia will make sure of it. America should see this Saudi snub as a warning shot; take Riyadh for granted at your peril. You won’t like the price, or indeed political implication that holds when the dream of U.S. energy independence is rudely awoken by the nightmare of on-going global energy realities.

#### Dependence on Saudi Oil key to relations

Lazazzero 08

[Joseph A. Lazazzero, Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, 2008, <http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Lazazzero.pdf>]

Just as the U.S.-Saudi alliance was important during World War I and the Cold War, this relationship is still of significant value in contemporary politics. As in previous years, the benefits of a strong U.S.-Saudi relationship affect everything from oil dependence to international conflicts. With a limited supply of oil and growing demands from an industrializing China, the United States needs to solidify its oil agreements with Saudi Arabia. An improved Saudi-American relationship would also help to resolve the United States’ failed efforts in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. More importantly, both the United States and Saudi Arabia have stakes in winning the War on Terrorism. Oil Dependence The United States’ demand for oil first initiated the U.S.-Saudi alliance, and it continues to be one of its most crucial components today. Roughly, 60 percent of the world’s oil supply is in the Gulf, and 25 percent of that is under Saudi soil (Cordesman, 28-42). Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest oil producer, and the United States is the largest oil consumer (Appendix 2-1). Both parties have stakes in a stable oil market (US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1981). Not only does Saudi Arabia have the most oil, it has also proven itself a reliable partner in the oil industry. Saudi Arabia’s spare production capacity has allowed it to answer oil production shortages in the past. Saudi Arabia enacted such policies in 1979 after the fall of the Shah, when the Gulf War decreased oil production in both Iraq and Kuwait, in 2003 on the verge of the second Iraq war and even today with instability in oil-producing countries like Venezuela and Nigeria (Bahgat, 115). These measures have shown that Saudi Arabia is committed to keeping oil costs low and production constant. In addition, Saudi Arabia has also proven itself a more stable oil partner for the United States than other oil-producing countries. Saudi Arabia has easily managed to nationalize foreign oil companies. Unlike the bitter dispute that existed between Iran and the British Petroleum Company in the 1950’s, Saudi Arabia has slowly acquired the American company Aramco, and U.S. investors and contractors still serve on the company’s board of directors (Bahgat, 115). Prince Abdullah visited Washington DC in 1998 to meet with U.S. oil companies and called for a greater strategic energy partnership (Bahagt, 115 & Ottaway & Hamilton, A1). Thus, not only is the United States in a unique position with access to the world’s largest oil producer, but it also has serious influence and economic footholds in Saudi Arabia’s oil companies. Oil dependence between the United States and Saudi Arabia benefits the Saudi government as well. Since the first discovery of oil in 1933, Saudi Arabia has changed itself into a regional superpower. Saudi Arabia has used much of its newfound wealth on military expenditures, but it has also utilized its money to make domestic improvements. For example, Saudi Arabia committed nearly $20.14 billion to local markets in an attempt to diversify its economy. Saudi Arabia has also debated entering the World Trade Organization, a move that would undoubtedly insert an Arab voice in the Westernized globalization of the international economy (Champion, 169-171). The money from oil production has allowed Saudi Arabia to become one of the wealthiest countries in the region. Such wealth has allowed Saudi Arabia to become a member of the modernized world, increasing everything from electrical output to mobile phones.(Appendix 1-1 & 12) (Al-Farsay, 31) The importance of a continued U.S.-Saudi economic partnership in oil investments is just as significant for Saudi Arabia’s development and power in the region as it is for the United States’ demand for foreign oil. Of course, there are other countries willing to buy Saudi oil, but here is where the significance of dual protection comes into play. Starting with the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, which declared that an attack on Saudi Arabia’s oil fields would be equivalent to an attack on the United States, the United States can make a promise no other nation can, of protection from the world’s most powerful military (Ashton, 103-113). Thus, even if there are other countries willing to purchase Saudi oil, Saudi Arabia is still gaining significant security from its alliance with the United States.

**Relations solve Saudi Prolif**

**Levi 03**, Michael, Science And Technology Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Brookings Institution, 2003 [The New Republic , June 2 http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/Brookings/perspex-brookings-levi-060203.htm]

Realists counter that the United States needs Saudi oil and Saudi military bases. But there's a less obvious argument for making sure the long-standing Washington-Riyadh partnership doesn't fracture: If it does, the Saudis might well go nuclear. Saudi Arabia could develop a nuclear arsenal relatively quickly. In the late '80s, Riyadh secretly purchased between 50 and 60 CSS-2 missiles from China. The missiles were advanced, each with a range of up to 3,500 kilometers and a payload capacity of up to 2,500 kilograms. What concerned observers, though, was not so much these impressive capabilities but rather the missiles' dismal accuracy. Mated to a conventional warhead, with a destructive radius of at most tens of meters, these CSS-2 missiles would be useless—their explosives would miss the target. But the CSS-2 is perfect for delivering a nuclear weapon. The missile itself may miss by a couple of kilometers, but, if the bomb's destructive radius is roughly as large, it will still destroy the target. The CSS-2 purchase, analysts reasoned, was an indication that the Saudis were at least hedging in the nuclear direction. July 1994 brought more news of Saudi interest in nuclear weapons when defector Mohammed Al Khilewi, a former diplomat in the Saudi U.N. mission, told London's Sunday Times that, between 1985 and 1990, Saudi Arabia had actively aided Iraq's nuclear weapons program, both financially and technologically, in return for a share of the program's product. Though Khilewi produced letters supporting his claim, no one has publicly corroborated his accusations. Still, the episode was unsettling. Then, in July 1999, *The New York Times* reported that Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud had recently visited sensitive Pakistani nuclear weapons sites. Prince Sultan toured the Kahuta facility where Pakistan produced enriched uranium for nuclear bombs—and which, at the same time, was allegedly supplying materiel and expertise to the North Korean nuclear program. The Saudis refused to explain the prince's visit. If Saudi Arabia chose the nuclear path, it would most likely exploit this Pakistani connection. Alternatively, it could go to North Korea or even to China, which has sold the Saudis missiles in the past. Most likely, as Richard L. Russell, a Saudi specialist at National Defense University, argued two years ago in the journal *Survival*, the Saudis would attempt to purchase complete warheads rather than build an extensive weapons-production infrastructure. Saudi Arabia saw Israel destroy Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, and it is familiar with America's 1994 threat to bomb North Korea's reactor and reprocessing facility at Yongbyon. As a result, it would probably conclude that any large nuclear infrastructure might be preemptively destroyed. At the same time, Riyadh probably realizes that America's current hesitation to attack North Korea stems at least in part from the fact that North Korea likely already has one or two complete warheads, which American forces would have no hope of destroying in a precision strike. By buying ready-made warheads, Riyadh would make a preemptive attack less likely. And, unlike recent proliferators such as North Korea, the Saudis have the money to do so.

#### Goes Nuclear

**Haddick 11**

-- managing editor of Small Wars Journal (12/16/2011, Robert, “This Week at War: Arms Race on the Gulf; Will it take Saudi nukes to deter Iranian nukes?”<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/16/this_week_at_war_arms_race_on_the_gulf>)

 Prince Turki seemed to suggest that Saudi Arabia requires its own nuclear force to, at a minimum, deter a classic and existential Cold War-style nuclear ballistic missile threat to the kingdom. The acquisition of a Saudi nuclear deterrent would be highly destabilizing. Very short missile flight times within the region, combined with fragile early-warning and command-and-control systems, would create an extremely dangerous hair-trigger posture on all sides. The Saudi acquisition of a nuclear deterrent would also be acrushing blow to the prestige of the **U**nited **S**tates as a military ally and to the diminishing role President Barack Obama has sought for nuclear weapons.

### Relations

#### Energy Independence is Impossible

**Levi 12**

[Michael Levi, senior fellow for energy and the environment at the Council on Foreign Relations and director of its Program on Energy Security and Climate Change, “Think Again: The American Energy Boom”, July 2012, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/think_again_the_american_energy_boom?page=0,0>]

In any case, energy independence requires more than impressive arithmetic. As long as the United States is fully integrated into the world oil market, U.S. fuel prices will rise and fall along with events on the other side of the globe -- say, a war with Iran. Greater domestic production will blunt the economic shock of rapidly rising prices -- better to suddenly be sending massive sums to North Dakota than to Saudi Arabia -- but because oil producers everywhere are relatively slow to spend their windfalls, skyrocketing prices could still knock the economy on its back.

#### Solar tariff tanks relations – massive alt cause

Solar Industry Magazine 12

[Solar Industry Magazine Staff, 7/20/12, <http://solarindustrymag.com/e107_plugins/content/content.php?content.10790>]

China has reportedly launched an investigation into whether exporters from the U.S. and South Korea illegally dumped solar-grade polysilicon, according to a report from Bloomberg, which cited China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOC). The probe was launched after four companies – GCL-Poly Energy Holdings Ltd., LDK Solar Co., Daqo New Energy Corp. and China Silicon Corp. – filed complaints with the MOC, the Bloomberg report states. These latest developments **intensify the ongoing** **trade disputes between China and the U.S.** following a ruling by the U.S. Department of Commerce that it would impose countervailing duties on Chinese solar cells and modules imported into the U.S. The Coalition for Affordable Solar Energy (CASE), which has opposed the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy complaints filed by the SolarWorld-led Coalition for American Solar Manufacturing (CASM), urged a peaceful resolution to the dispute. “Tariffs at any point in the global solar value chain **are counterproductive and make solar energy less competitive against fossil fuels,”** said CASE President Jigar Shah in a statement in response to the latest investigation. “Looking at the preliminary tariffs set in the U.S., it’s clear that the free flow of solar goods is already disrupted, prices are increasing, jobs are being eliminated and businesses are adversely impacted at every level of the global solar industry. We urge all countries to avoid unilateral actions that impede trade and resolve conflicts in a bilateral or multilateral context.” CASM did not comment on the MOC’s decision. Following the news, Solar Energy Industries Association President and CEO Rhone Resch reiterated his call for a collaborative dialogue. “We are disappointed by China’s decision to escalate the U.S.-China solar trade conflict,” he said in a statement. “Unfortunately, these investigations will have an immediate, adverse impact on U.S. polysilicon manufacturers, regardless of the investigations’ outcome. The investigations also threaten the Chinese solar industry’s access to the world’s most efficient and innovative polysilicon products. “Some have argued that it’s too soon to either start a collaborative dialogue or consider negotiations,” he added. “We disagree – **it’s never too soon to begin work on solutions and forward-thinking action. And we now have confirmation that disputes within one segment of the solar industry affect the entire supply chain. Let’s start the broader collaborative process now.”**

#### -- Security cooperation won’t break down

Taiwan News 4 (4-27, Lexis)

He also said Washington's renewed protests about Beijing's human rights, weapons proliferation and trade practices were insufficient to destabilize U.S.-China relations, because America's reliance on Beijing in diplomatic efforts toward North Korea, and Beijing's hopes for U.S. pressure to be used against Taiwan, are part of a broad set of calculations keeping the relationship on track.

#### -- Empirically denied

Shambaugh 5 (David, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs – George Washington University and Fellow – Brookings Institute, “The New Strategic Triangle: U.S. and European Reactions to China's Rise”, Washington Quarterly, Summer, Lexis)

Third, significant divergences exist along all the legs of the new strategic triangle as well. The United States and Europe have certainly had their fair share of recent disagreements about Iraq, a series of international treaties and regimes, the role of the United States in the world, and the China arms embargo. China and Europe have had a series of disputes over trade and MES classification as well as disagreements over human rights. Europe has concerns about China’s proliferation practices, as well as the arms embargo. More recently, China’s Europe specialists have begun to criticize the motives underlying EU programs to promote civil society in China as an ideological ruse to “Westernize and divide China” (Xi-hua, fen-Hua).12 The United States and China have also disputed human rights, trade, and proliferation, as well as Taiwan, missile defense, and regional security in East Asia. All these features add up to a very fluid and shifting set of relationships in which mutual positions sometimes converge and sometimes diverge. The EU and the United States sometimes side with each other, China and the EU sometimes find themselves in agreement, the United States and China sometimes work well together, and sometimes the interests and policies of all three intersect, all while each side simultaneously has disputes with the other two parties. What has not occurred, to date, is a situation where U.S. and Chinese perspectives converge against European interests.

#### -- No US/China war – economics checks

Sargent 8 (Sara, Business Reporter – Medill News Service, “China Space Launch Raises Fears”, UPI, 10-3, Lexis)

In January 2007 China conducted its first successful anti-satellite weapons test by destroying one of its own space weather satellites. The move angered the U.S. government, which accused the Chinese of making a move toward militarizing outer space. Despite the U.S. government's concerns, the only circumstance under which the United States and China would engage in space warfare is in the face of another conflict, suggests Dean Cheng, senior Asia analyst for Virginia-based think tank CNA. And given the current stability of U.S.-Chinese relations and the economic interdependence of the two nations, Cheng and other experts agree that war is an exceptionally unlikely scenario.

#### -- Conflict inevitable

Bremmer and Roubini 9 (Ian, President – Eurasia Group and Nouriel, Professor of Economics – New York University and Chari – RGE Monitor, “The Yin and Yang of U.S.-China Relations”, Wall Street Journal, 9-1, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204731804574384601554931882.html)

American and Chinese officials said all the right things during this summer's inaugural round of their Strategic and Economic Dialogue. President Barack Obama pledged to "forge a path to the future that we seek for our children." Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo wondered aloud whether America and China can "build better relations despite very different social systems, cultures and histories." He answered his own question, in English, with a "Yes we can." They can, but they probably won't. Yes, Mr. Obama will visit China in November. But when it comes to international burden-sharing, Washington is focused on geopolitical headaches while China confines its heavy-lifting to geoeconomic challenges. The two sides have good reason to cooperate, but there's a growing gap between what Washington expects from Beijing and what the Chinese can deliver. Many of the issues that create conflict in U.S.-Chinese relations are well known: an enormous bilateral trade deficit, disputes over the value of China's currency, protections for U.S. intellectual property, the dollar's role as international reserve currency, conflicts over human rights, naval altercations, protectionist threats from both sides, and disagreements over how best to handle North Korea's Kim Jong Il. But there are other, less obvious obstacles to partnership. First, both governments remain largely focused on formidable domestic challenges. Mr. Obama knows his political fortunes depend largely on the resilience of the U.S. economy and its ability to generate jobs. He's occupied for the moment with a high-stakes poker game with lawmakers in his own party over ambitious health-care and energy-reform plans. China's leadership faces competing internal demands from those who want to stimulate the economy toward another round of export-driven growth and others who want to shift quickly toward greater dependence on domestic consumption. Given the trade deficit, Washington would like Beijing to focus on the latter, but China won't move as fast as the U.S. would like, in part because the leadership recognizes that the loss of millions of manufacturing and construction jobs in recent months could fuel further turmoil in a country that already sees tens of thousands of large-scale protests each year. Second, there's the bureaucratic problem. For the past several years, former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson chaired a strategic dialogue with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan. Washington and Beijing have now expanded the scope of talks to include the State Department and China's foreign ministry. Leaving aside the difficulties in building trust between U.S. and Chinese negotiators, State and Treasury don't coordinate well on strategy, and there's no guarantee that China's foreign and finance ministries will work seamlessly together either. The new formula for talks is bureaucratic infighting squared. The third reason the U.S. and China won't build a durable strategic partnership is that Beijing has little appetite for the larger geopolitical role Washington would like it to play. Why should Beijing accept the risks that come with direct involvement in conflicts involving Iran and Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Israelis and Palestinians, Somalia and Sudan, and other sources of potential turmoil? It has more immediate problems at home.

#### High prices cause efficiency- solves the impact

AAP 12

[Australian Associated Press, 9/12/12, <http://www.perthnow.com.au/news/breaking-news/high-oil-prices-fuel-efficiency-drive-iea/story-e6frg133-1226473001539>]

These factors will also cap demand growth in 2013, the agency said on Wednesday. "The pace of oil demand growth is expected to remain relatively steady over the next 18 months, with annual gains of just 0.8 million barrels per day in both 2012 and 2013," the agency said in its latest Oil Market Report. "This modest growth rate reflects the combined effects of sluggish global economic activity, historically elevated oil prices and global improvements in energy efficiency," said IEA, an offshoot of the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. With Brent futures indicating prices will remain above $100 in 2012 before dipping to just below $99 in 2013, consumers are being given an incentive to cut consumption.

### Warming

#### Warming is irreversible

ANI 10 (“IPCC has underestimated climate-change impacts, say scientists”, 3-20, One India, http://news.oneindia.in/2010/03/20/ipcchas-underestimated-climate-change-impacts-sayscientis.html)

According to Charles H. Greene, Cornell professor of Earth and atmospheric science, "Even if all man-made greenhouse gas emissions were stopped tomorrow and carbon-dioxide levels stabilized at today's concentration, by the end of this century, the global average temperature would increase by about 4.3 degrees Fahrenheit, or about 2.4 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels, which is significantly above the level which scientists and policy makers agree is a threshold for dangerous climate change." "Of course, greenhouse gas emissions will not stop tomorrow, so the actual temperature increase will likely be significantly larger, resulting in potentially catastrophic impacts to society unless other steps are taken to reduce the Earth's temperature," he added. "Furthermore, while the oceans have slowed the amount of warming we would otherwise have seen for the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the ocean's thermal inertia will also slow the cooling we experience once we finally reduce our greenhouse gas emissions," he said. This means that the temperature rise we see this century will be largely irreversible for the next thousand years. "Reducing greenhouse gas emissions alone is unlikely to mitigate the risks of dangerous climate change," said Green.

#### Sequestration doesn’t change this – they read no evidence that they can sequestrate ENOUGh to solve – particularly since they cant prove in cross-x that the tech is commercial ready to be adopted globally now

#### CO2 is not the one cause for climate change – solar radiation and ocean interactions are ignored

Patterson 11 [Norman Paterson is a Professional Engineer and Consulting Geophysicist with 60 years’ experience in Mineral and Environmental Geophysics. He obtained his Ph. D in Geophysics at the University of Toronto in 1955, and was elected Fellow, Royal Society of Canada in 1977. “Global Warming: A Critique of the Anthropogenic Model and its Consequences”, Geoscience Canada - Volume 38, Number 1, March 2011, Chetan]

WHAT CAUSES WARMING? It is likely that the cyclical warming and cooling of the earth results from a number of different causes, none of which, taken alone, is dominant enough to be entirely responsible. The more important ones are solar changes (including both irradiance and magnetic field effects), atmosphere–ocean interaction (including both multidecadal climatic oscillations and unforced internal variability), and greenhouse gases. All of these factors have been discussed by IPCC, but the first two have been dismissed as negligible in comparison with the greenhouse-gas effect and man’s contribution to it through anthropogenic CO2 . It is claimed (e.g. Revelle and Suess 1957) that the particular infrared absorption bands of CO2 provide it with a special ability to absorb and reradiate the sun’s longer wavelength radiation, causing warming of the troposphere and an increase in high-altitude (cirrus) cloud, further amplifying the heating process. Detailed arguments against this conclusion can be found in Spencer et al. (2007) and Gerlich and Tscheuschner (2009). These scientists point out (among other arguments, which include the logarithmic decrease in absorptive power of CO2 at increasing concentrations), that clouds have poor ability to emit radiation and that the transfer of heat from the atmosphere to a warmer body (the earth) defies the Second Law of Thermodynamics. They argue that the Plank and Stefan-Boltzman equations used in calculations of radiative heat transfer cannot be applied to gases in the atmosphere because of the highly complex multi-body nature of the problem. Veizer (2005) explains that, to play a significant role, CO2 requires an amplifier, in this case water vapour. He concludes that water vapour plays the dominant role in global warming and that solar effects are the driver, rather than CO2 . A comprehensive critique of the greenhouse gas theory is provided by Hutton (2009).

#### Can’t solve globally – shift won’t happen fast enough

#### Renewables are competitive now

**Tickell, 8/20**/12 – British journalist, author and campaigner on health and environment issues, and author of the Kyoto2 climate initiative (Oliver, “Does the world need nuclear power to solve the climate crisis?” <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/aug/20/world-need-nuclear-power-climate-crisis>)

However, non-hydro renewables are growing very fast – up 15% in 2010. And within this figure just three power sources are responsible for most of the growth: wind power, solar PV and solar hot water. From 2005 to 2010, global solar hot water and wind power capacity both grew at 25% per year, while solar PV capacity grew at over 50% per year. If these growth rates were to be sustained for 35 years, wind capacity would rise 6,300-fold from 200 gigawatts (GW) in 2010 to about 1.25 million GW, solar hot water 6,300-fold from 185 GW to 1.15 million GW, and solar PV 40 million-fold from 40 GW to 1.6 billion GW. These figures are not predictions. Exponential growth will not continue for so long, as prime sites for wind turbines and solar panels get used up. Other technologies, such as concentrated solar power, will also become important. And there will be demand-side constraints: the projected 1.6 billion GW of solar PV capacity alone would produce over 3 billion billion kilowatt hours per year, equivalent to a primary energy burn of some 30 million Mtoe – over 1,000 times our projected world primary energy demand in 35 years. We would not even know what to do with so much energy. But while not predictive, the figures are highly indicative of the low-carbon energy choices the world should make. The one, nuclear power, is expensive and becoming more so. It will be a practical impossibility to increase its capacity to a scale big enough to make a real difference to global climate within a realistic time frame. Worse, if we were somehow to build our 11,000 nuclear reactors, we would face the certainty of repeated catastrophic accidents and the spread of nuclear weapons, not to mention unimaginable liabilities for decommissioning and long-term nuclear-waste management. We can fairly say that nuclear power is both repulsive and utterly wrong. The other choice, renewable power, already costs less than fossil fuels for many applications, thanks in large part to generous subsidies in Germany, Japan and other countries, which have had the effect of greatly reducing prices. Solar electricity is now cheaper than power from diesel generators in the tropics and subtropics – and so the rapid spread of solar power across China, India, Africa and Latin America is being driven not by subsidy but by the market. And it is getting cheaper all the time as increased demand, caused by its lower price, stimulates greater competition among manufacturers, technological advance, and even greater price falls, in a delightful virtuous circle. Moreover, renewable energy is free of catastrophic dangers and long- term liabilities. It is both romantic and right.

#### New oil supplies derail renewables

Styles 12 (Geoffrey, “Could Oil's Surge Sink Renewable Energy?,” The Energy Collective, 7-2-12, <http://theenergycollective.com/node/89161>)

A new forecast of global oil production by the end of the decade attracted a fair amount of attention this week. The study, from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, indicates that oil production could expand by about 20% by 2020 from current levels. The Wall St. Journal's Heard on the Street column cited this in support of the view that the influence of "peak oil" on the market has itself peaked and fallen into decline. I was particularly intrigued by a scenario suggested in MIT's Technology Review that this wave of new oil supplies could trigger an oil price collapse similar to the one in the mid-1980s that helped roll back the renewable energy programs that were started during the oil crises of the 1970s. That's possible, though I'm not sure this should be the biggest worry that manufacturers of wind turbines and solar panels have today.

#### Renewables key to solve warming

**Jagger, 8** – Chair of the World Future Council (Bianca, 3/6. CQ Congressional Testimony, “RENEWABLE ENERGY,” Lexis.)

"If we go beyond the point where human intervention can no longer stabilise the system, then we precipitate unstoppable runaway climate change. That will set in motion a major extinction event comparable to the five other extinction crises that the earth has previously experienced." I find it deeply mystifying that the vast majority of the media are still not adequately expressing the scale of the danger we face. Professor John Holdren, President of the AAAS, said in August, "We have already passed the stage of dangerous climate change. The task now is to avoid catastrophic climate change." And as George Monbiot, in an article he wrote for the Guardian in July, said: "Unaware of the causes of our good fortune, blissfully detached from their likely termination, we drift into catastrophe." This clearly demonstrates what the World Future Council, the organisation I chair, is advocating. If we are serious about averting climate change catastrophe, we must think in revolutionary terms, and transform our way of life, restoring rather than destroying life on earth. We must embark upon a global renewable energy revolution: if we are to achieve the necessary carbon reduction by 2020, we must replace our carbon- driven economy with a renewable energy economy

#### Turn – CO2 increases marine calcification through symbiont photosynthesis

Idso et al 12 [Sherwood, Keith, Craig - Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service, Vice President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change with a PhD in Botany, former Director of Environmental Science at Peabody Energy in St. Louis, Missouri and is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Geophysical Union, American Meteorological Society, Arizona-Nevada Academy of Sciences, Association of American Geographers, Ecological Society of America, “Algal Symbionts Appear to Determine Responses of Calcifying Organisms to Ocean Acidification”, Volume 15, Number 5: 1 February 2012, <http://www.co2science.org/articles/V15/N5/EDIT.php>, Chetan]

Many are the studies that claim that increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations will lead to a condition described as ocean acidification, where the pH of seawater declines and it becomes ever more difficult for calcifying marine organisms to produce skeletal structures. However, in a culture experiment with two algal symbiont-bearing, reef-dwelling foraminifers (Amphisorus kudakajimensis and Calcarina gaudichaudii), which was conducted in seawater under five different pCO2 conditions - 245, 375, 588, 763 and 907 ppm, maintained with a precise pCO2-controlling technique - Hikami et al. (2011) found that net calcification of A. kudakajimensis was indeed reduced under higher pCO2, but that calcification of C. gaudichaudii did just the opposite and actually increased with increased pCO2. This latter result, although seemingly strange, is anything but unusual; for the nine researchers report that various taxa of coccolithophores and sea urchins "show enhanced calcification in environments with higher pCO2," citing the work of Iglesias-Rodriguez et al. (2008), Doney et al. (2009) and Ries et al. (2009). And they say that "different populations of Emiliania huxleyi have shown decreased, increased, or unchanged calcification in response to higher pCO2," citing Fabry (2008). In discussing the findings of their experiment, Hikami et al. say that the upward trend in the calcification of C. gaudichaudii in response to ocean acidification "can probably be attributed to the increase in CO2, possibly through enhancement of symbiont photosynthesis, a phenomenon known as the CO2-fertilizing effect," citing Ries et al. (2009), although the concept was first described several years earlier by Idso et al. (2000). And in discussing possible causes of the two contrasting types of calcification response to atmospheric CO2 enrichment (positive and negative), they speculate that "the type of symbiont influences the strength of the CO2-fertilizing effect."

#### Our understanding of the ocean is too small to make any sweeping conclusions – the ocean acidification theory ignores ocean carbonation and is based on short term experiments

Idso et al 12 [Sherwood, Keith, Craig - Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service, Vice President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change with a PhD in Botany, former Director of Environmental Science at Peabody Energy in St. Louis, Missouri and is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Geophysical Union, American Meteorological Society, Arizona-Nevada Academy of Sciences, Association of American Geographers, Ecological Society of America, “The Unsettled Science of Ocean Warming and Acidification ”, Volume 15, Number 19: 9 May 2012, <http://www.co2science.org/articles/V15/N19/EDIT.php>, Chetan]

All of these phenomena, many of which are nonlinear and extremely complicated, are interlinked; and Riebesell and his colleagues thus conclude, from their objective review of the pertinent scientific literature, that the magnitude and even the sign of the global ocean's carbon cycle feedback to climate change are, in their words, "yet unknown." They note, for example, that "our understanding of biological responses to ocean change is still in its infancy." With respect to ocean acidification, in particular, they write that the impact it will have on marine life "is still uncertain," and that the phenomenon itself is but "one side of the story," the other side being what they call "ocean carbonation," which, as they describe it, "will likely be beneficial to some groups of photosynthetic organisms." Thus, they write that "our present understanding of biologically driven feedback mechanisms is still rudimentary," and that with respect to many of their magnitudes, "our understanding is too immature to even make a guess." What is more, they imply that even what we do think we know could well be wrong, because, as they elucidate, "our present knowledge of pH/CO2 sensitivities of marine organisms is based almost entirely on short-term perturbation experiments, neglecting the possibility of evolutionary adaptation."

#### Increased CO2 is key to crop fertilization that prevents famine and solves extinction

Idsos 10 [Sherwood, Keith, Craig - Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service, Vice President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change with a PhD in Botany, former Director of Environmental Science at Peabody Energy in St. Louis, Missouri and is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Geophysical Union, American Meteorological Society, Arizona-Nevada Academy of Sciences, Association of American Geographers, Ecological Society of America, “Food Security: The Real Planetary Problem ”, Volume 13, Number 51: 22 December 2010, <http://www.co2science.org/articles/V13/N51/EDIT.php>, Chetan]

In a paper recently published in the Journal of Proteome Research, Sarkar et al. (2010) write that "increasing population and unsustainable exploitation of nature and natural resources have made 'food security' a burning issue in the 21st century," echoing sentiments much like those expressed by Farrell (2009), who has noted that "the alarming increase in biofuel production, the projected demand for livestock products, and the estimated food to feed the additional 700 million people who will arrive here by 2016, will have unprecedented consequences," among which are likely to be the unsavory facts that "arable land, the environment, water supply and sustainability of the agricultural system will all be affected," and not in a positive manner. Furthermore, when the human population of the globe reaches 8.7-11.3 billion by the year 2050 (Bengtsson et al., 2006), the situation will become truly intolerable, unless something is done, far in advance of that date, to dramatically mitigate the situation. Thus, as Sarkar et al. suggest, "a normal approach for any nation/region is to strengthen its agricultural production for meeting future demands and provide food security." But a major difficulty, which could well spoil mankind's ability to do so, is the ongoing rise in the atmosphere's ozone concentration, which is the subject of Sarkar et al.'s new paper. In a study designed to elucidate the many ways in which ozone (O3) is harmful to plants, the eight researchers grew two high-yielding cultivars (Sonalika and HUW 510) of wheat (Triticum aestivum L.) out-of-doors at the Agriculture Research Farm of India's Banaras Hindu University. This was done within open-top chambers that they maintained at the ambient O3 concentration and at elevated O3 concentrations of 25% and 50% above ambient during the peak O3 period of the day (10:00 to 15:00 hours local time) for a total of fifty days, during which period they measured numerous responses of the plants to the two levels of ozone enrichment. So what did they find? Sarkar et al. determined, among several other things, that the moderate increases in the air's O3 concentration resulted in higher foliar injury, a reduction in photosynthetic efficiency, induced inhibition in photochemical efficacy of photosystem II, lowered concentrations of photosynthetic pigments and proteins, plus what they describe as "drastic reductions" in RuBisCO large and small subunits, while noting that major leaf photosynthetic proteins and important energy metabolism proteins were also "drastically reduced." In discussing the results of their study, the scientists from India, Japan and Nepal remark that anthropogenic activities have made ozone a "major environmental pollutant of our time," while noting that some are predicting it to be an even "greater problem for the future." And adding this dilemma to the problem of feeding the world over the next few decades and beyond, humanity's future is not looking good. In fact, it's incredibly bleak. So what can be done to help us weather this potentially devastating perfect storm? Sarkar et al. suggest that we focus on "engineering crops for future high O3," concentrating on maintaining "effective stomatal conductance of plants which can avoid O3 entry but not hamper their productivity." We agree. But not knowing to what extent we will be successful in this endeavor, we need to do something else that we know will work; and that is to allow the air's CO2 content to rise, unimpeded by the misguided efforts of climate alarmists who would curtail anthropogenic CO2 emissions in the guise of fighting what they claim is anthropogenic-induced global warming. This contention is largely theoretical and wholly unproven; but we know that atmospheric CO2 enrichment nearly always acts to increase both the productivity and water use efficiency of nearly all plants, as a result of literally hundreds, if not thousands, of real-world experiments, while it often more than compensates for the negative effects of O3 pollution. Clearly, we are going to need all of the help we can possibly get to make it unscathed through even the first half of the 21st century; and we cannot afford to throw away any of the means we have at our disposal to help us in this great effort. We have got to see carbon dioxide for what it truly is -- the elixir of life: one of the two raw § Marked 11:30 § materials (the other being water) that combine during the process of photosynthesis to produce the substances of plant tissues that provide the food for nearly all human and animal life on the planet, either directly, in the case of herbivores, or indirectly in the case of other life forms. And that makes carbon dioxide just the opposite of what the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has recently declared it to be -- a dangerous air pollutant. Shame on them! ... and on all those who demonize this life-giving molecule that we expel to the air every time we exhale.

#### Famine sparks World War 3

Calvin 98 (William H. Calvin, Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at the University of Washington, January 1998, “The Great Climate Flip-Flop,” The Atlantic Monthly, Ebsco Host]

The population-crash scenario is surely the most appalling. Plummeting crop yields would cause some powerful countries to try to take over their neighbors or distant lands – if only because their armies, unpaid and lacking food, would go marauding, both at home and across the borders. The better-organized countries would attempt to use their armies, before they fell apart entirely, to take over countries with significant remaining resources, driving out or starving their inhabitants if not using modern weapons to accomplish the same end : eliminating competitors for the remaining food.      This would be a worldwide problem – and could lead to a Third World War – but Europe's vulnerability is particularly easy to analyze. The last abrupt cooling, the Younger Dryas, drastically altered Europe's climate as far east as Ukraine. Present-day Europe has more than 650 million people. It has excellent soils, and largely grows its own food. It could no longer do so if it lost the extra warming from the North Atlantic.

#### CO2 didn’t cause sea level rise

Carter et al 11 [Dr. Robert M. Carter is a stratigrapher and marine geologist with degrees from the University of Otago (New Zealand) and the University of Cambridge (England)., Dr. Craig D. Idso is the founder and chairman of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Dr. S. Fred Singer is one of the most distinguished atmospheric physicists in the U.S. He established and served as the first director of the U.S. Weather Satellite Service, now part of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and earned a U.S. Department of Commerce Gold Medal Award for his technical leadership. “Climate Change Reconsidered – 2011 Interim Report of the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change” <http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/2011/pdf/2011NIPCCinterimreport.pdf>, Chetan]

If one splits the period of linear sea-level rise into two equal 57-year parts centered on the middle of the twentieth century—1893 to 1950 and 1950 to 2007— it can be determined from various atmospheric trace gas records that the air‘s CO2 concentration rose about 3.8 times faster over the last of these periods than it did over the first period. Since mean sea level rose at a constant rate over the entire 114 years, it is unlikely the historical increase in the atmosphere‘s CO2 content was the ultimate cause of the steady mean sea-level rise.

## 2nc v Emory LS

### T

#### Topical Affs must increase financial incentives – that requires offering a material and monetary reward.

#### “Financial incentives” are a distinct category that excludes fiscal and tax incentives – that’s Christiansen. There is a clear list of topical incentives: grants, loans, loan guarantees, direct subsidies, and subsidized credits.

#### They don’t meet – they increase tax credits – that’s a reduction in amount paid, not an offer of a monetary reward. Financial incentives is distinct from tax incentives – that’s Chi and Hoffman.

#### It’s a voting issue for limits –

#### They allow for hundreds of small changes that encourage one type of an energy over another – any negative incentive, fines, credit enhancements, levelized pricing, tradable certificates, etc. Not to mention – all non-financial incentives like coercive, moral, personal, and social incentives.

#### Financial incentives are distinct from tax incentives.

Hubert & Pain 2 (Florence, Senior Research Officer at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Economist in Monetary Analysis at the Bank of England, & Nigel, Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, “Fiscal Incentives, European Integration and the Location of Foreign Direct Investment,” March, p. 5, http://www.niesr.ac.uk/pubs/dps/dp195.PDF)

There are three broad categories of investment incentives which can be distinguished - tax incentives, financial incentives and other non-financial measures. Examples of tax incentives include preferential tax rates, and capital allowances. Even if production costs are equalised across locations, international differences in corporate taxes may affect the location decision if they affect post-tax returns. Financial incentives cover factors such as government grants and subsidies, loan guarantees, preferential loans and government equity participation in high-risk investments. These measures are often discretionary, with the size of payment depending upon the scale of investment and the activities that the inward investor plans to undertake. The third category, other non-financial measures, includes the provision of subsidised infrastructure, such as prepared industrial sites, free-trade zones and the use of preferential government contracts.

#### We allow a fair number of Affs: all the types of incentives above for each energy category. Also – allow for a topical version of their aff – they could do subsidized tax credits.

#### Limits outweigh – they’re the vital access point for any theory impact – its key to fairness – huge research burdens mean we can’t prepare to compete – and its key to education – big topics cause hyper-generics, lack of clash, and shallow debate – and it destroys participation

Rowland 84 (Robert C., Debate Coach – Baylor University, “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective, Ed. Parson, p. 53-54)

The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing in scope and size.4 This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breath. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. Naitonal debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change.5 The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of the topics has all but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process.6 Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske belives that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad policy topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breadth of the topic and experience “negophobia,”7 the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novices through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caugh without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.”8 The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters or eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much times and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are forced out of the activity.9 Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.”10 The final effect may be that entire programs either cease functioning or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.”11 In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.

#### “Financial incentives” require cash transfer – their interpretation is too broad. Prefer federal definitions

Vaughn 8 (John R., Chairperson – National Council on Disability, “The State of 21st Century Financial Incentives for Americans with Disabilities,” National Council on Disability, 8-11, http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2008/Aug2008#\_Toc204703675)

Broadly, financial incentives are defined as benefits that confer economic well-being and opportunity. Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines an incentive as something that promotes or incites greater productivity.[7] The economist Levitt describes incentives as "the cornerstone of modern life and that the ability to understand them is the key to solving just about any riddle."[8] Levitt and Dubner write that incentives come in "three flavors, economic, social and moral," but rarely does an incentive represent all three.[9] The most common definition of a financial incentive is a benefit that is intended to enhance profit. Financial incentives drive the marketplace for pharmaceuticals, insurance companies, health care, and technology industries. The other definition of financial incentives and the one used in this study is the intended benefit conferred by Federal Government programs that provide social transfers, usually of cash or in-kind services, designed to change behavior, increase cash flow, and supplement services and supports, but that rarely enhance or create assets.

#### Their interpretation explodes limits – that’s in the overview – their evidence says they allow some form of credit to allow for the development of energy, but that blows open the doors of incentives

#### [OPTIONAL] Their interpretation allows for regulations and fines on oil and natural gas to be topical because it would “expand market preference” for wind and solar – that makes the topic bidirectional and puts an impossible burden on the neg.

#### Defining the word “incentive” generally is too broad and explodes the topic – narrow definitions of “financial incentive” sets a precise limit

Liska and Snell 92 (Roger W., Head and Professor of the Department of Construction Science and Management –Clemson University, and Bill, “Financial Incentive Programs for Average-size Construction Firm,” Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 118(4), p.1)

The term "incentive" implies a diverse set of meanings. The literal definition states that an incentive is something that inspires action. In terms of the construction industry this definition is translated into attempts to increase production or performance in return for increased psychological or material rewards. There are many types of incentives; **the major ones are financial and psychological**. Financial incentives use a monetary reward to stimulate increased performance or production. Employees are induced to work smarter and harder in the hopes of receiving financial compensation over and above their normal pay.

#### FI – Cash Transfer – 2NC – Ground

#### Their interpretation kills neg ground –

#### Every good generic is based off a stable funding mechanism – CP competition, politics and elections, spending – all require stable funding mechanisms.

#### Neg ground outweighs aff innovation – they get first and last speech, the persuasive value of the 2AR outweighs the advantage of the neg block. It’s especially true on this topic – the restrictions part of the topic is already too big and explodes mechanism and advantage area – limiting the incentives part of the topic is the only way to get the neg to an even playing field.

#### Advantage innovation solves aff flex and stale debate – there’s many reasons why promoting a type of energy is good. Adding mechanisms differences makes the topic unmanageable.

#### FI – Cash Transfer – 2NC – Ground – A2: You Kill Solar and Wind Affs

#### Not true – directly subsidize projects, grants, etc. are all topical ways to incentivize wind and solar – no reason tax credits are key.

#### Also – who cares – allowing wind and solar explodes the topic – having a unidirectional topic is more manageable and sets a better limit – that’s the overview.

### CP

#### CP solves 100% of the case and the external net benefit –

#### State-level financial incentives for EOR solve – reduce capital costs, provide financial certainty, and incentivize tech investment and adoption

NEORI 12 (National Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative along with Center for Climate and Energy Solutions and the Great Plains Initiative, "CARBON DIOXIDE ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY: A CRITICAL DOMESTIC ENERGY,

ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL OPPORTUNITY," February, http://www.neori.org/NEORI\_Report.pdf)

C. OVERVIEW OF MODEL STATE INCENTIVES FOR ¶ CO2¶ -EOR DEPLOYMENT TO COMPLEMENT FEDERAL ¶ SUPPORT¶ Several states have incentives to encourage CO2¶ capture ¶ and transport from power plants and industrial facilities, ¶ which complement federal grants, tax credits, and other support mechanisms. States with these incentives have ¶ provided critical support for projects to advance toward ¶ deployment. Furthermore, as with the new federal tax ¶ credit recommended in this report, state incentives for ¶ commercial CO2¶ capture and pipeline projects have the ¶ potential to be revenue positive, stimulate local oil production, and spur economic activity at a time when most ¶ states face profound fiscal challenges. ¶ NEORI recommends consideration, adoption or ¶ adaptation of the following state policies to complement ¶ federal policy and encourage commercial deployment of ¶ CO2¶ capture and transport technologies.¶ Severance tax reduction and/or extension of existing ¶ severance tax reduction for oil produced with CO2¶ from ¶ anthropogenic sources. This policy provides a percentage reduction in the severance tax for oil production, ¶ if the taxpayer uses CO2¶ -EOR techniques and/or uses ¶ anthropogenic CO2¶ for EOR. It creates an incentive to ¶ pursue CO2¶ -EOR and use CO2¶ from man-made sources, ¶ although it would only work for states with a production ¶ or severance tax. ¶ Cost recovery approval for regulated entities. This ¶ policy enables regulatory approval by public utility commissions for a utility to recover certain costs associated ¶ with CO2¶ capture through rates paid by customers. Cost ¶ recovery approval provides significant financial certainty ¶ to attract the private investment necessary for a project ¶ to proceed to construction and commercial operation.¶ Off-take agreements. This policy enables projects to ¶ enter into long-term contracts for supply of a project’s ¶ output (e.g., electricity). Long-term off-take agreements ¶ provide significant financial certainty, similar to regulatory cost recovery.¶ Tax credits, exemptions, or abatements. This policy ¶ provides credits, exemptions, and abatements for taxes ¶ that would otherwise be incurred, such as property tax ¶ abatement, franchise tax credits, and sales tax exemption ¶ for sale of captured CO2¶ . Such tax policies reduce the ¶ incremental capital cost of capture, compression, infrastructure, and purchase of manmade CO2¶ .¶ State-level bonding of CO2¶ pipeline projects and/or ¶ capture and compression facilities. This policy supports ¶ project financing, development, and planning of infrastructure or facilities deemed to be in the public interest. ¶ Public infrastructure authorities commonly may issue ¶ bonds, make grants/loans, plan/coordinate infrastructure, or participate in infrastructure build-out (e.g., own, ¶ construct, maintain, and operate a facility). ¶ Inclusion in Portfolio Standards. This policy requires ¶ that a certain percentage of all electricity generated in ¶ a state must come from specific sources, such as power ¶ plants with CCS. Portfolio standards that include CCS ¶ are an effective tool to establish financial certainty ¶ through state policy requirements, by allowing for regulatory cost recovery of investments made to meet statutory obligations.¶ A more detailed description of model state policies ¶ can be found in Appendix C, including state-by-state ¶ links to specific policies to serve as a resource to state ¶ policy-makers.

#### Extend the Byner 2 evidence – State action can take place within the realm devolution – this means that the entirety of the plan still happens, just under state control, states are still given the power of decision making.

#### State level incentives for EOR solve oil recovery and production

Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 12 ("PRESS RELEASE: ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY PLAN DRAWS BIPARTISAN WELCOME IN CONGRESS," http://www.c2es.org/newsroom/releases/eor-plan-draws-bipartisan-support)

WASHINGTON, D.C. – A coalition of industry, state, environmental and labor leaders called today for federal and state incentives to stimulate the expansion of enhanced oil recovery using carbon dioxide (CO2) from power plants and industrial facilities. The proposed measures would boost domestic U.S. oil production while reducing the nation’s CO2 emissions. ¶ The recommendations by the National Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative (NEORI), convened by the Great Plains Institute (GPI) and the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES), were released at an event on Capitol Hill. ¶ Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND) and Congressman Mike Conaway (R-TX) were on hand to welcome the recommendations, and Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), Senator John Hoeven (R-ND) and Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), and Congressman Rick Berg (R-ND) offered written statements in support of the initiative.¶ In CO2-enhanced oil recovery (EOR), oil producers inject CO2 into wells to draw more oil to the surface. The practice, 6 percent of current U.S. domestic oil production, helps sustain production in otherwise declining oil fields, but limited supplies of CO2 constrain the expansion of EOR. NEORI’s recommendations would encourage the capture of CO2 from industrial and power facilities for use in EOR.¶ The centerpiece of the group’s recommendations is a proposed federal tax incentive focused on companies that capture and transport CO2, not oil companies. NEORI estimates that the tax credit would quadruple U.S. oil production from EOR, to 400 million barrels a year, while reducing CO2 emissions by 4 billion tons over the next 40 years. The U.S. Treasury Department would administer the competitively awarded tax credit. ¶ NEORI calculates that the program would pay for itself within 10 years through increased federal revenues generated by boosting domestic oil production, with an estimated net return of $100 billion over 40 years. The incentive would reduce the trade deficit by saving the United States about $610 billion in expenditures on imported oil over the same period. ¶ As an immediate measure, NEORI recommends that Congress or the Treasury Department modify the existing Section 45Q Tax Credit for Carbon Dioxide Sequestration to provide a more workable incentive to firms to capture and transport CO2.¶ At the state level, NEORI identified a range of existing state policies encouraging commercial deployment of CO2 capture technologies and projects and recommends that other states tailor and adopt them. The model state policies include tax credits, exemptions or abatements, and the inclusion of carbon capture-and-storage in electricity portfolio standards, among others.¶ “The EOR Initiative’s recommendations strike common ground among a diverse collection of interests and offer a realistic opportunity to increase U.S. oil supplies while reducing carbon emissions,” said C2ES President Eileen Claussen. “The proposal reflects practical solutions that deliver a win for our nation’s economic growth, energy security, and the climate.” ¶ “Implementing these recommendations for EOR can create a virtuous circle of increasing benefits to our nation over time,” said Brad Crabtree, policy director for GPI. “Congress and state policymakers can expand American oil production, spur jobs, increase revenues, reduce the trade deficit and store significant CO2, all with incentives that pay for themselves.”¶ In total, an estimated 26 billion to 61 billion barrels of economically recoverable oil could be produced in the United States using currently available CO2-EOR technologies and practices, or potentially more than twice the country’s proved reserves. Expanded use of CO2-EOR also can advance the development of infrastructure needed for long-term capture, transportation and storage of carbon emissions.¶ NEORI participants include state officials from Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, Texas, West Virginia and representatives of:¶ Air Products, Inc. Natural Resources Defense Council¶ AFL-CIO Ohio Environmental Council¶ Arch Coal, Inc. Southern Company¶ Archer Daniels Midland Co. Summit Power ¶ Basin Electric Power Cooperative Tenaska Energy¶ Clean Air Task Force United Transportation Union ¶ Enhanced Oil Recovery Institute, University of Wyoming Wyoming Outdoor Council¶ GE Energy

#### AND – Counterplan is more efficient - Federal bureaucracy dooms the plan – institutional failures mean zero solvency

Bryner 2 (Gary C. - Professor, Department of Political Science, Brigham Young University, and Research Associate, Natural Resources Law Center. University of Colorado School of Law., “ARTICLE: Policy Devolution and Environmental Law: Exploring the Transition to Sustainable Development”, Fall, 26 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 1, lexis)

Devolution theory calls for increased policy authority and discretion to be delegated to state governments in order to improve the efficiency of public policies, ensure they effectively resolve specific problems, and foster political accountability. Devolution also gives different communities the opportunity to strike their own balance among the competing policy objectives of economic growth and reducing environmental risks. n10 Devolution to regulated industries promises to reduce the cost of regulation, create incentives for sources of pollution to find the most efficient and effective means of reducing emissions, encourage reductions that go beyond minimum mandates, and allow for flexibility in business decision making. Devolution to citizens is championed as a way to get the public involved in regulatory initiatives that will change the behavior of citizens. Reducing emissions through energy conservation and increased use of [\*5] mass transit, for example, require major commitments on the part of citizens to change their behavior, and that commitment cannot simply be mandated from the top down. Other forms of participatory policy making have been proposed to respond to the demands of citizens for a role in decisions that affect their health and quality of life. Advocates of devolution argue that the current federal regulatory structure is **plagued by burdensome procedures and a cumbersome chain of command**. The combination of environmental statutes, EPA regulations, and guidance documents result in **an impenetrable pyramid of paperwork, planning, and reports**. A tremendous amount of effort at all levels of governments is required to manage this process. Compliance with these requirements often replaces energy and resources that could be used to actually reduce pollution and improve environmental quality. Accountability is difficult to identify since **so many policy makers compete and jostle for influence**, that citizens do not know who to hold accountable when environmental goals are not achieved. Federal officials lay claim to credit for issuing ambitious environmental goals, while state and local officials bear the brunt of criticism for imposing regulatory burdens. The EPA seeks vainly to develop and impose national requirements on conditions that vary widely throughout the nation. n11 Critics have identified a **host of problems with centralized, command and control regulation**: it has not only failed to remedy many environmental problems and threats, but it has engendered significant opposition because of the restraints on freedom it imposes, the costs and burdens of compliance, and **the apparent ease by which some businesses are able to escape** liability and responsibility for their actions. n12 There are real limits to the power of government to promote and ensure the preservation of air, water, land, and other resources. Government agencies alone cannot accomplish these environmental goals, but must be combined with clear and effective economic incentives and with a widely held ethic of care for the land and resources on which all life is so dependent. But the dominant role the federal government plays in environmental policy making focuses too much attention on Washington, and **fails to encourage more local efforts**. n13 Other critics of the current structure of regulatory federalism argue that some state and local governments had a long tradition of ambitious environmental regulation and enacted ambitious pollution control legislation well before Congress or the executive branch acted. The first clean air laws in the United States were enacted by cities in the 1880s, [\*6] some 75 years before the first federal program aimed at air pollution. n14 Many states passed water pollution laws in the 1920 and 30s, and by 1948, every state had an environmental protection agency. n15 While it is true that many federal initiatives for air and water pollution predated the 1970 Earth Day, when the modern era of environmental regulation began, states are not newcomers to environmental regulation. Nor is federal regulation a clear success story. Federal environmental policy has been, **in many areas, problematic**, and has threatened environmental quality. Federal subsidies for road building in national forests, grazing on public lands, the development of fossil fuels, and the emptying of rivers and streams into reservoirs for irrigation, for example, have taken a tremendous toll on natural systems and resources and have encouraged waste, unsustainable consumption, and pollution. n16 One of the consequences of environmental federalism has been to place limitations on more aggressive state regulations. A major impetus for federal air pollution regulation, for example, was a concern by the auto industry that states would impose different emission standards on new vehicles; this fear of having to meet a maze of state regulatory requirements prompted Detroit to lobby for federal regulation of new vehicle emissions. n17 Another example, from the mid-1990s, is the development of federal emission standards for hazardous emissions from coke ovens that were less stringent than those devised in some states, such as Pennsylvania, where environmental advocates had pushed for and won more ambitious limits. n18

#### Condo

#### 1. Counter-interpretation: We get one counterplan and one K.

#### 2. Critical thinking – it tests the Aff from multiple angles, forcing the best arguments.

#### 3. Neg flex – we need every option. Outweighs Aff ground – they have structural advantages like 1st and last speech and infinite prep.

#### 4. Real world: policy-makers always use conditional arguments.

#### 5. Time and strat skew inevitable – we could’ve read multiple T violations or Da’s and they would still have to answer them.

#### 6. Encourages lazy debate – instead of arguing the CP you’re complaining that you shouldn’t have to answer it. Hard debate outweighs.

7. Not a voting issue – just stick us with the counterplan

#### A2: Perm do both

#### -- Links to politics – includes immediate federal action. Perm doesn’t shield: state support is slow. Delay means it won’t take effect until after the vote.

#### -- Impossible – CP transfers authority to the states. The federal government can’t do it while transferring authority to the states – if they can – it’s intrinsic because it adds a new time element that is neither in the plan or counterplan – that’s a voting issue

#### Federal policies crowd out the states—reduces demand for state action

Adler 7 (Jonathan H – Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Business Law and Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, ., “WHEN IS TWO A CROWD? THE IMPACT OF

FEDERAL ACTION ON STATE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION”, 31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 67, Lexis)

A second potential negative indirect effect of federal regulation on state regulatory choices is crowding out. This occurs because federal regulation **may serve as a substitute for state-level regulation, thereby reducing the benefits of adopting or maintaining state-level protections**. Insofar as voters in a given state demand a certain level of environmental protection, there is no reason to expect states to duplicate federal efforts when a federal program satisfies that demand, particularly if a state has not already created such a program. If the federal floor is greater than or equal to the level of environmental protection demanded by a state's residents, **that state has no reason to adopt environmental regulations of its own** once the federal government has acted. To the extent that this effect occurs, it is separate from--perhaps even in addition to--the signaling effect described above. The claim here is not simply that states regulate less than they would absent federal regulation--although this claim is almost certainly true. Rather, the claim is that some states that would adopt regulations more protective than the federal floor, absent the imposition of federal regulation, have not done so due to federal regulation and may not do so in the future. If this hypothesis is correct, the net effect of federal environmental regulation in at least some states could be less environmental protection than would have been adopted had the federal government not intervened. To see how this could occur, recall that the demand for environmental regulation in any given jurisdiction tends to increase over time as wealth, [\*99] technical capability, scientific knowledge, and environmental impacts increase. n131 In any given state (as in the nation as a whole), there is an initial period ("Period A") during which the demand for a given type of environmental protection is relatively low. The costs of adopting environmental regulations in this period are greater than the benefits of adopting any such protections. These costs include the costs of developing, drafting, and passing legislation; the costs of creating a new policy program, drafting and implementing regulations, defending the regulations from any potential legal or administrative challenges, creating a means to monitor and enforce regulatory compliance; and so on. In addition, there are opportunity costs of devoting state resources and political capital to the cause of environmental protection as opposed to some other policy goal. As discussed earlier, the demand for environmental protection has tended to increase over time along with increases in living standards. n132 At the same time, increases in technical knowledge and administrative efficiency may lower the costs of a given regulatory program. Eventually, a state will enter a second period ("Period B") in which the benefits of a given environmental regulatory program are greater than the costs of initiating, implementing, and operating such a program. Absent any federal interference, the hypothetical state will not adopt environmental regulations in Period A, but will adopt such regulations in Period B. See Figure 3. This is the environmental transition discussed in Part I. In Period A, the demand for environmental protection is insufficient to justify the costs of implementing environmental protection measures. By Period B, however, the demand for environmental protection has risen due to increases in wealth and knowledge, among other factors. At the same time, increases in technical capacity and scientific understanding have reduced the cost of adopting environmental protections. As a result, in Period B a state will adopt Q[B] amount of environmental protection. n133 [\*100] The timing of Period A and Period B will vary from state to state. This is clearly the case as different states have enacted different environmental regulatory measures at different times--some before the adoption of federal environmental regulation, some after, and some not at all. Looking at the history of various environmental concerns, such as air quality, water quality, or wetlands, it is clear that many states moved from Period A to Period B for these environmental concerns at various times prior to the onset of federal regulations in the 1970s. In many other states, however, a federal regulatory floor was adopted before the onset of Period B. [\*101] For states that went through their environmental transition and entered Period B prior to the enactment of federal environmental protection, whether the adoption of a federal regulatory floor increased the aggregate level of environmental protection in that state depended upon whether preexisting state policies offered greater or lesser levels of protection than the relevant federal policies. For states in which the onset of Period B begins after the adoption of federal regulations, the enactment of a federal regulatory floor will, at the time of enactment, increase the aggregate level of environmental protection in that state. However, this may not be the case over time. In states that desire a greater level of protection than that provided by the relevant federal regulations, it is not clear that the existence of the federal regulatory floor will result in an equal or greater level of protection than would be adopted were it not for the federal regulations. This is because federal regulation will, **to some extent, act as a substitute for state regulation**. As a result, the adoption of federal regulation has the potential to reduce the demand for state regulation and, in some instances, even result in less aggregate regulation in a given state than would have been adopted absent federal intervention. In short, federal regulation can crowd out state regulation. **The potential for such a crowding-out effect is illustrated** in Figure 4. The existence of federal regulation will reduce the demand for state regulation by an amount equal to the extent to which federal regulation is a substitute for state regulation of the same environmental concern (Q[FReg]). This substitution effect will reduce the net benefit of adopting state-level environmental regulations from OCQ[B] to OC'Q'[B]. By reducing the net benefits of state-level environmental regulation in this manner, federal regulation has the potential to crowd out state-level environmental protections, even if the quantity of environmental protection demanded in the state is greater than that provided by the federal government. In such cases, the aggregate level of environmental protection will be lower with federal regulation than it would be without it. [\*102]

#### Perm fails – preemption means it’s net worse

Leshy 4 (John D., Distinguished Professor of Law – University of California Hastings College of the Law, “Natural Resources Policy in the Bush Administration: an Outsider's Somewhat Jaundiced Assessment,” Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum, Spring, 14 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 347, Lexis)

VI. Traditional conservative principles, like promoting free markets and **devolving governmental responsibilities to state and local governments**, have taken a back seat where they conflict with industry desires Perhaps the strongest indication of the administration's capture by industry is the manner in which it has kept the free-market ideologies of some of its key natural resource appointees firmly in check, readily sacrificing them where they conflict with industry demands. For example, in recent years, ideological conservatives, among others, have touted the resolution of longstanding conflicts over the environmental impacts of livestock grazing on arid federal lands by buying the ranches in consensual, market-based transactions, and retiring the federal lands their cattle has been grazing from livestock grazing in the future. n34 This has provided the administration with a great opportunity to put in place the principles of so-called "free-market environmentalism" favored by many of the Bush Administration's right-wing supporters. [\*356] But when the Grand Canyon Trust, a conservation group, went into the marketplace to purchase grazing permits on nearly a million acres of public lands in the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in southern Utah, and sought to retire those lands from grazing, the Bush Administration balked. n35 The Interior Solicitor (a former official of the National Public Lands Council, a rancher trade association) issued legal opinions throwing up roadblocks to retirement, and the retirement proposal continues to languish inside the Department. n36 Even though Interior has acknowledged that retirement will improve the health of the land, n37 the administration is more concerned about placating the cattlemen's association and hard-bitten local opponents of the national monument who do not want to see even market-based land conservation. The unhappy result is that philanthropic money to invest in grazing retirements is harder to come by, much to the chagrin of free-market environmental groups, one of who recently gave the administration a "C-" in its report card on this point. n38 Another example is the administration's unwillingness to defer to state and local governments when their interests diverge from those of industry. Thus, the administration told a federal court in Nevada that federal mining law preempted efforts by a local county to regulate a proposed processing plant for federal minerals that would be located on private land. n39 The overriding federal interest here is somewhat mysterious, considering that the only use of the material being mined is to make kitty litter. n40 The administration has made a similar argument in opposing Los Angeles County's efforts to regulate a quarry on private land extracting sand and gravel owned by the federal government. n41 And it has aggressively (but so far unsuccessfully) [\*357] pushed the Congress to give it authority to preempt state regulation of rights-of-way for energy facilities. n42

#### Doesn’t solve

Zimmerman 1 (Joseph F., Professor of Political Science – State University of New York at Albany, Publius, Spring, p 16)

Examining this list, it becomes apparent that different institutional features of the federal structure are more or less important for securing these different values. Some of the values ‑ diversity, competition, and experimentalism ‑ appear to depend significantly on the existence of many states pursuing unique regulatory agendas. If all of the states pursued identical regulatory strategies, or were prevented from instituting meaningful agendas altogether, these values, as a logical matter, could not be promoted. Obviously there would be no regulatory diversity, because all of the states would structure the lives of their citizens in the same way. Moreover, this uniformity would prevent state competition and experimentation: people would have no incentive to "vote with their feet" if each state provided the same package of public goods, and experimentation by definition requires that different states attempt different solutions to the same social problems.

#### Perm do CP

#### Clearly severs– the states reduce restrictions/increase incentives. The federal government only devolves authority.

#### They have to defend only federal action

Webster’s 76 (New International Dictionary Unabridged, p. 883)

Federal government. Of or relating to the central government of a nation, having the character of a federation as distinguished from the governments of the constituent unites (as states or provinces).

#### Perm severs immediacy -

#### 'Substantial' must be at the present time

Words and Phrases 64 (40W&P 759)

The words" outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive," in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain: absolute: real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to fonn; actually existing; true; not including, admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

#### “Should” means immediate

Summer 94 (Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)

4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn16)  ¶5 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.[17](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn17) The order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.[18](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn18) When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.[19](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn19) True minutes[20](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn20) of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the statutory policy of this State. **[Continues – To Footnote]** [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn14) In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

#### Voting issue – stable agent is the locus of all ground

## 1nr v Emory LS

### Politics

### Impact Outweighs and Turns the Case

#### They’ve conceded the impact level of the poliics disad – it outweighs case because it’s the most probable impacts – with all sides racing to nuclear war only probability and timeframe matters and the negative is ahead on both of them – this is the only unanswered impact scenario in the round, 100% risk

#### US/Russian nuclear war causes extinction – its categorically different than other impacts

Bostrom 2 (Nick, PhD Philosophy – Oxford University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are **mere ripples** on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[2]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html" \l "_ftn2" \o ") At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[3]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html" \l "_ftn3" \o ") A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as **global** and **terminal**. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html" \l "_ftn4" \o ")  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for § Marked 12:16 § instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### AND THIS TURNS CASE

#### Romney’s China policy will collapse relations.

**Sanger**, 5/12/**2012** (David – chief Washington correspondent for the New York Times, Is There a Romney Doctrine?, The New York Times, p. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/sunday-review/is-there-a-romney-doctrine.html?pagewanted=all)

More complicated for Mr. Romney, given his business credentials, is his position on China. He argues for more arms to Taiwan and much tougher use of trade sanctions to respond to China’s currency and market manipulations. In the past, such actions have frozen Chinese cooperation with the United States, but, the white paper insists, “Romney will work to persuade China to commit to North Korea’s disarmament,” as if the last three presidents have not.

#### GOP victory leads to China bashing over multiple issues – causes sanctions

Gerstein 11 (Josh – Politico, “The GOP's China syndrome”, 11/22, <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/68952.html>)

Mitt Romney says America is at war with China — a “trade war” over its undervalued currency. “They’re stealing our jobs. And we’re gonna stand up to China,” the former Massachusetts governor declared in a recent Republican presidential debate, arguing that the United States should threaten to impose tariffs on Chinese imports. When Romney steps on stage tonight for another debate, this one devoted to foreign policy, that kind of China-bashing is likely to be a favorite theme. With a moribund economy and relatively little traction for other international issues, the threat posed by cheap Chinese imports and Chinese purchases of U.S. debt is an irresistible target. The problem, China experts are quick to point out, is that those attacks often fly in the face of the business interests Republicans have traditionally represented, not to mention the record many of the candidates have either supporting trade with China — or actively soliciting it. Just last year, for example, Romney slammed President Barack Obama for growth-killing protectionism after he put a 35 percent tariff on Chinese tires because of a surge of cheap imports. And, Romney wrote in his book, “No Apology: The Case for American Greatness,” “Protectionism stifles productivity.” And though Texas Gov. Rick Perry predicted at a debate this month that “the Chinese government will end up on the ash heap of history if they do not change their virtues,” a picture posted on the Internet shows a smiling Perry on a trade mission to Shanghai and Beijing posing with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi after presenting him with a pair of cowboy boots. Nor has Perry been shy about encouraging Chinese investments in Texas: In October 2010, he appeared at the announcement of a new U.S. headquarters for Huawei Technologies to be located in Plano, Texas, despite lingering concerns among U.S. security officials that Huawei-made telecommunications equipment is designed to allow unauthorized access by the Chinese government. “There’s a certain pandering going on,” said Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, who adds that the GOP rhetoric is squarely at odds with the views of the U.S. establishment, which believes a showdown with China over the trade issue “will make things worse, not better.” Not all of the 2012 GOP presidential hopefuls have taken to publicly pummeling Beijing. The only bona fide China expert in the group, former Ambassador to China Jon Huntsman, has criticized Romney for being cavalier and simplistic in his talk of tariffs. “You can give applause lines, and you can kind of pander here and there. You start a trade war if you start slapping tariffs randomly on Chinese products based on currency manipulation,” Huntsman said at a recent debate. “That doesn’t work.” Former Sen. Rick Santorum also rejected the idea of slapping tariffs on Beijing if it won’t buckle on the currency issue. “That just taxes you. I don’t want to tax you,” Santorum said. Newt Gingrich says he wants to bring a world of hurt down on Beijing for alleged Chinese cyberattacks on the U.S. and theft of intellectual property, though he’s vague about how. “We’re going to have to find ways to dramatically raise the pain level for the Chinese cheating,” the former house speaker declares. And Herman Cain talks of a threat from China, but says the answer is to promote growth in the U.S. “China’s economic dominance would represent a national security threat to the USA, and possibly to the rest of the world,” Cain wrote in May in the Daily Caller. “We can outgrow China because the USA is not a loser nation. We just need a winner in the White House.” Romney’s rhetoric has been particularly harsh. “It’s predatory pricing, it’s killing jobs in America,” he declared at the CNBC debate earlier this month, promising to make a formal complaint to the World Trade Organization about China’s currency manipulation. “I would apply, if necessary, tariffs to make sure that they understand we are willing to play at a level playing field.” The Romney campaign insists those tariffs are entirely distinguishable from the tire duties Obama imposed in 2009. “The distinction between Obama’s tire action and what Gov. Romney is proposing is simple,” said a Romney aide who did not want to be named. “President Obama is not getting tough with China or pushing them unilaterally, he is handing out political favors to union allies. [Romney’s] policy focuses on fostering competition by keeping markets open and the playing field level.” Romney, who helped set up investment bank Bain Capital, has long been a favorite of Wall Street, so his stridency on the China trade issue has taken some traditional conservatives — for whom free trade is a fundamental tenet — by surprise. National Review said Romney’s move “risk[ed] a trade war with China” and was “a remarkably bad idea.” In fact, many business leaders give Obama good marks for his China policy. “What the Obama administration has done in not labeling China as a ‘currency manipulator’ is correct,” said one U.S. business lobbyist who closely follows U.S.-China trade issues and asked not to be named. “We’re very leery of a tit-for-tat situation,” he added, while acknowledging that the anti-China rhetoric is “good politics.”

#### That causes a US-China trade war – escalates to conflict and collapses global trade

**Droke 10** (Clif, Editor – Momentum Strategies Report, “America and the Next Major War’, Green Faucet, 3-29, http://www.greenfaucet.com/technical-analysis/america-and-the-next-major-war/79314)

In the current phase of relative peace and stability we now enjoy, many are questioning when the next major war may occur and speculation is rampant as to major participants involved. Our concern here is strictly of a financial nature, however, and a discussion of the geopolitical and military variables involved in the escalation of war is beyond the scope of this commentary. But what we can divine from financial history is that "hot" wars in a military sense often emerge from trade wars. As we shall see, the elements for what could prove to be a trade war of epic proportions are already in place and the key figures are easily identifiable. Last Wednesday the lead headline in the Wall Street Journal stated, "Business Sours on China." It seems, according to WSJ, that Beijing is "reassessing China's long-standing emphasis on opening its economy to foreign business....and tilting toward promoting dominant state companies." Then there is Internet search giant Google's threat to pull out of China over concerns of censorship of its Internet search results in that country. The trouble started a few weeks ago Google announced that it no longer supports China's censoring of searches that take place on the Google platform. China has defended its extensive censorship after Google threatened to withdraw from the country. Additionally, the Obama Administration announced that it backs Google's decision to protest China's censorship efforts. In a Reuters report, Obama responded to a question as to whether the issue would cloud U.S.-China relations by saying that the human rights would not be "carved out" for certain countries. This marks at least the second time this year that the White House has taken a stand against China (the first conflict occurring over tire imports). Adding yet further fuel to the controversy, the U.S. Treasury Department is expected to issue a report in April that may formally label China as a "currency manipulator," according to the latest issue of Barron's. This would do nothing to ease tensions between the two nations and would probably lead one step closer to a trade war between China and the U.S. Then there was last week's Wall Street Journal report concerning authorities in a wealthy province near Shanghai criticizing the quality of luxury clothing brands from the West, including Hermes, Tommy Hilfiger and Versace. This represents quite a change from years past when the long-standing complaint from the U.S. over the inferior quality of Chinese made merchandise. On Monday the § Marked 12:16 § WSJ ran an article under the headline, "American Firms Feel Shut Out In China." The paper observed that so far there's little evidence that American companies are pulling out of China but adds a growing number of multinational firms are "starting to rethink their strategy." According to a poll conducted by the American Chamber of Commerce in China, 38% of U.S. companies reported feeling unwelcome in China compared to 26% in 2009 and 23% in 2008. As if to add insult to injury, the high profile trial of four Rio Tinto executives in China is another example of the tables being turned on the West. The executives are by Chinese authorities of stealing trade secrets and taking bribes. There's a touch of irony to this charge considering that much of China's technology was stolen from Western manufacturing firms which set up shop in that country. It seems China is flexing its economic and political muscle against the West in a show of bravado. Yet one can't help thinking that this is exactly the sort of arrogance that typically precedes a major downfall. As the Bible states, "Pride goeth before destruction, and an haughty spirit before a fall." In his book, "Jubilee on Wall Street," author David Knox Barker devotes a chapter to how trade wars tend to be common occurrences in the long wave economic cycle of developed nations. Barker explains his belief that the industrial nations of Brazil, Russia, India and China will play a major role in pulling the world of the long wave deflationary decline as their domestic economies begin to develop and grow. "They are and will demand more foreign goods produced in the United States and other markets," he writes. Barker believes this will help the U.S. rebalance from an over weighted consumption-oriented economy to a high-end producer economy. Barker adds a caveat, however: if protectionist policies are allowed to gain force in Washington, trade wars will almost certainly erupt and. If this happens, says Barker, "all bets are off." He adds, "The impact on global trade of increased protectionism and trade wars would be catastrophic, and what could prove to be a mild long wave [economic] winter season this time around could plunge into a global depression." Barker also observes that the storm clouds of trade wars are already forming on the horizon as we have moved further into the long wave economic "winter season." Writes Barker, "If trade wars are allowed to get under way in these final years of a long wave winter, this decline will be far deeper and darker than necessary, just as the Great Depression was far deeper and lengthier than it should have been, due to growing international trade isolationism. He further cautions that protectionism in Washington will certainly bring retaliation from the nations that bear the brunt of punitive U.S. trade policies. He observes that the reaction from one nation against the protectionist policies of another is typically far worse than the original action. He cites as an example the restriction by the U.S. of $55 million worth of cotton blouses from China in the 1980s. China retaliated by cancelling $500 million worth of orders for American rain. "As one nation blocks trade, the nation that is hurt will surely retaliate and the entire world will suffer," writes Barker.

### Climate Deal 2NC

#### Obama reelection is critical to a global climate deal

**Geman**, 1/5/**2012** (Ben, Report says global climate deal hinges on Obama reelection, The Hill, p. http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/202539-report-global-climate-deal-hinges-on-obama-reelection-)

Prospects for striking a binding global climate deal by 2015 are probably toast if President Obama loses in November. That’s among the conclusions in a wide-ranging, new climate and green energy outlook from banking giant HSBC’s research branch. A major outcome from the United Nations climate talks in December was a plan to craft a deal by 2015 — one that would include big, developing nations such as China — and have it come into force by 2020. But Obama’s main Republican White House rivals are critical of emissions limits and skeptical of climate science. HSBC predicts an international agreement by 2015 is highly unlikely if Obama loses the election. From their research note: [T]he prospects for a new global climate deal in 2015 depend considerably on the election of a pro-climate action president. The election of a President opposed to climate action will not only damage growth prospects for low-carbon solutions in the USA itself, but will make the hard task of negotiating a new global agreement by 2015 almost impossible.

#### Climate leadership is critical to solve warming – prevents extinction.

**Moon** 10/25/**2009** (Ban Ki – secretary general of the United Nations, We Can Do It, New York Times, p. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/26/opinion/26iht-edban.html)

Every day, the critical December summit in Copenhagen grows closer. All agree that climate change is an existential threat to humankind. Yet agreement on what to do still eludes us. How can this be? The issues are complex, affecting everything from national economies to individual lifestyles. They involve political trade-offs and commitments of resources no leader can undertake lightly. We could see all that at recent climate negotiations in Bangkok. Where we needed progress, we saw gridlock. Yet the elements of a deal are on the table. All we require to put them in place is political will**.** We need to step back from narrow national interest and engage in frank and constructive discussion in a spirit of global common cause. In this, we can be optimistic. Meeting in London earlier this week, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown told the leaders of 17 major economies (responsible for some 80 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions) that success in Copenhagen is within reach—if they themselves engage, and especially if they themselves go to Copenhagen to push an agenda for change. U.S. leadership is crucial. That is why I am encouraged by the spirit of compromise shown in the bipartisan initiative announced last week by John Kerry and Lindsey Graham. Here was a pair of U.S. senators — one Republican, the other Democratic — coming together to bridge their parties’ differences to address climate change in a spirit of genuine give-and-take. We cannot afford another period where the United States stands on the sidelines. An engaged United States can lead the world to seal a deal to combat climate change in Copenhagen. An indecisive or insufficiently engaged United States will cause unnecessary — and ultimately unaffordable — delay in concrete strategies and policies to beat this looming challenge. Leaders across the globe are increasingly showing the engagement and leadership § Marked 12:17 § we need. Last month, President Barack Obama joined more than 100 others at a climate change summit at U.N. headquarters in New York — sending a clear message of solidarity and commitment. So did the leaders of China, Japan and South Korea, all of whom pledged to promote the development of clean energy technologies and ensure that Copenhagen is a success. Japan’s prime minister promised a 25 percent cut in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by 2020, laying down a marker for other industrialized nations. The European Union, too, has pledged to make a 30 percent reduction as part of a global agreement. Norway has announced its readiness for a 40 percent cut in emissions. Brazil has unveiled plans to substantially cut emissions from deforestation. India and China are implanting programs to curb emissions as well.

### Impact Wall

#### Romney’s policies would isolate Russia --- collapses relations

**Bandow**, 4/23/**2012** (Doug – senior fellow at the Cato Institute, Romney and Russia: Complicating American Relations, National Interest, p. <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/romney-russia-complicating-american-relationships-6836>)

Mitt Romney has become the inevitable Republican presidential candidate. He’s hoping to paint Barack Obama as weak, but his attempt at a flanking maneuver on the right may complicate America’s relationship with Eastern Europe and beyond. Romney recently charged Russia with being America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” As Jacob Heilbrunn of National Interest pointed out, this claim embodies a monumental self-contradiction, attempting to claim “credit for the collapse of the Soviet Union, on the one hand [while] predicting dire threats from Russia on the other.” Thankfully, the U.S.S.R. really is gone, and neither all the king’s men nor Vladimir Putin can put it back together. It is important to separate behavior which is grating, even offensive, and that which is threatening. Putin is no friend of liberty, but his unwillingness to march lock-step with Washington does not mean that he wants conflict with America. Gordon Hahn of CSIS observes: Yet despite NATO expansion, U.S. missile defense, Jackson-Vanik and much else, Moscow has refused to become a U.S. foe, cooperating with the West on a host of issues from North Korea to the war against jihadism. Most recently, Moscow agreed to the establishment of a NATO base in Ulyanovsk. These are hardly the actions of America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” Romney’s charge is both silly and foolish. This doesn’t mean the U.S. should not confront Moscow when important differences arise. But treating Russia as an adversary risks encouraging it to act like one. Moreover, treating Moscow like a foe will make Russia more suspicious of America’s relationships with former members of the Warsaw Pact and republics of the Soviet Union—and especially Washington’s determination to continue expanding NATO. After all, if another country ostentatiously called the U.S. its chief geopolitical threat, ringed America with bases, and established military relationships with areas that had broken away from the U.S., Washington would not react well. It might react, well, a lot like Moscow has been reacting. Although it has established better relations with the West, Russia still might not get along with some of its neighbors, most notably Georgia, with its irresponsibly confrontational president. However, Washington should not give Moscow additional reasons to indulge its paranoia.

#### Only Obama can resolve the missile defense crisis --- collapses relations.

**Trenin et. al**, June **2012** (Dmitri – director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Maria Lipman – editor-in-chief of Pro Et Contra, Alexey Malashenko – scholar-in-residence in Religion, Society and Security at the Moscow Center, Nikolay Petrov – scholar-in-residence in the Society and Regions Program at the Moscow Center, Russia on the Move, p. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=48309>)

But strategically, the United States is still Russia’s de facto main potential adversary: Many influential Russians suspect that Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney, not Barack Obama, reflects the U.S. establishment’s real views on Russia. In their analysis, U.S. global missile defense efforts bespeak a consistent desire to neutralize Russia’s nuclear deterrent and make the country vulnerable to U.S. non-nuclear strategic weaponry. A U.S.-Russian agreement on missile defense, if it is reached in a second Obama term, could thus defuse a looming crisis in the relationship. However, a failure to agree could lead to deeper and more pronounced hostility. In today’s geopolitical context, that would probably mean Russia drawing further away from the West and closer to China, amounting to a major geostrategic shift on a global scale.

### Uniqueness Debate

They say Romney winning but that’s only one model – our Silver evidence is wholesome and predictive – the overwhelming consensus of evidence says Obama will win the election

#### Abramowitz prediction model proves. But dramatic events can still change the outcome.

**Ravi**, **9/13**/2012 (Anusha, Abramowitz Predicts 2012 Election Results, The Emory Wheel, p. http://www.emorywheel.com/abramowitz-predicts-2012-election-results/)

Alan Abramowitz, the Alben W. Barkley Professor of Political Science, has released his forecast for the outcome of the presidential election this November. Abramowitz, who has accurately predicted the popular vote winner of every presidential election since 1988, says incumbent President Barack Obama will win the election by a close margin of about 1.2 percent. Abramowitz based his forecast on statistical analysis composed of the candidate’s approval rating at the end of June, the growth of the economy and the value of the “incumbency factor,” which refers to the advantage a candidate will have simply for being the candidate that voters are familiar with. “The Democratic constituency is just larger than the Republicans’ and encompasses far more different types of people,” Abramowitz said. “Even if Romney receives the maximum turnout from white Republican voters, he won’t win.” In the past, the incumbency factor has meant more, according to Abramowitz. But more recently, the value of merely being the incumbent candidate has decreased because of the stark polarization — the division of voters into political extremes — of the American voting public. While Abramowitz has made his prediction about two months before the election takes place, he said that a very dramatic event would have to occur to change what he believes will be the outcome of the election.

b)

#### Obama will win – Romney is not exploiting white voters.

**Cohn**, **8/8**/2012 (Nate – former Whitman debater and author of the Electionate, 90 Days Until the Election – And Obama Has the Advantage, The New Republic, p. <http://www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/105912/obama-has-the-advantage-90-days-go>)

Barack Obama has the advantage with 90 days to go until November 6, and the Romney campaign mostly has itself to blame. Four years after Obama’s decisive victory in 2008, a poor economy, dissatisfaction with the direction of the country, and mediocre approval ratings have conspired to endanger the president’s reelection chances. But a close race, which is what the polls show, is not the same as a dead heat. Romney is an imperfect candidate who has been poorly served by a strategy that has failed to contest Obama’s predictable attacks, leaving him poorly positioned heading into the conventions. Over the last four years, Obama’s coalition suffered deep enough losses to give his challenger a legitimate path to victory. But those losses were narrow and concentrated among white voters without a college degree, as Obama retains near-2008 levels of support among minorities and college-educated whites. As a wealthy former CEO of a private equity firm with an awkward cadence who could never call himself a great politican, Romney has never naturally appealed to white working class voters, and, as a result, Romney’s ability to capitalize on Obama’s biggest weakness requires him to overcome his own. With three months to go, these weaknesses are as pronounced as ever. The Obama campaign adopted a strategy to remedy their weakness among white working class voters by defining Romney as an out-of-touch, outsourcing plutocrat willing to close factories, fire workers, and avoid taxes to advance his self-interest. If the Romney campaign possessed effective tools to blunt Obama’s offensive, they weren’t properly employed. Instead, the Romney campaign inexplicably focused on attacking a well-defined incumbent president, while permitting Obama and his allies to broadcast unflattering and uncontested tales about an undefined challenger. Boston’s ill-advised strategy has endangered Romney’s chances. Romney’s unfavorable ratings remain high and he hasn’t yet consolidated the disaffected white working class voters with reservations about Obama’s performance. In Ohio—ground zero for the Obama campaign’s efforts—Romney’s numbers have plummeted to the low forties, an extremely weak showing in a must win state. Undecided voters harbor particularly unfavorable impressions of the Republican nominee. According to recent surveys, Romney’s favorables are in the teens among undecided voters, while a majority has already formulated a negative impression.

They’re ev says economy but:

#### The economy will not hurt Obama --- it’s in political win territory.

**Drum**, 9/11/**2012** (Kevin, If Obama Wins, You Can thank the Economy, Not Blame It, Mother Jones, p. <http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2012/09/if-obama-wins-you-can-thank-economy-not-blame-it>)

Matt Yglesias picks up the baton with a series of charts showing that, in fact, the economy isn't in especially dire shape. I've compressed this all into one chart, and as Matt says, the difference is like night and day. In the year before the 2008 election, employment was dropping like a stone. Sure enough, the incumbent party lost. In the year before the 2010 election, employment was at rock bottom and going nowhere. Sure enough, the incumbent party lost. But in the year before the 2012 election, employment numbers have been on a steady upward trajectory. That suggests a modest win for the incumbent party. Obviously, Obama's chances are hurt by the fact that unemployment remains high, wages are stagnant, and we still haven't made up all the job losses from the recession. But politically speaking, the economy isn't in terrible shape. It's in OK-but-not-great shape. And that means the incumbent probably has a small advantage. If Obama wins by a couple of percentage points in November, he will have performed almost exactly as well as you'd expect given the state of the economy.

### Intrinsicness

-- Our disad is intrinsic – the link proves that the plan results in \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

-- Destroys all ground –

A) No disad is intrinsic – “make-up calls” can be crafted to solve any link or impact – even purely reaction-based DAs like Relations can be avoided by having the government cut the offended nation a big check

B) Fairness outweighs – logical debate is worthless if the Neg always loses. Fairness protects the forum that makes debate educational

-- Moving target – intrinsicness makes the plan conditional – destroys fairness because it's the locus of debate

-- Not logical: no single actor can do the plan and other actions. Even Congress is made up of many individual legislators.

-- Empirical intrinsicness checks – the Aff can read evidence that Congress will react to the plan by taking action – but not fiat that it occurs

### Link Wall

#### Supporting oil causes a populist backlash against Obama --- this will cause him to lose the election. That’s the 1NC Cillizza evidence.

#### Anti-oil attacks are part of Obama’s populist strategy --- key to his re-election.

**Hughes**, 3/29/**2012** (Brian – staff writer for the Washington Examiner, Obama seeks end to oil subsidies; Congress says no, The Washington Examiner, p. http://washingtonexaminer.com/article/1204111#.UDb7s91lSf4)

President Obama used the bully pulpit of the White House on Thursday to condemn lawmakers for supporting billions of dollars in subsidies to oil companies, seeking to tap Americans' frustration with gas prices in a populist pitch that has become a centerpiece of his re-election strategy. Obama implored Congress to either "stand with big oil companies or the American people," but just moments later, the Senate voted against ending tax breaks for the nation's five largest oil companies despite Democrats' attempts to paint the GOP as beholden to the petroleum industry.

#### Populism is key to get swing voters --- attacks on Big Oil are key.

**Lux**, 4/11/**2012** (Michael – CEO of Progressive Strategies, partner at Democracy Partners, That Old-Time Populism Debate, Daily Kos, p. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/04/11/1082470/-That-Old-Time-Populism-Debate)

Tested beautifully with independents, swing voters, and in general, and tested far better than some less populist messages they have tested over the last year-plus. You do have to be thoughtful in your messaging to swing voters. A pure give ’em hell eat-the-rich stem-winder of a message may not appeal to them without some nuance in it. Making fighting for small business, cutting government waste, and rewarding hard work part of the message always helps with in-the-middle voters. A focus on opportunity and economic growth helps as well. But to say that you have to avoid economic populism when talking about those things is something that only a true blue Third Wayer would ever say with a straight face. Taking on Wall Street and Wall Street bailouts never hurts and always helps in all the polling I have seen. Going after big oil, big insurance companies, corporate special interests, and big business CEOs who outsource jobs never turns off very many swing voters, and helps you with a whole lot of other folks. Which brings me to my last, and perhaps most important, point: winning political messages can never work for just one slice of the electorate. Third Way may well have found that segment of swing independents who were less old, less blue collar, and less populist than any other group of voters in the potential Democratic electoral coalition. But your message has to appeal to all different kinds of folks. For a Democrat to win a national election, you need a message that inspires your volunteers and small contributors and fans who will talk to their neighbors about you; a message that generates enough excitement from blacks, Latinos, young people, and unmarried women to get them out to vote; a message that appeals to all those underwater homeowners and people without jobs that voted for Obama last time but may be leaning Republican or too discouraged to vote because of their own hard times; and a message that appeals to a wide array of different kinds of swing voters. If the message can’t do all those things at once, it will not get you 51 percent. That’s what makes economic populism so incredibly valuable: it is the message, if nuanced correctly per the paragraph above, which comes the closest to doing that. Even if I lost all my doubts about the Third Way analysis in terms of the small slice of the electorate they had identified, the message still wouldn’t work strategically because it would fail with all those other voters we Democrats need to have to win. A group like Third Way, with staffers who walk into their offices every day with a pre-determined mission of not wanting Democrats to be too economically populist, can easily design a sample and polling questions to reinforce the messages they want to work. But Democrats, especially Democratic incumbents, who are trying to win elections in times like these when the middle class is being squeezed so hard, need to be willing to take the populist torch and carry it proudly.

#### Big Oil is seen as part of the 1% ---- support kills any populist platform.

**Roberts**, 1/26/**2012** (David – staff writer for Grist, Clean energy is a wedge issue that favors Democrats, Grist, p. http://grist.org/politics/clean-energy-is-a-wedge-issue-that-favors-democrats/)

Americans know that clean energy is the future. They want to embrace the future. They want to, well, win it. They certainly don’t want to fend it off for the sake of oil companies. Americans hate oil companies! (Almost as much as they hate congressional Republicans.) They don’t want to subsidize oil companies any more. Even Republicans support ending oil subsidies by a 2-to-1 margin. On to the second significant finding: Americans want to tax the rich. These swing voters, even the Republicans, responded enthusiastically to [Obama's] call for a “Buffett Rule” that would require the wealthiest Americans to pay their fair share. As one participant put it, “I agree with his tax reform — the 1 percent should shoulder more of the burden than the other 99 percent. He [Obama] talked about being all for one, one for all — that really resonated for me.” These dial focus groups make it very clear that defending further tax cuts for those at the top of the economic spectrum puts Republicans in Congress and on the Presidential campaign trail well outside of the American mainstream. (See also this Sept. 2011 Gallup poll or this Oct. 2011 Bloomberg poll or this Oct. 2011 CBS News poll or many others). What this shows is that the Occupy movement has won. Americans across party lines increasingly see things in terms of the 1 percent and the 99 percent. A Pew survey earlier this month found that “conflict between rich and poor now eclipses racial strain and friction between immigrants and the native-born as the greatest source of tension in American society.” Two-thirds of Americans now see “strong conflicts” between the rich and poor. Even Mitt Romney is using Occupy’s language. These issues — clean energy and taxing the rich — are not unconnected. Properly done, clean energy is a populist issue. Big Oil perfectly symbolizes the 1 percent, and Americans are ready to redirect public resources away from oil and toward a wide network of home-grown cleantech innovators.

#### Financial incentives for oil spark massive opposition --- the link vastly outweighs any turn.

**Weiss**, 2/15/**2012** (Daniel – senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, Poll Finds Americans, Especially Independents, Overwhelmingly Oppose Subsidies to Fossil Fuels, Think Progress, p. http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/02/15/426014/poll-finds-americans-especially-independents-overwhelmingly-oppose-subsidies-to-fossil-fuels/)

As part of the FY 2013 budget released on February 13, President Obama proposed to eliminate $40 billion in tax breaks for oil and gas producers over the next ten years. Yesterday, the Yale Project on Climate Change reiterated its recent finding that Americans of all political stripes oppose subsidies for “coal, oil, and natural gas companies.” They oppose these subsidies by 70 percent to 30 percent – better than two to one. Republicans oppose these subsidies by 67 percent to 34 percent (reflects rounding of percentages). Intensity matters in public opinion. A determined, energetic minority can be quite powerful. The Yale poll shows that there is much more intensity against oil subsidies than in favor of them. Americans strongly opposed to the subsidies outnumber those who strongly support them by 31 percent to 3 percent – a 10 to 1 ratio. Independents – the voters who will likely determine the outcome of the 2012 election – strongly oppose these fossil fuel subsidies by 45 percent to 2 percent. This poll was conducted from October 20 to November 16, 2011, before respondents knew that the profits of the big five oil companies – BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil and Shell – would be a record $137 billion in 2011. In addition, gasoline prices averaged $3.38 to $3.44 per gallon during the survey period. This week the average gasoline price was $3.52 and climbing. Imagine how the anticipated higher gasoline prices combined with big oil’s record 2011 profits will intensify opposition to big oil subsidies. It is said that elections are won in the middle. Politicians who want to appeal to these independent voters would do well to vocally oppose these big oil subsidies. Certainly President Obama understands that. Supporters of big oil tax breaks may learn this lesson the hard way.

#### The link is also perception based- arguments about the way the plan will be spun don’t matter, the initial reaction to the plan is that it is support of big oil

#### Pro-oil moves will not translate into votes for Obama --- it’s clearly just politics.

**Belogolova**, 5/17/**2012** (Olga – staff reporter for the National Journal, Insiders: Outreach to Oil Industry Won’t Help Obama, p. http://www.nationaljournal.com/energy/insiders-outreach-to-oil-industry-won-t-help-obama-20120517)

Better dialogue between the White House and the oil and gas industry has lobbyists and congressional Republicans screaming “politics,” arguing that both sides have something to gain from warmer relations in an election year. But National Journal’s Energy & Environment Insiders say that this ostensible “détente” won’t really do much for President Obama in November. Nearly 70 percent of Insiders polled said that improved relations with Big Oil won’t help the president at the polls, many pointing out that no one has noticed these developments outside the Beltway and that campaign donations from the industry will still mostly flow to Republicans. “Follow the money. When oil and gas trade associations shift PAC contributions away from Romney/GOP, then it will help the president,” said one Insider. “Until then, this is less détente than a cold peace.” Earlier this month, American Petroleum Institute President Jack Gerard told National Journal Daily that communications between the industry and the White House have improved “dramatically” in recent months. Congressional Republicans were already well aware of that and were not happy. In an April 23 e-mail obtained by NJD, a senior aide on energy issues to Senate Environment and Public Works ranking member James Inhofe, R-Okla., criticized oil and gas lobbyists for working closely with the White House. Despite the growing anxiety over the improved relations, Insiders argue that the whole food fight has likely gone unnoticed outside of Washington, where voters still see Republicans as aligned with the oil industry and the Obama administration aligned with the environmental movement. “Energy-industry leaders understand this is all about politics and that this administration’s heart is with the Sierra Club in stopping ALL fossil fuels.… American people don’t care,” said one Insider, arguing that the story is “too inside Beltway.”

### Warming

### Overshoot

They say overshoot this doesn’t answer the irrevsibility claim – crossapply from solvency, she drops in too places that the cross-x concedes this tech isn’t commercially ready which means they cant solve the impact – they won’t fix overshoot fast enough – Ani ev says it would take thousands of years of sequestration to fix the damage

This answers decreasing emissions and global diffusion, they don’t have the tech that was above

### Renewables

Not enough work on the renewables disad she only says that they are a bridge fuel but ignores the warrants of the Styles evidence that projects that extend the length of global oil supply slow the transition to renewables – rather than bridging they prevent the rapid transition that would otherwise occur

#### Oil production drops the price, kills global renewables

Bullis 12 (Kevin, Senior Editor, Energy, “Could New Oil Production Cause Oil Prices—and Energy Innovation—to Collapse?,” 6-26-12, <http://www.technologyreview.com/view/428343/could-new-oil-production-cause-oil-pricesand/?nlid=nldly&nld=2012-06-27>)

A new report out of Harvard suggests that a boom in oil exploration and production—driven by a surge of investment starting in 2003—might lead to a sharp drop in oil prices. If that happens, could that kill development of alternatives to oil, as happened when oil prices hit bottom in the 1990s? Will solar panels, electric cars, and advanced biofuels fade from view? Three decades ago, high oil prices spurred investment in alternatives. But by the time oil prices had bottomed-out in the 1990s, much of that research had been abandoned, and promising technologies didn’t come to market or weren’t made cheap enough to catch on widely. With the surge in oil prices in recent years, much of that research has been taken up again, and the trends look good. Solar power is approaching the cost of conventional fossil-fuel power, and advanced biofuels seem on the cusp of becoming commercial reality. As new energy startups proliferated, many alternative energy researchers and companies waved away suggestions that oil might plummet again, causing these technologies to be abandoned once again. The conventional wisdom has been that high demand from fast-growing economies will keep oil prices high enough to drive innovation. And concern about climate change will lead to a price on carbon that will drive new technologies even if oil prices drop. But interest in climate change seems to have waned, and efforts to put a price on carbon dioxide emissions have failed in the U.S. and most of the rest of the world. If oil prices also drop due to overproduction, as the report suggests, what could that mean for technologies such as electric cars, advanced internal combustion engines, and renewable electricity sources, such as solar power? Taking solar power first, things are a bit different now than in the 1970s, at least in the United States. The oil crisis spurred investment in solar power in part because oil was used to generate a substantial amount of electricity in the United States. Now the U.S. hardly uses oil at all for generating electricity, and installing solar panels doesn’t do anything to decrease oil consumption. Some people don’t know that, and support solar as a way of reducing oil consumption—their support could fade with high oil prices. Such public support is critical for the solar industry now, since it relies heavily on subsidies. More importantly, while the U.S. doesn’t use oil for electricity, much of the rest of the world does. At current oil prices, solar power is cheaper than electricity from diesel generators, and that’s creating a new markets for solar panels. A drop in oil prices could hurt the solar industry. But solar panel prices have been dropping quickly, and some solar companies, such as First Solar, are staking their business on the prospect that they can soon be competitive in unsubsidized markets. There’s a race on. If the oil price drops within the next couple of years, that could be a bad sign for the solar industry. If it drops later, the solar industry may be able to survive on its own by then, even if it’s hurt some by lower prices. A drop in oil prices could really hurt advanced biofuels companies, which are struggling to get prices low enough to compete with even today’s relatively pricey oil. Low oil prices could further deteriorate already strained support for advanced biofuels. And low oil prices could also hurt attempts to sell electric cars, and cars with costly efficiency improvements. Automakers have struggled to sell electric cars even with relatively high gas prices. If oil prices drop, will new fuel economy standards that are driving automakers to sell more efficient vehicles hold up?

#### Lobbying – Oil companies oppose cleantech initiatives, kills renewables

Willis 12 (Paul, Earth Techling, “Is Big Oil really serious about renewables?,” 6-21-12,

<http://www.tgdaily.com/sustainability-features/64198-is-big-oil-really-serious-about-renewables>)

In truth, most of the impetus for clean energy development has come from other sources than Big Oil, which has rarely strayed much from the concerns of the balance sheet. For example, the large-scale push into biofuels by most of the major oil companies in recent years must be seen in the light of the Energy Independence and Security Act, which President Bush signed into law in 2007 and which requires the country to work toward the production of 36 billion gallons of renewable fuels by 2022. As well in the context of Obama's green energy push and commitments made by the U.S. military to get half of its power from clean energy sources by 2020. "All of our alternative energy businesses are businesses," Katrina Landis, the CEO of BP's alternative energy division, told Forbes recently. "We have to compete for investment dollars with all the hydrocarbon resources within BP." In fact, oil companies have not just remained passive observers to the renewables revolution, waiting to jump on the bandwagon when there's money to be made. At times they have actively tried to undermine efforts to deploy more cleantech. For example, Chevron's claims to be behind renewables are rather undermined by the fact that the company and its subsidiaries spent $2.1 million in lobbying the California state legislature last year over new laws requiring utilities to get a third of their power from alternative energy sources by the end of the decade.

### Oceans

They only read ev that ocean salinity is increasing, that’s not our argument:

#### Turn – CO2 increases marine calcification through symbiont photosynthesis

Idso et al 12 [Sherwood, Keith, Craig - Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service, Vice President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change with a PhD in Botany, former Director of Environmental Science at Peabody Energy in St. Louis, Missouri and is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Geophysical Union, American Meteorological Society, Arizona-Nevada Academy of Sciences, Association of American Geographers, Ecological Society of America, “Algal Symbionts Appear to Determine Responses of Calcifying Organisms to Ocean Acidification”, Volume 15, Number 5: 1 February 2012, <http://www.co2science.org/articles/V15/N5/EDIT.php>, Chetan]

Many are the studies that claim that increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations will lead to a condition described as ocean acidification, where the pH of seawater declines and it becomes ever more difficult for calcifying marine organisms to produce skeletal structures. However, in a culture experiment with two algal symbiont-bearing, reef-dwelling foraminifers (Amphisorus kudakajimensis and Calcarina gaudichaudii), which was conducted in seawater under five different pCO2 conditions - 245, 375, 588, 763 and 907 ppm, maintained with a precise pCO2-controlling technique - Hikami et al. (2011) found that net calcification of A. kudakajimensis was indeed reduced under higher pCO2, but that calcification of C. gaudichaudii did just the opposite and actually increased with increased pCO2. This latter result, although seemingly strange, is anything but unusual; for the nine researchers report that various taxa of coccolithophores and sea urchins "show enhanced calcification in environments with higher pCO2," citing the work of Iglesias-Rodriguez et al. (2008), Doney et al. (2009) and Ries et al. (2009). And they say that "different populations of Emiliania huxleyi have shown decreased, increased, or unchanged calcification in response to higher pCO2," citing Fabry (2008). In discussing the findings of their experiment, Hikami et al. say that the upward trend in the calcification of C. gaudichaudii in response to ocean acidification "can probably be attributed to the increase in CO2, possibly through enhancement of symbiont photosynthesis, a phenomenon known as the CO2-fertilizing effect," citing Ries et al. (2009), although the concept was first described several years earlier by Idso et al. (2000). And in discussing possible causes of the two contrasting types of calcification response to atmospheric CO2 enrichment (positive and negative), they speculate that "the type of symbiont influences the strength of the CO2-fertilizing effect."

#### Our understanding of the ocean is too small to make any sweeping conclusions – the ocean acidification theory ignores ocean carbonation and is based on short term experiments

Idso et al 12 [Sherwood, Keith, Craig - Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service, Vice President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change with a PhD in Botany, former Director of Environmental Science at Peabody Energy in St. Louis, Missouri and is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Geophysical Union, American Meteorological Society, Arizona-Nevada Academy of Sciences, Association of American Geographers, Ecological Society of America, “The Unsettled Science of Ocean Warming and Acidification ”, Volume 15, Number 19: 9 May 2012, <http://www.co2science.org/articles/V15/N19/EDIT.php>, Chetan]

All of these phenomena, many of which are nonlinear and extremely complicated, are interlinked; and Riebesell and his colleagues thus conclude, from their objective review of the pertinent scientific literature, that the magnitude and even the sign of the global ocean's carbon cycle feedback to climate change are, in their words, "yet unknown." They note, for example, that "our understanding of biological responses to ocean change is still in its infancy." With respect to ocean acidification, in particular, they write that the impact it will have on marine life "is still uncertain," and that the phenomenon itself is but "one side of the story," the other side being what they call "ocean carbonation," which, as they describe it, "will likely be beneficial to some groups of photosynthetic organisms." Thus, they write that "our present understanding of biologically driven feedback mechanisms is still rudimentary," and that with respect to many of their magnitudes, "our understanding is too immature to even make a guess." What is more, they imply that even what we do think we know could well be wrong, because, as they elucidate, "our present knowledge of pH/CO2 sensitivities of marine organisms is based almost entirely on short-term perturbation experiments, neglecting the possibility of evolutionary adaptation."

#### No impact—negligible pH change and animal response

NIPCC 10 (Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change, multi-national scientific coalition comprised of leading climate scientists, “Speculations beyond the Scope of Reality,” http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2010/may/05may2010a1.html, AM)

In the introductory material to their paper on potential effects of predicted near-future increases in CO2-driven ocean acidification on shell-producing calcification in a certain species of oyster, Watson et al. (2009) report that over the past two centuries, CO2 emissions from deforestation and the burning of fossil fuels have increased atmospheric CO2 concentrations from 280 to 380 ppm, citing NOAA/ESRL records produced and maintained by Pieter Tans. They additionally say that the portion of this extra CO2 that has been taken up by the planet's oceans has caused a 0.1 unit drop in the pH of their surface waters, which would appear to be correct. However, they predict there will be a further reduction in ocean pH of 0.3 to 0.5 units by 2100, citing the work of Haugan and Drange (1996), Orr et al. (2005) and Caldeira and Wickett (2005), while noting that these predicted changes in ocean pH "are not only greater but far more rapid than any experienced in the last 24 million years," citing Blackford and Gilbert (2007), or "possibly the last 300 million years," citing Caldeira and Wickett (2003). But how likely are such predictions? Consider the findings of Tans himself, who Watson et al. approvingly cite in regard to the CO2 history they mention. In a paper published inOceanography, Tans (2009) concluded that the future trajectory of oceanic pH will likely be significantly different from that suggested by the scientists cited by Watson et al., while at the same time bravely criticizing the IPCC reports that have also accepted the highly inflated acidification predictions of those scientists. Indeed, whereas Watson et al. and the IPCC accept the claims of those who project a decline in pH somewhere in the range of 0.3 to 0.5 between now and the end of the century, Tans' projections yield a pH decline somewhere in the range of 0.09 to 0.17, which is much smaller, and which would be expected to have significantly reduced biological impacts compared to those suggested by the experimental work of Watson et al. for that future point in time. Based on the results of their experiments and the maximum decline in ocean-water pH that they accept, for example, Watson et al. predict a significantdecline of 72% in Sydney rock oyster (Saccostrea glomerata) larval survival by the year 2100. However, utilizing Watson et al.'s data, but with the maximum ocean-water pH decline calculated by Tans, one obtains a non-significant larval survival decline of only 14%, based on interpolation of the graphical results portrayed in Watson et al.'s paper. In like manner, similar assessments of changes in antero-posterior measurement yield asignificant decline of 8.7% using Watson et al.'s assumptions about ocean pH, but a non-significant decline of only 1.8% according to Tans' pH calculations. Corresponding results for dorso-ventral measurement were a significant decline of 7.5% with Watson et al.'s pH values, but a non-significant decline of only 1.5% with Tans' values; while for larval dry mass there was a decline of 50% in Watson et al.'s analysis, but an actualincrease (albeit non-significant) of 6% using Tans' pH analysis. Last of all, for empty shells remaining there was a significant decline of 90% in the Watson et al. study, but a non-significant decline of only 6% when Tans' pH projections were used. In summation, based on their experimental data and the ocean pH projections for the end of the century that are promoted by them and the IPCC, Watson et al. find what they characterize as "a dramatic negative effect on the survival, growth, and shell formation of the early larval stages of the Sydney rock oyster." On the other hand, employing the pH values projected by Tans, there are no statistically significant reductions in any of the five biological parameters measured and evaluated by Watson et al., which is an amazingly benign response to an environmental threat that is being suggested by some to be more serious or extreme than it was at any other time that it may have reared its ugly head over the past 300 million years!

### C02

Her only answer to the C02 turn is that it doesn’t increase food yields – this is from 07, our Idso 10 evidence is best – idsos are some of the most trusted people on warming

#### Continued CO2 emissions are key to sustain all life on the planet and prevent the impending global famine. Increasing ozone concentrations is damaging crop production – only CO2 enrichment can offset it and provide enough food for ALL life on the planet

#### Absent CO2 – global famine will spark World War 3 – Calvin says plummeting crop yields would cause countries to invade different lands to take over resources – and these conflicts go nuclear

Klare 6 (Michael Klare, Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College, “The Coming Resource Wars,” 3/11/2006, <http://www.waterconserve.org/shared/reader/welcome.aspx?linkid=53710&keybold=water%20land%20conflict>)

"As famine, disease, and weather-related disasters strike due to abrupt climate change," the Pentagon report notes, "many countries' needs will exceed their carrying capacity" -- that is, their ability to provide the minimum requirements for human survival. This "will create a sense of desperation, which is likely to lead to offensive aggression" against countries with a greater stock of vital resources. "Imagine eastern European countries, struggling to feed their populations with a falling supply of food, water, and energy, eyeing Russia, whose population is already in decline, for access to its grain, minerals, and energy supply." Similar scenarios will be replicated all across the planet, as those without the means to survival invade or migrate to those with greater abundance -- producing endless struggles between resource "haves" and "have-nots." It is this prospect, more than anything, that worries John Reid. In particular, he expressed concern over the inadequate capacity of poor and unstable countries to cope with the effects of climate change, and the resulting risk of state collapse, civil war and mass migration. "More than 300 million people in Africa currently lack access to safe water," he observed, and "climate change will worsen this dire situation" -- provoking more wars like Darfur. And even if these social disasters will occur primarily in the developing world, the wealthier countries will also be caught up in them, whether by participating in peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations, by fending off unwanted migrants or by fighting for access to overseas supplies of food, oil, and minerals. When reading of these nightmarish scenarios, it is easy to conjure up images of desperate, starving people killing one another with knives, staves and clubs -- as was certainly often the case in the past, and could easily prove to be so again. But these scenarios also envision the use of more deadly weapons. "In this world of warring states," the 2003 Pentagon report predicted, "nuclear arms proliferation is inevitable." As oil and natural gas disappears, more and more countries will rely on nuclear power to meet their energy needs -- and this "will accelerate nuclear proliferation as countries develop enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to ensure their national security." Although speculative, these reports make one thing clear: when thinking about the calamitous effects of global climate change, we must emphasize its social and political consequences as much as its purely environmental effects. Drought, flooding and storms can kill us, and surely will -- but so will wars among the survivors of these catastrophes over what remains of food, water and shelter. As Reid's comments indicate, no society, however affluent, will escape involvement in these forms of conflict.

#### And, warming does not outweigh – global food demand will double by 2050 and absent a solution, all the geopolitical and environmental impacts of warming are inevitable because of the expansion of unsustainable agriculture – that’s Idso

## 1nc v George Washington BW

### 1NC

#### -- Aff must specify which branch passes the plan – they don’t

#### -- Vote Neg –

#### 1. Ground – robs courts, congress, executive counterplans, agent specific disads and case arguments

#### 2. Conditionality – “resolved” means a “firm course of action” – not specifying allows them to shift and clarify in the 2AC

#### 3. No solvency – there’s no actor as the “Federal Government”, only specific branches

### 1NC

#### Energy production through modern technology places nature as a standing reserve – to be dominated and ordered by humanity

DeLuca 5 (Kevin Michael – Professor of Communications at University of Utah, “Thinking with Heidegger: Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice”, 2005, Ethics and the Environment, Vol. 10, No. 1, JSTOR)

In addition to meditating on media and public relations practices, a careful reading of Heidegger would compel environmentalism to meditate on its relations to technology and to images. To address the issue of tech- nology first, environmental groups often rely on modern technology while writing off such use as a necessary cost of 'doing business' in a mod- ern, mass media public sphere. That may be true, but Heidegger's writings caution us against gliding over the writing off. What are the costs of using modern technology? Besides relying on the technological infrastructure of the communication industry (computers, telephones, video camcorders, etc. . . .) to appear on TV, issue press releases, maintain web sites, lobby politicians, and raise money, environmentalists in the course of working and living rely on cars, planes, air conditioning, highways, microwaves, electricity, and a plethora of plastic products. In short, environmentalists are implicated and imbricated in the technosphere. Now Heidegger's meditation on the essence of technology and the essence of humanity's relation to technology serves to displace the conventional questions concerning technology. Heidegger refuses the question of whether technology is good or bad or neutral. As he puts it, "Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology" (1993, 311-12). Instead, Heidegger is asking after the essence of technology, which, he famously declares, "is by no means anything technological" (1993, 311). Rejecting the understand- ing of technology as a "mere means" that humans can master, what he terms the merely correct but not true "instrumental and anthropological definition of technology" (1993, 312), Heidegger proposes technology as "a way of revealing" (1993, 318). Avoiding the romanticism of a return to the Pleistocene or the utopi- anism of embracing a Star Trek futurism, from a Heideggerian perspective the question becomes, "What sort of revealing does a particular regime of technology make possible?" More prosaically, what sort of relationships to the earth and world does a technology enable? To this question, Heidegger provides a stinging critique of modern technology [albeit, admittedly, tempered by an ontological hope (see 1993, 333-41)]. The way of revealing of modern technology is Gestell or enframing: "The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. ... a challenging, which **puts to nature** the unreasonable demand that it supply energy **which can be extracted and stored** as such" (1993, 321, 320). Nature, then, is reduced to a "standing-reserve ... a calculable coherence of forces" (1993, 322, 326),6 so that "nature reports itself in some way or other **that is identifiable through calculation and that it remains orderable** as a system of information" (1993, 328).7 Heidegger gives examples from the fields of agriculture and energy that ring even more true today (see 1993, 320-21). Of farming, Heidegger writes: The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In sow- ing grain it places seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agricul- ture is now the mechanized food industry. (1993, 320) Of course, the all-too-immediate reaction to such an example is to charge Heidegger with a dangerous romanticism. With the benefit of a few decades experience around the world with the products of the mecha- nized food industry, from tasteless food, soil erosion, and ubiquitous pesticides to emptied communities, alienated consumers, and green impe- rialism, in retrospect Heidegger's critique seems understated. More significantly, though, the question is not a moral one of good or bad but an exploration of **what possible ways of relating to nature are opened and foreclosed** with different practices of revealing. Heidegger himself dis- misses the possibility of romanticism in response to the giganticism and the progress of science, "whose onset can neither be hindered nor even held up in any way, by any romantic remembering of what was earlier and different" (1999, 108). Indeed, Heidegger's fundamental critique of modern technology is not directed at the world it reveals **but the world it erases**: Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of revealing. Above all, enframing conceals that revealing which, in the ~~^ 79 sense of poiesis, lets what presences come forth into appearance. As compared with that other revealing, the setting-upon that challenges forth thrusts man into a relation to whatever is that is at once antithet- ical and rigorously ordered. Where enframing holds sway, **regulating and securing of the standing-reserve** mark all revealing. (1993, 332) The problem, then, is not that nature is seen as "standing-reserve," a "cal- culable coherence of forces," but that that is all it can be seen as.

#### This causes planetary extinction—it divorces our relationship with the natural world and makes ecocide inevitable

Gottlieb 94 (Roger S. Gottlieb – Professor of Humanities at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Brandeis University, “Ethics and Trauma: Levinas, Feminism, and Deep Ecology,” Crosscurrents: A Journal of Religion and Intellectual Life, 1994, Summer, http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm)

Here I will at least begin in agreement with Levinas. As he rejects an ethics proceeding on the basis of self-interest, so I believe the anthropocentric perspectives of conservation or liberal environmentalism cannot take us far enough. Our relations with nonhuman nature are poisoned and not just because we have set up feedback loops that already lead to mass starvations, skyrocketing environmental disease rates, and devastation of natural resources. The problem with ecocide is not just that it hurts human beings. Our uncaring violence also violates the very ground of our being, our natural body, our home. Such violence is done not simply to the other – as if the rainforest, the river, the atmosphere, the species made extinct are totally different from ourselves. Rather, we have crucified ourselves**-in-relation-to-the-other, fracturing a mode of being** in which self and other can no more be conceived as fully in isolation from each other than can a mother and a nursing child. We are that child, and nonhuman nature is that mother. If this image seems too maudlin, let us remember that other lactating women can feed an infant, but we have only one earth mother. What moral stance will be shaped by our personal sense that we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and so many kindred spirits of the air, water, and forests? To begin, we may see this tragic situation as setting the limits to Levinas's perspective. The other which is nonhuman nature is not simply known by a "trace," nor is it something of which all knowledge is necessarily instrumental. This other is inside us as well as outside us. We prove it with every breath we take, every bit of food we eat, every glass of water we drink. We do not have to find shadowy traces on or in the faces of trees or lakes, topsoil or air: we are made from them. Levinas denies this sense of connection with nature. Our "natural" side represents for him a threat of simple consumption or use of the other, a spontaneous response which must be obliterated by the power of ethics in general (and, for him in particular, Jewish religious law(23) ). A "natural" response lacks discipline; without the capacity to heed the call of the other, unable to sublate the self's egoism. Worship of nature would ultimately result in an "everything-is-permitted" mentality, a close relative of Nazism itself. For Levinas, to think of people as "natural" beings is to assimilate them to a totality, a category or species which makes no room for the kind of individuality required by ethics.(24) He refers to the "elemental" or the "there is" as unmanaged, unaltered, "natural" conditions or forces that are essentially alien to the categories and conditions of moral life.(25) One can only lament that Levinas has read nature -- as to some extent (despite his intentions) he has read selfhood -- through the lens of masculine culture. It is precisely our sense of belonging to nature as system, as interaction, as interdependence, which can provide the basis for an ethics appropriate to the trauma of ecocide. As cultural feminism sought to expand our sense of personal identity to a sense of inter-identification with the human other, so this ecological ethics would expand our personal and species sense of identity into an inter-identification with the natural world. Such a realization can lead us to an ethics appropriate to our time, a dimension of which has come to be known as "deep ecology."(26) For this ethics, we do not begin from the uniqueness of our human selfhood, existing against a taken-for-granted background of earth and sky. Nor is our body somehow irrelevant to ethical relations, with knowledge of it reduced always to tactics of domination. Our knowledge does not assimilate the other to the same, but reveals and furthers the continuing dance of interdependence. And our ethical motivation is neither rationalist system nor individualistic self-interest, but a sense of connection to all of life. The deep ecology sense of self-realization goes beyond the modern Western sense of "self" as an isolated ego striving for hedonistic gratification. . . . . Self, in this sense, is experienced as integrated with the whole of nature.(27) Having gained distance and sophistication of perception [from the development of science and political freedoms] we can turn and recognize who we have been all along. . . . we are our world knowing itself. We can relinquish our separateness. We can come home again -- and participate in our world in a richer, more responsible and poignantly beautiful way.(28) Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory. [This] knowledge is ecological and plural, reflecting both the diversity of natural ecosystems and the diversity in cultures that nature-based living gives rise to. The recovery of the feminine principle is based on inclusiveness. It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving. In nature it implies seeing nature as a live organism. In woman it implies seeing women as productive and active. Finally, in men the recovery of the feminine principle implies a relocation of action and activity to create life-enhancing, not life-reducing and life-threatening societies.(29) In this context, the knowing ego is not set against a world it seeks to control, but one of which it is a part. To continue the feminist perspective, the mother knows or seeks to know the child's needs. Does it make sense to think of her answering the call of the child in abstraction from such knowledge? Is such knowledge necessarily domination? Or is it essential to a project of care, respect and love, precisely because the knower has an intimate, emotional connection with the known?(30) Our ecological vision locates us in such close relation with our natural home that knowledge of it is knowledge of ourselves. And this is not, contrary to Levinas's fear, reducing the other to the same, but a celebration of a larger, more inclusive, and still complex and articulated self.(31) The noble and terrible burden of Levinas's individuated responsibility for sheer existence gives way to a different dream, a different prayer: Being rock, being gas, being mist, being Mind, Being the mesons traveling among the galaxies with the speed of light, You have come here, my beloved one. . . . You have manifested yourself as trees, as grass, as butterflies, as single-celled beings, and as chrysanthemums; but the eyes with which you looked at me this morning tell me you have never died.(32) In this prayer, we are, quite simply, all in it together. And, although this new ecological Holocaust -- this creation of planet Auschwitz – is under way, it is not yet final. We have time to step back from the brink, to repair our world. But **only if we see that world not as an other** across an irreducible gap of loneliness and unchosen obligation, but as a part of ourselves as we are part of it, to be redeemed not out of duty, but out of love**; neither for our selves nor for the other, but for us all**.

#### Vote Neg to recognize humanity’s solidarity with nature – this can repair our relationship with both nature and our own being

**Best and Nocella 6** (Associate professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso, “Igniting a Revolution: Voices in Defense of the Earth”, p. 82-84)

Yet, for both Heidegger and revolutionary environmentalists, **there exist possibilities for transformation despite the destructiveness of Enframing**. In the midst of technological peril – indeed, precisely because the peril strikes at and thus awakens us to the bond between human and nonhuman life – there emerges a sense of solidarity of human with nonhuman beings. Looking at the well-heeled, bureaucratic discourse of “human resource management” and “personnel resources,” the challenging forth of human beings into standing reserve is fairly evident. Factory-farmed cows, pigs, and chickens obviously have it far worse than people, but in both cases the purpose is to harness resources for maximum efficiency and profit. Ultimately human and nonhuman beings are similarly enframed within one giant “gasoline station.” It is precisely the experience of this solidarity which must be constantly rearticulated – in arts, poetry, ceremony, music, and especially in socioeconomic and political action – in order to provide a historically and ontologically authentic break with the metaphysics of technical control and capitalist exploitation. Action **will only be truly revolutionary if it revolves around engagement in solidarity with nature**, where liberation is always seen both as human liberation from the confines of Enframing and simultaneously as liberation of animal nations and eco-regions from human technics. **Anything less will always lapse back into the false and** oppressive hierarchy of “man” over “nature” and “man” over animals with attendant effects of technological, disciplinary control over humans, nonhumans, and the Earth. Using a familiar title from the anarchist Crimethinc collective, revolutionary environmentalism is truly an instance of “fighting for our lives” where the pronoun refers to all life not just human life. Heidegger describes the possibility of transformation through a return of Being as a re-figured humanism. It is the possibility of suspending the will and attaining a lucid sense of the free play of Being within which all of life emerges and is sustained. A human being, like any entity, *is* – s/he stands forth as present. But “his distinctive feature lies in [the fact] that he, as the being who thinks, is open to Being….Man is essentially this relationship of responding to Being. Such experience is the clearing of a space (symbolically represented, for example, in the building of an arbor for a ceremony or in the awesome silence created by the space within a cathedral or a grove of old-growth Redwoods), and the patient readiness for Being to be brought to language. Given the appropriate bearing and evocation through language, human beings can become aware of dwelling, along with all other existent beings, within Being – the open realm within which entities are “released” into presence (Gelassenhait – or “releasement”). What comes to the fore in suspension of willed manipulation is an embrace of other beings and the enduring process of evolution within which all beings emerge and develop. By reflecting on or experiencing oneself within the dimension of freedom that is the domain through which all beings pass, human beings can repair the willed manipulation **inherent in calculative thinking and realize a patient equanimity toward Life**. It is only in the context of this reawakened sense of the unity of life that revolutionary action gains an authentic basis. It is the engagement with “the Other” that shows the ELF actions are truly about defense of plant and animal life, and they demonstrate genuine liberation concerns that typically are trapped within Enframing. That is to say, ELF (and similar) actions, show themselves as part of a dynamic and necessary historical evolution and transformation process, not merely a gesture of opposition and negation, because of their profound solidarity with animals and the Earth. Such guidance solidarity thus serves as a general basis for a post-Enframing, post-capitalist order, an ecological, not a capitalist society. What will change is, first, the preeminence of Enframing as that which animates the epoch and, correspondingly, our relationship to technology. No longer will technical solutions be sought after in realms of activity where technique is not applicable. No longer will everyday activities be pervaded by the standardization and frenzied pace of technology. **No longer will nature be looked upon as a homogenous field of resources to be extracted and exploited**. No longer will resource-intensive and polluting technologies be utilized simply because they serve the blind interests of corporations over the needs of the Earth. No longer will human beings take from the Earth without thought of the far-reaching consequences of such actions on all present and future forms of life. Critics would wrongly denounce this position as atavistic, primitivist, or anti-science/technology. But as the turning toward the re-emergence of Being unfolds, both through revolutionary action rooted in solidarity with nature and through new, non-exploitative modes of acting in the world, technics will not disappear; instead, the limits of technology as a mode of revealing will begin to be discerned so that new forms and uses of technology can emerge. Questions about technology will center on whether a given technology can be developed and used so that plant and animal life can appear as it is and not be reduced to standing reserve. The question, for Heidegger, is not whether technology, in the sense of a set of tools, is done away with, but whether Enframing is surmounted. It is in this sense of releasement Heidegger writes, “Mortals dwell in that they save the earth….Saving does not only snatch something from a danger. To save really means to set something free intro its own presencing. I take this as the literal equivalent of the masked ALF activist reclaiming a puppy from a research lab so that it can become a dog rather than a unit of research, or an ELF activist who stops the destruction of an aquifer or forest so that it can remain an aquifer or forest rather than become a water or wood resource. It is just this new ethos which must guide a revolutionary reconstruction of society on grounds that preserve the openness to Being and the ability of each kind of being to become what it is in its essence. For those who charge Heidegger with merely recycling, and not transcending, Western anthropocentrism, it is important to note that there are possibilities here for an emerging post-humanism – a new orientation to nature beyond egocentric forms of human agency and **towards interrelation with other beings and Being itself**. Heidegger’s philosophy allows for multiple modes of engagement with others and nature as equals, all of them rooted in a relationship of solidarity, respect, and concern. I call this kind of pluralistic, egalitarian, and ecological outlook ontological anarchism. It begins with the rejection of illegitimate “rule” of metaphysical constructs that have served to justify unlimited technological appropriation of the world. In place of Enframing with its subjectivist metaphysical underpinnings, ontological anarchism proclaims a multiplicity of forms of experience in which a sense of revealing comes to the fore – such as in art, music, religion, and philosophy. One such experience, a pre-dominant theme of spiritual re-awakening in the ELF communiques, is found in Native American philosophy and practice.

### 1NC

#### Obama will win --- a consensus of polls and forecasts prove.

**Silver**, **9/20**/2012 (Nate, Sept. 19: A Wild Day in the Polls, but Obama Ends Up Ahead, Five Thirty Eight, New York Times, p. <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/sept-19-a-wild-day-in-the-polls-but-obama-ends-up-ahead/#h>[])

There are also going to be some outliers — sometimes because of unavoidable statistical variance, sometimes because the polling company has a partisan bias, sometimes because it just doesn’t know what it’s doing. (And sometimes: because of all of the above.) By the end of Wednesday, however, it was clear that the preponderance of the evidence favored Mr. Obama. He got strong polls in Ohio, Florida, Michigan, Wisconsin and Virginia, all from credible pollsters. Mr. Obama, who had been slipping in our forecast recently, rebounded to a 75.2 percent chance of winning the Electoral College, up from 72.9 percent on Tuesday. The most unambiguously bearish sign for Mr. Romney are the poor polls he has been getting in swing states from pollsters that use a thorough methodology and include cellphones in their samples. There have been 16 such polls published in the top 10 tipping point states since the Democratic convention ended, all conducted among likely voters. Mr. Obama has held the lead in all 16 of these polls. With the exception of two polls in Colorado — where Mr. Obama’s polling has been quite middling recently — all put him ahead by at least four points. On average, he led by 5.8 percentage points between these 16 surveys. If this is what the post-convention landscape looks like, then Mr. Romney is in a great deal of trouble. Perhaps these polls imply that Mr. Obama’s lead is somewhere in the range of five percentage points in the popular vote — national polls suggest that it’s a bit less than that, but state polls provide useful information about the national landscape. Or perhaps they imply that Mr. Obama is overperforming slightly in the swing states. Either way, that’s a pretty big deficit for Mr. Romney to overcome. What’s more, Mr. Obama was at 49.4 percent of the vote on average between these 16 surveys, meaning that he’d need to capture only a tiny sliver of the undecided vote to get to an outright majority. (If we’re being technical, 49.4 percent might be sufficient for him to win these states on its own, since perhaps 1 or 2 percent of the vote will go to third-party candidates.) To be clear: I do not recommend that this is the only data you look at. The forecast model also evaluates polls that exclude cellphones, although it gives them slightly less weight. Those have not necessarily shown a great deal of strength for Mr. Obama. And just as the model looks at state polls to infer the national trend, it also does the reverse, using the national polls (and essentially the assumption of ”uniform swing”) to infer where the states stand. The national polls show a spread right now from an effective tie to an eight-point lead for Mr. Obama. Taken as a whole, they seem to imply more like a three or four point lead for Mr. Obama rather than something in the range of five points. (These distinctions really do make a difference, especially with so few undecided voters left.) The other questions, of course, are whether Mr. Obama’s bounce is fading, and if it might fade further. His FiveThirtyEight forecast remains off its high of about an 80 percent chance of victory, that he achieved late last week.

#### Solar is massively unpopular

* Concerns about deficit
* Solyndra has tarnished image

Cardwell, 12 (Diane, “Energy Tax Breaks Proposed, Despite Waning Support for Subsidies”, New York Times, January 26, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/business/energy-environment/clean-energy-projects-face-waning-subsidies.html?pagewanted=all)

But the lobbying by the wind and solar industries comes at a time when there is little enthusiasm for alternative-energy subsidies in Washington. **Overall concerns about the deficit** are making lawmakers more skeptical about any new tax breaks for business in general. And taxpayer losses of more than half a billion dollars on Solyndra, a bankrupt maker of solar modules that defaulted on a federal loan, has tarnished the image of renewable power in particular. “Most of the folks I think recognize that this is not a Solyndra effort here,” said Representative David G. Reichert, Republican of Washington, who introduced a bill to extend a renewable tax credit last year. Solyndra was financed under a now-expired program, part of the 2009 stimulus package, that provided government loan guarantees for clean-energy projects, some of which administration officials expected to be risky. The wind and solar companies argue that the tax breaks they are seeking are different. The tax credits can be taken only by businesses that are already up and running, so taxpayers are less likely to be stuck subsidizing a failing company, proponents say. “This is a program that doesn’t pick winners or losers,” said Rhone Resch, president and chief executive of the Solar Energy Industries Association. “It’s hard to argue against a program like this that is creating jobs.” Without the new breaks, industry executives warn, they will be forced to scale back production and eliminate jobs in a still-weak economy. The American division of Iberdrola, a big Spanish producer of wind turbines, is already feeling the impending loss of one tax break that expires this year. “We’ve seen the prospects for new wind farms really fall off,” said Donald Furman, a senior vice president at Iberdrola Renewables, which announced this week that it was laying off 50 employees. “We’re not getting out of the business and we’re not in any financial trouble, but we are doing the prudent thing so that we don’t have issues.” The tax break that Iberdrola and other wind companies rely on, called the production tax credit, has been in place since 1992 but after repeated extensions is now scheduled to expire at the end of 2012. It allows for a credit of 2.2 cents per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated for the first 10 years of a project’s operation, which the industry says is sometimes enough to eliminate the price difference between wind power and fossil fuels. The Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation recently estimated that the production tax credit would cost the government $6.8 billion from 2011 to 2015 for projects in place before the end of this year. The other tax break, which expired at the end of last year and was especially popular with solar companies, allows renewable energy companies to get 30 percent of the cost of a new project back as a cash grant once construction is complete. Without the cash grant program, a company can still take the 30 percent credit, but must spread the benefit over a period of years. The industry says the grant program is more effective because it encourages a broader range of private investors to help finance its projects. As of early this year, the cash-grant program, known as the 1603 program, had awarded $1.76 billion for more than 22,000 solar projects, according to the Treasury Department. Mr. Obama, who has been a steadfast supporter of clean-energy programs, has already begun making a case for new government investment in clean energy projects as a way to foster both energy independence and employment at a time when Capitol Hill evaluates new laws in terms of job creation as well as budget cost or savings. “Because of federal investments, renewable energy use — sources like wind and solar — has nearly doubled,” Mr. Obama said at a stop at Buckley Air Force Base in Aurora, Colo., where he promoted the increasing use of renewable power by the military and repeated a call for Congress to approve the tax credits. “Thousands of Americans have jobs because of those efforts.” Mr. Obama used his trip to press for increased use of liquid natural gas in transportation, appearing at a United Parcel Service center in Las Vegas that received a stimulus grant to support natural gas-fueled trucks. He also said that the Interior Department would open up about 38 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico to gas and oil exploration and development, selling leases in June. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management estimates drilling there could yield one billion barrels of oil and four trillion cubic feet of natural gas. According to the American Wind Energy Association, wind projects account for more than a third of all the new electric generation installed in recent years, while over the last six years, domestic wind turbine production has grown twelvefold, to more than 400 facilities in 43 states. A recent study by Navigant Consulting found that this year the industry would support 78,000 jobs, but that the number would fall to 41,000 in 2013 without an extension of the production tax credit. Solar, too, is growing quickly in the United States. According to the Solar Energy Industries Association, more solar was installed in the third quarter of 2011 than in all of 2009 combined. A one-year extension of the 1603 tax-grant program would create an additional 37,000 solar industry jobs in 2012, according to a report by EuPD Research. Lobbyists for both industries say the new tax breaks need to be passed quickly and are trying to get Congress to include them in a bill to extend the payroll tax cut. That bill, like all tax cuts these days, has **Congress at loggerheads**. “But true performance-based incentives, where incentives are only provided when actual production occurs, seem to be maintaining their support,” said Robert Gramlich, senior vice president for public policy for the American Wind Energy Association. How this will play out in Congress is anybody’s guess, lawmakers say. Mr. Reichert said the credits were not yet part of the negotiations over the payroll tax cut, which is due to expire at the end of February. Republican leaders may look to revive the Keystone XL oil pipeline — as proposed, the pipeline would run 1,700 miles from oil sands in Canada to refineries on the Gulf Coast — as part of a compromise to approve the renewable energy credits, according to lobbyists and lawmakers involved in the discussions. But there is a lot of ideological opposition to more tax credits, said Senator Jeff Bingaman, Democrat of New Mexico and the chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, who supports the extension.

#### Clean energy attacks will swing the election for Romney ---it outweighs other issues.

**LeVine**, 6/13/**2012** (Steve – author of *The Oil and Glory*, How Dirty is Romney Prepared to get to win election, Foreign Policy, p. <http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/12/how_dirty_is_romney_prepared_to_get_to_win_election>)

Is Barack Obama sufficiently dirty to win re-election? Not according to presumptive Republican nominee Mitt Romney, who says the president is too spic and span. Calculating that clean energy is passé among Americans more concerned about jobs and their own pocketbooks, Romney is gambling that he can tip swing voters his way by embracing dirtier air and water if the tradeoff is more employment and economic growth. Romney's gamble is essentially a bet on the demonstrated disruptive potency of shale gas and shale oil, which over the last year or so have shaken up geopolitics from Russia to the Middle East and China. Now, Romney and the GOP leadership hope they will have the same impact on U.S. domestic politics, and sweep the former Massachusetts governor into the White House with a strong Republican majority in Congress. A flood of new oil and natural gas production in states such as North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas is changing the national and global economies. U.S. oil production is projected to reach 6.3 million barrels a day this year, the highest volume since 1997, the Energy Information Agency reported Tuesday. In a decade or so, U.S. oil supplies could help to shrink OPEC's influence as a global economic force. Meanwhile, a glut of cheap U.S. shale gas has challenged Russia's economic power in Europe and is contributing to a revolution in how the world powers itself. But Romney and the GOP assert that Obama is slowing the larger potential of the deluge, and is not up to the task of turning it into what they say ought to be a gigantic jobs machine. The president's critics say an unfettered fossil fuels industry could produce 1.4 million new jobs by 2030. They believe that American voters won't be too impressed with Obama's argument that he is leading a balanced energy-and-jobs approach that includes renewable fuels and electric cars. The GOP's oil-and-jobs campaign -- in April alone, 81 percent of U.S. political ads attacking Obama were on the subject of energy, according to Kantar Media, a firm that tracks political advertising -- is a risk that could backfire. Americans could decide that they prefer clean energy after all. Or, as half a dozen election analysts and political science professors told me, energy -- even if it seems crucial at this moment in time -- may not be a central election issue by November. Yet if the election is as close as the polls suggest, the energy ads could prove a pivotal factor. "Advertising is generally not decisive. Advertising matters at the margins. ... But ask Al Gore if the margin matters," said Ken Goldstein, president of the Campaign Media Analysis Group at Kantar Media. "This is looking like an election where the margin may matter." Romney is hardly the first major U.S. presidential candidate to embrace Big Oil. The politics of clean go back to Lady Bird Johnson's war on litter and Richard Nixon's embrace of environmentalism. But both presidents Bush came from the oil industry, and former Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin, the last GOP vice presidential nominee, gleefully led chants of "Drill, baby, drill" in 2008. Yet President George W. Bush also famously declared that "America is addicted to oil" in his 2006 State of the Union address, and initiated most of the energy programs for which Obama is currently under fire. And Palin's drumbeat in the end seemed to fall flat. The Republican efforts appear to go beyond any modern campaign in their brash embrace of what is dirty, and their scorn of what is not. And the times seem to favor them. In 2009, the GOP, backed by heavy industry lobbying, knocked back environmentalists on their heels by crushing global warming legislation. Other previously central issues -- Afghanistan, Iraq, health care -- are still debated in the campaign, but not as centrally nor as viscerally as energy, said Frank Maisano, an energy and political analyst at Bracewell & Giuliani, a Houston-based law firm. Obama advisors have said rightly that energy is only one component of a much broader American and global economy, but the GOP appears to have at least partially successfully injected the oil and gas boom as a defining feature of the economic discourse. In a Sunday op-ed in the New York Times entitled "America's New Energy Reality," industry consultant Daniel Yergin remarked that while Obama's 2010 State of the Union address focused on clean-energy jobs, the president pivoted this year to talk as much about oil and natural gas. "His announcement that ‘American oil production is the highest it has been in eight years' turned out to be an applause line," Yergin noted.

#### Obama reelection maintains the US/Russian reset --- Romney will collapse relations

**Weir**, 3/27/**2012** (Fred, Obama asks Russia to cut him slack until reelection, Minnesota Post, p. <http://www.minnpost.com/christian-science-monitor/2012/03/obama-asks-russia-cut-him-slack-until-reelection>)

Russian experts say there's little doubt the Kremlin would like to see Obama re-elected. Official Moscow has been pleased by Obama's policy of "resetting" relations between Russia and the US, which resulted in the new START treaty and other cooperation breakthroughs after years of diplomatic chill while George W. Bush was president. The Russian media often covers Obama's lineup of Republican presidential challengers in tones of horror, and there seems to be a consensus among Russian pundits that a Republican president would put a quick end to the Obama-era thaw in relations. "The Republicans are active critics of Russia, and they are extremely negative toward Putin and his return to the presidency," says Dmitry Babich, a political columnist with the official RIA-Novosti news agency. "Democrats are perceived as more easygoing, more positive toward Russia and Putin." Speaking on the record in Seoul, Mr. Medvedev said the years since Obama came to power "were the best three years in the past decade of Russia-US relations.… I hope this mode of relations will maintain between the Russian Federation and the United States and between the leaders." During Putin's own election campaign, which produced a troubled victory earlier this month, he played heavily on anti-Western themes, including what he described as the US drive to attain "absolute invulnerability" at the expense of everyone else. But many Russian experts say that was mostly election rhetoric, and that in office Putin will seek greater cooperation and normal relations with the West. "Russian society is more anti-American than its leaders are," says Pavel Zolotaryov, deputy director of the official Institute of USA-Canada Studies in Moscow. "Leaders have to take popular moods into account. But it's an objective fact that the US and Russia have more points in common than they have serious differences. If Obama wins the election, it seems likely the reset will continue."

#### US/Russian relations prevent nuclear war

**Elliott**, 5/15/**1995** (Michael, Why Russia Still Matters to America, Newsweek, p. lexis)

"Russia," says Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "is a big country." That it is; lop off the newly independent states born within the old Soviet husk and you've still got a lot left -- a highly educated work force sitting on top of some of the globe's most valuable resources. True, much of that vast territory has an awful climate (climate matters-for different reasons than Russia's, it explains why Australia will never be a great power). But unlike India and China, two other "giant" states, Russia will be able to husband its vast resources without the additional strain of feeding -- and employing-more than a billion souls. It also, of course, is the only country that can launch a **devastating nuclear attack** on the United States. That kind of power demands respect. And sensitive handling. Stephen Sestanovich, head Russia watcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, argues that present U.S. policy is geared too much to "dismantling Russian military might" -- a policy that, since it breeds Russian resentment of Western meddling, is self-defeating. "We have to reorient Russian power," says Sestanovich, "not eliminate it. Because we can't eliminate it." Indeed, Washington should prefer a strong Russia. A Russia so weak, for example, that it could not resist a Chinese land grab of its Far East **without resorting to nuclear weapons** is a 21st-century nightmare. **All this implies a close U.S. -- Russian relationship** stretching into the future. American officials say it will be a "pragmatic" one, recognizing that Russian and U.S. national interests will sometimes collide. The danger, for the United States, is that a pragmatic relationship could be dominated by security issues. In Western Europe, some futurists say that in the coming decades Russia will talk to the United States about nuclear weapons but to the European Union about everything else-trade, economic development and the rest.

### 1NC

#### TEXT

#### The 50 states should establish the right to, and devote all necessary resources to make available, public housing that is both cost competitive and of higher livable quality than federally provided housing, including allowing occupants of public housing to install passive solar on state assisted housing.

**States can open state affordable housing**

**Progressive State Network 07**, (public housing lobby, Serves as a leading national voice for state legislators.

Promotes an active democracy and shared economic prosperity.

Embraces our nation’s rich diversity and increased access to opportunity for all.

Protects and enhances transparency, accountability, and stewardship of our public and private institutions.

Supports strategic initiatives, processes, and systems that provide immediate results and long term impact, <http://www.progressivestates.org/files/Housing/PSNHousingStatePolicyOptions.pdf>

Create enforceable “rights” to support the development of affordable homes in areas

where they are needed. States can facilitate the construction of new affordable homes by

creating “rights” to develop these homes in areas where they are needed. Typically, these rights

are given “teeth” by the identification of an enforcement agency or state court that hears

expedited appeals from developers whose proposals to build affordable homes have been denied.

The enforcement agency has the authority to override local regulations in municipalities that fail

to comply with state requirements. When the enforcement process is initiated by developers

seeking to build affordable homes, it is sometimes referred to as the “builder’s remedy.”

Individuals in need of affordable housing or advocacy groups that represent such individuals also

could be granted standing to enforce these rights, but this is less common. In general, the burden

of proof in these appeals is shifted to the municipality, which must justify the decision to deny

approval.

### Case

#### -- Evaluate consequences – allowing violence for the sake of moral purity is evil

Isaac 2 (Jeffrey C., Professor of Political Science – Indiana-Bloomington, Director – Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, Ph.D. – Yale, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the **clean conscience** of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about **unintended consequences** as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### -- Governments must weigh consequences

Harries 94 (Owen, Editor and Founder – National Interest and Senior Fellow – Centre for Independent Studies, “Power and Civilization”, The National Interest, Spring, Lexis)

Performance is the test. Asked directly by a Western interviewer, “In principle, do you believe in one standard of human rights and free expression?”, Lee immediately answers, “Look, it is not a matter of principle but of practice.” This might appear to represent a simple and rather crude pragmatism. But in its context it might also be interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made by Max Weber that, in politics, it is “the ethic of responsibility” rather than “the ethic of absolute ends” that is appropriate. While an **individual** is free to treat human rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost, **governments** **must always weigh consequences** and the competing claims of other ends. So once they enter the realm of politics, human rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as national security and the promotion of prosperity. Their place in that hierarchy will vary with circumstances, but no responsible government will ever be able to put them always at the top and treat them as inviolable and over-riding. The cost of implementing and promoting them will always have to be considered.

#### -- Extinction mandates consequentialism

Bok 88 (Sissela, Professor of Philosophy – Brandeis College, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. Rosenthal and Shehadi, p. 202-203)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake.For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.

#### Problem isn't investment – resource production for solar is impossible

EC 12 -- European Commission, DG Environment News Alert Service, edited by SCU, The University of the West of England, Bristol (1/26/12, "Photovoltaic supply falls short of solar power targets," http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/research/newsalert/pdf/271na7.pdf)

Europe could struggle to meet the target set by the renewable energy sector of 25 per cent of electricity produced by solar energy by 2040 because the supply of materials, including rare metals, needed to produce photovoltaics (PV) is unlikely to meet demand. Production rates need to be drastically improved, according to a new study. Calculations based on available appropriate land, global irradiance and conversions of solar energy to electricity demonstrate that technically, solar energy could provide 7.5 to 9 times the expected electricity demand in 2050. However, several PV technologies employ rare metals, which could limit the capacity for electricity generation. The new study looked at whether current global production of rare metals could support the huge increase in solar panels generation required to meet ambitious energy targets for 2040 laid out by the European Renewable Energy Council (EREC). The scientists looked at the four main PV technologies: crystalline silicon (c-Si), amorphous silicon (a-Si), cadmium tellurium (CdTe) and copper indium gallium diselenide (CIGS). The scientists assumed that by 2040, each technology would have an equal market share of 25 per cent. This reflects the fact that although c-Si currently has the largest share (81 per cent), a shift is already taking place towards the other technologies, which require a thinner layer of PV material. They simulated a 'neutral' future scenario, where moderate technological developments gradually improve the efficiency of electricity generation, in line with current policy expectations. The results showed that the maximum demand for gallium and indium in tonnes per year for use in CIGS technology surpasses current production (2008) by a factor of 7.3 and 2.8, respectively. Even under an 'optimistic' future scenario, in which more ambitious technological advances in cell efficiency require less PV material, demand still outstrips current supply by a factor of 3.9 and 1.5, respectively. Neither cadmium nor copper were found to be seriously limiting, even when the scientists simulated a 'pessimistic' scenario in which technological advances do not meet current expectations. However, the predicted demand for tellurium was found to be 30-180 times higher than today's production rate, depending on the scenario used. Although silicon is the second most abundant element in the earth.s crust, only very high purity silicon is used in the solar industry and production will need to increase by 15 times to meet demand in the neutral scenario and by 10 times in the optimistic scenario. Even bigger shortages may result from competition with the electronics industry, which also uses high-purity silicon. On the other hand, amorphous silicon technology represents the only realistic option for large-scale electricity production since the cumulative demand by 2040 would equal just 20 per cent of production. The research shows that reaching solar power targets for 2040 will not necessarily be limited by known global reserves of silicon and rare metals, but that current production rates will be the limiting factor. Better refining techniques, increased exploitation of deposits and strategic planning of technological shifts are needed to satisfy the demand for PV materials. This poses a challenge as tellurium, indium, gallium, selenium and cadmium are by-products of other processes and are not currently mined separately. New production methods are also likely to take up to 10 years to develop and so research should be initiated soon to meet the anticipated demand.

#### Increased solar adoption causes utilities to reject net metering – makes solar development impossible

Martin 9/12 -- reporter for Bloomberg News (Christopher, 2012, "U.S. Solar Industry Bracing for Utility Backlash Over Metering,"

Utilities are required to purchase electricity generated by solar panels installed on consumers’ homes under so-called net- metering policies, an arrangement that may become less viable as solar systems become more common, said Rhone Resch, chief executive officer of the Washington-based trade group. California, the largest solar market, capped the amount of panels utilities are required to connect to their grids and other states are considering similar policies. Some utilities see the requirement to buy solar power from every rooftop system as a threat to their profitability, Resch said. “Net metering works for us now, but we’re going to see a backlash from utilities as solar penetration increases over the next few years,” Resch said today in an interview at the Solar Power International conference in Orlando, Florida. California regulators capped the amount of rooftop solar that may be connected to the grid at 5 percent of a utility’s power needs, and is studying the long-term impact upon their profits. Other states may consider similar actions, said Tony Clifford, chief executive officer of Standard Solar Inc., a closely held developer based in Rockville, Maryland. “I’m really concerned about a utility pushback on net- metering,” Clifford said in an interview. “What we need is an honest assessment of the true costs and benefits of managing distributed generation and I don’t think we’ve seen that yet.” Utilities are considering ways to offset the cost of buying solar, including Sempra Energy (SRE)’s San Diego Gas & Electric, which proposed a fee for residential solar customers, said Aaron Hall, president of the San Diego-based developer Borrego Solar Systems Inc. Regulars blocked the proposal in January. “That would have made almost every installation lose money and prevent new projects from getting financing,” Hall said.

#### -- Utility maximizes value to life and precludes zeroing anyone out

Dworkin 77 (Ronald, Professor of Law and Philosophy – New York University, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 274-275)

Utilitarian arguments of policy, however, would seem secure from that objection. They do not suppose that any form of life is inherently more valuable than any other, but instead base their claim, that constraints on liberty are necessary to advance some collective goal of the community, just on the fact that that goal happens to be desired more widely or more deeply than any other. Utilitarian arguments of policy, therefore, seem not to oppose but on the contrary to embody the fundamental right of equal concern and respect, because they treat the wishes of each member of the community on a par with the wishes of any other, with no bonus or discount reflecting the view that the member is more or less worthy of concern, or his views more or less worthy of respect, than any other.

#### Life always has value

1. For Aaron Swanlek it’s good grades, cats doing dumb things, and beer
2. For me it’s horses, material comforts, and swon dancing gangam style

#### -- Calculations stop the zero-point by increasing diversity and social limitation. Rejecting it increases violence and exclusion

Williams 5 (Michael, Professor of International Politics – University of Wales-Aberystwyth, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 165-166)

Yet it is my claim that the willful Realist tradition does not lack an understanding of the contingency of practice or a vision of responsibility to otherness. On the contrary, its strategy of objectification is precisely an attempt to bring together a responsibility to otherness and a responsibility to act within a willfully liberal vision. The construction of a realm of objectivity and calculation is not just a consequence of a need to act — the framing of an epistemic context for successful calculation. It is a form of responsibility to otherness, an attempt to allow for diversity and irreconcilability precisely by — at least initially — reducing the self and the other to a structure of material calculation in order to allow a structure of mutual intelligibility, mediation, and stability. It is, in short, a strategy of limitation: a willful attempt to construct a subject and a social world limited — both epistemically and politically — in the name of a politics of toleration: a liberal strategy that John Gray has recently characterised as one of modus vivendi. If this is the case, then the deconstructive move that gains some of its weight by contrasting itself to a non- or apolitical objectivism must engage with the more complex contrast to a sceptical Realist tradition that is itself a constructed, ethical practice. This issue becomes even more acute if one considers Iver Neumann’s incisive questions concerning postmodern constructions of identity. action, and responsibility. As Neumann points out, the insight that identities are inescapably contingent and relationally constructed, and even the claim that identities are inescapably indebted to otherness, do not in themselves provide a foundation for practice, particularly in situations where identities are ‘sedimented’ and conflictually defined. In these cases, deconstruction alone will not suffice unless it can demonstrate a capacity to counter in practice (and not just in philosophic practice) the essentialist dynamics it confronts. Here, a responsibility to act must go beyond deconstruction to consider viable alternatives and counter-practices. To take this critique seriously is not necessarily to be subject yet again to the straightforward ‘blackmail of the Enlightenment’ and a narrow ‘modernist’ vision of responsibility.85 While an unwillingness to move beyond a deconstructive ethic of responsibility to otherness for fear that an essentialist stance is the only (or most likely) alternative expresses a legitimate concern, it should not license a retreat from such questions or their practical demands. Rather, such situations demand also an evaluation of the structures (of identity and institutions) that might viably be mobilised in order to offset the worst implications of violently exclusionary identities. It requires, as Neumann nicely puts it, the generation of compelling ‘as if’ stories around which counter-subjectivities and political practices can coalesce. Wilful Realism, I submit, arises out of an appreciation of these issues, and comprises an attempt to craft precisely such ‘stories’ within a broader intellectual and sociological analysis of their conditions of production, possibilities of success, and likely consequences. The question is, to what extent are these limits capable of success, and to what extent might they be limits upon their own aspirations toward responsibility? These are crucial questions, but they will not be addressed by retreating yet again into further reversals of the same old dichotomies.

#### This maximizes value to life

Winslow 82 (Gerald**,** Professor of Christian Ethics – Loma Linda University, Triage and Justice, p. 83)

If this method seems cold and impersonal, Fletcher reminds us that ethics is for the ‘tough-minded.’ Besides, he contends, it is a mistake to think of such utilitarian decisions as diminishing a high regard for the life of each individual. ‘It is not discounting the life of the individual, but balancing the interest of one individual against the interest of other INDIVIDUALS.’

#### Electricity prices are low and will likely decline now – gas boom, energy efficiency, reduced demand

**Burtraw 8/21/12** (one of the nation’s foremost experts on environmental regulation in the electricity sector. “Falling Emissions and Falling Prices: Expectations for the Domestic Natural Gas Boom” http://common-resources.org/2012/falling-emissions-and-falling-prices-expectations-for-the-domestic-natural-gas-boom/)

Moreover, the boom in domestic natural gas production could have even more immediate affects for U.S. electricity consumers. The increased supply of gas is expected to lower natural gas prices and retail electricity prices over the next 20 years, according to a [new RFF Issue Brief](http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=22019). These price decreases are expected to be even larger if demand for electricity continues on a slow-growth trajectory brought on by the economic downturn and the increased use of energy efficiency.For example, RFF analysis found that delivered natural gas prices would have been almost 35% higher in 2020 if natural gas supply projections had matched the lower estimates released by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 2009. Instead, with an increased gas supply, consumers can expect to pay $4.9 per MMBtu for delivered natural gas in 2020 instead of $6.6 per MMBtu. These trends are even more exaggerated if demand for electricity were to increase to levels projected by the EIA just three years ago, in 2009.This decrease in natural gas prices is expected to translate into a decrease in retail electricity prices for most electricity customers in most years out to 2020. Compared to the world with the lower gas supply projections, average national electricity prices are expected to be almost 6% lower, falling from 9.25 cents to 8.75 cents per kilowatt-hour in 2020. Residential, commercial, and industrial customers are all expected to see a price decrease, with the largest price changes occurring in parts of the country that have competitive electricity markets. All of these prices decreases translate into real savings for most electricity customers. The savings are largest for commercial customers, who stand to save $33.9 Billion (real $2009) under the new gas supply projections in 2020. Residential customers also stand to save big, with estimates of $25.8 Billion (real $2009) in savings projected for 2020.

#### Renewable energy increases electricity prices – solar is FIVE TIMES more expensive than conventionally produced energy

Zycher 1/17/12 (Benjamin, Visiting Scholar specializing in energy policy @ AEI, "Wind and solar power, part I: uncooperative reality," http://www.aei.org/outlook/energy-and-the-environment/alternative-energy/wind-and-solar-power-part-i-uncooperative-reality/)

The EIA estimates wind (onshore) and solar costs in 2016 at about $149 and $257–396 per mWh, respectively; if we add the rough estimate for backup costs, the total is about $517 for wind and $625–764 for solar generation.13 The EIA estimates for gas- or coal-fired generation are about $80–110 per mWh. Accordingly, the projected cost of renewable power in 2016, including the cost of backup capacity, is at least five times higher than that for conventional electricity. At the same time, outages of wind capacity because of weak wind conditions are much more likely to be correlated geographically than outages of conventional plants, and the same is true for solar electric generation because of the geographic concentrations of thermal solar sites and photovoltaic systems.

The higher cost of electricity generated with renewable energy sources is only one side of the competitiveness question; the other is the value of that generation, as not all electricity is created equal. In particular, power produced at periods of peak demand is more valuable than off-peak generation. In this context, wind generation, in particular, is problematic because, in general, winds tend to blow at night and in the winter, which corresponds inversely to peak energy demand during daylight hours and in the summer.

#### Low electricity prices spurs manufacturing "reshoring" and sparks US economic growth via consumer spending and investment

Perry 7/31/12 (Mark, Prof of Economics @ Univ. of Michigan, "America's Energy Jackpot: Industrial Natural Gas Prices Fall to the Lowest Level in Recent History," http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2012/07/americas-energy-jackpot-industrial.html)

Building petrochemical plants could suddenly become attractive in the United States. Manufacturers will "reshore" production to take advantage of low natural gas and electricity prices. Energy costs will be lower for a long time, giving a competitive advantage to companies that invest in America, and also helping American consumers who get hit hard when energy prices spike.¶ After years of bad economic news, the natural gas windfall is very good news. Let's make the most of it." ¶ The falling natural gas prices also make the predictions in this December 2011 study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, "Shale gas: A renaissance in US manufacturing?"all the more likely: ¶ U.S. manufacturing companies (chemicals, metals and industrial) could employ approximately one million more workers by 2025 because of abundant, low-priced natural gas.¶ Lower feedstock and energy cost could help U.S. manufacturers reduce natural gas expenses by as much as $11.6 billion annually through 2025.¶ MP: As I have emphasized lately, America's ongoing shale-based energy revolution is one of the real bright spots in an otherwise somewhat gloomy economy, and provides one of the best reasons to be bullish about America's future. The shale revolution is creating thousands of well-paying, shovel-ready jobs in Texas, North Dakota and Ohio, and thousands of indirect jobs in industries that support the shale boom (sand, drilling equipment, transportation, infrastructure, steel pipe, restaurants, etc.). In addition, the abundant shale gas is driving down energy prices for industrial, commercial, residential and electricity-generating users, which frees up billions of dollars that can be spent on other goods and services throughout the economy, providing an energy-based stimulus to the economy. ¶ Cheap natural gas is also translating into cheaper electricity rates, as low-cost natural gas displaces coal. Further, cheap and abundant natural gas is sparking a manufacturing renaissance in energy-intensive industries like chemicals, fertilizers, and steel. And unlike renewable energies like solar and wind, the natural gas boom is happening without any taxpayer-funded grants, subsidies, credits and loans. Finally, we get an environmental bonus of lower CO2 emissions as natural gas replaces coal for electricity generation. Sure seems like a win, win, win, win situation to me.

#### Turns case - Hits poor the worst - Higher electricity prices exacerbates poverty – low-income households have less capacity to reduce energy demand

Chester and Morris 8/20/12 (Lynne and Alan, Professors of Political Economy and Social Sciences @ University of Sydney and University of New South Wales, "'Energy poverty' a growing problem," http://phys.org/news/2012-08-energy-poverty-problem.html)

"Low-income households are the most vulnerable to this kind of poverty because their energy bills take a larger proportion of their disposable income," Dr Chester said. In the five-year period from 2007 to 2012 the average increase in household electricity prices was 80 percent in NSW, more than 60 percent in Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania; and 38 to 45 percent in Northern Territory and the ACT. Further increases recently occurred in NSW, Victoria and Queensland. Across the globe, the liberalisation of electricity sectors has resulted in increased consumer electricity prices that are far in excess of inflation and wage increases. Many disadvantaged households are experiencing discomfort and ill health as well as other forms of material and social deprivation because of the need to choose between essential household items and using electricity to maintain a decent standard of living. Electricity and gas bills have been found, for example, to be the greatest cause of rental arrears in Victorian low-income households. Yet the authors warn there is no large-scale Australian research to provide a substantial evidence base of the consequences for low-income households and that policymakers rely on measures that significantly underestimate electricity price changes. There is consequently little understanding of the pressures and circumstances confronting the poorest Australian households. The paper calls for this to be addressed from a policy perspective in order to prevent the problem becoming more widespread. "Energy poverty needs to be explicitly recognised as a distinct and growing social problem for Australia's 3.5 million households, who fall in the two lowest-income quintiles as defined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics." "Steep increases in electricity prices will cause hardship for low-income households because they have far less capacity to reduce their energy demand."

#### Manufacturing strength is key to both the economy and military power

Ettlinger and Gordon 11 (Michael and Kate, the Vice President for Economic Policy at the Center for American Progress, former director of the Economic Analysis and Research Network of the Economic Policy Institute and Vice President for Energy Policy at the Center for American Progress. Most recently, Kate was the co-director of the national Apollo Alliance, where she still serves as senior policy advisor. Former senior associate at the Center on Wisconsin Strategy, "The Importance and Promise of American Manufacturing" <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/04/pdf/manufacturing.pdf-)>

Manufacturing is critically important to the American economy. For generations, the strength of our country rested on the power of our factory floors—both the machines and the men and women who worked them. We need manufacturing to continue to be a bedrock of strength for generations to come. Manufacturing is woven into the structure of our economy: Its importance goes far beyond what happens behind the factory gates. The strength or weakness of American manufacturing carries implications for the entire economy, our national security, and the well-being of all Americans. Manufacturing today accounts for 12 percent of the U.S. economy and about 11 percent of the private-sector workforce. But its significance is even greater than these numbers would suggest. The direct impact of manufacturing is only a part of the picture. First, jobs in the manufacturing sector are good middle-class jobs for millions of Americans. Those jobs serve an important role, offering economic opportunity to hard-working, middle-skill workers. This creates upward mobility and broadens and strengthens the middle class to the benefit of the entire economy. What’s more, U.S.-based manufacturing underpins a broad range of jobs that are quite different from the usual image of manufacturing. These are higher-skill service jobs that include the accountants, bankers, and lawyers that are associated with any industry, as well as a broad range of other jobs including basic research and technology development, product and process engineering and design, operations and maintenance, transportation, testing, and lab work. Many of these jobs are critical to American technology and innovation leadership. The problem today is this: Many multinational corporations may for a period keep these higher-skill jobs here at home while they move basic manufacturing elsewhere in response to other countries’ subsidies, the search for cheaper labor costs, and the desire for more direct access to overseas markets, but eventually many of these service jobs will follow. When the basic manufacturing leaves, the feedback loop from the manufacturing floor to the rest of a manufacturing operation—a critical element in the innovative process—is eventually broken. To maintain that feedback loop, companies need to move higher-skill jobs to where they do their manufacturing. And with those jobs goes American leadership in technology and innovation. This is why having a critical mass of both manufacturing and associated service jobs in the United States matters. The "industrial commons" that comes from the crossfertilization and engagement of a community of experts in industry, academia, and government is vital to our nation’s economic competitiveness. Manufacturing also is important for the nation’s economic stability. The experience of the Great Recession exemplifies this point. Although manufacturing plunged in 2008 and early 2009 along with the rest of the economy, it is on the rebound today while other key economic sectors, such as construction, still languish. § Marked 18:55 § Diversity in the economy is important—and manufacturing is a particularly important part of the mix. Although manufacturing is certainly affected by broader economic events, the sector’s internal diversity—supplying consumer goods as well as industrial goods, serving both domestic and external markets— gives it great potential resiliency. Finally, supplying our own needs through a strong domestic manufacturing sector protects us from international economic and political disruptions. This is most obviously important in the realm of national security, even narrowly defined as matters related to military strength, where the risk of a weak manufacturing capability is obvious. But overreliance on imports and substantial manufacturing trade deficits weaken us in many ways, making us vulnerable to everything from exchange rate fluctuations to trade embargoes to natural disasters.

#### Econ decline risks extinction

Auslin 9 (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

#### -- “Value to life” impact is trash –

A) Always exists – many things make living valuable – people can enjoy life even if slaves

B) “Denying” value isn’t the same as no value – incremental reduction isn’t total

C) Existence is a pre-requisite – have to be alive to value it – so the case impact of extinction turns this

#### Rare earth shortages threaten renewables – Europe proves

Spence 11 -- independent journalist (Timothy, 11/16/11, "Rare-earth shortage to hamper clean energy: EU study," http://www.euractiv.com/sustainability/rare-earth-shortage-hamper-clean-news-508967)

Looming shortages of metals that are in high demand and dominated by a single supplier – China – threaten Europe’s goals for cleaner transport and sustainable energy, says a new study prepared for the European Commission. The study by the Joint Research Centre says supply shortfalls of component metals in the next two decades risk the production of solar, wind and nuclear technologies as well as electric vehicles and carbon-capture systems. “This adds more evidence to the fact that Europe has to look within itself … and more toward waste management, to re-use existing metals,” said Dr. Raymond Moss, lead author of the report. The findings could have serious implications for the EU’s “Roadmap for moving to a low-carbon economy in 2050” that hinges on development of renewable energy, cleaner transport as well as modernising and integrating Europe’s electricity grids. Such ambitions depend heavily on the availability of neodymium, dysprosium, indium, tellurium and gallium, metals that are in demand globally. EU’s vital raw materials The Commission has already identified many so-called rare-earth minerals as well as metals like cobalt in its lists of 14 economically vital raw materials that are prone to supply disruption. The JRC study is part of the Commission’s examination of raw material needs. Europe depends on imports for nearly all of its rare-earth metals. Though many are in abundant supply on the planet, the metals are dispersed or difficult to access, and despite their importance to green energy, require intensive mining and processing. China controls more than 90% of the market. In July, the World Trade Organisation called on China to ease its export restrictions on 17 rare-earth metals important to energy, transport and electronics manufacturing. Shortages or limitations on supply would have serious impact on many industries. But with solar and wind power expected to account for the biggest energy growth markets over the next 20 years, the impact on alternative energy could be profound. The JRC report says five metals - dysprosium, neodymium, tellurium, gallium, and indium - are at the highest risk of supply “bottlenecks” from high demand, concentration of supply and “high political risks due to an extreme concentration of supply in China.” The study examines 14 rare-earth metals. Solar energy technologies, for example, will require half the current world supply of tellurium and 25% of the supply of indium, the report says. Europe’s wind energy technology will require about 4% of the supply of both neodymium and dysprosium. “While the percent might be small, it could have a significant effect on wind technology,” Moss told EurActiv. The concern, he said is that “90 percent of the source is in China at the moment, and they themselves have a rapidly growing demand for the same metals whilst they have also limited restrictions on export.”

#### Utilitarianism produces equality – extreme examples don’t apply

Harsanyi 82 (John, Professor of Economics – University of California, Berkeley, Utilitarianism and Beyond, Ed. Sen and Williams, p. 26-27)

Some further notes on this suggestion will be in place here. First, it is sometimes alleged that justice has to be at odds with utility. But if we ask how we are to be just between the competing interests of different people, it seems hard to give any other answer than it is by giving equal weight, impartially to the interests of everybody. And this is precisely what yields the utility principle. It does not necessarily yield equality in the resulting distribution. There are certainly very good utilitarian reasons for seeking equality in distribution too; but justice is something distinct. The utilitarian is sometimes said to be indifferent between equal and unequal distributions provided that total utility is equal. This is so; but it conceals two important utilitarian grounds for a fairly high degree of actual goods (tempered, of course, as in most systems including Rawls’s by various advantages that are secured by moderate inequalities). The second is that inequalities tend to produce, at any rate in educated societies, envy hatred and malice whose disutility needs no emphasizing. I am convinced that when these two factors are taken into account, utilitarians have no need to fear the accusation that they could favor extreme inequalities of distribution in actual modern societies. Fantastic hypothetical cases can no doubt be invented in which they would have to favor them; but as, as we shall see, this is an illegitimate form of argument.

#### Grid parity already happening and no impact

Schlichting 12 -- SolarBuzz (Wolfgang, 8/10/12, "What does grid parity mean for solar PV?" http://www.climatespectator.com.au/commentary/what-does-grid-parity-mean-solar-pv)

Grid parity – the almost ‘mystical’ point in time when levelised cost of generating electric power from PV energy is equal to the price of purchasing power from the grid – appears to be getting closer every month. Beyond this important point, PV power becomes, in principle, a viable technology for widespread development without subsidy support. This is expected to trigger an accelerated shift in PV adoption. With the PV industry currently focused on cost reduction – to ensure profitability when widespread grid parity is finally achieved – it is prudent to highlight some important aspects of grid-parity: -- Grid parity is not a singular event – it will happen in different geographies at different times -- Grid parity is a moving target – competing energy sources will adjust to the challenge from PV and other alternatives -- Grid Parity will not be the threshold after which PV quickly becomes the dominating energy source – established infrastructure and utility business models will take time to change Today, we are already at – or have passed through – grid parity at several locations in the world. This includes Hawaii and other tropical island nations in the Caribbean and South Pacific where PV competes with electricity from expensive oil imports. Also, grid parity has also been achieved in parts of Spain where there is plenty of sunshine and relatively high electricity cost. In 2013, we expect parts of Italy, Brazil, Chile and Australia to also reach the threshold. Thereafter, the Philippines, California, Japan and others will follow during the period from 2014 to 2016. This accelerated drive towards grid parity is timely because, in many key markets, incentives are declining or disappearing. This trend will continue, especially in Europe. Many coal, gas and nuclear plants are already fully-amortized and produce low-cost, highly-competitive electric power. Also, PV has been most successful in competing within the ‘peak-power’ segment. However, this is changing within locations where PV provides a substantial portion of the energy on sunny days (such as southern Germany). When PV becomes a mainstream energy source, it then competes with less expensive sources rather than ‘peak-only’ power plants. In many countries, this segment is primarily serviced by natural gas, coal and other fossil fuel powered plants. The adoption of hydraulic fracking – especially within the US – has caused natural gas production to increase dramatically. This has resulted in prices declining to historic lows, rivaling coal prices. This cheap gas represents serious competition to PV within the US and other areas. Declining fossil fuel prices are also compounded by large subsidies that were four times greater than the total revenues of the global PV industry during 2011§ Marked 18:57 § . In addition, the grid infrastructure is not optimised for distributed generation – one of PV’s key advantages. Most grids were typically designed to pipe electricity (mainly coal) from power plants to the industrial and population centers. This legacy infrastructure may cause challenges for PV power in being able to access the grid. Infrastructure changes to take advantage of distributed generation will take time to implement, and will likely require significant investments. Also, the intermittent nature of PV energy becomes a challenge as PV contributes more to the overall energy mix. This could be addressed with energy storage or buffering in the future. However, these technologies are still expensive today at the scale necessary to ensure grid stability, if PV were to provide the majority of power generated. Therefore, while grid parity in major electricity markets will mark an important achievement for the PV industry, it will not necessarily represent a single inflection-point in time for overall PV growth.

## 1nr v GW BW

### Politics§ Marked 19:57 §

### Impact Outweighs and Turns the Case

#### Disad outweights – it outweighs case because it’s the only extinction impact in the round and existential risk o/w

War and extinction prevent a focus on the value to life of the poor

#### US/Russian nuclear war causes extinction – its categorically different than other impacts

Bostrom 2 (Nick, PhD Philosophy – Oxford University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are **mere ripples** on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[2]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn2) At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[3]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn3) A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as **global** and **terminal**. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn4)  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### Romney will aggressively push human rights legislation on Russia.

Business Insider, 9/1/**2012** (Romney Could Screw Up US Relations With Russia, p. <http://www.businessinsider.com/mitt-romneys-foreign-policy-chops-come-into-light-2012-9>)

Russia has joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO), but the US is yet to grant Russia permanent normal trade relations. Moves to do so by repealing the Jackson-Vanik amendment have been stymied by the US election and efforts in Congress to tie such relations to legislation that would punish Russian officials deemed guilty of human rights abuses, including the arrest and death in custody of Sergei Magnitsky, a whistleblower. The Obama administration has taken action against those suspected of complicity in Mr Magnitsky's death, but in a limited and low-profile manner. It is not clear whether Mr Romney would be more forceful, because there are Democrats and Republicans on both sides of the argument. It seems likely that Mr Romney will back granting permanent normal trade relations soon after the election, but he might be more amenable to framing human rights legislation in ways that the Russian political class would regard as unwarranted interference in Russian domestic affairs.

#### That undermines START and U.S./Russian relations.

**Rogin**, **4/24**/2012 (Josh, Kerry delays action on Magnitsky bill, Foreign Policy, p. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/04/24/kerry\_delays\_action\_on\_magnitsky\_bill)

The Obama administration is on the record opposing the Magnitsky bill and believes that its passage could imperil U.S.-Russian cooperation on a range of issues. The Russian government has even threatened to scuttle the New START nuclear reductions treaty if the Magnitsky bill is passed, which would erase the signature accomplishment of the administration's U.S.-Russia reset policy. "Senior Russian government officials have warned us that they will respond asymmetrically if legislation passes," the administration said in its official comments on the bill last July. "Their argument is that we cannot expect them to be our partner in supporting sanctions against countries like Iran, North Korea, and Libya, and sanction them at the same time. Russian officials have said that other areas of bilateral cooperation, including on transit Afghanistan, could be jeopardized if this legislation passes." Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak said Monday at a lunch with reporters in Washington that passage of the Magnitsky bill would have a "significant negative impact" on the U.S.-Russia relationship and said it was unacceptable for the United States to interfere in the Magnitsky case, which he said was an internal Russian issue.

#### START collapse causes extinction

**Collins and Rojansky**, 8/18/**2010** (James – director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ex-US ambassador to the Russian Federation, and Matthew – deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program, Why Russia Matters, Foreign Policy, p. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/18/why\_Russia\_matters)

Russia's nukes are still an existential threat. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons in stockpile and hundreds still on hair-trigger alert aimed at U.S. cities. This threat will not go away on its own; cutting down the arsenal will require direct, bilateral arms control talks between Russia and the United States. New START, the strategic nuclear weapons treaty now up for debate in the Senate, is the latest in a long line of bilateral arms control agreements between the countries dating back to the height of the Cold War. To this day, it remains the only mechanism granting U.S. inspectors access to secret Russian nuclear sites. The original START agreement was essential for reining in the runaway Cold War nuclear buildup, and New START promises to cut deployed strategic arsenals by a further 30 percent from a current limit of 2,200 to 1,550 on each side. Even more, President Obama and his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, have agreed to a long-term goal of eliminating nuclear weapons entirely. But they can only do that by working together.

### Uniqueness

#### Obama will win the election --- Abramowitz prediction model proves. But dramatic events can still change the outcome.

**Ravi**, **9/13**/2012 (Anusha, Abramowitz Predicts 2012 Election Results, The Emory Wheel, p. http://www.emorywheel.com/abramowitz-predicts-2012-election-results/)

Alan Abramowitz, the Alben W. Barkley Professor of Political Science, has released his forecast for the outcome of the presidential election this November. Abramowitz, who has accurately predicted the popular vote winner of every presidential election since 1988, says incumbent President Barack Obama will win the election by a close margin of about 1.2 percent. Abramowitz based his forecast on statistical analysis composed of the candidate’s approval rating at the end of June, the growth of the economy and the value of the “incumbency factor,” which refers to the advantage a candidate will have simply for being the candidate that voters are familiar with. “The Democratic constituency is just larger than the Republicans’ and encompasses far more different types of people,” Abramowitz said. “Even if Romney receives the maximum turnout from white Republican voters, he won’t win.” In the past, the incumbency factor has meant more, according to Abramowitz. But more recently, the value of merely being the incumbent candidate has decreased because of the stark polarization — the division of voters into political extremes — of the American voting public. While Abramowitz has made his prediction about two months before the election takes place, he said that a very dramatic event would have to occur to change what he believes will be the outcome of the election.

#### Challenger won’t get the undecided voters.

**Cohn**, **8/8**/2012 (Nate – former Whitman debater and author of the Electionate, 90 Days Until the Election – And Obama Has the Advantage, The New Republic, p. <http://www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/105912/obama-has-the-advantage-90-days-go>)

Contrary to conventional wisdom, history suggests that undecided voters are unlikely to uniformly flock toward the challenger: Candidates almost always finish above their share of the vote in summer polling. While there are examples of challengers sweeping undecided voters, as Reagan did in 1980, the “1980 or bust” position is hardly enviable. The economy is bad enough that the 1980 scenario can’t be discounted, but the differences between 1980 and 2012 are too great to count on it—especially given Romney’s astonishingly bad numbers among undecided voters.

#### Obama will win – Romney is not exploiting white voters.

**Cohn**, **8/8**/2012 (Nate – former Whitman debater and author of the Electionate, 90 Days Until the Election – And Obama Has the Advantage, The New Republic, p. <http://www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/105912/obama-has-the-advantage-90-days-go>)

Barack Obama has the advantage with 90 days to go until November 6, and the Romney campaign mostly has itself to blame. Four years after Obama’s decisive victory in 2008, a poor economy, dissatisfaction with the direction of the country, and mediocre approval ratings have conspired to endanger the president’s reelection chances. But a close race, which is what the polls show, is not the same as a dead heat. Romney is an imperfect candidate who has been poorly served by a strategy that has failed to contest Obama’s predictable attacks, leaving him poorly positioned heading into the conventions. Over the last four years, Obama’s coalition suffered deep enough losses to give his challenger a legitimate path to victory. But those losses were narrow and concentrated among white voters without a college degree, as Obama retains near-2008 levels of support among minorities and college-educated whites. As a wealthy former CEO of a private equity firm with an awkward cadence who could never call himself a great politican, Romney has never naturally appealed to white working class voters, and, as a result, Romney’s ability to capitalize on Obama’s biggest weakness requires him to overcome his own. With three months to go, these weaknesses are as pronounced as ever. The Obama campaign adopted a strategy to remedy their weakness among white working class voters by defining Romney as an out-of-touch, outsourcing plutocrat willing to close factories, fire workers, and avoid taxes to advance his self-interest. If the Romney campaign possessed effective tools to blunt Obama’s offensive, they weren’t properly employed. Instead, the Romney campaign inexplicably focused on attacking a well-defined incumbent president, while permitting Obama and his allies to broadcast unflattering and uncontested tales about an undefined challenger. Boston’s ill-advised strategy has endangered Romney’s chances. Romney’s unfavorable ratings remain high and he hasn’t yet consolidated the disaffected white working class voters with reservations about Obama’s performance. In Ohio—ground zero for the Obama campaign’s efforts—Romney’s numbers have plummeted to the low forties, an extremely weak showing in a must win state. Undecided voters harbor particularly unfavorable impressions of the Republican nominee. According to recent surveys, Romney’s favorables are in the teens among undecided voters, while a majority has already formulated a negative impression.

#### Obama is ahead in the approval and favorability poll.

**Cohn**, **8/8**/2012 (Nate – former Whitman debater and author of the Electionate, 90 Days Until the Election – And Obama Has the Advantage, The New Republic, p. <http://www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/105912/obama-has-the-advantage-90-days-go>)

If Romney was closer to fifty percent, he could more easily overcome these problems with undecided voters. But Obama has a consistent three-point edge in national surveys, with 47 or 48 percent of registered voters; this means that to fight to a tie, let alone to win, Romney will need to persuade the preponderance of undecided voters. And while many hold that Obama’s 47 or 48 percent approval rating suggests that a majority of voters are lined up to unconditionally select the challenger, reality is somewhat more complicated. Obama’s net approval is roughly even and a majority of voters usually say they have a favorable opinion of Obama, unlike Romney. While approval ratings are a great indicator of an incumbent’s chances, net-approval or favorability ratings also perform quite well. Once all the metrics are taken into account, it is not clear that a majority of voters are committed to voting against Obama.

### Intrinsicness

-- Our disad is intrinsic – the link proves that the plan results in \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

-- Destroys all ground –

A) No disad is intrinsic – “make-up calls” can be crafted to solve any link or impact – even purely reaction-based DAs like Relations can be avoided by having the government cut the offended nation a big check

B) Fairness outweighs – logical debate is worthless if the Neg always loses. Fairness protects the forum that makes debate educational

-- Moving target – intrinsicness makes the plan conditional – destroys fairness because it's the locus of debate

-- Not logical: no single actor can do the plan and other actions. Even Congress is made up of many individual legislators.

-- Empirical intrinsicness checks – the Aff can read evidence that Congress will react to the plan by taking action – but not fiat that it occurs

### Links Debate

#### Link alone turns case - GOP win rolls back solar tax incentives

**Carus**, 7/16/**2012** (Felicity – UK journalist based in California, former for the Guardian, Suntech President Warns of Election Threat to Solar Incentives, Aol Energy, p. <http://energy.aol.com/2012/07/16/suntech-president-warns-of-election-threat-to-solar-incentives/>)

The US president of the world's largest PV manufacturer said this week that he was more concerned about a change of administration in the White House that could revoke incentives for solar than he was about controversial trade tariffs on Chinese suppliers. John Lefebvre, the president of Suntech America, said that he was especially concerned about potential Republican attempts to revoke the Investment Tax Credit, which returns 30% of the cost of a solar project, and state-level renewable goals. "There are currently threats against the ITC, the ITC being extended or perhaps being revoked. State Renewable Portfolio Standards are under attack in a lot of different markets that will certainly impact the utility business potentially in a large way."

They’ll say no link but plan will be perceived as an incentive

#### Clean energy loses Obama the election --- GOP attacks will swing key voters in favor of Romney and the support from clean energy is weaker than the opposition. That’s the 1NC LeVine evidence.

#### Plan kills blue collar support --- causes Obama to lose.

**Mead**, 6/6/**2012** (Walter Russell – avid fan of the television show the Price is Right and the movie Saving Private Ryan, Green Politics Hurting Obama in Swing States, The American Interest, p. http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/06/06/green-politics-hurting-obama-in-swing-states/)

Since the beginning of the recession, America’s “brown jobs” revolution has been one of the few bright spots in an otherwise shaky recovery. States like North Dakota and Texas have led the country in growth due to their strong energy sectors, and the discovery of vast quantities of shale gas in states like Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Colorado are now providing new jobs. These states have more than shale gas in common: all of them are also on the short list of swing states that decide this year’s presidential election. Republicans are seizing the opportunity to make energy politics a centerpiece of their campaign. As the FT reports: “Blue-collar voters were never that sold on environmental issues, and if some Democrats come across as not keen on economic development, it could lose them support here in Ohio,” he said. Republicans, from Mitt Romney, the party’s presidential candidate, to the congressional leadership, have made Barack Obama’s alleged stifling of the energy industry a centrepiece of their campaigns this year. . . . Mr Romney has said he will approve the Keystone XL pipeline as soon as he wins office and curb the powers of the Environmental Protection Agency. Only time will tell whether this is a winning strategy, but there is reason to think it could work. As we’ve mentioned before, energy politics is an area where Obama is particularly vulnerable. His decision to nix the popular Keystone pipeline earlier this year signaled antipathy toward one of America’s strongest industries while doing nothing to help the environment; it was lambasted as a pointless blunder by observers on both sides of the aisle. Meanwhile, his pet projects in alternative energy have fallen flat, as debacles like Solyndra have received far more attention than the program’s few successes. This should be seriously worrying to the Obama campaign. Brown jobs may be unpopular in Obama’s white-collar, urban, coastal base, but it is blue collar voters in swing states that are likely to decide the election, and many of these voters stand to reap significant benefits from an expansion of America’s energy sector. From a political perspective, Obama has placed himself on the wrong side of this issue. It may come back to bite him come November.

#### True even of ps- if they get people off the grid this pisses off people who lose their jobs as a result – perception of the attempt to do this causes the link

#### Link alone turns case – Romney is worse for the impoverished

#### Energy is Obama’s vulnerability --- the plan is a lightning rod for criticism.

**Belogolova**, 5/17/**2012** (Olga – staff reporter for the National Journal, Insiders: Outreach to Oil Industry Won’t Help Obama, p. http://www.nationaljournal.com/energy/insiders-outreach-to-oil-industry-won-t-help-obama-20120517)

“The president has been navigating towards the economic center since November 2010 and a pro-production veneer will certainly help make that case (even if it doesn’t last),” said one Insider. That doesn’t mean Republicans will back off from attacking Obama on his energy policies. While improved relations between the White House and big oil have thrown a wrench into some of their plans, 93 percent of Insiders say Republicans have plenty of material left. Whether it’s the administration refusing to “drill, baby, drill,” delayng the Keystone XL pipeline, imposing tough environmental regulations, or backing a big loan to struggling solar company Solyndra, Republicans are not short on ammunition to fire at Obama on energy issues. “It may be harder now for Republicans to land punches related to oil and gas, because the administration has called off the dogs, but many voters still think the president would like to thwart production and consumption of fossil fuels,” said one Insider. “Every time the president singles out the oil and gas industry for unfavorable tax treatment, voters are reminded of the White House's true goals." Insiders said that energy issues will continue to be a sticking point in this election — to the very end. “Energy is one of the president's biggest vulnerabilities. From Solyndra to 'cap and tax,' the administration has pursued one energy flop after another. The president's campaign team must agree, since their first ad was a defensive spot on their energy record, and the follow-up was a campaign swing through the country's energy heartland,” said another Insider. “Republicans are going to continue to pound away on the president's energy record to make sure he doesn't get away with trying to mask it.”

### Case

#### The distinction is critical – deontology only makes sense in private contexts

**Goodin 98** (Robert, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the Research School of the Social Sciences – Australian National University, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, p. 38)

The great advantage of utilitarianism as a guide to public conduct is that it avoids gratuitous sacrifices, it ensures as best we are able to ensure in the uncertain world of public policy-making that policies are sensitive to people's interests or desires or preferences. The great failing of more deontological theories applied to those realms, is that they fixate upon duties done for the sake of duty rather than for the sake of any good that is done by doing one's duty. Perhaps it is permissible (perhaps it is even proper) for private individuals in the course of their personal affairs to fetishize duties done their own sake. It would be a mistake for public officials to do likewise, not least because it is impossible.

#### Uncertainty of public policy mandates utility

**Goodin 98** (Robert, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the Research School of the Social Sciences – Australian National University, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, p. 43)

Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices - public and private alike - are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus - if they want to use it at all - to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rule.

### V2l

#### Utilitarianism produces equality – extreme examples don’t apply

Harsanyi 82 (John, Professor of Economics – University of California, Berkeley, Utilitarianism and Beyond, Ed. Sen and Williams, p. 26-27)

Some further notes on this suggestion will be in place here. First, it is sometimes alleged that justice has to be at odds with utility. But if we ask how we are to be just between the competing interests of different people, it seems hard to give any other answer than it is by giving equal weight, impartially to the interests of everybody. And this is precisely what yields the utility principle. It does not necessarily yield equality in the resulting distribution. There are certainly very good utilitarian reasons for seeking equality in distribution too; but justice is something distinct. The utilitarian is sometimes said to be indifferent between equal and unequal distributions provided that total utility is equal. This is so; but it conceals two important utilitarian grounds for a fairly high degree of actual goods (tempered, of course, as in most systems including Rawls’s by various advantages that are secured by moderate inequalities). The second is that inequalities tend to produce, at any rate in educated societies, envy hatred and malice whose disutility needs no emphasizing. I am convinced that when these two factors are taken into account, utilitarians have no need to fear the accusation that they could favor extreme inequalities of distribution in actual modern societies. Fantastic hypothetical cases can no doubt be invented in which they would have to favor them; but as, as we shall see, this is an illegitimate form of argument.

## 1nc v Liberty LW

### 1NC

#### Interpretation – “financial incentive” is a distinct category that requires a cash transfer – tax incentives are not included.

Christiansen & Böhmer 5 (Hans, Senior Economist in the OECD Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, & Alexander, co-ordinator of the MENA-OECD Investment Programme in the OECD’s Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Investment Division, “Incentives and Free Zones In The MENA Region: A Preliminary Stocktaking,” MENA-OECD Investment Programme, OECD, Working Group 2, p. 4-5, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/22/36086747.pdf)

I. Toward a common definition of incentives and FEZs¶ a) Investment incentives¶ 3. There is a grey area between, on the one hand, investment promotion and facilitation, and investment incentives on the other. Investment promoters may make information about their host location, relevant laws and administrative procedures available as a public good, but as soon as they offer facilitation and matchmaking tailored to the needs of individual investors then they are effectively subsidising these investors. The monetary value to investors of such assistance may in some cases exceed the value of outright investment incentives. Conversely, actual investment incentives are normally considered as falling into three categories, namely “regulatory”, “fiscal” and “financial” incentives1:¶ • Regulatory incentives are policies of attracting investment projects by offering derogations from national or sub-national rules and regulation. Where such derogations are offered on an economy-wide basis they tend to focus on the environmental, social and labour-market related requirements placed on investors. In the context of FEZs, they often consist in the relaxation of direct investment regulations (e.g. nationality requirements; screening and authorisation procedures) in place elsewhere in the host economy.¶ • Fiscal incentives consist of an easing of the tax burden on the investing companies or their employees. Unlike many other incentives they are most commonly rules-based as changes in taxation in most cases require legislative action. General fiscal incentives normally take the form of reduced corporate tax rates or tax holidays; encouragement of capital formation (e.g. investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation allowances); and preferential treatment of foreign operators (e.g. lower tax on remittances; reduced personal income tax rates on expatriates). In FEZs fiscal incentives, virtually by definition, also include lower import and export taxes and tariffs.¶ • Financial incentives consist of out of hand public spending to attract companies or induce them to invest. They are often formally justified by a need to compensate investors for the perceived disadvantages of a particular location (“site equalisation outlays”), or may take the form of tailoring the infrastructure of a prospective location to the needs of investors. Other financial incentives include subsidising the actual costs of relocating corporate units (e.g. job training cost; expatriation support; and temporary wage subsidies).

#### Violation – that excludes tax credits

Chi and Hoffman 2k (Keon S., Senior Fellow – CSG, and Daniel J., Research Associate, “State Business Incentives: Trends and Options for the Future,” The Council of State Governments, http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/Misc00BusinessIncentives.pdf)

In this report, the term “business incentives” is broadly defined as public subsidies, including, but not limited to, tax abatement and financial assistance programs, designed to create, retain or lure businesses for job creation. The term is used interchangeably as “industrial” or “development incentives.” The term “tax incentives” broadly refers to any credits or abatements of corporate income, personal income, sales-and-use, property or other taxes to create, retain or lure business. The term “financial incentives” broadly refers to any type of direct loan, loan guarantee grant, infrastructure development, or job training assistance offered to help create, retain or lure businesses.

#### Voting issue –

#### A. Limits – each category is massive, they explode the topic by allowing hundreds of new, conceptually distinct incentives – makes neg research impossible.

#### B. Ground – different generics apply by category – forcing the aff to spend government money is the only stable mechanism for disad links and counterplan competition.

### 1NC

#### Energy policy justified through security perpetuates inequalities, environmental degradation, and inhibits their long-term development – must be examined prior to their enactment

Simpson 7 – Founding Convenor of the APSA Environmental Politics and Policy Group, Lecturer in the International Relations program at the University of South Australia where he coordinates courses on IR and Environmental Politics, Researcher (Full Member) in the Hawke Research Institute and a member of the UniSA Human Rights and Security Cluster Leadership Committee, Associate at the Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre (IPGRC) at the University of Adelaide (Adam, 2007, "The Environment: Energy Security Nexus: Critical Analysis of an Energy 'Love Triangle' in Southeast Asia," Third World Quarterly, 28(3), JSTOR)

The pursuit of energy security has been a dominant policy objective and political tool for governments of various hues throughout the world. While there is no doubt that individuals have certain minimum energy require ments, the rhetoric of energy security has often been used as an excuse for governing elites to pursue centralised industrialisation and grandiose energy projects at the expense of marginalised populations. Mega-dams, gas pipelines and similar projects undertaken in majority, or less affluent, countries in the name of energy security and development are rarely vetted through a process of environmental or social impact assessment.' On the rare occasions when this does occur, the process is often a rubber-stamping exercise with little input from local communities. The situation is exacerbated when the political regime promoting or administering the project is particularly repressive or authoritarian in nature, such as in Burma.2 It is usually the case that the communities surrounding these projects are indigenous, dispossessed or otherwise marginalised and have little chance of mitigating the adverse effects that flow from the development, while most of the benefits are reaped in elite circles of the urban centres, where the development decisions are usually made. The interests of these elites, despite populist overtures, are largely antagonistic to the general populations, and this is reflected in development decision-making processes. Attempts by governments and developers either to enrich themselves or, at best, provide electricity for the urban middle classes invariably result in local ethnic minorities or indigenous peoples bearing the brunt of the environmental and social costs associated with the projects while having little input into the development process itself. While the discourse of national energy security is employed by dominant interests, the environmental security of the local communities can be severely undermined by a project but is rarely considered. Environmental security can be defined quite narrowly or understood more broadly to include the energy security deficit felt by many communities in majority countries, who often see no relief from the deficit when an energy project is completed. While the discourse of energy security is used to justify the project, communities living in its vicinity may remain without electricity following its completion and have other elements of their security, such as food, water or livelihood, undermined.4 In this situation it becomes pertinent to ask whose security whether it be 'energy', 'environmental' or 'financial' is being addressed by the project. Unfortunately, it is often the financial security of governing and business elites that determines project decision making at the expense of the environmental security of local communities.5 The transnational projects to be discussed here include a gas pipeline and various mega-dam projects in Southeast Asia. These projects are at various stages of their development but all relate to the purported pursuit of energy security by the dominant classes in Thailand and the supply thereof by their colleagues in Burma (or Myanmar) and Laos. In Thailand, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai party used the rhetoric of economic nationalism to obtain acquiescence to major projects but, in reality, Thaksin and other plutocratic government elements ran much of the economy for their own profit, privatising benefits but socialising costs and risks.6 In Burma the corrupt military regime of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDc) has ensured energy exporting projects bring little but suffering to local communities, with transnational corporations and successive Thai governments also being complicit.7 The SPDC and the military dominate Burma's economy, through both state and individual interests, and following dubious privatisations since 1988 the 'iron glove of the military envelops the invisible hand of the private sector'.8 In Laos corruption is also rampant and the economy is tightly controlled by the state. The state, in turn, is a tool of the sole legal political entity, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, membership of which offers the best guarantee of wealth.9 In all three countries major political and economic interests are virtually indistinguish able, often co-operating with foreign transnational corporations and bodies such as the World Bank to promote large-scale energy projects. By the mid-1990s, however, the success of the environment and anti-dam movements in Thailand made it politically expedient for Thai businesses and governments-including the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) to export the environmental and social problems associated with large dams and other energy pro ects to its more authoritarian neighbours while importing the electricity. 1 In Burma the completed Yadana gas pipeline to Thailand has resulted in significant human and environmental depredations against local ethnic minorities. The preparations being under taken for the Nam Theun 2 Dam in Laos and a series of dams on Burma's Salween River to export electricity to Thailand are already having similar impacts, for which recent studies of the Narmada Dams in India would provide a salutary lesson.11 These projects, at various stages of development, illustrate the vast chasm between the security interests of governing elites and those of the local indigenous or ethnic minority communities in these countries. These situations, juxtaposing energy projects with environmental destruc tion and human rights violations, have led to the new concept of 'earth rights', the nexus between human rights and environmental protection.12 Before examining these projects, a brief exposition on the nature of earth rights and environmental and energy security will assist in clarifying the location of this research within the field of critical security studies. The environment-energy security nexus Security is a contested concept, but the field of critical security studies has, since the late 1980s, challenged the state-centric focus of traditional cold war studies.13 Within this field environmental security has now been established as a significant area of interest.14 Barnett's definition of environmental insecurity considers the way in which 'environmental degradation threatens the security of people'.15 His added focus on the inequitable distribution of degradation resonates strongly with environmental justice theory. From this perspective, environmental security focuses more on human security than on threats to national security from environmental degradation or a securing 'of the environment itself.'6 Recent writings linking the concept of human security to that of environmental security have been concerned with 'social disruptions' as the principal source of insecurity.17 In this sense dislocation caused by major development projects such as dams may cause insecurity, but when this is linked to civil conflict the impacts are compounded. There is now a well established link between the exploitation of abundant resources and the propensity for civil strife, indicating that resource exploitation can be linked to both environmental degradation and human insecurity.'8 As my interest here relates to the majority world, one of the most useful concepts to emerge is that of 'earth rights'.' In addition to the benefit of its holistic inferences and simple terminology, most work on the concept is related to the majority world, where the interrelationships between environmental protection and human rights are most acute.20 Implicit in the notion of earth rights is that a degradation of environmental security reflects an erosion of human rights, and often vice versa. In their analysis of this concept Greer and Giannini have produced the most useful description thus far, arguing that: earth rights are those rights that demonstrate the connection between human well-being and a sound environment, and include the right to a healthy environment, the right to speak out and act topirotect the environment, and the right to participate in development decisions. In the projects that this paper investigates, it is these acknowledged rights to act in defence of the environment and the right to a healthy environment that are, for ethnic minority and indigenous communities living in the vicinity of the projects, most at risk. While a rights-based approach has been, to some extent, co-opted by institutions such as the World Bank, it can still provide a useful method of analysing development activities when employed from a critical perspective.22 In addition to theoretical developments in earth rights and environmental security, increased attention has also been given to energy security. It comes as no surprise, however, that discourses of energy security focus particularly on fossil fuels and large-scale electricity projects, given their centrality to military and industrial development. While this article examines this dominant energy discourse, it is only for the purposes of critical analysis. Although I examine cross-border energy projects in three countries, and therefore national issues do arise, it is the security impacts on local communities surrounding these projects that are of particular interest here. An important question to consider before discussing the impacts of these projects is, however, the reasons for the institutional and political momentum behind such large-scale undertakings in the first place. The industrial-scale development paradigm There are numerous reasons for the fixation, both academic and develop mental, on large-scale energy projects. Some relate to academic or government research funding opportunities, but this approach also fits neatly within the predominant large-scale and hierarchical, top-down development paradigm prescribed by financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. Much of the national development programmes throughout the 1980s and well into the 1 990s were undertaken within the 'Washington Consensus' model of neoliberal reform and structural adjustments. These policies exacerbated existing exploitative relationships between the North and South, with economic growth considered by these Bretton Woods institutions to be the only possible 'sustainable development', an approach considered to be 'Northern imperial ism, using the language of ecology'.24 The 'Post-Washington Consensus', which emerged within the World Bank and the IMF in response to an avalanche of criticism, revised the emphasis on pure neoliberalism, admitting a limited role for the state in development processes. Poverty and governance became key issues, but this approach continues to show an 'inability or unwillingness to address major issues pertaining to [political] power and its distribution both at the domestic and international levels'.25 In addition, the development modus operandi of the Bretton Woods institutions that produced poverty and inequality in the past is very much a part of the present.26 The World Bank has adopted a rights-based approach, but its interpretation of rights relates more to the rights of private enterprise than to those enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.27 Undoubtedly rhetoric at organisations such as the World Bank has changed; in terms of energy security there is now a focus on poverty reduction to be achieved through access to 'clean energy' sources. There is, however, a disconnect between World Bank rhetoric and its funding of major projects such as mega-dams that have proven to be environmentally and culturally destructive, while providing little in terms of energy security for local people. Despite some rhetorical revisionism, the discourse of energy security is still employed by government and business elites to justify top-down investments in large-scale energy projects, which require significant initial capital injections and subsequent industrial-scale capital returns. According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, this top-down approach to development has caused ecological destruction on a vast scale and tends to perpetuate, rather than ameliorate, inequalities.29 After decades of promoting capitalist industrialisation in the majority world, even the World Bank now recognises that inequality both within and between is increasing and can inhibit development. Nonetheless, the bank still cites 'ine uality of outcomes' as playing an important role in facilitating development.

#### Enframing of national security is a pre-requisite to macropolitical violence

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, pol icymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

#### Altenative – reject the affirmative’s security discourse – only resistance can generate genuine political thought

Neoclous 8 – Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

### 1NC

#### Text: The fifty state governments of the United States and relevant subnational actors should implement permanent production tax credits for onshore and offshore wind turbine components and turbine installation vessels. State-level production tax credits should parallel the size and scope of the federal production tax credit.

#### 50 State action solves better

Milford 10 (Lewis – The founder and president of Clean Energy Group (CEG), “Federal Climate and Energy Legislation and the States: Legislative Principles and Recommendations for a New Clean Energy Federalism”, April, http://www.cleanenergystates.org/assets/Uploads/CEGCleanEnergyFederalismv3April2010.pdf)

States should and will remain the laboratories of experimentation and innovation on technology and economic development because most energy investment decisions are made at the state and/or local utility and customer level. 2. State and local clean energy development decisions are made closer to the markets, are often more politically durable and stable over time, and should be encouraged. 3. There is no simple, standard or optimal clean energy program design and practice that will achieve carbon stabilization; instead, all states and local jurisdictions should be given adequate federal resources and assistance to create and implement a diverse portfolio of finance, technology, and policy tools to create the necessary fifty state programs to advance a clean energy future. 4. There are many existing, experienced and “best practice” state-based, clean energy institutions that deserve continued and expanded support for their decade-long successes in these areas. 5. States can develop more nuanced and effective finance mechanisms that can leverage private sector development because they know their markets, their market players and their barriers to success. 6. Bottom-up, distributed solutions that the states can provide have always proved the most responsive and nimble solutions **that best respect the ever changing demands of locally regulated state energy investment decisions**, which are the hallmark of the US energy sector. 7. States should be given express authority to enact climate and clean energy policy and laws that are more stringent and aggressive than the federal programs.

#### State wind incentives solve

Zaidi 7 (Kamaal, “WIND ENERGY AND ITS IMPACT ON FUTURE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY PLANNING: POWERING RENEWABLE ENERGY IN CANADA AND ABROAD”, 2007, 11 Alb. L. Envtl. Outlook 198, lexis)

The growing emergence of renewable energy highlights the importance of searching for cheaper, cleaner, and more reliable methods of using the world's natural resources. This response is reasonable given the volatility of electricity prices in the market [\*273] from the use of conventional fossil fuels, such as oil and natural gas. n515 Whether or not wind energy can replace these conventional sources remains to be seen. However, more nations are discovering its untapped potential, and are targeting energy capacity goals by using wind energy technology's natural availability. n516 Thus, harnessing this potential depends upon the level of commitment by government, industry, and citizens to establish a meaningful partnership in advancing sensible environmental policy frameworks. n517 As described earlier, federal and state/provincial governments play an active role in promoting the use of renewable energy by providing financial incentives to companies by way of tax incentives, favorable loan treatment, and funding for research and development of new wind technology. n518 Furthermore, companies are given financial incentives through funding mechanisms by purchasing electricity directly from renewable energy sources. n519 Wind-generated electricity is certainly becoming prosperous given the high urbanization rates and an increasing pressure on local authorities to provide affordable electricity to consumers. n520 Numerous authorities are attempting to cushion against fluctuating energy market prices that stem from conventional fossil fuel sources. n521 It is no wonder why renewable energy is being sought to guide future environmental policy planning. n522 Aside from economic considerations, several nations have committed to promote wind energy that minimizes [\*274] the impact on local environments. n523

### 1nc

#### A. Electricity prices are low and will likely decline now – gas boom, energy efficiency, reduced demand

**Burtraw 8/21/12** (one of the nation’s foremost experts on environmental regulation in the electricity sector. “Falling Emissions and Falling Prices: Expectations for the Domestic Natural Gas Boom” http://common-resources.org/2012/falling-emissions-and-falling-prices-expectations-for-the-domestic-natural-gas-boom/)

Moreover, the boom in domestic natural gas production could have even more immediate affects for U.S. electricity consumers. The increased supply of gas is expected to lower natural gas prices and retail electricity prices over the next 20 years, according to a [new RFF Issue Brief](http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=22019). These price decreases are expected to be even larger if demand for electricity continues on a slow-growth trajectory brought on by the economic downturn and the increased use of energy efficiency.For example, RFF analysis found that delivered natural gas prices would have been almost 35% higher in 2020 if natural gas supply projections had matched the lower estimates released by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 2009. Instead, with an increased gas supply, consumers can expect to pay $4.9 per MMBtu for delivered natural gas in 2020 instead of $6.6 per MMBtu. These trends are even more exaggerated if demand for electricity were to increase to levels projected by the EIA just three years ago, in 2009.This decrease in natural gas prices is expected to translate into a decrease in retail electricity prices for most electricity customers in most years out to 2020. Compared to the world with the lower gas supply projections, average national electricity prices are expected to be almost 6% lower, falling from 9.25 cents to 8.75 cents per kilowatt-hour in 2020. Residential, commercial, and industrial customers are all expected to see a price decrease, with the largest price changes occurring in parts of the country that have competitive electricity markets. All of these prices decreases translate into real savings for most electricity customers. The savings are largest for commercial customers, who stand to save $33.9 Billion (real $2009) under the new gas supply projections in 2020. Residential customers also stand to save big, with estimates of $25.8 Billion (real $2009) in savings projected for 2020.

#### Expanding wind power skyrockets electricity prices – costs of expansion would be enormous

Bryce 11 (Robert, Senior Fellow @ Manhattan Institute, "The High Cost of Wind Energy as a Carbon-Dioxide Reduction Method," http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/ib\_11.htm)

The Global Wind Energy Council (GWEC), an industry group, maintains that reducing the amount of carbon dioxide going into the atmosphere “is the most important environmental benefit from wind power generation.”[27] For its part, the American Wind Energy Association (AWEA), a national trade association, says “there is no need to wait for a new climate solution. Wind power is one of only a few near-term options to reduce emissions.”[28] In its 2008 report, the NREL claimed that if the United States were to derive 20 percent of its electricity from wind, it “could avoid approximately 825 million metric tons of carbon dioxide in the electric sector in 2030.”[29]¶ How does that 825 million tons of carbon dioxide compare with global emissions? In 2010, global carbon-dioxide emissions totaled 33.1 billion tons.[30] Thus, if the United States were somehow able to instantly increase its wind-generated electricity to 20 percent of total consumption, doing so might reduce global emissions by about 2.5 percent. But it is unlikely that global emissions will be the same in 2030 as they were in 2010. By 2030, the International Energy Agency (IEA) expects global emissions will total about 40.2 billion tons.[31] Thus, the 825 million tons that NREL claims might be reduced by achieving the “20 by ‘30” goal will result in a global reduction of just 2 percent.[32]¶ Therefore, to justify a total investment of $850 billion in wind, U.S. policymakers would have to agree that reducing carbon dioxide in the year 2030 is worth spending $1,030 per ton. Of course, that amount would not be spent all at once. Instead it would be allocated over the coming 19 years and would be, in effect, a carbon tax set at $54 per ton.¶ However, the actual cost may be somewhat lower. In its 2008 report, NREL claimed that only 305,000 megawatts of wind capacity would be needed to meet the “20 by ‘30” goal. Recall that the United States has built about 40,000 megawatts of wind capacity at a cost of about $68 billion. Thus, building an additional 265,000 megawatts of wind capacity (again, at $2.43 million per megawatt) at a cost of $644 billion, would lead to a total cost of $712 billion, thereby implying that cutting one ton of carbon dioxide by 2030 would cost about $863. Spread over the next 19 years, the cost would be the equivalent of a carbon levy set at $45 per ton.¶ Achieving the “20 by ‘30” goal will have a significant impact on electricity rates. In 2007, Steven Hayward and Kenneth Green of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) estimated that a $15 carbon tax would likely increase the cost of coal-fired generation by about $0.0163 per kilowatt-hour. Therefore, we can assume that a carbon levy of $54-per-ton could increase electricity rates in coal-reliant regions by about $0.058 per kilowatt-hour. That’s a major increase given that the average price of electricity for residential consumers in the United States is currently $0.12 per kilowatt-hour.[33]¶ Put another way, if the United States were to achieve the “20 by ‘30” goal, U.S. residential electricity prices in coal-dependent regions could increase by about 48 percent over current levels. If we use the lower range of wind costs outlined by NREL in its 2008 report, and assume that reducing a ton of carbon by 2030 will cost $45 per year, the increase in electricity costs in coal-dependent areas will amount to about $0.049 per kilowatt-hour. That would result in an increase of 40 percent over current levels for residential customers in those regions.¶ These higher electricity costs will likely accelerate the pace of electric rate increases now underway around the country. Since 2004, the average cost of residential electricity has gone from $0.0895 per kilowatt-hour to $0.1218 per kilowatt-hour, an increase of 36 percent.[34]¶ Wind energy is not a cost-effective method of reducing carbon-dioxide emissions. Any effort—whether at the state level or the federal level—to dramatically increase the use of wind energy will result in a new tax on electricity consumers. If the United States were to achieve the “20 by ‘30” goal, the effective carbon tax of $45 to $54 per ton would far exceed any such tax regime currently in place. Further, if the stated goal were met by 2030, the likely reduction in carbon dioxide emissions would amount to just 2 percent of the expected global total.

#### C. Low electricity prices spurs manufacturing "reshoring" and sparks US economic growth via consumer spending and investment

Perry 7/31/12 (Mark, Prof of Economics @ Univ. of Michigan, "America's Energy Jackpot: Industrial Natural Gas Prices Fall to the Lowest Level in Recent History," http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2012/07/americas-energy-jackpot-industrial.html)

Building petrochemical plants could suddenly become attractive in the United States. Manufacturers will "reshore" production to take advantage of low natural gas and electricity prices. Energy costs will be lower for a long time, giving a competitive advantage to companies that invest in America, and also helping American consumers who get hit hard when energy prices spike.¶ After years of bad economic news, the natural gas windfall is very good news. Let's make the most of it." ¶ The falling natural gas prices also make the predictions in this December 2011 study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, "Shale gas: A renaissance in US manufacturing?"all the more likely: ¶ U.S. manufacturing companies (chemicals, metals and industrial) could employ approximately one million more workers by 2025 because of abundant, low-priced natural gas.¶ Lower feedstock and energy cost could help U.S. manufacturers reduce natural gas expenses by as much as $11.6 billion annually through 2025.¶ MP: As I have emphasized lately, America's ongoing shale-based energy revolution is one of the real bright spots in an otherwise somewhat gloomy economy, and provides one of the best reasons to be bullish about America's future. The shale revolution is creating thousands of well-paying, shovel-ready jobs in Texas, North Dakota and Ohio, and thousands of indirect jobs in industries that support the shale boom (sand, drilling equipment, transportation, infrastructure, steel pipe, restaurants, etc.). In addition, the abundant shale gas is driving down energy prices for industrial, commercial, residential and electricity-generating users, which frees up billions of dollars that can be spent on other goods and services throughout the economy, providing an energy-based stimulus to the economy. ¶ Cheap natural gas is also translating into cheaper electricity rates, as low-cost natural gas displaces coal. Further, cheap and abundant natural gas is sparking a manufacturing renaissance in energy-intensive industries like chemicals, fertilizers, and steel. And unlike renewable energies like solar and wind, the natural gas boom is happening without any taxpayer-funded grants, subsidies, credits and loans. Finally, we get an environmental bonus of lower CO2 emissions as natural gas replaces coal for electricity generation. Sure seems like a win, win, win, win situation to me.

#### D. Manufacturing strength is key to both the economy and military power

Ettlinger and Gordon 11 (Michael and Kate, the Vice President for Economic Policy at the Center for American Progress, former director of the Economic Analysis and Research Network of the Economic Policy Institute and Vice President for Energy Policy at the Center for American Progress. Most recently, Kate was the co-director of the national Apollo Alliance, where she still serves as senior policy advisor. Former senior associate at the Center on Wisconsin Strategy, "The Importance and Promise of American Manufacturing" <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/04/pdf/manufacturing.pdf-)>

Manufacturing is critically important to the American economy. For generations, the strength of our country rested on the power of our factory floors—both the machines and the men and women who worked them. We need manufacturing to continue to be a bedrock of strength for generations to come. Manufacturing is woven into the structure of our economy: Its importance goes far beyond what happens behind the factory gates. The strength or weakness of American manufacturing carries implications for the entire economy, our national security, and the well-being of all Americans. Manufacturing today accounts for 12 percent of the U.S. economy and about 11 percent of the private-sector workforce. But its significance is even greater than these numbers would suggest. The direct impact of manufacturing is only a part of the picture. First, jobs in the manufacturing sector are good middle-class jobs for millions of Americans. Those jobs serve an important role, offering economic opportunity to hard-working, middle-skill workers. This creates upward mobility and broadens and strengthens the middle class to the benefit of the entire economy. What’s more, U.S.-based manufacturing underpins a broad range of jobs that are quite different from the usual image of manufacturing. These are higher-skill service jobs that include the accountants, bankers, and lawyers that are associated with any industry, as well as a broad range of other jobs including basic research and technology development, product and process engineering and design, operations and maintenance, transportation, testing, and lab work. Many of these jobs are critical to American technology and innovation leadership. The problem today is this: Many multinational corporations may for a period keep these higher-skill jobs here at home while they move basic manufacturing elsewhere in response to other countries’ subsidies, the search for cheaper labor costs, and the desire for more direct access to overseas markets, but eventually many of these service jobs will follow. When the basic manufacturing leaves, the feedback loop from the manufacturing floor to the rest of a manufacturing operation—a critical element in the innovative process—is eventually broken. To maintain that feedback loop, companies need to move higher-skill jobs to where they do their manufacturing. And with those jobs goes American leadership in technology and innovation. This is why having a critical mass of both manufacturing and associated service jobs in the United States matters. The "industrial commons" that comes from the crossfertilization and engagement of a community of experts in industry, academia, and government is vital to our nation’s economic competitiveness. Manufacturing also is important for the nation’s economic stability. The experience of the Great Recession exemplifies this point. Although manufacturing plunged in 2008 and early 2009 along with the rest of the economy, it is on the rebound today while other key economic sectors, such as construction, still languish. Diversity in the economy is important—and manufacturing is a particularly important part of the mix. Although manufacturing is certainly affected by broader economic events, the sector’s internal diversity—supplying consumer goods as well as industrial goods, serving both domestic and external markets— gives it great potential resiliency. Finally, supplying our own needs through a strong domestic manufacturing sector protects us from international economic and political disruptions. This is most obviously important in the realm of national security, even narrowly defined as matters related to military strength, where the risk of a weak manufacturing capability is obvious. But overreliance on imports and substantial manufacturing trade deficits weaken us in many ways, making us vulnerable to everything from exchange rate fluctuations to trade embargoes to natural disasters.

#### E. Heg solves multiple scenarios for nuke war

Kagan 7 (Robert, Senior Associate – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “End of Dreams, Return of History: International Rivalry and American Leadership”, Policy Review, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10)

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying —  its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess **nuclear weapons**. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more **catastrophic**. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not only on the goodwill of peoples but also on American power. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War II would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. **War could erupt between** **China and Taiwan** and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between **Russia and Georgia**, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between **India and Pakistan** remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel **or** other **Middle** **Eastern states**. **These**, too, could **draw in** other **great powers**, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. Conflicts are more likely to erupt if the United States withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore  to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn **draw the** **U**nited **S**tates **back in** under unfavorable circumstances.

### 1NC

#### Obama will win --- a consensus of polls and forecasts prove.

**Silver**, **9/20**/2012 (Nate, Sept. 19: A Wild Day in the Polls, but Obama Ends Up Ahead, Five Thirty Eight, New York Times, p. <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/sept-19-a-wild-day-in-the-polls-but-obama-ends-up-ahead/#h>[])

There are also going to be some outliers — sometimes because of unavoidable statistical variance, sometimes because the polling company has a partisan bias, sometimes because it just doesn’t know what it’s doing. (And sometimes: because of all of the above.) By the end of Wednesday, however, it was clear that the preponderance of the evidence favored Mr. Obama. He got strong polls in Ohio, Florida, Michigan, Wisconsin and Virginia, all from credible pollsters. Mr. Obama, who had been slipping in our forecast recently, rebounded to a 75.2 percent chance of winning the Electoral College, up from 72.9 percent on Tuesday. The most unambiguously bearish sign for Mr. Romney are the poor polls he has been getting in swing states from pollsters that use a thorough methodology and include cellphones in their samples. There have been 16 such polls published in the top 10 tipping point states since the Democratic convention ended, all conducted among likely voters. Mr. Obama has held the lead in all 16 of these polls. With the exception of two polls in Colorado — where Mr. Obama’s polling has been quite middling recently — all put him ahead by at least four points. On average, he led by 5.8 percentage points between these 16 surveys. If this is what the post-convention landscape looks like, then Mr. Romney is in a great deal of trouble. Perhaps these polls imply that Mr. Obama’s lead is somewhere in the range of five percentage points in the popular vote — national polls suggest that it’s a bit less than that, but state polls provide useful information about the national landscape. Or perhaps they imply that Mr. Obama is overperforming slightly in the swing states. Either way, that’s a pretty big deficit for Mr. Romney to overcome. What’s more, Mr. Obama was at 49.4 percent of the vote on average between these 16 surveys, meaning that he’d need to capture only a tiny sliver of the undecided vote to get to an outright majority. (If we’re being technical, 49.4 percent might be sufficient for him to win these states on its own, since perhaps 1 or 2 percent of the vote will go to third-party candidates.) To be clear: I do not recommend that this is the only data you look at. The forecast model also evaluates polls that exclude cellphones, although it gives them slightly less weight. Those have not necessarily shown a great deal of strength for Mr. Obama. And just as the model looks at state polls to infer the national trend, it also does the reverse, using the national polls (and essentially the assumption of ”uniform swing”) to infer where the states stand. The national polls show a spread right now from an effective tie to an eight-point lead for Mr. Obama. Taken as a whole, they seem to imply more like a three or four point lead for Mr. Obama rather than something in the range of five points. (These distinctions really do make a difference, especially with so few undecided voters left.) The other questions, of course, are whether Mr. Obama’s bounce is fading, and if it might fade further. His FiveThirtyEight forecast remains off its high of about an 80 percent chance of victory, that he achieved late last week.

**Massive opposition to wind power – local NIMBY groups working with oil and gas industry**

**Goldenberg 12** (Suzanne, US environment correspondent, “Conservative thinktanks step up attacks against Obama's clean energy strategy,” 5-8-12, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/08/conservative-thinktanks-obama-energy-plans>)

A network of ultra-conservative groups is ramping up an offensive on multiple fronts to turn the American public against wind farms and Barack Obama's energy agenda. A number of rightwing organisations, including Americans for Prosperity, which is funded by the billionaire Koch brothers, are attacking Obama for his support for solar and wind power. The American Legislative Exchange Council (Alec), which also has financial links to the Kochs, has drafted bills to overturn state laws promoting wind energy. Now a confidential strategy memo seen by the Guardian advises using "subversion" to build a **national movement of wind farm protesters**. The strategy proposal was prepared by a fellow of the American Tradition Institute (ATI) – although the thinktank has formally disavowed the project. The proposal was discussed at a meeting of self-styled 'wind warriors' from across the country in Washington DC last February. "These documents show for the first time that local Nimby anti-wind groups are co-ordinating and working with national fossil-fuel funded advocacy groups to wreck the wind industry," said Gabe Elsner, a co-director of the Checks and Balances, the accountability group which unearthed the proposal and other documents. Among its main recommendations, the proposal calls for a **national PR campaign** aimed at causing "subversion in message of industry so that it effectively because so bad that no one wants to admit in public they are for it." It suggests setting up "dummy businesses" to buy anti-wind billboards, and creating a "counter-intelligence branch" to track the wind energy industry. It also calls for spending $750,000 to create an organisation with paid staff and tax-exempt status dedicated to building public opposition to state and federal government policies encouraging the wind energy industry. The proposal was reviewed by John Droz Jr, a senior fellow at ATI, for discussion at the Washington meeting, which he also organised. ATI's executive director, Tom Tanton, said Droz had acted alone on the memo, although he confirmed he remains a fellow at the thinktank. Droz is a longtime opponent of wind farms, arguing that the technology has not yet been proven and that wind technology should not receive government support. He claims 10,000 subscribers to his anti-wind-power email newsletter. In a telephone interview, Droz said the Washington strategy session was his own initiative, and that neither he nor any of the participants had been paid for attending the session. Their main priority was co-ordinating PR strategy. "Our No 1 reason for getting together was to talk about whether there should be agreement to talk about a common message." The strategy session is the latest evidence of a **concerted attack** on the clean energy industry by thinktanks and lobby groups connected to oil and coal interests and free-market ideologues.

#### Romney election results in Iran strikes --- Obama reelection defuses the situation with diplomacy

**Daily Kos**, 4/16/**2012** (President Obama versus Romney on Iran, p. <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/04/16/1083726/-President-Obama-versus-Romney-on-Iran>)

3. Approach to foreign policy: Romney says he will “not apologize” for America and advocates a return to the Bush cowboy “my way or the highway” approach to dealing with other nations. When John Bolton is an endorser, that scares me. To me, however the biggest contrast is their approach to Iran. Binyamin Netanyahu by all accounts is a hawk who is pushing the United States to bomb Iran and has been doing so for a long time. He appears to see no need for negotiation. Granted, he has a right to protect his nation if he believes that its under threat. However, we all know how flawed the “intelligence” was for the Iraq war. And its important to let negotiations play out as far as possible before rushing to war, which would have many unintended consequences for years to come. (See the Iraq war). Here’s the big difference. Here’s Netanyahu’s recent response to the ongoing P5+1 talks: http://news.yahoo.com/... Netanyahu -- whose government has not ruled out a preemptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities -- earlier said however that Tehran had simply bought itself some extra time to comply. "My initial impression is that Iran has been given a 'freebie'," Netanyahu said during talks with visiting US Senator Joe Lieberman, the premier's office reported. "It has got five weeks to continue enrichment without any limitation, any inhibition. I think Iran should take immediate steps to stop all enrichment, take out all enrichment material and dismantle the nuclear facility in Qom," he said. "I believe that the world's greatest practitioner of terrorism must not have the opportunity to develop atomic bombs," he said. Here’s President Obama’s response yesterday to Netanyahu (in a response to a journalist's question) at the press conference in Cartagena: But Obama refuted that statement, saying "The notion that we've given something away or a freebie would indicate that Iran has gotten something." "In fact, they got the toughest sanctions that they're going to be facing coming up in a few months if they don't take advantage of those talks. I hope they do," Obama said. "The clock is ticking and I've been very clear to Iran and our negotiating partners that we're not going to have these talks just drag out in a stalling process," Obama told reporters after an Americas summit in Colombia."But so far at least we haven't given away anything -- other than the opportunity for us to negotiate," he said. Obama in conjunction with world powers is negotiating with Iran, trying to prevent a needless war. You can be sure that Mitt Romney would bow to his buddy Netanyahu and attack Iran. He has previously said “We will not have an inch of difference between ourselves and Israel”. As he also said in a debate, before making any decision regarding Israel, he will call his friend Bibi. Bottom line, if somehow the American people elect Mitt Romney, expect more of the bombastic, Bush cowboy approach to foreign policy with a more than likely bombardment of Iran. If the American people are not fooled by this charlatan and they reelect Barack Obama, he will continue in his measured way to deal with the threats around the world, quietly, through the use of negotiation, and force if absolutely necessary, but only as a last resort, without bragging, and scaring the American people with needless terrorism alerts.

#### Iran strikes escalates to a nuclear world war.

**Chossudovsky**, 12/26/**2011** (Michel, Preparing to attack Iran with Nuclear Weapons, Global Research, p. http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=28355)

An attack on Iran would have devastating consequences, It would unleash an all out regional war from the Eastern Mediterranean to Central Asia, potentially leading humanity into a World War III Scenario. The Obama Administration constitutes a nuclear threat. NATO constitutes a nuclear threat Five European "non-nuclear states" (Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Turkey) with tactical nuclear weapons deployed under national command, to be used against Iran constitute a nuclear threat. The Israeli government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not only constitutes a nuclear threat, but also a threat to the security of people of Israel, who are misled regarding the implications of an US-Israeli attack on Iran. The complacency of Western public opinion --including segments of the US anti-war movement-- is disturbing. No concern has been expressed at the political level as to the likely consequences of a US-NATO-Israel attack on Iran, using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state. Such an action would result in "the unthinkable": a nuclear holocaust over a large part of the Middle East.

### Solvency

#### Wind Power is “Inordinately Expensive”

The Blaze 12 (Jan 10, Environmental Writer Liz Klimas, Report: Hidden Expenses Associated with Wind Farming cancels out ‘Green’ Benefits, <http://www.theblaze.com/stories/report-hidden-expenses-associated-with-wind-farming-could-cancel-out-green-benefits/>)

Civitas, an independent think tank, recently published a report by British economist Ruth Lea — director of the manufacturing renewal project at Civitas and an economic adviser to the Arbuthnot Banking Group – that concludes the expense of wind farms and need for backup energy makes harvesting wind “inordinately expensive and ineffective at cutting emissions.” According to the U.K.’s Climate Change Act, signed in 2008, greenhouse gas emission goals set a 20 percent reduction by 2020 compared to 1990 levels and an 80 percent cut by 2050. Such drastic reductions fundamentally change the way many businesses operate and require adoption of renewable energy or carbon-cutting technology. Since generation of electricity alone accounted for nearly a third of the U.K.’s CO2 emissions in 2010, according to the report, this is clearly an area where the government is seeking to make improvements. The Telegraph reports that the U.K. plans to build as many as 32,000 wind turbines in the next two decades. This initiative is part of a goal set by EU’s Renewables Directive to have 15 percent of the energy produced in the U.K. come from renewables by 2020. The Lea report states that while wind power looks like a competitive option for alternative energy, additional costs associated are not being considered and may in fact negate the carbon-saving benefits: The costing of wind-power electricity generation is clearly very complex. But one conclusion can safely be drawn and that is that wind-power is expensive – especially offshore. Under these circumstances it seems unwise to be embarking on a huge programme of investment in wind generated electricity, especially when the country is facing grave economic challenges. This analysis also ignores the perceived environmental costs of wind-power, especially onshore wind turbines.

#### Wind will always require backup fuel sources

Driessen 12 (MAKE THIS CITE MATCH, 8 May 2012, Big Wind Subsidies: Time to Terminate?, <http://www.masterresource.org/2012/05/wind-subsidies-terminate/#more-19930>)

Energy 101. It is impossible to have wind turbines without fossil fuels, especially natural gas. Turbines average only 30% of their “rated capacity” – and less than 5% on the hottest and coldest days, when electricity is needed most. They produce excessive electricity when it is least needed, and electricity cannot be stored for later use. Hydrocarbon-fired backup generators must run constantly, to fill the gap and avoid brownouts, blackouts, and grid destabilization due to constant surges and falloffs in electricity to the grid. Wind turbines frequently draw electricity from the grid, to keep blades turning when the wind is not blowing, reduce strain on turbine gears, and prevent icing during periods of winter calm.¶ Energy 201.Despite tens of billions in subsidies, wind turbines still generate less than 3% of US electricity. Thankfully, conventional sources keep our country running – and America still has centuries of hydrocarbon resources. It’s time our government allowed us to develop and use those resources.

#### Chinese Dysprosium is key to Turbines – and it’s running out

Rhodes 12 (July 30, Chris, chemistry and doctor phil, youngest professor of Physical Chemistry in UK, “The No.1 Source for Oil and Energy News,” “Peak Minerals: Shortage of Rare Earth Metals Threatens Renewable Energy” <http://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Renewable-Energy/Peak-Minerals-Shortage-of-Rare-Earth-Metals-Threatens-Renewable-Energy.html>)

Of the other REEs, demands for dysprosium and terbium, which are harder elements to extract than their lighter relatives, are such that supply will be outpaced within a decade. The latter have been described as "miracle" ingredients for green energy production since small quantities of dysprosium can result in magnets with only one tenth the weight of conventional permanent magnets of similar strength, while terbium can be used to furnish lights that use as little as 20% of the power consumed by normal illumination. By alloying neodymium with dysprosium and terbium, magnets are created that more readily maintain their magnetism at the high temperatures of hybrid car engines. However, far more dysprosium relative to neodymium is required than occurs naturally in the REE ores, meaning that another source of dysprosium must be found if hybrid cars are to be manufactured at a seriously advancing rate. As noted, almost all REEs come from China whom it appears will run out of dysprosium and terbium within 15 years, or sooner if demand continues to soar, notwithstanding that Chinese hegemony for its own future energy projects may mean that the current amount of REEs being released onto the world markets will be severely curbed. Almost certainly, new sources of REEs will be sought, given their vital importance to providing future renewable energy, and Japanese geologists have reported that there may be 100 billion tonnes of REEs in the mud of the floor of the Pacific Ocean. Since the minerals were found at depths of 3,500 to 6,000 metres (11,500-20,000 ft) below the ocean surface, the undertaking required to recover them will not be trivial, however, and the practicalities of the enterprise remain to be seen.

#### Tightening REE supply causes US-China trade wars

Time 12 (Time Science & Space, “Raring to Fight: The US Tangles with China over Rare-Earth Exports,” Bryan Walsh, March 13, http://science.time.com/2012/03/13/raring-to-fight-the-u-s-tangles-with-china-over-rare-earth-exports/)

Or not. This morning Obama announced that the U.S. — along with the European Union and Japan — had filed a case with the World Trade Organization requesting talks with China over its export controls of the rare-earth minerals used in the high-tech and clean-tech manufacturing industries. The request for consultations is the first step in a process that will lead to a full legal case within two months, unless China agrees to the demands to ease its tightening export quotas on rare-earth minerals. That isn’t likely — and the fact that Obama chose to make his case publicly, from the White House Rose Garden, indicates that both sides could be gearing up for a trade war in a presidential-election year. “Being able to manufacture advanced batteries and cars is too important to sit back and do nothing,” Obama said. “We can’t let the new energy industry take root in other countries because they are allowed to break the rules.”

#### Trade Wars Empirically Go Hot

**Droke 10** (Clif, Editor – Momentum Strategies Report, “America and the Next Major War’, Green Faucet, 3-29, http://www.greenfaucet.com/technical-analysis/america-and-the-next-major-war/79314)

In the current phase of relative peace and stability we now enjoy, many are questioning when the next major war may occur and speculation is rampant as to major participants involved. Our concern here is strictly of a financial nature, however, and a discussion of the geopolitical and military variables involved in the escalation of war is beyond the scope of this commentary. But what we can divine from financial history is that "hot" wars in a military sense often emerge from trade wars. As we shall see, the elements for what could prove to be a trade war of epic proportions are already in place and the key figures are easily identifiable.

#### Conflict with China will escalate to global nuclear war

**Hunkovic 9** (Lee J, American Military University, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict: Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, [http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/ Hunkovic.pdf](http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf))

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential **to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war**, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

#### Grid Problems Prevent Solvency

Rosenbloom 6 (Eric, Science Writer, president of National Wind Watch, September 2006, A Problem with Wind Power, <http://www.aweo.org/ProblemWithWind.html>, summary)

The biggest problem with large-scale wind-powered electricity generation is the grid. A home system can work well because the fluctuating output (even in the windiest places it is highly variable) can be regulated by batteries, and another source (the grid or a gas-powered generator) is tied in to kick in when need be. This is the model where larger systems work in isolated villages, too. But industrial-scale wind plants designed to supply the grid do not work well, even where the wind is superb. The grid is meant to respond to demand, constantly modulating the various suppliers to match the demand exactly. Wind plants respond only to the wind, forcing the more controllable "conventional" plants to change their output in response to wind production as well as to grid demand. And the need to respond within seconds to a drop in wind production requires a plant that runs more inefficiently than one that could run if the grid didn't have to cope with the unpredictable fluctuations of significant wind-powered sources. That is to say, wind farms may actually cause more fossil fuel burning. The huge turbines designed for the grid can't work without electricity from the grid, either. They produce on average 25%-35% of what they are capable of, but they are using electricity (apparently free) 100% of the time. And a problem about sites with good steady strong winds is that they are too windy. The turbines can't handle strong gusts and automatically shut down (typically around 55 mph). So "good" sites turn out to be very little more productive than less windy ones.

### Econ

#### Wind subsidies artificially extend a dead industry – there’s no economic benefit

Hawaii Reporter 12 (August 20, “Wind Energy Subsidies Are As Useful As VHS Tape Subsidies,” Quoting and referring to the work of Nicolas Loris, Economist with a research focus in energy and environmental and regulatory issues, Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, <http://www.hawaiireporter.com/?p=53632>)

Heritage's Nicolas Loris has made the case that the wind energy tax credit makes as much sense as a VHS production tax credit. Can you imagine the logic: "We can't afford to lose our VHS tape manufacturing plants. They provide valuable jobs. Americans need a variety of ways to watch recorded entertainment." Loris says this is what proponents of wind energy tax credits sound like. Wasting taxpayer dollars on different but similar programs—claiming that these subsidies really are necessary to create jobs or prevent layoffs—simply creates a "subsidies for me but not for thee" mentality in Washington….Renewable energy production tax credits have received support from Democrats, Republicans, and industry groups, but that doesn't make it good policy. The credit is a huge handout to wind producers, allowing them to sell their electricity for less than market price. They would profit even if they offered it for free—because they would still pocket the subsidy. The subsidy is already equivalent to 50 percent to 70 percent of the wholesale price of electricity. And that isn't the only special-interest treatment wind producers receive, as Heritage's David Kreutzer explains: Though you would not know it from wailing and gnashing of teeth over the expiration of the [production tax credit, or] PTC, many states also have renewable energy standards that force ratepayers to buy wind, solar, and biomass produced electricity regardless of how much it costs. These renewable standards are separate from—and, for wind-power producers, in addition to—the PTC. A business that cannot survive without taxpayers paying 50 percent of the costs does not help the economy. Instead, it eats up more value than it produces. Policies like the production tax credit concentrate benefits on a few recipients and spread the costs among the rest of us through higher taxes and energy costs. They hurt the economy by making production more expensive, which puts U.S.-based products at a competitive disadvantage. This means fewer jobs for American workers. Those production expenses also make necessities more expensive for consumers, who are already hurting from the higher energy costs. Higher prices across the board hit lower-income Americans the hardest.

#### Wind empirically kills jobs – turns case

Driessen 12 (MAKE THIS CITE MATCH, 8 May 2012, Big Wind Subsidies: Time to Terminate?, <http://www.masterresource.org/2012/05/wind-subsidies-terminate/#more-19930>)

Economics 201. As Spain, Germany, Britain and other countries have learned, wind energy mandates and subsidies drive up the price of electricity – for families, factories, hospitals, schools, offices and shops. They squeeze budgets and cost jobs. Indeed, studies have found that two to four traditional jobs are lost for every wind or other “green” job created. That means the supposed 37,000 jobs (perpetuated by $5 billion to $10 billion in combined annual subsidies, or $135,000 to $270,000 per wind job) are likely costing the United States 74,000 to 158,000 traditional jobs, while diverting billions from far more productive uses.

#### Alt cause: Consumer Spending

Reich 12 (Robert, chancellor's professor of public policy at UC Berkeley, and former U.S. secretary of labor,

<http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/reich/article/Consumer-spending-key-to-job-creation-3866757.php#ixzz26ZAhK5H9> “Consumer Spending Key to Job Creation” Sept 14, 2012, San Francisco Chronicle)

If that were all there was to it, the Sept. 7 report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics showing that the economy added only 96,000 jobs in August - below what's needed merely to keep up with the growth in the number of eligible workers - would seem to bolster Romney's claim. But, of course, congressional Republicans have never even given Obama a chance to try his approach. They've blocked everything he's tried to do - including his proposed Jobs Act that would help state and local governments replace many of the teachers, police officers, social workers and firefighters they've had to let go over the past several years. The deeper question is what should be done starting in January to boost a recovery that by anyone's measure is still anemic. In truth, not even the Jobs Act will be enough. At the Republican convention in Tampa, Fla., Romney produced the predictable set of Republican bromides: cut taxes on corporations and the already rich, cut government spending (mainly on the lower middle class and the poor) and gut business regulations. It's the same supply-side nonsense that got the economy into trouble in the first place. Corporations won't hire more workers just because their tax bill is lower and they spend less on regulations. In case you hadn't noticed, corporate profits are up. Most companies don't even know what to do with the profits they're already making. Not incidentally, many of those profits have come from replacing jobs with computer software or outsourcing them abroad. Meanwhile, the wealthy don't create jobs, and giving them additional tax cuts won't bring unemployment down. America's rich are already garnering a bigger share of American income than they have in 80 years. They're using much of it to speculate in the stock market. All this has done is drive stock prices higher. The way to get jobs back is to get American consumers to spend again. Consumer spending is 70 percent of the nation's economic activity. Most of it comes from the middle class and those aspiring to join the middle class. They're the real job creators. But here's the problem: Middle-class consumers won't and can't spend because their savings are depleted, their homes are worth a fraction of what they were five years ago, their wages are dropping, and they're worried about keeping their jobs. And they're no longer able borrow against the rising values of their homes because the housing bubble burst - which means they can no longer pretend they're in better financial shape than they really are.

#### Multiple thumpers to the US and global economies - Eurozone, China hard landing, emerging market recession, anemic US growth and budget fights, Iran

Roubini 9/13/12 (Nouriel, professor at NYU’s Stern School of Business and Chairman of Roubini Global Economics, "Fiddling at the Fire," http://www.project-syndicate.org/print/fiddling-at-the-fire-by-nouriel-roubini)

In the eurozone, euphoria followed the ECB’s decision to provide support with potentially unlimited purchases of distressed countries’ bonds. But the move is not a game changer; it only buys time for policymakers to implement the tough measures needed to resolve the crisis. And the policy challenges are daunting: the eurozone’s recession is deepening as front-loaded fiscal consolidation and severe credit rationing continues. And, as eurozone banks and public-debt markets become increasingly balkanized, establishing a banking union, a fiscal union, and an economic union while pursuing macroeconomic policies that restore growth, external balance, and competitiveness will be extremely difficult.¶ Even the ECB’s support is not obvious. Monetary hawks – the Bundesbank and several other core central banks – who were worried about a new open-ended ECB mandate pushed successfully for strict and effective conditionality for countries benefiting from the bond purchases. As a result, they can pull the plug on the program if its stringent criteria are not met.¶ Moreover, Greece could exit the eurozone in 2013, before Spain and Italy are successfully ring-fenced; Spain – like Greece – is spiraling into depression, and may need a full-scale bailout by the “troika” (the ECB, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund). Meanwhile, austerity fatigue in the eurozone periphery is increasingly clashing with bailout fatigue in the core.¶ Small wonder, then, that Germany, politically unable to vote on more bailout resources, has outsourced that job to the ECB, the only institution that can bypass democratically elected parliaments. But, again, liquidity provision alone – without policies to restore growth soon – would merely delay, not prevent, the breakup of the monetary union, ultimately taking down the economic/trade union and leading to the destruction of the single market.¶ In the United States, the latest economic data – including a weak labor market – confirm that growth is anemic, with output in the second half of 2012 unlikely to be significantly stronger than the 1.6% annual gain recorded in January-June. And, given America’s political polarization and policy gridlock, we can expect more fights on the budget and the debt ceiling, another rating downgrade, and no agreement on a path toward medium-term fiscal consolidation and sustainability – regardless of whether President Barack Obama is reelected in November. On the contrary, we should expect agreement only on the path of least political resistance: avoidance of tough fiscal choices until the bond vigilantes eventually wake up, spike long rates, and force fiscal adjustment on the political system.¶ In China, a hard economic landing looks increasingly likely as the investment bubble deflates and net exports shrink. Meanwhile, the reforms necessary to reduce savings and increase private consumption are being delayed. As in Europe and the US, the worst will be avoided in 2012 only by kicking the can down the road with more monetary, fiscal, and credit stimulus.¶ But a hard landing becomes more likely in 2013, as the stimulus fades, non-performing loans rise, the investment bust accelerates, and the problem of rolling over the debts of provincial governments and their special investment vehicles can no longer be papered over. And, given a new leadership’s caution as it establishes its power, reforms will occur at a snail’s pace, making social and political unrest more likely.¶ Meanwhile, Brazil, India, Russia, and other emerging economies are playing the same game. Many have not adjusted as advanced economies’ weakness reduces the room for export-led growth; and many delayed structural reforms needed to boost private-sector development and productivity growth, while embracing a model of state capitalism that will soon reveal its limits. So the recent slowdown of growth in emerging markets is not just cyclical, owing to weak growth or outright recession in advanced economies; it is also structural.¶ Similar dithering is apparent at the geopolitical level as well. The major global powers are still trying negotiations and sanctions to induce Iran to abandon its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. But Iran is playing for time and hoping to reach a zone of immunity. By 2013, an Israel that – rightly or wrongly – perceives Iran’s nuclear program to be an existential threat, and/or the US, which has rejected containment of a nuclear Iran, may decide to strike, leading to a war and a massive spike in oil prices.¶ Ineffective governments with weak leadership are at the root of the problem. In democracies, repeated elections lead to short-term policy choices. In autocracies like China and Russia, leaders resist the radical reforms that would reduce the power of entrenched lobbies and interests, thereby fueling social unrest as resentment against corruption and rent-seeking boils over into protest.¶ But, as everyone kicks the can down the road, the can is getting heavier and, in the major emerging markets and advanced economies alike, is approaching a brick wall. Policymakers can either crash into that wall, or they can show the leadership and vision needed to dismantle it safely.

#### Wind incentives distort the market and increase costs

Schwartz 5 (L.M. Schwartz is the Chairman of the Virginia Land Rights Coalition. “Wind Power Dollars and Sense” http://www.vlrc.org/articles/3.html)

Despite the multi-billion dollar expenditure of taxpayer funds by government and the “renewable energy” industry during the past 35+ years, the results have proven disastrous in economic terms. The Department of Energy (DOE) and other federal and state agencies have spent over $40 billion on “energy research and development” and subsidies, not including private R&D costs, yet virtually nothing has been ‘developed’ that is technologically, economically or environmentally sound.¶ The subsidy of “green” energy, such as solar, geo-thermal, hydro, bio-mass and wind, has distorted the operation of electrical power markets, increased electricity rates to consumers, increased taxes at all levels of government, diverted resources from industry financed (private) research for more efficient and cleaner means of producing and distributing power, politicized energy production, and prevented or delayed bringing more base capacity on line to reliably meet present and projected increases in demand.

#### No solvency - stats skewed by low baseline

Murphy 12 (Robert, Ph.D Economics, senior fellow Pacific Research Institute, Institute for Energy Research, January 4 2012, <http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2012/01/04/wind-power-and-the-free-market/> “Wind Power and the Free Market”)

Lockard’s talking points make it sound as if wind power is poised to take over the energy scene. But like Paul Krugman’s similar remarks about solar power, these too are unsubstantiated. According to the Energy Information Administration, in 2010, wind power accounted for 0.9 percent of the energy used in the United States. Yes, it’s easy to achieve large rates of growth in the wind sector, when starting from such a low baseline. The EIA projects that wind will only produce 3.1 percent of electricity by 2035, up from 2.3 percent in 2010. Because of higher costs and the tremendous problem of intermittency—the wind doesn’t always blow—wind power is nowhere near a position to fuel an economic recovery.

#### Redundancy checks genetic diversity

Marxen 3 (Craig S., Associate Professor of Economics – University of Nebraska, The Independent Review, 7(3), Winter, http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir\_07\_3\_marxsen.pdf)

Carlos Davidson (2000), a biologist with an economics background, takes issue with what he perceives as Sagoff’s agnosticism concerning the existence of significant environmental destruction relevant to humankind’s well-being. He perceives that Sagoff risks overstatement of the environment’s robustness, and he argues that human activities clearly damage the environment, but not in a way that is likely to lead to catastrophe. According to Davidson, environmental damage is not so much like pulling rivets out of an airplane as it is like pulling threads out of a tapestry. The tapestry becomes more and more threadbare and damaged looking, but it never reaches some critical threshold of cataclysmic failure. The ecosystem is **brimming with redundancy**, and problems such as reductions in biodiversity do not threaten the viability of the simpler system that results. Like an old carpet, an increasingly damaged and dirty environment would show no tendency to resolve the deterioration trend catastrophically.

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Miller 00 (Morris, Economist, Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Administration – University of Ottawa, Former Executive Director and Senior Economist – World Bank, “Poverty as a Cause of Wars?”, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Winter, p. 273)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that  
exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore **no relationship** to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### History proves

Ferguson 6 (Niall, Professor of History – Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, 85(5), September / October, Lexis)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, **no** general **relationship between economics and conflict is discernible** for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some **severe economic crises were not followed by wars**.

#### Wind farms could harm critical Texas wetlands which are key to aquifer recharge

DallasNews.Com 9 (Reporter Elizabeth Souder, The Dallas Morning News, 3 June 2009, “Do Wind Turbines Hurt the Environment” <http://energyandenvironmentblog.dallasnews.com/archives/2009/06/do-wind-turbines-hurt-the-envi.html>)

Despite the attraction of wind as a nearly pollution-free power source, a Texas Tech University wildlife ecologist cautions that a tsunami of modern wind turbines dotting the South Plains of Texas could have as yet unknown ecological consequences on critical wetlands known as playas. And there are plenty of playas on the Texas High Plains and in Eastern New Mexico - approximately 22,000, in fact. Indeed, it's the largest concentration in the world. Playas act as natural water storage sites, providing irrigation water and seasonally recharging the Ogallala, the nation's largest aquifer. "We don't have any information specific to this region about the effect of wind farm construction on wildlife, and that's a problem because the Panhandle and South Plains of Texas are going to be major players in the wind industry," said David Haukos, an adjunct wildlife ecology professor in Texas Tech's Department of Natural Resources Management.

#### Ogallala decline destroys irrigated crop production, which causes farmers to switch to risky dryland crops, decimating the agricultural sector, lowering employment, and tanking the regional economy

Terrell and Johnson 99 (Bonnie L, assistant director of agricultural investments for Mutual of New York, and Phillip N, Assistant professor in the department of agricultural and applied economics, Texas Tech University, paper presented at American Agricultural Economics Association Aug 8-11 1999, “Economic Impact of the Depletion of the Ogallala Aquifer: A Case Study of the Southern High Plains of Texas, <http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/21589/1/sp99te01.pdf>)

The results of this study support the conclusion that as the saturated thickness of the Ogallala aquifer diminishes and pumping lifts of irrigation wells increase, the regional cropping patterns will begin to shift toward more dryland agriculture. As water availability decreases, fanners will reevaluate their traditional cropping patterns. When faced with reduced water availability, the results indicate that the optimal solution for producers will be to shift their focus to those crops that utilize less water during the growing season, and to adopt the most efficient irrigation technologies. Irrigated and dryland cotton were consistently the optimal choices. In comparing the net returns of all possible combinations of crops and technology, irrigated cotton surpasses all other crops. Although irrigated corn displayed high levels of gross returns, irrigation requirements and the associated costs of production caused its acreage to diminish within the region. The low profitability of irrigated and dryland grain sorghum and wheat caused these crops to decrease, although dryland wheat production increased in the latter years of the time horizon. As feed grain production declines in the SHP, the cattle feedlot sector of the regional economy may experience associated impacts. In 1997, the feedlot sector contributed approximately $2.655 billion in output value to the regional economy (Texas Agricultural Statistics Service, 1998). As production from the feed grain sector declines, this may negatively affect the cattle feeding industry in this region due to the symbiotic relationship between the two sectors. The results point to the conclusion that cotton is "king" in the SHP region and should be regarded as the crop of choice for producers. Yet, this analysis does not take into consideration the threat that boll weevil infestations present to an economy dominated by cotton production or possible changes in crop prices in the future. Recognizing these limitations, the results demonstrate important trends for the area's regional economy. Even producing at an optimal level dominated by cotton production, the contribution of agricultural production to the regional economy is reduced given a declining irrigation groundwater resource. This analysis represents a lower bound estimate in terms of the negative economic impacts resulting from the depletion of the Ogallala because of the assumption that all fanners will produce at the optimal level, which entails the willingness to make the transition to dryland farming and more efficient irrigation technology. Additionally, the optimization models are based on the assumption that as long as there is any positive net return a farmer will continue to produce, which is not necessarily the case. Not only will the sectors facing decreasing agricultural production be affected, but the economy as a whole will be affected due to the interdependence between all industries in an economy and the corresponding multiplier effects of any change within an economy. Once regional agricultural production peaks and begins to decline through diminished irrigated acreage, the entire economy would be affected. The direct effects from agricultural production will be reduced as dryland crops with their associated yields replace higher yielding irrigated crops. In turn, this reduction in the final demand within the agricultural sectors will ripple through the economy and effect virtually everyone within § Marked 08:26 § the region to some degree. This occurs through the indirect and induced effects of a change in final demand. Employment, and thus household consumption, will eventually be impacted as the regional economy dominated by agriculture begins to feel the effects of decreasing irrigated crop production.

#### Economy is resilient Behravesh 06 (Nariman, most accurate economist tracked by USA Today and chief global economist and executive vice president for Global Insight, Newsweek, “The Great Shock Absorber; Good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility have strengthened the global economy's 'immune system.'” 10-15-2006, www.newsweek.com/id/47483)

The U.S. and global economies were able to withstand three body blows in 2005--one of the worst tsunamis on record (which struck at the very end of 2004), one of the worst hurricanes on record and the highest energy prices after Hurricane Katrina--without missing a beat. This resilience was especially remarkable in the case of the United States, which since 2000 has been able to shrug off the biggest stock-market drop since the 1930s, a major terrorist attack, corporate scandals and war. Does this mean that recessions are a relic of the past? No, but recent events do suggest that the global economy's "immune system" is now strong enough to absorb shocks that 25 years ago would probably have triggered a downturn. In fact, over the past two decades, recessions have not disappeared, but have become considerably milder in many parts of the world. What explains this enhanced recession resistance? The answer: a combination of good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility. Since the mid-1980s, central banks worldwide have had great success in taming inflation. This has meant that long-term interest rates are at levels not seen in more than 40 years. A low-inflation and low-interest-rate environment is especially conducive to sustained, robust growth. Moreover, central bankers have avoided some of the policy mistakes of the earlier oil shocks (in the mid-1970s and early 1980s), during which they typically did too much too late, and exacerbated the ensuing recessions. Even more important, in recent years the Fed has been particularly adept at crisis management, aggressively cutting interest rates in response to stock-market crashes, terrorist attacks and weakness in the economy. The benign inflationary picture has also benefited from increasing competitive pressures, both worldwide (thanks to globalization and the rise of Asia as a manufacturing juggernaut) and domestically (thanks to technology and deregulation). Since the late 1970s, the United States, the United Kingdom and a handful of other countries have been especially aggressive in deregulating their financial and industrial sectors. This has greatly increased the flexibility of their economies and reduced their vulnerability to inflationary shocks. Looking ahead, what all this means is that a global or U.S. recession will likely be avoided in 2006, and probably in 2007 as well. Whether the current expansion will be able to break the record set in the 1990s for longevity will depend on the ability of central banks to keep the inflation dragon at bay and to avoid policy mistakes. The prospects look good. Inflation is likely to remain a low-level threat for some time, and Ben Bernanke, the incoming chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, spent much of his academic career studying the past mistakes of the Fed and has vowed not to repeat them. At the same time, no single shock will likely be big enough to derail the expansion. What if oil prices rise to $80 or $90 a barrel? Most estimates suggest that growth would be cut by about 1 percent--not good, but no recession. What if U.S. house prices fall by 5 percent in 2006 (an extreme assumption, given that house prices haven't fallen nationally in any given year during the past four decades)? Economic growth would slow by about 0.5 percent to 1 percent. What about another terrorist attack? Here the scenarios can be pretty scary, but an attack on the order of 9/11 or the Madrid or London bombings would probably have an even smaller impact on overall GDP growth.

### Investment

#### -- No famine – the poorest are insulated from global markets

Paarlberg 8 (Robert, Professor of Political Science – Wellesley College, “It's Not the Price that Causes Hunger”, The International Herald Tribune, 4-23, Lexis)

International prices of rice, wheat and corn have risen sharply, setting off violent urban protests in roughly a dozen countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. But is this a ''world food crisis?'' It is certainly a troubling instance of price instability in international commodity markets, leading to social unrest among urban food-buyers. But we must be careful not to equate high crop prices with hunger around the world. Most of the world's hungry people do not use international food markets, and most of those who use these markets are not hungry. International food markets, like international markets for everything else, are used primarily by the prosperous and secure, not the poor and vulnerable. In world corn markets, the biggest importer by far is Japan. Next comes the European Union. Next comes South Korea. Citizens in these countries are not underfed. In the poor countries of Asia, rice is the most important staple , yet most Asian countries import very little rice. As recently as March , India was keeping imported rice out of the country by imposing a 70 percent duty. Data on the actual incidence of malnutrition reveal that the regions of the world where people are most hungry, in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, are those that depend least on imports from the world market. Hunger is caused in these countries not by high international food prices, but by local conditions, especially rural poverty linked to low productivity in farming. When international prices are go up, the disposable income of some import-dependent urban dwellers is squeezed. But most of the actual hunger takes place in the villages and in the countryside , and it **persists even when international prices are low**. When hunger is measured as a balanced index of calorie deficiency, prevalence of underweight children and mortality rates for children under five, we find that South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa in 2007 had hunger levels two times as high as in the developing countries of East Asia, four times as high as in Latin America, North Africa or the Middle East, and five times as high as in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The poor in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are hungry even though their connections to high-priced international food markets are quite weak. In the poorest developing countries of Asia, where nearly 400 million people are hungry, international grain prices are hardly a factor, since imports supply only 4 percent of total consumption - even when world prices are low. Similarly in sub-Saharan Africa, only about 16 percent of grain supplies have recently been imported, going mostly into the more prosperous cities rather than the impoverished countryside, with part arriving in the form of donated food aid rather than commercial purchases at world prices. The region in Africa that depends on world markets most heavily is North Africa, where 50 percent of grain supplies are imported. Yet food consumption in North Africa is so high (average per capita energy consumption there is about 3,000 calories per day, comparable to most rich countries) that increased import prices may cause economic stress for urban consumers (and perhaps even street demonstrations) but little real hunger. Import dependence is also high in Latin America (50 percent for some countries) but again high world prices will not mean large numbers of hungry people, because per capita GDP in this region is five times higher than in sub-Saharan Africa. There is a severe food crisis among the poor in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, but it does not come from high world prices. Even in 2005 in sub-Saharan Africa, a year of low international crop prices, 23 out of 37 countries in the region consumed less than their nutritional requirements. Africa's food crisis grows primarily out of the low productivity, year in and year out, of the 60 percent of all Africans who plant crops and graze animals for a living. The average African smallholder farmer is a woman who has no improved seeds, no nitrogen fertilizers, no irrigation and no veterinary medicine for her animals. Her crop yields are only one third as high as in the developing countries of Asia, and her average income is only $1 a day.

#### new supplies solve

**Pelletier 12**

[ Martin Pelletier, CFA, is a portfolio manager at TriVest Wealth Counsel Ltd, 6/12/12, <http://business.financialpost.com/2012/06/12/sad-news-for-peak-oil-disciples/?__lsa=2f97124e>]

Whenever oil prices surpass US$100 per barrel, a certain group of well-known economists and investment banks re-emerge to tout their dire warnings that oil will soon top US$200 or more because of peaking oil supplies. Several bestselling books have been written warning that the world’s supply of oil has peaked and we had better prepare for the day of reckoning when there will be global shortfall of crude. I must admit the data, especially given the rapid growth in demand from emerging countries, seemed very compelling five or six years ago. So much so that even the contrarian in me capitulated and I was an active participant among those predicting a global shortage of energy. Times certainly have changed and so have I. Very few observers, if any, were able to predict the enormous impact new technologies such as horizontal multi-stage fracking would have on unlocking supplies of oil and gas once thought unrecoverable. There seems to be no shortage of news these days about the vast amounts of unconventional oil and gas being discovered in North America, Russia, China and several other countries.

#### Wind doesn’t reduce oil consumption – because wind affects electricity not transportation

#### -- Lack of infrastructure and distribution networks cause famine – not high prices

Khosla 7 (Vinod, Founder – Sun Microsystems and Khosla Ventures, “Food versus Fuel” or the “Salve for Africa”?, <http://www.khoslaventures.com/presentations/FOODvFUEL.pdf>)

Despite its misplaced pessimism about corn-ethanol, the excerpted section does note that the advent of cellulosic ethanol would mitigate the purported prices rises; as production capacity for cellulosic ethanol ramps up, it will be competitive, even without further improvements in technology. Cellulosic ethanol will act as price-ceiling on corn ethanol, much as corn ethanol can do for oil today. Nonetheless, the pessimism that the world’s poor starve because we don’t produce enough food is absurd. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) notes that there is more food per-capita today than ever before – the lack of infrastructure, income, and distribution networks are the real causes of hunger, and not corn prices (indeed, the U.S exports just 17% of its corn production, and the majority of even this exported crop is used for livestock feed). Instead of rebelling against corn ethanol, the developing world (and Africa in particular) has been pushing the western world for agricultural subsidy reductions in the West, noting that their farmers cannot compete (and earn income) against such heavily discounted products. Critics conjure up images of starving children as innocent byproducts of corn ethanol; meanwhile, the EU actually pays farmers not to grow food (and thus to reduce supply). The (subsidized) low prices of agricultural products like corn have made foreign farmers in poor countries uneconomic producers. According to the New York Times (Aug 18, 2007), “CARE, the big global charity, had decided to stop selling subsidized American farm products in poor African countries because the program was inefficient and undercut local farmers.” Corn ethanol, by helping make corn more economic to grow and hence reducing corn subsidies, is actually helping the poor.

#### Wind doesn’t solve oil prices – only affects electricity

MasterResource 12 (Letter from Glen Schleede, June 4 “Dear Senator Warner (D-Va.): PTC a Loser All Around” <http://www.masterresource.org/2012/06/dear-senator-warner-d-va-ptc/#more-20272>)

Your letter asserts, incorrectly, that “Domestically generated wind power can … [help] reduce dependence on foreign oil…” This simply isn’t true.¶ Wind turbines are built solely to produce electricity. Virtually none (about 1%) of the electricity produced in the US is produced by oil-fired generating units. Many of the units making up this small percentage are “peaking” units (turbine or internal combustion) that are used primarily on hot days when electricity demand reaches very high levels – a time when wind turbines tend to produce little or no electricity.

#### -- Market reactions solve – production will increase to meet demand

Khosla 7 (Vinod, Founder – Sun Microsystems and Khosla Ventures, “Food versus Fuel” or the “Salve for Africa”?, <http://www.khoslaventures.com/presentations/FOODvFUEL.pdf>)

Markets have **already reacted** to the higher-corn demand with increases supply, which have already dropped prices to about $3.50 per bushel. The ProExporter Network’s data shows us that while total corn demand in 2007/08 is estimated to be approximately 900 million bushels higher than 2006/07, total supply will increase by a 1.6 billion bushels (sufficient for about 4.8 billion gallons of ethanol or a big proportion of 2007 production!).12

#### -- Billions won’t die – their data is wrong

Khosla 7 (Vinod, Founder – Sun Microsystems and Khosla Ventures, “Food versus Fuel” or the “Salve for Africa”?, <http://www.khoslaventures.com/presentations/FOODvFUEL.pdf>)

Stopping bad policy is a worthwhile goal, but we should not abandon all biofuels. There is no doubt that we can produce biofuels in the right or wrong way. However, at each step, we need to evaluate the costs of biofuels vs. the long-term costs of continuing with our current path. There exists vast tracts of underutilized pastureland worldwide and good energy crop practices can improve the sustainability of farming while meeting our energy needs. Lester Brown’s assertions that food supplies are likely to be threatened by corn ethanol (800M motorists vs. 2 billion poor people) is **illogical and ill-thought out** – the data is extrapolated from corn ethanol projections (without a basic understanding that cellulosic, and not corn ethanol, is the long term future) is flawed at best. To repeat what we have cited before: taking this “logic” to Brown’s idealistic vision of wind power – it would be akin to extrapolating to “if we produced all our electricity with wind 75% of the planet would be without electricity 75% of the time (or worse!)”. Irrational, fear-mongering extrapolation of data leads to irrational results.

#### Many countries empirically deny the impact

**Impact Lab 10** (6/21, “The 2010 Failed States Index.” http://www.impactlab.com/2010/06/21/the-2010-failed-states-index/)

Given time and the right circumstances, countries do recover. Sierra Leone and Liberia, for instance, no longer rank among the top 20 failing states, and Colombia has become a stunning success story. Few remember today that the Dominican Republic once vied with its neighbor Haiti for the title of “worst [Caribbean](http://www.impactlab.com/2010/06/21/the-2010-failed-states-index/) basket case.” But the overall story of the Failed States Index is one of wearying constancy, and 2010 is proving to be no different: Crises in Guatemala, [Honduras](http://www.impactlab.com/2010/06/21/the-2010-failed-states-index/), Iran, and Nigeria — among others — threaten to push those unstable countries to the breaking point.

## 1nr v Liberty LW

### Politics

### DA Turns Case

#### Disad outweighs and turns the case iran strikes trump their advantages you know what causes state collapse? When the state gets cratered by a nuclear weapon. And the impact happens sooner, they make no timeframe claims about the state of the agricultural industry now but Romney has said that a nuclear armed iran is unacceptable and that he would immediately stong arm them upon entering office – I bet small farms do really well in a world of nuclear winter

#### Link alone turns case - Romney will roll back wind tax credits.

**The Hill**, 7/30/**2012** (Romney campaign: Let wind energy credit die this year, p. http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/241107-romney-campaign-let-wind-energy-credit-die-this-year)

Mitt Romney’s campaign said Monday that he wants longstanding tax credits that help finance wind energy projects to expire at year’s end, providing a stark political contrast with President Obama, who is pushing Congress to renew the incentive. Campaign aides confirmed that Romney wants the quick demise of the credits, which will lapse in less than six months absent congressional action, ending uncertainty about how he wants to phase out the credits.

### 2nc Uniqueness Wall

#### Obama will win the election --- Abramowitz prediction model proves. But dramatic events can still change the outcome.

**Ravi**, **9/13**/2012 (Anusha, Abramowitz Predicts 2012 Election Results, The Emory Wheel, p. http://www.emorywheel.com/abramowitz-predicts-2012-election-results/)

Alan Abramowitz, the Alben W. Barkley Professor of Political Science, has released his forecast for the outcome of the presidential election this November. Abramowitz, who has accurately predicted the popular vote winner of every presidential election since 1988, says incumbent President Barack Obama will win the election by a close margin of about 1.2 percent. Abramowitz based his forecast on statistical analysis composed of the candidate’s approval rating at the end of June, the growth of the economy and the value of the “incumbency factor,” which refers to the advantage a candidate will have simply for being the candidate that voters are familiar with. “The Democratic constituency is just larger than the Republicans’ and encompasses far more different types of people,” Abramowitz said. “Even if Romney receives the maximum turnout from white Republican voters, he won’t win.” In the past, the incumbency factor has meant more, according to Abramowitz. But more recently, the value of merely being the incumbent candidate has decreased because of the stark polarization — the division of voters into political extremes — of the American voting public. While Abramowitz has made his prediction about two months before the election takes place, he said that a very dramatic event would have to occur to change what he believes will be the outcome of the election.

#### Obama will win – Romney is not exploiting white voters.

**Cohn**, **8/8**/2012 (Nate – former Whitman debater and author of the Electionate, 90 Days Until the Election – And Obama Has the Advantage, The New Republic, p. <http://www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/105912/obama-has-the-advantage-90-days-go>)

Barack Obama has the advantage with 90 days to go until November 6, and the Romney campaign mostly has itself to blame. Four years after Obama’s decisive victory in 2008, a poor economy, dissatisfaction with the direction of the country, and mediocre approval ratings have conspired to endanger the president’s reelection chances. But a close race, which is what the polls show, is not the same as a dead heat. Romney is an imperfect candidate who has been poorly served by a strategy that has failed to contest Obama’s predictable attacks, leaving him poorly positioned heading into the conventions. Over the last four years, Obama’s coalition suffered deep enough losses to give his challenger a legitimate path to victory. But those losses were narrow and concentrated among white voters without a college degree, as Obama retains near-2008 levels of support among minorities and college-educated whites. As a wealthy former CEO of a private equity firm with an awkward cadence who could never call himself a great politican, Romney has never naturally appealed to white working class voters, and, as a result, Romney’s ability to capitalize on Obama’s biggest weakness requires him to overcome his own. With three months to go, these weaknesses are as pronounced as ever. The Obama campaign adopted a strategy to remedy their weakness among white working class voters by defining Romney as an out-of-touch, outsourcing plutocrat willing to close factories, fire workers, and avoid taxes to advance his self-interest. If the Romney campaign possessed effective tools to blunt Obama’s offensive, they weren’t properly employed. Instead, the Romney campaign inexplicably focused on attacking a well-defined incumbent president, while permitting Obama and his allies to broadcast unflattering and uncontested tales about an undefined challenger. Boston’s ill-advised strategy has endangered Romney’s chances. Romney’s unfavorable ratings remain high and he hasn’t yet consolidated the disaffected white working class voters with reservations about Obama’s performance. In Ohio—ground zero for the Obama campaign’s efforts—Romney’s numbers have plummeted to the low forties, an extremely weak showing in a must win state. Undecided voters harbor particularly unfavorable impressions of the Republican nominee. According to recent surveys, Romney’s favorables are in the teens among undecided voters, while a majority has already formulated a negative impression.

#### Obama is ahead in the approval and favorability poll.

**Cohn**, **8/8**/2012 (Nate – former Whitman debater and author of the Electionate, 90 Days Until the Election – And Obama Has the Advantage, The New Republic, p. <http://www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/105912/obama-has-the-advantage-90-days-go>)

If Romney was closer to fifty percent, he could more easily overcome these problems with undecided voters. But Obama has a consistent three-point edge in national surveys, with 47 or 48 percent of registered voters; this means that to fight to a tie, let alone to win, Romney will need to persuade the preponderance of undecided voters. And while many hold that Obama’s 47 or 48 percent approval rating suggests that a majority of voters are lined up to unconditionally select the challenger, reality is somewhat more complicated. Obama’s net approval is roughly even and a majority of voters usually say they have a favorable opinion of Obama, unlike Romney. While approval ratings are a great indicator of an incumbent’s chances, net-approval or favorability ratings also perform quite well. Once all the metrics are taken into account, it is not clear that a majority of voters are committed to voting against Obama.

### 2nc Link Wall

**Wind power could be a hot button issue in the election – conservative groups use it as a spotlight issue**

**Goldenberg 12** (Suzanne, US environment correspondent, “Conservative thinktanks step up attacks against Obama's clean energy strategy,” 5-8-12, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/08/conservative-thinktanks-obama-energy-plans>)

But conservative activists describe the ramp-up as **critical** to the effort to **defeat Obama in the elections**. "It's absolutely a campaign issue and it's a big one," said Dave Schwartz, who heads the Maryland chapter of Americans for Prosperity, a tea party group with Koch funds. "It absolutely is a contentious issue," he said. Kert Davies, Greenpeace research director, agrees. "They are going back to the states to create the space for an anti-Obama, anti-green energy thing. It is really a **political attack,**" he said. " What the right wing wants to perpetuate is that this is a type of energy that never works and requires massive government handouts." More than 30 local wind farm opponents, all selected by Droz, came to Washington at his invitation. Participants included members of conservative groups such as Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow and Tea Party Patriots. A number said they had come to DC for strategy tips and PR advice. Three used the same phraseology as Droz who said the decision to meet and pool strategies was to avoid having to continually "reinvent the wheel". "Everybody is amateur and everybody is learning from the ground up and re-inventing the wheel and the discussion among some of us was as to whether or not we could be a little more efficient and share resources and information," said Carolyn Gerwin an attorney and Tea Party activist from Pontiac Illinois who was among the participants. Gerwin has been active in both Illinois Wind Watch and the Tea Party Patriots, and lobbied against wind energy at the state and federal level, her sign-in questionnaire for the February meeting said. "I'd like to see us develop a **nationwide network** of wind warriors that can be mobilised on very short notice," she wrote in a questionnaire distributed to participants. There is evidence that network is already coming into being. Since the meeting, participants have pooled efforts to make phone calls and send email to **members of Congress.** Opposing Obama's energy policies was a natural fit for conservatives, said Marita Noon, a conservative activist from New Mexico who was at the meeting. "The American way, what made CostCo and Walmart a success, is to use more and pay less. That's the American way," The president's green policies however were the reverse, she said. "President Obama wants us to pay more and use less." That set the stage for a **confrontation** over wind farms and other clean energy issues in the elections, Noon argued. "I would say it's almost the issue," she said. "It's **going to be huge**."

#### No more bipartisan support for PTC

Styles 8/2 (Geoffrey, 8/2/12, Managing Director of GSW Strategy Group, LLC, an energy and environmental strategy consulting firm, MBA w/ BS in Chemical Engineering, “Last Hurrah for the Wind Power Tax Credit?” The Energy Collective, <http://theenergycollective.com/geoffrey-styles/99336/last-hurrah-wind-power-tax-credit?ref=popular_posts>)

Ahead of Thursday's meeting of the Senate Finance Committee, a bipartisan deal has apparently omitted the expiring production tax credit (PTC) for wind power from a package of "tax extenders"--various expiring federal tax provisions, including the annual "patch" for the Alternative Minimum Tax. This development might surprise some of the industry's supporters, but the politics of wind have changed since I last examined this issue in February. A measure that once enjoyed solid bi-partisan support is now caught between two presidential campaigns that hold diametrically opposed views on its fate.

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#### Offshore unpopularity in great lakes region underscores massive unpopularity nationwide

McDermott 10 (June 2, 2010 Mac, New York University's Center for Global Affairs Masters in Environment and Energy Policy, Editor, Treehugger, “Great Lakes Offshore Wind Farms Already Face NIMBY Opposition, Just Like Those in Saltwater” <http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/great-lakes-offshore-wind-farms-already-face-nimby-opposition-just-like-those-in-saltwater.html>)

Developing offshore wind farms on the Great Lakes has been touted as an overlooked resource in a number of studies and indeed a few projects are in the planning stages. Which, seemingly on cue, has aroused opposition to them on the usual grounds, as the Detroit News reports: A Canadian company's plan to place hundreds of wind turbines in Lake St. Clair and Lake Erie has more than a few people on both sides of the border up in arms. Lynn Kotwicki is one of them. The Royal Oak resident has raced sailboats on Lake St. Clair for years and can't understand why anyone would think it was the right place to generate electricity from wind. "We've had three races canceled in the last 10 days," she said. "And each time, it was because there was no wind." The article goes on to describe the various groups opposed to putting wind turbines in the Great Lakes and their arguments against them. All are the usual suspects, with concerns about property values declining for those in sight of the turbines at the top of the list. "It's frustrating--you pay a premium for the land because it sits on the water and then you pay those taxes each year," said [Jennifer Hoover]..."And they can just come in and, on their own whim, decide to throw 50 windmills out in front of our homes." We've all heard this one before with both onshore and offshore wind farms. Thought putting offshore wind farms in the Great Lake would be easier than anywhere else? Nope.

### Winners Win

#### PTC is extremely controversial

Politico 7/31/12 (“Mitt Romney would blow off Wind Tax Credit” Andrew Restuccia <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/79227.html?hp=r8>)

Democrats pounced and fiscal conservatives voiced praise over Mitt Romney’s strongest statement yet that he would allow a key wind energy tax credit to expire at the end of the year. The news made waves Tuesday in Iowa — a state President Barack Obama carried in 2008 — with The Des Moines Register featuring a story on the candidates’ divide over the wind production tax credit on the front page. The Obama campaign is using Monday’s campaign announcement to bolster its long-standing claim that the GOP presidential candidate will put fossil fuels above renewables. “By opposing an extension to the wind production tax credit, Mitt Romney has come out against growth of the wind industry to support 100,000 jobs by 2016 and 500,000 jobs by 2030,” Obama campaign spokesman Adam Fetcher said in a statement, pointing to job estimates touted by the American Wind Energy Association, the wind industry’s lobbying group. “Meanwhile, he supports $4 billion in oil and gas subsidies for companies that have rarely been more profitable.” But Romney won praise from conservative groups. “Gov. Romney is absolutely correct to oppose an extension of the tax credit for wind production,” Club for Growth President Chris Chocola said in a statement. “Subsidies for the energy industry distort the marketplace and are simply bad policy. If a market exists for wind production, the private sector will create it, not government.” Americans for Tax Reform also applauded the decision.

#### Controversial wins bleed momentum not build it.

**Politico**, 1/20/**2010** (Obama's first year: What went wrong, p. http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=4DF829C9-18FE-70B2-A8381A971FA3FFC9)

Obama believed that early success would be self-reinforcing, building a powerful momentum for bold government action. This belief was the essence of the White House’s theory of the “big bang” — that success in passing a big stimulus package would lead to success in passing health care, which in turn would clear the way for major cap-and-trade environmental legislation and “re-regulation” of the financial services sector — all in the first year. This proved to be a radical misreading of the dynamics of power. The massive cost of the stimulus package and industry bailouts — combined with the inconvenient fact that unemployment went up after their passage — meant that Obama spent the year bleeding momentum rather than steadily increasing public confidence in his larger governing vision. That vision was further obscured for many Americans by the smoke from the bitter and seemingly endless legislative battle on Capitol Hill over health care.

### Econ

### Texas

#### Wind farms could harm critical Texas wetlands which are key to aquifer recharge

DallasNews.Com 9 (Reporter Elizabeth Souder, The Dallas Morning News, 3 June 2009, “Do Wind Turbines Hurt the Environment” <http://energyandenvironmentblog.dallasnews.com/archives/2009/06/do-wind-turbines-hurt-the-envi.html>)

Despite the attraction of wind as a nearly pollution-free power source, a Texas Tech University wildlife ecologist cautions that a tsunami of modern wind turbines dotting the South Plains of Texas could have as yet unknown ecological consequences on critical wetlands known as playas. And there are plenty of playas on the Texas High Plains and in Eastern New Mexico - approximately 22,000, in fact. Indeed, it's the largest concentration in the world. Playas act as natural water storage sites, providing irrigation water and seasonally recharging the Ogallala, the nation's largest aquifer. "We don't have any information specific to this region about the effect of wind farm construction on wildlife, and that's a problem because the Panhandle and South Plains of Texas are going to be major players in the wind industry," said David Haukos, an adjunct wildlife ecology professor in Texas Tech's Department of Natural Resources Management.

#### Ogallala decline destroys irrigated crop production, which causes farmers to switch to risky dryland crops, decimating the agricultural sector, lowering employment, and tanking the regional economy

Terrell and Johnson 99 (Bonnie L, assistant director of agricultural investments for Mutual of New York, and Phillip N, Assistant professor in the department of agricultural and applied economics, Texas Tech University, paper presented at American Agricultural Economics Association Aug 8-11 1999, “Economic Impact of the Depletion of the Ogallala Aquifer: A Case Study of the Southern High Plains of Texas, <http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/21589/1/sp99te01.pdf>)

The results of this study support the conclusion that as the saturated thickness of the Ogallala aquifer diminishes and pumping lifts of irrigation wells increase, the regional cropping patterns will begin to shift toward more dryland agriculture. As water availability decreases, fanners will reevaluate their traditional cropping patterns. When faced with reduced water availability, the results indicate that the optimal solution for producers will be to shift their focus to those crops that utilize less water during the growing season, and to adopt the most efficient irrigation technologies. Irrigated and dryland cotton were consistently the optimal choices. In comparing the net returns of all possible combinations of crops and technology, irrigated cotton surpasses all other crops. Although irrigated corn displayed high levels of gross returns, irrigation requirements and the associated costs of production caused its acreage to diminish within the region. The low profitability of irrigated and dryland grain sorghum and wheat caused these crops to decrease, although dryland wheat production increased in the latter years of the time horizon. As feed grain production declines in the SHP, the cattle feedlot sector of the regional economy may experience associated impacts. In 1997, the feedlot sector contributed approximately $2.655 billion in output value to the regional economy (Texas Agricultural Statistics Service, 1998). As production from the feed grain sector declines, this may negatively affect the cattle feeding industry in this region due to the symbiotic relationship between the two sectors. The results point to the conclusion that cotton is "king" in the SHP region and should be regarded as the crop of choice for producers. Yet, this analysis does not take into consideration the threat that boll weevil infestations present to an economy dominated by cotton production or possible changes in crop prices in the future. Recognizing these limitations, the results demonstrate important trends for the area's regional economy. Even producing at an optimal level dominated by cotton production, the contribution of agricultural production to the regional economy is reduced given a declining irrigation groundwater resource. This analysis represents a lower bound estimate in terms of the negative economic impacts resulting from the depletion of the Ogallala because of the assumption that all fanners will produce at the optimal level, which entails the willingness to make the transition to dryland farming and more efficient irrigation technology. Additionally, the optimization models are based on the assumption that as long as there is any positive net return a farmer will continue to produce, which is not necessarily the case. Not only will the sectors facing decreasing agricultural production be affected, but the economy as a whole will be affected due to the interdependence between all industries in an economy and the corresponding multiplier effects of any change within an economy. Once regional agricultural production peaks and begins to decline through diminished irrigated acreage, the entire economy would be affected. The direct effects from agricultural production will be reduced as dryland crops with their associated yields replace higher yielding irrigated crops. In turn, this reduction in the final demand within the agricultural sectors will ripple through the economy and effect virtually everyone within § Marked 08:26 § the region to some degree. This occurs through the indirect and induced effects of a change in final demand. Employment, and thus household consumption, will eventually be impacted as the regional economy dominated by agriculture begins to feel the effects of decreasing irrigated crop production.

### Wind Tanks Jobs

#### Wind destroys jobs which flips both internal links because it hurts the initial sector – driessen says that wind destroys jobs almost 2 to 1 – they say they solve short term jobs but shortterm they cause a DECLINE of 50% of jobs in the industry – tanks the advantage

#### Wind jobs cost $46,000 each

Bryce 12 (Robert, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, “Windy Disinformation”, <http://www.robertbryce.com/articles/461-windy-disinformation.html>, og)

A final point: Toward the end of his piece, Mr. Glotfelty says that the wind-energy sector is “providing much-needed jobs for American workers.” That may be true, but just how much are those jobs costing? I did a recent analysis for the Manhattan Institute that looked at the cost of tax preferences given to the oil-and-gas industry, and compared them with the ones given to the wind industry. The result: Each wind-energy-related job costs taxpayers between 9 and 39 times as much as a job created by the oil-and-gas sector. Each job in the wind sector costs taxpayers as much as $46,600. And that figure doesn’t count any of the $3.25 billion in tax-free grants that were given to the wind sector by the Treasury Department under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.

### Alt Causes

There are SIX alt causes to the aff that they don’t cause which thumps any chance of aff solvency

Eurozone which is inevitably going to break up – liquidation only slows it down – the aff only reads one card on this and that just says that Germany is going to try to help but our ev assumes this and we have five more that they concede they don’t solve in cross-x

anemic US growth, the expected rating downgrade, a hard landing in china, emerging countries export weakness, and ineffective government – if they don’t solve EVERY ONE OF THESE then they cant solve any of the aff and you cant vote on this

Roubini is a highly qualified professor and researcher in economics, not one of their random wind hacks – he doesn’t serve to benefit

### diversity

#### Redundancy checks genetic diversity

Marxen 3 (Craig S., Associate Professor of Economics – University of Nebraska, The Independent Review, 7(3), Winter, http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir\_07\_3\_marxsen.pdf)

Carlos Davidson (2000), a biologist with an economics background, takes issue with what he perceives as Sagoff’s agnosticism concerning the existence of significant environmental destruction relevant to humankind’s well-being. He perceives that Sagoff risks overstatement of the environment’s robustness, and he argues that human activities clearly damage the environment, but not in a way that is likely to lead to catastrophe. According to Davidson, environmental damage is not so much like pulling rivets out of an airplane as it is like pulling threads out of a tapestry. The tapestry becomes more and more threadbare and damaged looking, but it never reaches some critical threshold of cataclysmic failure. The ecosystem is **brimming with redundancy**, and problems such as reductions in biodiversity do not threaten the viability of the simpler system that results. Like an old carpet, an increasingly damaged and dirty environment would show no tendency to resolve the deterioration trend catastrophically.

### Rising Powers Challenge

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Miller 00 (Morris, Economist, Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Administration – University of Ottawa, Former Executive Director and Senior Economist – World Bank, “Poverty as a Cause of Wars?”, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Winter, p. 273)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that  
exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore **no relationship** to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

## 1nc v Kentucky GS

### 1nc

#### A. Interpretation – a topical aff must reduce barriers that limit the quantity of extracted or capture energy.

#### Restrictions must change “quantity” of energy production, not “quality”

Browne 53 (Gerald Peter, “The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the Distribution of Legislative Powers in the British North America Act, 1867,” University of British Columbia, October, p. 54-57, https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/40650/UBC\_1953\_A8%20B8%20J8.pdf?sequence=1)

If the argument based on the concluding words of 91 can be fairly successfully engaged, however, it is not so easy to counter the other argument based on the introductory words to that section. The main criticism of this argument is that it fails to give due weight to the expression, "but not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing terms of this section." By establishing the paramountcy of the enumerations of 91 over section 92, it is contended, the Judicial Committee not only disregarded this expression but actually introduced the very restriction it specifically forbids. At first glance this contention might seem of some validity but deeper consideration reveals its fallacy. For, to begin with, it will be noticed that the word "restrict" is ambiguous and is in fact capable of two quite different interpretations, each of which would affect the meaning of the expression in a quite different way. If, for instance, a restriction in what might be termed "quality" is meant--if, in other words, the idea that the enumerations of 91 are not to be considered as of greater weight than "peace, order, and good government"--then the three compartment scheme definitely violates this expression. If, on the other hand, the restriction is one of "quantity"--if, in other words, the idea is that enumerations of 91 are not to be considered as comprising all the power of the federal parliament which, in addition to the enumerated powers, also has a general residuary power--then no violation at all is involved by declaring the enumerations of 91 supplement rather than illustrate the scope of "peace, order, and good government." The question revolves, then, about the meaning of the word "restrict"--and here is where the phrase "in relation to all matters not coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces," as well as the word "exclusively," must be introduced into the controversy. For if the word "restrict" is defined in the first manner, that is, so as to make the enumerations of 91 merely illustrate the scope of "peace, order, and good government," the non obstante clause would immediately hurdle backwards over the semi-colo and would thus establish the paramountcy of "peace, order, and good government," as well as the enumeration of 91, over section 92. That in turn, however, would involve a plain and inevitable violation of the limitation place on these general power by the word "exclusively" and the phrase, "in relation to all matters not coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces." If, on the other hand, the second meaning of the word "restrict" is adopted--if, that is, the enumerations of 91 are held to supplement the scope of "peace, order, and good government"--no such violation would result. The two phrases, "but not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing terms of this section" and "in relation to all matters not coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces," as well as the word "exclusively," can all thus exist quite happily side by side, with no violation or contradiction whatsoever. For this reason, it will be apparent that the word "restrict" simply must be interpreted as a limitation in "quantity" rather in "quality," that enumerations of 91 must be admitted to supplement that that illustrate the scope of "peace, order, and good government," that the three-compartment scheme must be supported, and the foundation of which the Judicial Committee has based its interpretation of the distribution of legislative powers in Canada's constitution must be acknowledge not merely as a sound but, from a legal point of view, as the only possible foundation that can exist without a direction violation of the express and clear words used in the British North America Act. Legally, the Judicial Committee's interpretation is correct.

#### “On” requires direct relation

Dictionary.com (“On,” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/on)

on   [on, awn] Show IPA

preposition

1. so as to be or remain supported by or suspended from: Put your package down on the table; Hang your coat on the hook.

2. so as to be attached to or unified with: Hang the picture on the wall. Paste the label on the package.

#### Energy production is extraction or capture for consumption

DOCC 8 (Australian Government’s Department of Climate Change, “National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Guidelines,” http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/publications/greenhouse-report/nger-reporting-guidelines.ashx)

Energy Production

‘Energy production’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Production of energy, in relation to a facility, means any one of the following:

a. the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources for final consumption by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in operation of the facility; 11

b. the manufacture of energy by the conversion of energy from one form to another form for final consumption by

or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in the operation of the facility.

Energy consumption

‘Energy consumption’ is defined in r. 2.23:

Consumption of energy, in relation to a facility, means the use or disposal of energy from the operation of the

facility including own-use and losses in extraction, production and transmission.

#### Must be on the energy producer

Words and Phrases 88 (Volume 4, p. 90)

It is, in my judgment, important to bear in mind that it is not strictly accurate to speak of restrictions affecting or imposed on property. It is the owner of the hereditament who is restricted---restricted, that is, in his freedom to use it as he likes. Some of the restrictions on him are of a perfectly general character. For instance, the owner of a house may not use it for an immoral purpose, nor so as to create a public or private nuisance; he may not contravene local by-laws in regard to building operations; he may not use it for harboring the King’s enemies or fugitive criminals. That is the first class of restrictions. This class…would include a prescribed building line, a requisitioning order, and similar statutory or departmental restrictions directed against the property itself or the owner of it in particular

#### B. Violation – the plan removes restrictions on financial incentives on oil and natural gas – this is not a direct restriction on the energy producer – it’s a restriction on the consumer – this is cross-x, the restriction is not on the ENERGY it’s on the INVESTOR

#### Prefer it –

#### Limits – there are tons of tiny financial burdens that change the quality of energy production – anything that makes any one of the energy sources economically viable is a restriction – that explodes the case list.

#### Effects – allowing for tiny changes that COULD affect energy production makes it impossible to predict what affs will be read because anything related to energy production functionally becomes topical. Limiting the aff to directly causal restrictions creates a fair division of ground and puts the neg on equal footing.

#### Err neg – “restrictions” is already hard to define, the financial incentive part of the topic is huge, and bidirectionality gives the aff strategic advantages. First and last speech plus infinite prep means limiting aff mechanism is the only remedy.

### 1nc

#### Obama will win --- a consensus of polls and forecasts prove.

**Silver**, **9/20**/2012 (Nate, Sept. 19: A Wild Day in the Polls, but Obama Ends Up Ahead, Five Thirty Eight, New York Times, p. <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/sept-19-a-wild-day-in-the-polls-but-obama-ends-up-ahead/#h>[])

There are also going to be some outliers — sometimes because of unavoidable statistical variance, sometimes because the polling company has a partisan bias, sometimes because it just doesn’t know what it’s doing. (And sometimes: because of all of the above.) By the end of Wednesday, however, it was clear that the preponderance of the evidence favored Mr. Obama. He got strong polls in Ohio, Florida, Michigan, Wisconsin and Virginia, all from credible pollsters. Mr. Obama, who had been slipping in our forecast recently, rebounded to a 75.2 percent chance of winning the Electoral College, up from 72.9 percent on Tuesday. The most unambiguously bearish sign for Mr. Romney are the poor polls he has been getting in swing states from pollsters that use a thorough methodology and include cellphones in their samples. There have been 16 such polls published in the top 10 tipping point states since the Democratic convention ended, all conducted among likely voters. Mr. Obama has held the lead in all 16 of these polls. With the exception of two polls in Colorado — where Mr. Obama’s polling has been quite middling recently — all put him ahead by at least four points. On average, he led by 5.8 percentage points between these 16 surveys. If this is what the post-convention landscape looks like, then Mr. Romney is in a great deal of trouble. Perhaps these polls imply that Mr. Obama’s lead is somewhere in the range of five percentage points in the popular vote — national polls suggest that it’s a bit less than that, but state polls provide useful information about the national landscape. Or perhaps they imply that Mr. Obama is overperforming slightly in the swing states. Either way, that’s a pretty big deficit for Mr. Romney to overcome. What’s more, Mr. Obama was at 49.4 percent of the vote on average between these 16 surveys, meaning that he’d need to capture only a tiny sliver of the undecided vote to get to an outright majority. (If we’re being technical, 49.4 percent might be sufficient for him to win these states on its own, since perhaps 1 or 2 percent of the vote will go to third-party candidates.) To be clear: I do not recommend that this is the only data you look at. The forecast model also evaluates polls that exclude cellphones, although it gives them slightly less weight. Those have not necessarily shown a great deal of strength for Mr. Obama. And just as the model looks at state polls to infer the national trend, it also does the reverse, using the national polls (and essentially the assumption of ”uniform swing”) to infer where the states stand. The national polls show a spread right now from an effective tie to an eight-point lead for Mr. Obama. Taken as a whole, they seem to imply more like a three or four point lead for Mr. Obama rather than something in the range of five points. (These distinctions really do make a difference, especially with so few undecided voters left.) The other questions, of course, are whether Mr. Obama’s bounce is fading, and if it might fade further. His FiveThirtyEight forecast remains off its high of about an 80 percent chance of victory, that he achieved late last week.

#### Permitting Chinese foreign investment in domestic energy supplies sparks a HUGE public backlash – SNOOC controversy proves

Burke 11 (John, Analyst @ BakerHostetler, "The United States Welcomes Chinese Foreign Direct Investment - The Handful of Deals Blocked by CFIUS are Aberrant," http://www.chinaustradelawblog.com/2011/02/articles/investment/the-united-states-welcomes-chinese-foreign-direct-investment-the-handful-of-deals-blocked-by-cfius-are-aberrant/)

The President of the United States may order the divestment of a foreigner’s controlling interest in a U.S. business should he determine that such control threatens U.S. “national security.” The CFIUS review system works through voluntary filings by those parties to proposed transactions who seek to take advantage of the safe harbor that a CFIUS approval prior to an acquisition provides. The safe harbor prevents the President from undoing the deal pursuant to his authority under FINSA.¶ The CFIUS process is disciplined by the authority FINSA provides CFIUS to self-initiate a review as to whether any “covered transaction” threatens U.S. national security at any time. That authority is seldom used, but its existence means that foreign acquirers should give serious consideration to voluntary CFIUS filings before any national security questions may be asked.¶ For most companies, CFIUS review takes only thirty days. By seeking it voluntarily before the acquisition is consummated, the foreign acquirer can obtain assurance that its investment would not be destroyed by a CFIUS review, perhaps years after the acquisition. For a small number of companies, CFIUS review may become an additional forty-five day in-depth investigation. Even at this stage, however, most acquisitions are approved, although often with conditions.¶ A handful of Chinese acquisitions of existing U.S. businesses have been stopped either as a result of the CFIUS review process, or as a result of intense political opposition. However, in each of those cases, circumstances unique to the particular transaction, and not any hostility to Chinese investment in general, are what caused the transaction to fail. For example, when Northwest Non Ferrous International Investment Co., Ltd. dropped its plans to acquire a Nevada mining company, the reason for the unfavorable CFIUS review was the extremely sensitive nature of U.S. military installations that were adjacent to the mines to be acquired. (See The United States Remains Open To Chinese Investment). Had those mines been located elsewhere, the acquisition likely would have sailed through with little opposition. There was no objection to Chinese acquisition of gold mines. The objection was to the proximity to military installations.¶ Another deal effectively blocked by a CFIUS review was the proposed acquisition in 2007 by Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. (“Huawei”) of a significant ownership stake in 3Com Corporation. Two major concerns reportedly led CFIUS agencies to oppose the deal. The first was the inclusion in the deal of 3Com’s subsidiary Tipping Point, which sells network-based intrusion prevention equipment used by the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence agencies. The second was specific to Huawei. There were allegations in the press that Huawei had engaged in corporate espionage and intellectual property theft and was involved in high tech exports to Saddam Hussein’s regime and the Taliban. The combination of mission critical U.S. military technology and an acquirer with a particularly bad reputation from the perspective of U.S. national security interests caused that deal to fail, not any general opposition to Chinese companies acquiring specific U.S. businesses.¶ China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (“CNOOC”) attempted acquisition in 2005 of Unocal, a U.S. energy company, was halted by congressional and public opposition before it could undergo a CFIUS review. That opposition arose because of concerns that critical energy supplies would pass out of US control. The fact that CNOOC is a Chinese state-owned enterprise did heighten those concerns. But it was the concern over access to critical energy supplies, and not anti-Chinese animus, that drove the opposition to that deal. Very few businesses that Chinese companies may seek to acquire will present these types of concerns. And, in hindsight, many observers think that, had CNOOC not pulled out, CFIUS would have approved. Unfortunately, CNOOC did not stay involved long enough to find out.

#### Obama reelection maintains the US/Russian reset --- Romney will collapse relations

**Weir**, 3/27/**2012** (Fred, Obama asks Russia to cut him slack until reelection, Minnesota Post, p. <http://www.minnpost.com/christian-science-monitor/2012/03/obama-asks-russia-cut-him-slack-until-reelection>)

Russian experts say there's little doubt the Kremlin would like to see Obama re-elected. Official Moscow has been pleased by Obama's policy of "resetting" relations between Russia and the US, which resulted in the new START treaty and other cooperation breakthroughs after years of diplomatic chill while George W. Bush was president. The Russian media often covers Obama's lineup of Republican presidential challengers in tones of horror, and there seems to be a consensus among Russian pundits that a Republican president would put a quick end to the Obama-era thaw in relations. "The Republicans are active critics of Russia, and they are extremely negative toward Putin and his return to the presidency," says Dmitry Babich, a political columnist with the official RIA-Novosti news agency. "Democrats are perceived as more easygoing, more positive toward Russia and Putin." Speaking on the record in Seoul, Mr. Medvedev said the years since Obama came to power "were the best three years in the past decade of Russia-US relations.… I hope this mode of relations will maintain between the Russian Federation and the United States and between the leaders." During Putin's own election campaign, which produced a troubled victory earlier this month, he played heavily on anti-Western themes, including what he described as the US drive to attain "absolute invulnerability" at the expense of everyone else. But many Russian experts say that was mostly election rhetoric, and that in office Putin will seek greater cooperation and normal relations with the West. "Russian society is more anti-American than its leaders are," says Pavel Zolotaryov, deputy director of the official Institute of USA-Canada Studies in Moscow. "Leaders have to take popular moods into account. But it's an objective fact that the US and Russia have more points in common than they have serious differences. If Obama wins the election, it seems likely the reset will continue."

#### US/Russian relations prevent nuclear war

**Elliott**, 5/15/**1995** (Michael, Why Russia Still Matters to America, Newsweek, p. lexis)

"Russia," says Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "is a big country." That it is; lop off the newly independent states born within the old Soviet husk and you've still got a lot left -- a highly educated work force sitting on top of some of the globe's most valuable resources. True, much of that vast territory has an awful climate (climate matters-for different reasons than Russia's, it explains why Australia will never be a great power). But unlike India and China, two other "giant" states, Russia will be able to husband its vast resources without the additional strain of feeding -- and employing-more than a billion souls. It also, of course, is the only country that can launch a **devastating nuclear attack** on the United States. That kind of power demands respect. And sensitive handling. Stephen Sestanovich, head Russia watcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, argues that present U.S. policy is geared too much to "dismantling Russian military might" -- a policy that, since it breeds Russian resentment of Western meddling, is self-defeating. "We have to reorient Russian power," says Sestanovich, "not eliminate it. Because we can't eliminate it." Indeed, Washington should prefer a strong Russia. A Russia so weak, for example, that it could not resist a Chinese land grab of its Far East **without resorting to nuclear weapons** is a 21st-century nightmare. **All this implies a close U.S. -- Russian relationship** stretching into the future. American officials say it will be a "pragmatic" one, recognizing that Russian and U.S. national interests will sometimes collide. The danger, for the United States, is that a pragmatic relationship could be dominated by security issues. In Western Europe, some futurists say that in the coming decades Russia will talk to the United States about nuclear weapons but to the European Union about everything else-trade, economic development and the rest.

### 1nc

#### CP Text: The United States Federal Government should exclude crude oil production from Exon-Florio reviews.

#### Solves case – no reason oil alone is less sufficient - still sends a signal to solve both advantages

#### Natural gas prices will rise – supply decreasing

Finger 12 (Richard, Forbes Contributor, “We're Headed To $8 Natural Gas,” 7-22-12,

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardfinger/2012/07/22/were-headed-to-8-00-natural-gas/>)

The British Thermal Unit (btu) equivalent of one barrel of oil equals six thousand cubic feet of natural gas. Therefore if gas at $3.00 per mcf were to be at energy parity with oil, then oil would sell for $18.00. But WTI sells at $90 bbl. So gas must get more expensive or oil will get cheaper. As the gas rig count dwindles and evidence mounts that at least some of the shale plays are depleting much faster than projected, the result has been the aforementioned much lower than normal stockpile injection rates. With the disparity between oil and gas prices at such extremes, all available capital will continue to flow into drilling for gas liquids and oil. Some of the remaining dry gas drilling is probably just to maintain lease rights. Newton’s 3rd Law of Thermodynamics says for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Natural Gas at $13.28 is too high and the April price of $1.89 is too low. The rubber band is becoming stretched in the direction of tight supply. It’s too cheap to drill for, so supplies will further dwindle until inexorably the shortage occurs and prices spike irrationally higher. That time is sooner than later. We had an abnormally warm 2011-12 winter season in the US which sank home heating gas demand to extremely low levels. Was it because of an El Nino effect or did global warming play the pivotal role? Or, most likely, it is a confluence of several factors. Whatever the cause, the jet streams carrying the traditional cold temperatures and accompanying snowstorms didn’t reach south as far and as often as usual. Conversely, Europe had an abnormally cold winter last season suggested causes being the abstruse North Atlantic Oscillation Index, low solar activity and attendant low sunspot numbers and associated solar magnetic flux. You understand, right. Natural Gas prices have spent all of 2012 below $3.00. Just the past three trading days, perhaps starting to reflect the fundamentals discussed herein, have seen spot prices nudge above the $3.00 level. So combine 13 year low gas rig counts, declining production levels with resultant ultralow storage injections, shut in gas production, faster than anticipated shale well declines, persistent switching from oil and coal to cheaper and cleaner gas alternatives…..Then consider unending hotter than normal summer temperatures, continued greater than normal nuclear plant outages, a hurricane or two that knocks out Gulf of Mexico natural gas production for a week or two, and a La Nina induced cold winter…….any one of these can light the fuse that pushes the tenuous supply/demand balance into cardiac arrest. That’s the chain and it’s going to lead us to $8.00 mcf natural gas by the approaching winter.

#### The aff causes sustained low prices

Ryan 12 (Sebastian, Property Mentor Group, “Low Natural Gas Prices Hurting The Independent Oil And Gas Industry,” 8-7-12, <http://www.propertymentorgroup.com/low-natural-gas-prices-hurting-the-independent-oil-and-gas-industry-atpg-gsx-fst-sm-kwk/121294/>)

Low natural gas prices and a weak global economy have weighed on the independent oil and gas industry and companies such as Chesapeake Energy Corporation (NYSE:CHK) and Noble Corporation (NYSE:NE). Excessive supply has dogged natural gas prices for much of 2012, and could keep doing so if demand does not rises. Many industry players have reported less than stellar numbers recently, which reflects the difficult times. Noble Energy in its latest quarter managed to increase its GAAP sales year-over-year while GAAP earnings per share contracted by 2.5%. Cheniere Energy, Inc. (AMEX:LNG) recently said it has received funds for a liquefied natural gas export plant in the state of Louisiana. The facility is estimated to be able to export more than 1 billion cubic feet per day before the end of 2015. Among decliners, ATP Oil & Gas Corporation (NASDAQ:ATPG) has been one of the worst performers in 2012 with a year-to-date performance of -80.03%. The stock, as of last close, traded 35.60% up from its 52 week low and was 89.85% behind its 52 week high. Its latest closing price was -77.50% down from the SMA200 while the distance from SMA 50 and SMA 20 was -60.12% and -39.52% respectively. ATPG engages in the acquisition, development, and production of oil and natural gas properties primarily in the Gulf of Mexico and the United Kingdom sector of the North Sea. Another worst performing stock Gasco Energy Inc (NYSE:GSX) operates as a natural gas and petroleum exploitation, development, and production company in the United States. Gasco Energy Inc has a performance down -47.83%. Its price, as of the latest close, was up 20.00% compared with the 52 week low and was 63.64% below the 52 week high.

#### Low natural gas prices kill Solar PV

Desmond 12 (James Christopher, Attorney at Law in Savannah, GA, J.D. at State University of New York at Buffalo - Law School, “Solar Economics & Politics In Real Time,” *Free Market Solar Power*, 8-22-12, <https://sites.google.com/site/freemarketsolarpower/home>)

Executive Summary: In the face of uncertainty over America's energy future and electricity prices (see also this), this "web-book" discusses grid-tied, Solar Photovoltaic (PV) power in consumer-economic terms, and whether it makes sense to subsidize it with tax- and rate-payer money. The discussion pivots on this point: Small-scale PV is still too expensive to make it in the free market without subsidies. And, as this article illuminates, those subsidies ("From 2007 to 2010, federal subsidies jumped to $14.7 billion from $5.1 billion"), are drying up. See also this piece on the debatable impact of subsidies. But are they a good idea in the first place? Many still advocate them in light of long-standing "brown power subsidies" (250 kinds, in fact, also click here, here, and here) and subsidies drove most of the 2011 solar market gains, totalling 1,855 megawatts (MW) of photovoltaic (PV) capacity for 2011 -- a year that set a record $257 billion in renewables investment. But they also, predictably, helped engender a projected industry-collapse and thus, as noted by the WSJ, "dark times." Helped because there are other causes, including cheap gas-powered electricity -- which perhaps will be Solar PV's the biggest nemesis (money quote: "Natural-gas-fired electricity now costs about 84 percent less than solar, and it cuts carbon-dioxide emissions compared to conventional coal by 30 percent to 50 percent"), and it looks like cheap natural gas will be here for a while (see also this analysis, as well as this, plus this piece, showing how it all affects the state of Georgia's "electricity politics").

#### Creates vulnerability to terrorism and natural disasters

Desmond 12 (James Christopher, Attorney at Law in Savannah, GA, J.D. at State University of New York at Buffalo - Law School, “Solar Economics & Politics In Real Time,” *Free Market Solar Power*, 8-22-12, <https://sites.google.com/site/freemarketsolarpower/home>)

Why residential Solar PV instead of those massive, utility-scale or even world-scale PV systems that you read about? Because distributed energy generation, in contrast to centralized, utility-scale energy generation, breeds unique benefits: \* It enables distributed energy independence (my refrigerated food won't spoil when the utility company's grid fails). "Distributed" means spread among individual owners (Joe), not monopolistic, concentrated wealth entities that can cop billions in subsidies and spread lobbying cash to politicians who give them turf-protecting legislation. \* It fosters distributed, cross-pollinating intelligence and upward-cascading technological enhancements: Billions of PC users were free to, and in fact developed, countless software/hardware innovations because no central source prevented smart users from innovating/improving PCs, which brought us $500 Billion in prosperity. The same phenomenon will accelerate higher-efficiency innovations with Solar PVs. Once "arrayed," 100 million "Joe Six Packs" will all be financially incentivized to relentlessly tweak their solar arrays to eke even more wealth out of them, especially if reverse-meter rates (more on that below) are kept competitive. Just look at the impact of just one fairly simple re-design of a wood stove will have on 3 billion people. Recall how splendidly fast PCs (and now i-Pads and other "i-minis") developed with hundreds of millions of users using/studying/tweaking them and their counterpart, the internet (just one example: over 350,000 apps written for the i-Phone, which has only existed since 2007). \* As will be further detailed below, it will harmoniously blend with existing utility grids because the average user will want to erect only enough of an array to cover his home's typical power needs, and only marginally bleed over excess energy into the local grid (and cop a reverse-meter credit for it). Compare that to the massive energy influx T. Boone Pickens's wind plan contemplated, which necessitated epic power grid reconfigurations (and he and his investors would control a mass load of power, while what is proposed here is "chicken in every pot" level, homeowner-controlled power). Relatedly, and good news for utility-scale Solar PV if this is true, this investment analysis says even big Solar PV projects can be better blended than wind and Concentrated Solar Thermal. This same concept is discussed for small wind farms, which not only alleviates transmission difficulties arising from large farms, but smooths net electricity flow since "the wind is almost always blowing somewhere." \* It will help form a second blend layer, that of peak load to base load (it will supply much of the "peak" amount of electricity a community demands, for example, on a hot sunny day, when the power company must buy or supply (at a more costly rate) it over the normal, "base load" demand letter -- as explained here and here. See also this analysis. \* It will generate distributed (not concentrated) wealth. Lots of it. Directly into Joe's pocket. Thousands, millions and then one hundred million Joes pocketing newly created (direct from the sun) wealth (free energy, reverse-meter payments) every day. That's wealth that Joe pockets, not some small group of utility owners/controllers. And unlike most forms of wealth (example: you've got to expend energy and create pollution to extract and burn coal to create electricity, then get money -- wealth -- from it), this is pure, cost-free new wealth (not government-printed money that feeds "economic multiplier" cycles in economists' heads). \* It also will deconcentrate electrical power generation, and thus deprive terrorists/tsunamis of targets and monopolists of concentrated-power-wealth manipulability. Indeed, it already is spreading to the 2.0 billion people who live off the grid, including some of the most desperate. As Seba says, "[h]alf a billion people in 500,000 villages in India alone are not connected to the grid. Two billion people around the world get their energy from kerosene or diesel at rates up to 10 times today’s PV cost." That market alone will spur greater economies of scale in Solar PV manufacturing -- to meet that demand. \* The self-consumed part of Solar PV energy obviously suffers no transmission loss, which can reach as high as 20% (hence, transmission alone packs a built-in energy waste). And, distributed "rooftop Solar PV" may well reduce the need for very expensive grid upgrades. It's been said that up to $11 billion in $55 billion in grid upgrading over the next 10 years could be avoided in Australia. Also, central power generation (big coal and nuke plants) loses 20% or more of its electricity just in its transmission to customers. If those same customers generate "distributed" energy and feed their local grid less transmission loss can result. \* It will be pre-positioned to fully exploit economically/ecologically feasible energy storage (envisioned here and discussed here) should anyone ever get around to inventing it. \* It can be arranged, when erected on a mass-commodity level scale (millions of homes), into a horizontal-management smart grid, if not a micro-grid, so that if clouds depress electricity generation on one side of town, and high-sun onthe other produces intense bursts of electricity, the smart-grid (or so techno-forecasters claim) can smooth the peaks and valleys to ensure a virtual base-load style electrical flow. This will help address the variable power, lack of temporary electrical storage problem that undermines Solar PV today (for more on this concept, click here, then here, and here). Utilities themselves can publish maps to show optimum blending with their grids. The White House is advancing its own smart grid initiative, by the way, and people are now conjuring up hybrid brown/green power combinations to stabilize output and claim base load status. Even vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technologists are charging into this area.

#### Terrorist attack on the grid kills heg

Merica 12 (Dan, reporter for CNN, “DoD official: Vulnerability of U.S. electrical grid is a dire concern,” CNN, 7-27-12, <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/07/27/dod-official-vulnerability-of-u-s-electrical-grid-is-a-dire-concern/>)

Speaking candidly at the Aspen Security Forum, one defense department official expressed great concern about the possibility of a terrorist attack on the U.S. electric grid that would cause a “long term, large scale outage.” Paul Stockton, assistant secretary for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs at the Department of Defense, said such an attack would affect critical defense infrastructure at home and abroad – a thought that Stockton said was keeping him up at night. “The DOD depends on infrastructure in order to be able to operate abroad. And to make those operations function, we depend on the electric grid,” Stockton said. The concern, Stockton continued, was that America’s adversaries would avoid attacking “the pointy end of the spear,” meaning combat troops, and would instead look for homeland, possibly non-military, targets. “Our adversaries, state and non-state, are not stupid. They are clever and adaptive,” Stockton said. “There is a risk that they will adopt a profoundly asymmetric strategy, reach around and attack us here at home, the critical infrastructure that is not owned by the Department of Defense.”

#### Global nuclear war

Khalilzad 11 (Zalmay, Counselor – Center for Strategic and International Studies, Former U.S. Permanent Representative – United Nations, Former U.S. Ambassador – Iraq, “The Economy and National Security”, National Review, 2-8, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad)

The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.

### Solvency

#### China CAN and HAS put massive energy-related FDI into the US economy

Burke 11 (John, Analyst @ BakerHostetler, "The United States Welcomes Chinese Foreign Direct Investment - The Handful of Deals Blocked by CFIUS are Aberrant," http://www.chinaustradelawblog.com/2011/02/articles/investment/the-united-states-welcomes-chinese-foreign-direct-investment-the-handful-of-deals-blocked-by-cfius-are-aberrant/)

Direct Chinese investment in the United States would likely be even greater were it not for press reports that have created the impression that the United States is hostile to investment from China. The press is full of terms such as CFIUS (the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) and FINSA (the Foreign Investment National Security Act), and tales of Chinese companies forced to abandon planned acquisitions of U.S. companies. Some Chinese companies have been forced to abandon their acquisition plans. However, each of those celebrated cases presented unique circumstances that would not exist for the vast majority of Chinese companies who may wish to set up operations in the United States. The reality is that the United States remains one of the world’s economies most open to foreign investment, including from China.

With a few very limited exceptions, such as airlines, foreigners are as free to invest in greenfield projects that create new businesses in the United States on the same basis as Americans. Recent Chinese greenfield investments in the United States include a $1 billion steel pipe mill that Tianjin Pipe is planning to build this year near Corpus Christi, Texas; Suntech Power Holdings’ solar panel assembly plant in Arizona; and American Yoncheng Gravure Cylinder plant in Spartanburg, South Carolina. These and many other Chinese greenfield investments have not faced any significant opposition and in many cases have been able to benefit from state and local government investment incentives.

#### US doesn’t restrict Chinese foreign direct investment now

Burke 11 (John, Analyst @ BakerHostetler, "The United States Welcomes Chinese Foreign Direct Investment - The Handful of Deals Blocked by CFIUS are Aberrant," http://www.chinaustradelawblog.com/2011/02/articles/investment/the-united-states-welcomes-chinese-foreign-direct-investment-the-handful-of-deals-blocked-by-cfius-are-aberrant/)

The United States remains committed to an open investment environment and treating foreign investors, including those from China, on an equal footing with their domestic competition in the vast majority of cases where the foreign investment does not threaten to impair the national security of the United States. It was for this reason that Congress set the initial CFIUS review deadline at thirty days, to coincide with the thirty day antitrust review period under the Hart-Scott-Rodino procedures.¶ Even after the implementation of FINSA, most cross-border mergers and acquisitions do not require a CFIUS review. Nevertheless, CFIUS national security reviews of proposed acquisitions of U.S. businesses are going to be a crucial part of the transaction for many foreign investments in existing U.S. businesses.¶ The most important considerations for success in a CFIUS review are understanding in advance the institutional and other concerns of the CFIUS member agencies, and creative thinking about how to demonstrate that those concerns are not threatened, or to mitigate them. In most cases early attention to the CFIUS process and to the legitimate concerns of the member agencies can ensure smooth and timely proceedings that result in CFIUS clearance without restrictions, or on terms that preserve the value of the transaction for all parties. Voluntary review, taking advantage of the law’s safe harbor provision, likely would have helped Chinese enterprises in all of the failed transactions, and sensitivity to possible political concerns would have contained the fallout and bruised feelings in those instances where national security legitimately prevailed.¶ To say the outcomes of such cases in China would have been no different or worse would not be good enough. The United States is not deliberately discriminating against foreign, nor specifically Chinese, investment, but like any sovereign it is mindful of its sovereignty, and its security.

### Investment

#### -- No internal link - Studies prove

Barbieri 96 (Katherine, Professor of Political Science – University of North Texas, Journal of Peace Research, February, p. 42-43)

This study provides **little empirical support** for the liberal proposition that trade provides a path to interstate peace. Even after controlling for the influence of conti­guity, joint democracy, alliance ties, and relative capabilities, the evidence suggests that in **most instances** trade fails to deter conflict. Instead, extensive economic inter­dependence increases the likelihood that dyads engage in militarized dispute; how­ever, it appears to have little influence on the incidence of war. The greatest hope for peace appears to arise from symmetrical trading relationships. However, the dampening effect of symmetry is offset by the expansion of interstate linkages. That is, extensive economic linkages, be they sym­metrical or asymmetrical, appear to pose the greatest hindrance to peace through trade. Although this article focuses exclusively on the pre-WWII period, elsewhere I provide evidence that the relationships revealed here are also observed in the post­WWII period and more extended period, 1870—1985 (Barbieri, 1995). Why do the findings differ from those presented in related studies of the trade—conflict re­lationship, which reveal an inverse relation­ship between trade and conflict? Several explanations, other than the temporal domain, can be offered. First, researchers differ in the phenomena they seek to explain, with many studies incorporating both conflictual and cooperative interstate behavior (e.g., Gasiorowski, 1986a, b; Gasiorowski & Polachek, 1982; Polachek, 1980, 1992; Polachek & McDonald, 1992). Studies that focus exclusively on extreme forms of conflict behavior, including dis­putes and wars, differ in their spatial and temporal domains, their level of analysis, and their measurement of central con­structs. Preliminary tests reveal that the composition of dyads in a given sample may have a more dramatic impact on the empiri­cal findings than variations in measurement. For example, the decision to focus exclusively on ‘politically relevant dyads’ may be one source of difference (Oneal et al., 19%). Perhaps the primary component missing from this and related research is the inclusion of a more adequate assessment of the costs and benefits derived from interdepen­dence. I have repeatedly argued that the conflictual or pacific elements of interdepen­dence are directly related to perceptions about trade’s costs and benefits. Yet, a more comprehensive evaluation of these costs and benefits is needed to see whether a link truly exists between the benefits enjoyed in a given trading relationship and the inhibition of conflict in that relationship, or con­versely, the presence of net costs for at least one trading partner and the presence of con­flict in that relationship. For example, are trading relationships that contain two partners believed to benefit from trade less conflict-prone than those containing at least one partner perceived to be worse off from trade? I have merely outlined the types of relationships believed to confer the greatest benefits, but such benefits and costs require a more rigorous investigation.

#### -- War collapses trade – no reverse link

Layne 98 (Christopher, Visiting Associate Professor of International Relations and Military Strategy – Naval Postgraduate School, Consultant – RAND Corporation, “Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century”, World Policy Journal, 15(2), Infotrac)

These arguments notwithstanding, international economic interdependence does not cause peace. In fact, it has very serious adverse security consequences that its proponents either do not understand or will not acknowledge. Economic relations (whether domestic or international) never take place in a vacuum; on the contrary, they occur within a politically defined framework. International economic interdependence requires certain conditions in order to flourish, including a maximum degree of political order and stability. Just as the market cannot function within a state unless the state creates a stable “security” environment in which economic exchange can occur (by protecting property rights and enforcing contracts), the same is true in international relations. Because there is no world government, it falls to the dominant state to create the conditions under which economic interdependence can take hold (by providing security, rules of the game, and a reserve currency, and by acting as the global economy’s banker and lender of last resort). Without a dominant power to perform these tasks, economic interdependence does not happen. Indeed, free trade and interdependence have occurred in the modern international system only during the hegemonies of Victorian Britain and postwar America.

#### -- Trade is resilient – no collapse

Perroni and Whally 96 (Carlo, University of Warwick and John, University of Western Ontario, American Economic Review, 86(2), May, p. 60)

Furthermore, trade performance in the period since the late 1940’s also clearly stands in sharp contrast to the events of the 1930’s. The largest players, the United States and the EU have **consistently displayed** a determination to mediate their trade disputes in the 1980’s, triggered by EU enlargement. And today’s global economy is **much more interdependent** than it was in the 1930’s. Firms and industries have become more reliant on export markets, and there is more interindustry trade. There is also the major difference of the presence of the GATT/WTO, accompanied by bindings on tariffs achieved in eight rounds of negotiations; and, despite its weaknesses, a GATT/WTO dispute-settlement procedure has continued to function.

#### -- Trade conflicts won’t escalate

Nye 96 (Joseph, Dean of the Kennedy School of Government – Harvard University, Washington Quarterly, Winter)

The **low likelihood** of direct great power clashes does not mean that there will be no tensions between them. Disagreements are likely to continue over regional conflicts, like those that have arisen over how to deal with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery are another source of friction, as is the case over Russian and Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran, which the United States steadfastly opposes. The sharing of burdens and responsibilities for maintaining international security and protecting the natural environment are a further subject of debate among the great powers. Furthermore, in contrast to the views of classical Liberals, increased trade and economic interdependence can increase as well as decrease conflict and competition among trading partners. The main point, however, is that such disagreements are **very unlikely to escalate** to military conflicts.

#### Multiple thumpers to the US and global economies - Eurozone, China hard landing, emerging market recession, anemic US growth and budget fights, Iran

Roubini 9/13/12 (Nouriel, professor at NYU’s Stern School of Business and Chairman of Roubini Global Economics, "Fiddling at the Fire," http://www.project-syndicate.org/print/fiddling-at-the-fire-by-nouriel-roubini)

In the eurozone, euphoria followed the ECB’s decision to provide support with potentially unlimited purchases of distressed countries’ bonds. But the move is not a game changer; it only buys time for policymakers to implement the tough measures needed to resolve the crisis. And the policy challenges are daunting: the eurozone’s recession is deepening as front-loaded fiscal consolidation and severe credit rationing continues. And, as eurozone banks and public-debt markets become increasingly balkanized, establishing a banking union, a fiscal union, and an economic union while pursuing macroeconomic policies that restore growth, external balance, and competitiveness will be extremely difficult.¶ Even the ECB’s support is not obvious. Monetary hawks – the Bundesbank and several other core central banks – who were worried about a new open-ended ECB mandate pushed successfully for strict and effective conditionality for countries benefiting from the bond purchases. As a result, they can pull the plug on the program if its stringent criteria are not met.¶ Moreover, Greece could exit the eurozone in 2013, before Spain and Italy are successfully ring-fenced; Spain – like Greece – is spiraling into depression, and may need a full-scale bailout by the “troika” (the ECB, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund). Meanwhile, austerity fatigue in the eurozone periphery is increasingly clashing with bailout fatigue in the core.¶ Small wonder, then, that Germany, politically unable to vote on more bailout resources, has outsourced that job to the ECB, the only institution that can bypass democratically elected parliaments. But, again, liquidity provision alone – without policies to restore growth soon – would merely delay, not prevent, the breakup of the monetary union, ultimately taking down the economic/trade union and leading to the destruction of the single market.¶ In the United States, the latest economic data – including a weak labor market – confirm that growth is anemic, with output in the second half of 2012 unlikely to be significantly stronger than the 1.6% annual gain recorded in January-June. And, given America’s political polarization and policy gridlock, we can expect more fights on the budget and the debt ceiling, another rating downgrade, and no agreement on a path toward medium-term fiscal consolidation and sustainability – regardless of whether President Barack Obama is reelected in November. On the contrary, we should expect agreement only on the path of least political resistance: avoidance of tough fiscal choices until the bond vigilantes eventually wake up, spike long rates, and force fiscal adjustment on the political system.¶ In China, a hard economic landing looks increasingly likely as the investment bubble deflates and net exports shrink. Meanwhile, the reforms necessary to reduce savings and increase private consumption are being delayed. As in Europe and the US, the worst will be avoided in 2012 only by kicking the can down the road with more monetary, fiscal, and credit stimulus.¶ But a hard landing becomes more likely in 2013, as the stimulus fades, non-performing loans rise, the investment bust accelerates, and the problem of rolling over the debts of provincial governments and their special investment vehicles can no longer be papered over. And, given a new leadership’s caution as it establishes its power, reforms will occur at a snail’s pace, making social and political unrest more likely.¶ Meanwhile, Brazil, India, Russia, and other emerging economies are playing the same game. Many have not adjusted as advanced economies’ weakness reduces the room for export-led growth; and many delayed structural reforms needed to boost private-sector development and productivity growth, while embracing a model of state capitalism that will soon reveal its limits. So the recent slowdown of growth in emerging markets is not just cyclical, owing to weak growth or outright recession in advanced economies; it is also structural.¶ Similar dithering is apparent at the geopolitical level as well. The major global powers are still trying negotiations and sanctions to induce Iran to abandon its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. But Iran is playing for time and hoping to reach a zone of immunity. By 2013, an Israel that – rightly or wrongly – perceives Iran’s nuclear program to be an existential threat, and/or the US, which has rejected containment of a nuclear Iran, may decide to strike, leading to a war and a massive spike in oil prices.¶ Ineffective governments with weak leadership are at the root of the problem. In democracies, repeated elections lead to short-term policy choices. In autocracies like China and Russia, leaders resist the radical reforms that would reduce the power of entrenched lobbies and interests, thereby fueling social unrest as resentment against corruption and rent-seeking boils over into protest.¶ But, as everyone kicks the can down the road, the can is getting heavier and, in the major emerging markets and advanced economies alike, is approaching a brick wall. Policymakers can either crash into that wall, or they can show the leadership and vision needed to dismantle it safely.

#### -- Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Miller 00 (Morris, Economist, Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Administration – University of Ottawa, Former Executive Director and Senior Economist – World Bank, “Poverty as a Cause of Wars?”, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Winter, p. 273)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that  
exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore **no relationship** to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### -- History proves

Ferguson 6 (Niall, Professor of History – Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, 85(5), September / October, Lexis)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, **no** general **relationship between economics and conflict is discernible** for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some **severe economic crises were not followed by wars**.

#### -- No timeframe

Russett 83 (Bruce, Dean Acheson Professor of International Relations and Political Science – Yale University, “Prosperity and Peace: Presidential Address”, International Studies Quarterly, 27(4), p. 384)

The ‘optimism’ argument seems strained to me, but elements of Blainey’s former thesis, about the need to mobilize resources before war can be begun, are more plausible, especially in the 20th century. Modern wars are fought by complex organizations, with complex and expensive weapons. It takes time to design and build the weapons that military commanders will require, and it takes time to train the troops who must use them. Large bureaucracies must plan and obtain some consensus on those plans; and even in a dictatorship the populace in general must be prepared, with clear images of who are their enemies and of the cause that will justify war with them. In short, preparations for war take time. Just how long a lag we should expect to find between an economic downturn and subsequent war initiation is unclear. But surely it will be **more than a year or two**, and war may well occur **only after** the economy is recovering.

#### -- Economy is resilient

Behravesh 06 (Nariman, most accurate economist tracked by USA Today and chief global economist and executive vice president for Global Insight, Newsweek, “The Great Shock Absorber; Good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility have strengthened the global economy's 'immune system.'” 10-15-2006, www.newsweek.com/id/47483)

The U.S. and global economies were able to withstand three body blows in 2005--one of the worst tsunamis on record (which struck at the very end of 2004), one of the worst hurricanes on record and the highest energy prices after Hurricane Katrina--without missing a beat. This resilience was especially remarkable in the case of the United States, which since 2000 has been able to shrug off the biggest stock-market drop since the 1930s, a major terrorist attack, corporate scandals and war. Does this mean that recessions are a relic of the past? No, but recent events do suggest that the global economy's "immune system" is now strong enough to absorb shocks that 25 years ago would probably have triggered a downturn. In fact, over the past two decades, recessions have not disappeared, but have become considerably milder in many parts of the world. What explains this enhanced recession resistance? The answer: a combination of good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility. Since the mid-1980s, central banks worldwide have had great success in taming inflation. This has meant that long-term interest rates are at levels not seen in more than 40 years. A low-inflation and low-interest-rate environment is especially conducive to sustained, robust growth. Moreover, central bankers have avoided some of the policy mistakes of the earlier oil shocks (in the mid-1970s and early 1980s), during which they typically did too much too late, and exacerbated the ensuing recessions. Even more important, in recent years the Fed has been particularly adept at crisis management, aggressively cutting interest rates in response to stock-market crashes, terrorist attacks and weakness in the economy. The benign inflationary picture has also benefited from increasing competitive pressures, both worldwide (thanks to globalization and the rise of Asia as a manufacturing juggernaut) and domestically (thanks to technology and deregulation). Since the late 1970s, the United States, the United Kingdom and a handful of other countries have been especially aggressive in deregulating their financial and industrial sectors. This has greatly increased the flexibility of their economies and reduced their vulnerability to inflationary shocks. Looking ahead, what all this means is that a global or U.S. recession will likely be avoided in 2006, and probably in 2007 as well. Whether the current expansion will be able to break the record set in the 1990s for longevity will depend on the ability of central banks to keep the inflation dragon at bay and to avoid policy mistakes. The prospects look good. Inflation is likely to remain a low-level threat for some time, and Ben Bernanke, the incoming chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, spent much of his academic career studying the past mistakes of the Fed and has vowed not to repeat them. At the same time, no single shock will likely be big enough to derail the expansion. What if oil prices rise to $80 or $90 a barrel? Most estimates suggest that growth would be cut by about 1 percent--not good, but no recession. What if U.S. house prices fall by 5 percent in 2006 (an extreme assumption, given that house prices haven't fallen nationally in any given year during the past four decades)? Economic growth would slow by about 0.5 percent to 1 percent. What about another terrorist attack? Here the scenarios can be pretty scary, but an attack on the order of 9/11 or the Madrid or London bombings would probably have an even smaller impact on overall GDP growth.

### Iran

#### Proliferation does not escalate to war. It de-escalates conflicts

**Tepperman**, 9/7/**2009** (John - journalist based in New York Cuty, Why obama should learn to love the bomb, Newsweek, p.lexis)

**A growing and compelling body of research** suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why--and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way--you need to start by recognizing that all states are **rational on some basic level**. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're **pretty sure they can get away with them**. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. **Not even Hitler or Saddam** waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the **wrong gamble and underestimate** the other side--and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war **obvious**, inevitable, **and unacceptable**. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button--and everybody knows it--the basic math shifts. Even the **craziest tin-pot dictator** is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is **unwinnable** and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "**Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything**?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring--because in each instance, very different **leaders all came to the same safe conclusion**. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have **meant curtains** for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time." The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, **then pull back**, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did **dramatically mellow their behavior**. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, **despite severe provocations** (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.

#### Proliferators are not aggressive – they care about the economy and regime survival

**Alagappa**, **2008** (Muthiah – distinguished senior fellow at the East-West Center, The Long Shadow, p. 508-509)

Another major conclusion of this study is that although nuclear weapons could have destabilizing consequences in certain situations, on net they have **reinforced national security and** regional **stability** in Asia. It is possible to argue that fledgling and small nuclear arsenals would be more vulnerable to preventive attacks; that the related strategic compulsion for early use may lead to early launch postures and crisis situations; that limited war under nuclear conditions to alter or restore the political status quo can intensify tensions and carry the risk of escalation to major war; that inadequate command, control, and safety measures could result in accidents; and that nuclear facilities and material may be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. These are legitimate concerns, but thus far nuclear weapons have not undermined national security and regional stability in Asia. Instead, they have **ameliorated national security concerns**, strengthened the status quo, **increased deterrence dominance**, prevented the outbreak of major wars, and reinforced the regional trend to reduce the salience of force in international politics. Nor have nuclear weapons had the predicted domino effect. These consequences have strengthened regional security and stability that rest on multiple pillars. The grim scenarios associated with nuclear weapons in Asia frequently rely on worst-case political and military situations; often they are seen in isolation from the national priorities of regional states that **emphasize economic development** and modernization through participation in regional and global economies and the high priority accorded to stability in domestic and international affairs. The primary goal of regional states is **not** aggrandizement through **military aggression** but preservation of national integrity, state or regime survival, economic growth and prosperity, increase in national power and international influence, preservation or incremental change in the status quo, and the construction of regional and global orders in which they are subjects rather than objects. Seen in this broader perspective, nuclear weapons and more generally military force are of **greater relevance in the defense, deterrence, and assurance roles than offensive ones**. This does not imply that offensive use of force or military clashes will not occur; only that force is not the first option, that military clashes will be infrequent, and that when they do occur they will be limited in scope and intensity. Security interaction in Asia increasingly approximates behavior associated with defensive realism.

#### No chain reactions – the domino effect never occurs

**Alagappa**, **2008** (Muthiah – distinguished senior fellow at the East-West Center, The Long Shadow, p. 521-522)

It will be useful at this juncture to address more directly the set of instability arguments advanced by certain policy makers and scholars: the domino effect of new nuclear weapon states, the probability of preventive action against new nuclear weapon states, and the compulsion of these states to use their small arsenals early for fear of losing them in a preventive or preemptive strike by a stronger nuclear adversary. On the domino effect, India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapon programs have not fueled new programs in South Asia or beyond. Iran's quest for nuclear weapons is not a reaction to the Indian or Pakistani programs. It is grounded in that country's security concerns about the United States and Tehran's regional aspirations. The North Korean test has evoked mixed reactions in Northeast Asia. Tokyo is certainly concerned; its reaction, though, has not been to initiate its own nuclear weapon program but to reaffirm and strengthen the American extended deterrence commitment to Japan. Even if the U.S. Japan security treaty were to weaken, it is not certain that Japan would embark on a nuclear weapon program. Likewise, South Korea has sought reaffirmation of the American extended deterrence commitment, but has firmly held to its nonnuclear posture. Without dramatic change in its political, economic, and security circumstances, South Korea is highly unlikely to embark on a covert (or overt) nuclear weapon program as it did in the 1970s. South Korea could still become a nuclear weapon state by inheriting the nuclear weapons of North Korea should the Kim Jong Il regime collapse. Whether it retains or gives up that capability will hinge on the security circumstances of a unified Korea. The North Korean nuclear test has not **spurred Taiwan or Mongolia to develop nuclear weapon capability**. The point is that each country's decision to embark on and sustain nuclear weapon programs is contingent on its particular security and other circumstances. **Though appealing, the domino theory is not predictive**; often it is employed to justify policy on the basis of **alarmist predictions**. § Marked 19:41 § The loss of South Vietnam, for example, did not lead to the predicted domino effect in Southeast Asia. In fact the so-called dominos became drivers of a vibrant Southeast Asia and brought about a fundamental transformation in that subregion (Lord 1993, 1996). In the nuclear arena, the nuclear programs of China, India, and Pakistan were part of a security chain reaction, not mechanically falling dominos. However, as observed earlier the Indian, Pakistani, and North Korean nuclear tests have thus far not had the domino effect predicted by alarmist analysts and policy makers. Great caution should be exercised in accepting at face value the sensational predictions of individuals who have a vested interest in **accentuating the dangers of nuclear proliferation**. Such analysts are now focused on the dangers of a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran may or may not have destabilizing effects. Such claims must be assessed on the basis of an objective reading of the drivers of national and regional security in Iran and the Middle East.

#### No risk of accidents – safety devices and conflict management prevent war

**Mueller**, **2009** (John – Woody Hayes chair of national security studies at Ohio State University, Atomic Obsession, p. 100-101)

It is a plausible argument that, all other things equal, if the number of nuclear weapons in existence increases, the likelihood one will go off by accident will also increase. In fact, all things haven't been equal. As nuclear weapons have increased in numbers and sophistication, **so have safety devices and procedures**. Precisely because the weapons are so dangerous, extraordinary efforts to keep them from going off by accident or by an unauthorized deliberate act have been instituted, and these measures have, so far, been effective: no one has been killed in a nuclear explosion since Nagasaki. Extrapolating further from disasters that have not occurred, many have been led to a concern that, triggered by a nuclear weapons accident, a war could somehow be started through an act of desperation or of consummate sloppiness. Before the invention of nuclear weapons, such possibilities were not perhaps of great concern, because no weapon or small set of weapons could do enough damage to be truly significant. Each nuclear weapon, however, is capable of destroying in an instant more people than have been killed in an average war, and the weapons continue to exist in the tens of thousands. However, even if a bomb, or a few bombs, were to go off, it does not necessarily follow that war would result. For that to happen, it is assumed, the accident would have to take place at a time of war-readiness, as during a crisis, when both sides are poised for action and when one side could perhaps be triggered – or panicked –into major action by an explosion mistakenly taken to be part of, or the prelude to, a full attack. This means that the unlikely happening –a nuclear accident – would have to coincide precisely with an event, a militarized international crisis, something that is **rare** to begin with, became more so as the cold war progressed, and has become even less likely since its demise. Furthermore, even if the accident takes place during a crisis, **it does not follow that escalation** or hasty response **is** inevitable, or even **very likely**. As Bernard Brodie points out, escalation scenarios essentially impute to both sides "a well-nigh limitless concern with saving face" and/or "a deal of ground-in automaticity of response and counterresponse." None of this was in evidence during the Cuban missile crisis when there were accidents galore. An American spy plane was shot down over Cuba, probably without authorization, and another accidentally went off course and flew threateningly over the Soviet Union. As if that weren’t enough, a Soviet military officer spying for the West sent a message, apparently on a whim, warning that the Soviets were about to attack.31 **None of these remarkable events triggered anything** in the way of precipitous response. They were duly evaluated and then ignored. Robert Jervis points out that "when critics talk of the impact of irrationality, they imply that all such deviations will be in the direction of emotional impulsiveness, of launching an attack, or of taking actions that are terribly risky. But irrationality could also lead a state to **passive acquiescence**." In moments of high stress and threat, people can be said to have three psychological alternatives: (1) to remain calm and rational, (2) to refuse to believe that the threat is imminent or significant, or to panic, lashing out frantically and incoherently at the threat. Generally, people react in one of the first two ways. In her classic study of disaster behavior, Martha Wolfenstein concludes, “The usual reaction is one of being unworried.” In addition, the historical record suggests that **wars simply do not begin by accident**. In his extensive survey of wars that have occurred since 1400, diplomat-historian Evan Luard concludes, "It is impossible to identify a single case in which it can be said that a war started accidentally; in which it was not, at the time the war broke out, the deliberate intention of at least one party that war should take place." Geoffrey Blainey, after similar study, very much agrees: although many have discussed "accidental" or "unintentional" wars, "it is difficult," he concludes, "to find a war which on investigation fits this description." Or, as Henry Kissinger has put it dryly, "Despite popular myths, large military units do not fight by accident."

**-- Iran won’t be aggressive – too many checks in the system**

**Boroujerdi 7** (Mehrzad, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program, “Iranian Nuclear Miasma”, Syracuse Law Review, 57 Syracuse L. Rev. 619, Lexis)

The potential for groupthink miscalculations is also **thwarted** by the existence of multiple consensus-based decision bodies within the overall multilayered structure. 18 While this complex process can sometimes make Iranian policy confusing and contradictory, it does not necessarily lend itself to high risk behavior. Even if one agent makes a hasty decision or issues an aggressive policy statement, it may be **immediately contradicted** by another authority. 19 Individual leaders also have difficulty muting [\*623] criticism within the regime and forcing all agents to agree on one course of action. While miscalculations and hasty behavior may be the rule at the micro-level, at the macro-level hasty action is **checked by** the **competing nodes of power**. While this structure could admittedly be problematic with regard to the nuclear program depending on what form of command and control system to control accidents and illicit transfer is established, it makes the prospect of Iran engaging in a boldly offensive or miscalculated action **less realistic**.

#### -- No impact to Iran prolif – zero risk of war

Sadr 5 (Ehsaneh, Dept of Government at the University of Maryland, Middle East Policy, Summer 2005)

In an article on U.S. options for a post- Cold War nuclear policy, Charles Glaser criticizes the work of foreign-policy analysts who “focus on a single criterion for evaluating U.S. security – the damage United States society would suffer in a war – but overlook other criteria for measuring U.S. security, specifically those criteria that measure the likelihood of war.”61 The same criticism might be leveled at Israeli security analysts whose preoccupation with the devastation a nuclear Iran could inflict upon the Jewish nation clouds their evaluation of the ways in which the acquisition of nuclear weapons affects the likelihood that Iran would initiate hostilities in the first place. The above analysis indicates that a nuclearized Iran is extremely unlikely to pose an existential threat to Israel. The doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction holds in the Iranian context: Iran’s clerical rulers, anxious to protect their own power, citizens and civilization, will not launch a war that will lead to their own destruction. Iran’s rulers are extremely unlikely to pass nuclear material on to terrorist actors whose loyalty they cannot ensure. They are also unlikely to step up conventional or terrorist harassment of Israel for fear of the escalation of hostilities to nuclear warfare. The impact of Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons upon Israel’s regional interests is less problematic than one might think. Although the regime-change option would be off the table, it is not clear that it has ever been a feasible alternative given current geopolitical realities. Any increase in domestic political support for the Iranian regime is likely to be temporary. Iran may indeed be empowered to pursue its own regional interests, but such pursuit is not necessarily bad for Israeli interests. Finally, it will be many years before Iran’s weapons stockpile begins to approach Israel’s and the latter is compelled to engage in an expensive arms race. Indeed, there is reason to believe that Iran’s access to nuclear weapons may increase the prospects for regional stability and even Middle East peace. Given the horrendous consequences of an accidental nuclear war, it will be imperative that Iran and Israel develop some sort of ability to communicate with one another directly. It is not outside the realm of possibility that the institutionalization of such communications may be the first step in the normalization of relations between the two countries and the future integration of Israel into its neighborhood.

#### No chance of Israeli strike – Iran is too strong

Dan Williams, 3/7/07 (http://www.capetimes.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=3717229)

JERUSALEM: Israel has long been the wild card in debates on the Iranian nuclear programme - a country that, while formally outside negotiations, has lobbying clout given its penchant for pre-emptive strikes.   But Israeli officials, once quick to project military menace in the face of what Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has called an "existential threat", are increasingly taking a softer public line on how to meet Iran's refusal to halt uranium enrichment.   It appears that many **Israelis have decided that Iran is too tough an enemy for their armed forces to take on alone - and that the international community senses this too.**   "**The last thing Israel is interested in is military action against Iran,**" said Avigdor Lieberman, the Israeli strategic affairs minister.

#### Israel will not strike Iran

Dan Williams, 3/7/07 (http://www.capetimes.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=3717229)

Like its US ally, Israel refuses to rule out pre-emptive strikes as a last-ditch means of curbing a nuclear programme, that Iran insists is peaceful. But unlike Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Iran's nuclear facilities may be too distant, numerous and fortified for Israel to tackle. The sense of tactical limitation was reinforced, throughout the region and beyond, by last year's inconclusive Israeli war against Lebanese Hezbollah guerrillas.   **"It is becoming increasingly clear that Israel has no viable military option on Iran, and is pinning its hopes on some sort of solution by the Americans,"** said Alon Ben-David, Israel analyst for Jane's Defence Weekly. "But **there is a growing number of Israelis who think the country will just have to live with a nuclear-armed Iran,**" he said.

#### Relations resilient

China Daily 3 (2-13, Lexis)

During President Jiang Zemin's visit to the United States last year, he and Bush stated that China and the United States had extensive and crucial common interests and should expand their exchanges and co-operation in various areas to develop a constructive and co-operative Sino-US relationship. Improving Sino-US relations thus became the inevitable option in Washington's China policy. Since the mid-1980s, economic and trade exchanges have been a vital factor in bilateral ties and remain the most resilient chain. Bearing in mind the huge economic interests arising from China's entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Bush emphasized the importance of Sino-US economic and trade relations, even when pursuing a hard-line China policy in the initial period of his tenure. History has proved that, despite some twists and turns, common interests have overweighed differences in Sino-US relations.

#### No spillover

IPS 3 (Inter-Press Service, 11-4, Lexis)

Indeed, it now appears that, despite rising tensions over the bilateral trade balance and the value of the yuan, the realists centered in the State Department have decisively taken control over U.S. China policy, thanks largely to Beijing's own behavior and rapidly growing influence. "The administration has come to the conclusion that strategic engagement is the only viable option on relations with China," says Garrett. That Washington's major problem today is over currency, he adds, illustrates the degree to which Sino-U.S. relations have **stabilized**. "This is the kind of problem we have with Japan," Garrett said. "We're at the point where we can have differences in one area without it threatening **other aspects** of the relationship."

#### U.S. nuclear primacy checks war

Lieber and Press 6 (Keir A., Assistant Professor of Political Science – Notre Dame and Daryl G., Associate Professor of Political Science – University of Pennsylvania, Foreign Affairs, March / April, Lexis)

For almost half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear states have been locked in a military stalemate known as mutual assured destruction (MAD). By the early 1960s, the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union had grown so large and sophisticated that neither country could entirely destroy the other's retaliatory force by launching first, even with a surprise attack. Starting a nuclear war was therefore tantamount to committing suicide. During the Cold War, many scholars and policy analysts believed that MAD made the world relatively stable and peaceful because it induced great caution in international politics, discouraged the use of nuclear threats to resolve disputes, and generally restrained the superpowers' behavior. (Revealingly, the last intense nuclear standoff, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, occurred at the dawn of the era of MAD.) Because of the nuclear stalemate, the optimists argued, the era of intentional great-power wars had ended. Critics of MAD, however, argued that it prevented not great-power war but the rolling back of the power and influence of a dangerously expansionist and totalitarian Soviet Union. From that perspective, MAD prolonged the life of an evil empire. This debate may now seem like ancient history, but it is actually more relevant than ever -- because the age of MAD is nearing an end. Today, for the first time in almost 50 years, the United States stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy. It will probably soon be possible for the United States to destroy the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or China with a first strike. This dramatic shift in the nuclear balance of power stems from a series of improvements in the United States' nuclear systems, the precipitous decline of Russia's arsenal, and the glacial pace of modernization of China's nuclear forces. Unless Washington's policies change or Moscow and Beijing take steps to increase the size and readiness of their forces, Russia and China -- and the rest of the world -- will live in the shadow of U.S. nuclear primacy for many years to come. One's views on the implications of this change will depend on one's theoretical perspective. Hawks, who believe that the United States is a benevolent force in the world, will welcome the new nuclear era because they trust that U.S. dominance in both conventional and nuclear weapons will help deter aggression by other countries. For example, as U.S. nuclear primacy grows, China's leaders may act more cautiously on issues such as Taiwan, realizing that their vulnerable nuclear forces will not deter U.S. intervention -- and that Chinese nuclear threats could invite a U.S. strike on Beijing's arsenal. But doves, who oppose using nuclear threats to coerce other states and fear an emboldened and unconstrained United States, will worry.

#### -- History proves no risk of China war – their cards are all hype

Dyer 9 (Gwynne, Ph.D. in War Studies – University of London and Board of Governors – Canada’s Royal Military College, “China Unlikely to Engage in Military Confrontation”, Jakarta Post, 4-29,

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/03/12/china-unlikely-engage-military-confrontation.html)

Given America's monopoly or huge technological lead in key areas like stealth bombers, aircraft carriers, long-range sensors, satellite surveillance and even infantry body armor, Goss's warning is misleading and self-serving. China cannot project a serious military force even 200 miles (km) from home, while American forces utterly dominate China's ocean frontiers, many thousands of miles (kilometers) from the United States. But the drumbeat of warnings about China's ""military build-up"" continues. Just the other week U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was worrying again about the expansion of the Chinese navy, which is finally building some amphibious landing ships half a century after Beijing's confrontation with the non-Communist regime on the island of Taiwan began. And Senator Richard Lugar, head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned that if the European Union ends its embargo on arms sales to China, the U.S. would stop military technology sales to Europe. It will come as no surprise, therefore, that the major U.S. defense review planned for this year will concentrate on the rising ""threat"" from China, or that this year for the first time the joint U.S.-Japanese defense policy statement named China as a ""security concern"", or that the Taiwan government urged the ""military encirclement"" of China to prevent any ""foreign adventures"" by Beijing. It comes as no surprise -- but it still makes no sense. China's defense budget this year is 247.7 billion yuan: Around US$30 billion at the official exchange rate. There are those in Washington who will say that it's more like $60 billion in purchasing power, but then there used to be ""experts"" who annually produced hugely inflated and frightening estimates of the Soviet defense budget. Such people will always exist: to justify a big U.S. defense budget, you need a big threat. It's true that 247.7 billion yuan buys an awful lot of warm bodies in military uniform in the low-wage Chinese economy, but it doesn't actually buy much more in the way of high-tech military systems. It's also true that the Chinese defense budget has grown by double-digit increases for the past fourteen years: This year it's up by 12.6 percent. But that is not significantly faster than the Chinese economy as a whole is growing, and it's about what you have to spend in order to convert what used to be a glorified peasant militia into a modern military force. It would be astonishing if China chose NOT to modernize its armed forces as the rest of the economy modernizes, and the end result is not going to be a military machine that towers above all others. If you project the current growth rates of military spending in China and the United States into the future, China's defense budget catches up with the United States about the same time that its Gross Domestic Product does, in the late 2030s or the early 2040s. As to China's strategic intentions, the record of the past is reassuring in several respects. China has almost never been militarily expansionist beyond the traditional boundaries of the Middle Kingdom (which do include Tibet in the view of most Chinese), and its border clashes with India, the Soviet Union and Vietnam in the first decades of Communist rule generally ended with a voluntary Chinese withdrawal from the disputed territories. The same moderation has usually applied in nuclear matters. The CIA frets that China could have a hundred nuclear missiles targeted on the United States by 2015, but that is actually evidence of China's great restraint. The first Chinese nuclear weapons test was forty years ago, and by now China could have thousands of nuclear warheads targeted on the U.S. if it wanted. (The United States DOES have thousands of nuclear warheads that can strike Chinese targets.) The Beijing regime is obsessed with economic stability, because it fears that a severe downturn would trigger social and political upheaval. The last thing it wants is a military confrontation with its biggest trading partner, the United States. It will go on playing the nationalist card over Taiwan to curry domestic political favor, but there is no massive military build-up and no plausible threat of impending war in East Asia.

#### -- Won’t go nuclear

PPG 4 (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania), 9-29, Lexis)

U.S. military capacity is now so overstretched by the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts that a Chinese move to realize its own top strategic objective, the scooping up of Taiwan to complete the hat trick with Hong Kong and Macao, would find the United States hard-pressed to be able to respond at all. A U.S. threat of a nuclear attack on China -- with China's inevitable nuclear counterstrike -- would be so wildly unacceptable in political terms in the United States itself as to be **out of the question** for any U.S. administration. The idea of causing Los Angeles to disappear because China had seized Taiwan would be a trade-off that no American leader would even dare contemplate. America is lucky so far that China has not yet sought to match its economic reach in Asia with a corresponding assertion of political influence. That doesn't mean that Asia will inevitably become a sphere of Chinese dominance. What will happen instead -- what is already happening, in fact -- is that other Asian powers such as Japan, Korea and India will increasingly take steps to check Chinese power by increasing their own military capacity. In other words, what was a situation in which the United States stood between Japan and Korea and the imposition of Chinese influence will now become one in which those countries will become more dependent on their own resources to defend themselves. The response of the Koreans could be said to be a move toward resolving the problems between South and North Korea to enable them to present a united front to the Chinese. The response of Japan that can be expected will be limited remilitarization. The health and peace of the region will depend on the degree to which the competition among these countries will be economic, rather than political and military. What will this modification of the balance of power in Asia mean for the United States? First of all, none of this will happen tomorrow. The extension of China's reach and the Japanese and Korean response will be gradual and spread out across the years, although there may well be some pinpricks at the extremities sooner rather than later. The Chinese themselves will avoid direct confrontation with the United States at all costs. It is not their way. Conflict between the two countries would be asymmetrical in the extreme in any case. Basically, the two can't attack each other. **Nuclear warfare is out**. The million-man People's Liberation Army isn't portable. The Chinese are definitely not into terrorism.

## 1nr v Kentucky GS

### Politics

#### Disad outweights and turns the case Russia war -> no trade and probably increase protectionism

#### US/Russian nuclear war causes extinction – its categorically different than other impacts

Bostrom 2 (Nick, PhD Philosophy – Oxford University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are **mere ripples** on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[2]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn2) At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[3]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn3) A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as **global** and **terminal**. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn4)  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

### Their Warming add on

#### US/Russia relations is the critical internal link to global warming

**Light, Wong and Charap**, 6/30/**2009** (Andrew – senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, Julian – senior policy analyst at CAP, and Samuel – fellow at CAP, U.S.-Russia Climate and Energy Efficiency Cooperation: A Neglected Challenge, Center for American Progress, p. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/neglected\_challenge.html)

The summit between President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in Moscow on July 6-8 comes in the middle of a packed international schedule of bilateral and multilateral meetings for the United States. on climate change. In the run up to the critical U.N. climate talks in Copenhagen at the end of this year, when the extension or successor to the existing Kyoto Protocol must be agreed upon, it is crucial that the United States and Russia—both major emitters of greenhouse gases and potentially leaders on this crucial issue—explore ways of working together to ensure a positive outcome at these talks. Enhancing cooperation on climate change and energy efficiency should be a major plank of U.S. Russia policy and should be discussed at the highest levels when President Obama meets with President Medvedev next week. Russia, like the United States, is a significant contributor to global warming. If the European Union is disaggregated Russia is the third-largest emitter of carbon dioxide behind the United States and China and still currently ahead of India. More importantly Russian per capita emissions are on the rise, and are projected at this point to approach America’s top rank as per capita emitter by 2030. Russia is also the third-largest consumer of energy and one of the world’s most energy-intensive economies. Making Russia a partner on these issues could be critical in order to **advance a sound global climate change agenda**.

#### Cooperation is the most effective warming solution --- solves in the short-term

**Light, Wong and Charap**, 6/30/**2009** (Andrew – senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, Julian – senior policy analyst at CAP, and Samuel – fellow at CAP, U.S.-Russia Climate and Energy Efficiency Cooperation: A Neglected Challenge, Center for American Progress, p. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/neglected\_challenge.html)

One of the most striking features of Russia’s energy profile is its energy intensity—the amount of energy consumed per unit of gross domestic product—which is higher than any of the world’s 10-largest energy-consuming countries, 3.1 times greater than the European Union, and more than twice that of the United States. This massive potential for improvement makes working with the Russians to increase their energy efficiency the most effective short-term way to help them reduce emissions and points toward the clearest path for demonstrating the economic advantages of taking on climate change.

#### Romney election results in Iran strikes --- Obama reelection defuses the situation with diplomacy

**Daily Kos**, 4/16/**2012** (President Obama versus Romney on Iran, p. <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/04/16/1083726/-President-Obama-versus-Romney-on-Iran>)

3. Approach to foreign policy: Romney says he will “not apologize” for America and advocates a return to the Bush cowboy “my way or the highway” approach to dealing with other nations. When John Bolton is an endorser, that scares me. To me, however the biggest contrast is their approach to Iran. Binyamin Netanyahu by all accounts is a hawk who is pushing the United States to bomb Iran and has been doing so for a long time. He appears to see no need for negotiation. Granted, he has a right to protect his nation if he believes that its under threat. However, we all know how flawed the “intelligence” was for the Iraq war. And its important to let negotiations play out as far as possible before rushing to war, which would have many unintended consequences for years to come. (See the Iraq war). Here’s the big difference. Here’s Netanyahu’s recent response to the ongoing P5+1 talks: http://news.yahoo.com/... Netanyahu -- whose government has not ruled out a preemptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities -- earlier said however that Tehran had simply bought itself some extra time to comply. "My initial impression is that Iran has been given a 'freebie'," Netanyahu said during talks with visiting US Senator Joe Lieberman, the premier's office reported. "It has got five weeks to continue enrichment without any limitation, any inhibition. I think Iran should take immediate steps to stop all enrichment, take out all enrichment material and dismantle the nuclear facility in Qom," he said. "I believe that the world's greatest practitioner of terrorism must not have the opportunity to develop atomic bombs," he said. Here’s President Obama’s response yesterday to Netanyahu (in a response to a journalist's question) at the press conference in Cartagena: But Obama refuted that statement, saying "The notion that we've given something away or a freebie would indicate that Iran has gotten something." "In fact, they got the toughest sanctions that they're going to be facing coming up in a few months if they don't take advantage of those talks. I hope they do," Obama said. "The clock is ticking and I've been very clear to Iran and our negotiating partners that we're not going to have these talks just drag out in a stalling process," Obama told reporters after an Americas summit in Colombia."But so far at least we haven't given away anything -- other than the opportunity for us to negotiate," he said. Obama in conjunction with world powers is negotiating with Iran, trying to prevent a needless war. You can be sure that Mitt Romney would bow to his buddy Netanyahu and attack Iran. He has previously said “We will not have an inch of difference between ourselves and Israel”. As he also said in a debate, before making any decision regarding Israel, he will call his friend Bibi. Bottom line, if somehow the American people elect Mitt Romney, expect more of the bombastic, Bush cowboy approach to foreign policy with a more than likely bombardment of Iran. If the American people are not fooled by this charlatan and they reelect Barack Obama, he will continue in his measured way to deal with the threats around the world, quietly, through the use of negotiation, and force if absolutely necessary, but only as a last resort, without bragging, and scaring the American people with needless terrorism alerts.

### Uniqueness debate – group it

#### Obama is winning now by a few points – all of their Romney leads args are specific to one or two polls but our sivler ev says the ovwhelming consensus – and our ev is just better there is literally one sentence highlighted in each of their ev and its not discussing consensus

#### Obama will win the election --- Abramowitz prediction model proves. But dramatic events can still change the outcome.

**Ravi**, **9/13**/2012 (Anusha, Abramowitz Predicts 2012 Election Results, The Emory Wheel, p. http://www.emorywheel.com/abramowitz-predicts-2012-election-results/)

Alan Abramowitz, the Alben W. Barkley Professor of Political Science, has released his forecast for the outcome of the presidential election this November. Abramowitz, who has accurately predicted the popular vote winner of every presidential election since 1988, says incumbent President Barack Obama will win the election by a close margin of about 1.2 percent. Abramowitz based his forecast on statistical analysis composed of the candidate’s approval rating at the end of June, the growth of the economy and the value of the “incumbency factor,” which refers to the advantage a candidate will have simply for being the candidate that voters are familiar with. “The Democratic constituency is just larger than the Republicans’ and encompasses far more different types of people,” Abramowitz said. “Even if Romney receives the maximum turnout from white Republican voters, he won’t win.” In the past, the incumbency factor has meant more, according to Abramowitz. But more recently, the value of merely being the incumbent candidate has decreased because of the stark polarization — the division of voters into political extremes — of the American voting public. While Abramowitz has made his prediction about two months before the election takes place, he said that a very dramatic event would have to occur to change what he believes will be the outcome of the election.

#### Challenger won’t get the undecided voters.

**Cohn**, **8/8**/2012 (Nate – former Whitman debater and author of the Electionate, 90 Days Until the Election – And Obama Has the Advantage, The New Republic, p. <http://www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/105912/obama-has-the-advantage-90-days-go>)

Contrary to conventional wisdom, history suggests that undecided voters are unlikely to uniformly flock toward the challenger: Candidates almost always finish above their share of the vote in summer polling. While there are examples of challengers sweeping undecided voters, as Reagan did in 1980, the “1980 or bust” position is hardly enviable. The economy is bad enough that the 1980 scenario can’t be discounted, but the differences between 1980 and 2012 are too great to count on it—especially given Romney’s astonishingly bad numbers among undecided voters.

#### Obama will win – Romney is not exploiting white voters.

**Cohn**, **8/8**/2012 (Nate – former Whitman debater and author of the Electionate, 90 Days Until the Election – And Obama Has the Advantage, The New Republic, p. <http://www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/105912/obama-has-the-advantage-90-days-go>)

Barack Obama has the advantage with 90 days to go until November 6, and the Romney campaign mostly has itself to blame. Four years after Obama’s decisive victory in 2008, a poor economy, dissatisfaction with the direction of the country, and mediocre approval ratings have conspired to endanger the president’s reelection chances. But a close race, which is what the polls show, is not the same as a dead heat. Romney is an imperfect candidate who has been poorly served by a strategy that has failed to contest Obama’s predictable attacks, leaving him poorly positioned heading into the conventions. Over the last four years, Obama’s coalition suffered deep enough losses to give his challenger a legitimate path to victory. But those losses were narrow and concentrated among white voters without a college degree, as Obama retains near-2008 levels of support among minorities and college-educated whites. As a wealthy former CEO of a private equity firm with an awkward cadence who could never call himself a great politican, Romney has never naturally appealed to white working class voters, and, as a result, Romney’s ability to capitalize on Obama’s biggest weakness requires him to overcome his own. With three months to go, these weaknesses are as pronounced as ever. The Obama campaign adopted a strategy to remedy their weakness among white working class voters by defining Romney as an out-of-touch, outsourcing plutocrat willing to close factories, fire workers, and avoid taxes to advance his self-interest. If the Romney campaign possessed effective tools to blunt Obama’s offensive, they weren’t properly employed. Instead, the Romney campaign inexplicably focused on attacking a well-defined incumbent president, while permitting Obama and his allies to broadcast unflattering and uncontested tales about an undefined challenger. Boston’s ill-advised strategy has endangered Romney’s chances. Romney’s unfavorable ratings remain high and he hasn’t yet consolidated the disaffected white working class voters with reservations about Obama’s performance. In Ohio—ground zero for the Obama campaign’s efforts—Romney’s numbers have plummeted to the low forties, an extremely weak showing in a must win state. Undecided voters harbor particularly unfavorable impressions of the Republican nominee. According to recent surveys, Romney’s favorables are in the teens among undecided voters, while a majority has already formulated a negative impression.

#### Obama is ahead in the approval and favorability poll.

**Cohn**, **8/8**/2012 (Nate – former Whitman debater and author of the Electionate, 90 Days Until the Election – And Obama Has the Advantage, The New Republic, p. <http://www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/105912/obama-has-the-advantage-90-days-go>)

If Romney was closer to fifty percent, he could more easily overcome these problems with undecided voters. But Obama has a consistent three-point edge in national surveys, with 47 or 48 percent of registered voters; this means that to fight to a tie, let alone to win, Romney will need to persuade the preponderance of undecided voters. And while many hold that Obama’s 47 or 48 percent approval rating suggests that a majority of voters are lined up to unconditionally select the challenger, reality is somewhat more complicated. Obama’s net approval is roughly even and a majority of voters usually say they have a favorable opinion of Obama, unlike Romney. While approval ratings are a great indicator of an incumbent’s chances, net-approval or favorability ratings also perform quite well. Once all the metrics are taken into account, it is not clear that a majority of voters are committed to voting against Obama.

### Link Debate

China bashing/link

#### Permitting Chinese foreign investment in domestic energy supplies sparks a HUGE public backlash – SNOOC controversy proves

Burke 11 (John, Analyst @ BakerHostetler, "The United States Welcomes Chinese Foreign Direct Investment - The Handful of Deals Blocked by CFIUS are Aberrant," http://www.chinaustradelawblog.com/2011/02/articles/investment/the-united-states-welcomes-chinese-foreign-direct-investment-the-handful-of-deals-blocked-by-cfius-are-aberrant/)

The President of the United States may order the divestment of a foreigner’s controlling interest in a U.S. business should he determine that such control threatens U.S. “national security.” The CFIUS review system works through voluntary filings by those parties to proposed transactions who seek to take advantage of the safe harbor that a CFIUS approval prior to an acquisition provides. The safe harbor prevents the President from undoing the deal pursuant to his authority under FINSA.¶ The CFIUS process is disciplined by the authority FINSA provides CFIUS to self-initiate a review as to whether any “covered transaction” threatens U.S. national security at any time. That authority is seldom used, but its existence means that foreign acquirers should give serious consideration to voluntary CFIUS filings before any national security questions may be asked.¶ For most companies, CFIUS review takes only thirty days. By seeking it voluntarily before the acquisition is consummated, the foreign acquirer can obtain assurance that its investment would not be destroyed by a CFIUS review, perhaps years after the acquisition. For a small number of companies, CFIUS review may become an additional forty-five day in-depth investigation. Even at this stage, however, most acquisitions are approved, although often with conditions.¶ A handful of Chinese acquisitions of existing U.S. businesses have been stopped either as a result of the CFIUS review process, or as a result of intense political opposition. However, in each of those cases, circumstances unique to the particular transaction, and not any hostility to Chinese investment in general, are what caused the transaction to fail. For example, when Northwest Non Ferrous International Investment Co., Ltd. dropped its plans to acquire a Nevada mining company, the reason for the unfavorable CFIUS review was the extremely sensitive nature of U.S. military installations that were adjacent to the mines to be acquired. (See The United States Remains Open To Chinese Investment). Had those mines been located elsewhere, the acquisition likely would have sailed through with little opposition. There was no objection to Chinese acquisition of gold mines. The objection was to the proximity to military installations.¶ Another deal effectively blocked by a CFIUS review was the proposed acquisition in 2007 by Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. (“Huawei”) of a significant ownership stake in 3Com Corporation. Two major concerns reportedly led CFIUS agencies to oppose the deal. The first was the inclusion in the deal of 3Com’s subsidiary Tipping Point, which sells network-based intrusion prevention equipment used by the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence agencies. The second was specific to Huawei. There were allegations in the press that Huawei had engaged in corporate espionage and intellectual property theft and was involved in high tech exports to Saddam Hussein’s regime and the Taliban. The combination of mission critical U.S. military technology and an acquirer with a particularly bad reputation from the perspective of U.S. national security interests caused that deal to fail, not any general opposition to Chinese companies acquiring specific U.S. businesses.¶ China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (“CNOOC”) attempted acquisition in 2005 of Unocal, a U.S. energy company, was halted by congressional and public opposition before it could undergo a CFIUS review. That opposition arose because of concerns that critical energy supplies would pass out of US control. The fact that CNOOC is a Chinese state-owned enterprise did heighten those concerns. But it was the concern over access to critical energy supplies, and not anti-Chinese animus, that drove the opposition to that deal. Very few businesses that Chinese companies may seek to acquire will present these types of concerns. And, in hindsight, many observers think that, had CNOOC not pulled out, CFIUS would have approved. Unfortunately, CNOOC did not stay involved long enough to find out.

If we win the link to politics, it turns the case

Burke 11 (John, Analyst @ BakerHostetler, "The United States Welcomes Chinese Foreign Direct Investment - The Handful of Deals Blocked by CFIUS are Aberrant," http://www.chinaustradelawblog.com/2011/02/articles/investment/the-united-states-welcomes-chinese-foreign-direct-investment-the-handful-of-deals-blocked-by-cfius-are-aberrant/)

Finally, CFIUS approval is not always the end of the story. It is important to pay attention to potential concerns of Congress and the general public. The law may authorize execution of a project. Popular opinion translated in Congress can still stop one.

### Group Ohio

Their ohio ev doesn’t apply in a world in which the plan gets spun as the overwhelming consensus finds it unpopular

#### Winning Ohio does not guarantee Romney the election.

**Sabato et. al**, 4/26/**2012** (Larry – director of the University of Virginia’s Center for Politics, Kyle Kondik – Director of Communications at the Center for Politics, Geoff Skelley – Media Relations Coordinator at the Center for Poltiics,Plan of Attack: Obama, Romney and the Electoral College, Crystal Ball, p. http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/plan-of-attack-obama-romney-and-the-electoral-college/)

• Would winning Ohio guarantee the presidency for Romney? Not necessarily. Richard Nixon won Ohio in 1960 but lost the presidency (just like Dewey in 1944). When Nixon in 1968 won his first presidential victory, his winning coalition was built on three big-state pillars: California (40 electoral votes) and Ohio and Illinois (both with 26 electoral votes). Ohio is now down to 18 electoral votes as its population growth has sagged. It remains a prize, but Obama has paths to victory without it. • One way of looking at this election is this: Obama took 52.87% of the popular vote in 2008, which was the best performance in the popular vote by a Democrat since 1964. In 23 of the 28 states he won (plus DC), Obama won a greater percentage of the vote than he did nationally. Conveniently for Obama, if he simply retains the states where he ran better than he did nationally, he will take 272 electoral votes — two more than necessary. This scenario assumes that Romney garners all 22 of John McCain’s states, plus Florida, Indiana, North Carolina, Ohio and Virginia.

#### Ohio is not a must win --- other states can open up. National trends matter more than swing states.

**Bernstein**, 7/8/**2012** (Jonathan – political scientist who contributes to the Washington Post blogs Plum Line and PostPartisan, Five myths about swing states, Tampa Bay Times, p. <http://www.tampabay.com/news/perspective/five-myths-about-swing-states/1239046>)

You'll hear plenty of similar pronouncements every election season. The Republicans have never won without Ohio, therefore they can't win without Ohio. Or: There is a "blue wall" of states that the Democrats have captured consistently since 1992, so the party has a built-in minimum in the electoral college. That could mean that any poll showing a strong Republican tilt in one of those states indicates that Obama is doomed — or that Gov. Scott Walker's recall victory in "blue wall" Wisconsin shows that Democrats are in trouble. Forget all these "rules." When Republicans won three consecutive presidential elections in the 1980s, pundits became convinced that the GOP had an electoral college lock. That view lasted exactly as long as the party's national vote lead did; as soon as Bill Clinton took the national lead in 1992, it turned out that some of the Republican "lock" states were swingers after all. Sure, if Romney wins Democratic California, he's going to win the election, but that's because if Romney wins California, he's going to be in the process of a huge national landslide. The United States has national elections, and what matters almost every time is the national results. Yes, a candidate must find 270 electoral votes in order to win. But in most years, the electoral college margin will be much larger than the popular vote difference. And the rare times, such as in 2000, when the popular vote is very close, it's not possible to guess in advance which states will be the one or two that really make a difference. So the campaigns will put their resources into those states they expect to be close, because it certainly doesn't hurt, but our elections are much more national than our obsession with swing states implies.

### Case

#### China CAN and HAS put massive energy-related FDI into the US economy

Burke 11 (John, Analyst @ BakerHostetler, "The United States Welcomes Chinese Foreign Direct Investment - The Handful of Deals Blocked by CFIUS are Aberrant," http://www.chinaustradelawblog.com/2011/02/articles/investment/the-united-states-welcomes-chinese-foreign-direct-investment-the-handful-of-deals-blocked-by-cfius-are-aberrant/)

Direct Chinese investment in the United States would likely be even greater were it not for press reports that have created the impression that the United States is hostile to investment from China. The press is full of terms such as CFIUS (the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) and FINSA (the Foreign Investment National Security Act), and tales of Chinese companies forced to abandon planned acquisitions of U.S. companies. Some Chinese companies have been forced to abandon their acquisition plans. However, each of those celebrated cases presented unique circumstances that would not exist for the vast majority of Chinese companies who may wish to set up operations in the United States. The reality is that the United States remains one of the world’s economies most open to foreign investment, including from China.

With a few very limited exceptions, such as airlines, foreigners are as free to invest in greenfield projects that create new businesses in the United States on the same basis as Americans. Recent Chinese greenfield investments in the United States include a $1 billion steel pipe mill that Tianjin Pipe is planning to build this year near Corpus Christi, Texas; Suntech Power Holdings’ solar panel assembly plant in Arizona; and American Yoncheng Gravure Cylinder plant in Spartanburg, South Carolina. These and many other Chinese greenfield investments have not faced any significant opposition and in many cases have been able to benefit from state and local government investment incentives.

#### US doesn’t restrict Chinese foreign direct investment now

Burke 11 (John, Analyst @ BakerHostetler, "The United States Welcomes Chinese Foreign Direct Investment - The Handful of Deals Blocked by CFIUS are Aberrant," http://www.chinaustradelawblog.com/2011/02/articles/investment/the-united-states-welcomes-chinese-foreign-direct-investment-the-handful-of-deals-blocked-by-cfius-are-aberrant/)

The United States remains committed to an open investment environment and treating foreign investors, including those from China, on an equal footing with their domestic competition in the vast majority of cases where the foreign investment does not threaten to impair the national security of the United States. It was for this reason that Congress set the initial CFIUS review deadline at thirty days, to coincide with the thirty day antitrust review period under the Hart-Scott-Rodino procedures.¶ Even after the implementation of FINSA, most cross-border mergers and acquisitions do not require a CFIUS review. Nevertheless, CFIUS national security reviews of proposed acquisitions of U.S. businesses are going to be a crucial part of the transaction for many foreign investments in existing U.S. businesses.¶ The most important considerations for success in a CFIUS review are understanding in advance the institutional and other concerns of the CFIUS member agencies, and creative thinking about how to demonstrate that those concerns are not threatened, or to mitigate them. In most cases early attention to the CFIUS process and to the legitimate concerns of the member agencies can ensure smooth and timely proceedings that result in CFIUS clearance without restrictions, or on terms that preserve the value of the transaction for all parties. Voluntary review, taking advantage of the law’s safe harbor provision, likely would have helped Chinese enterprises in all of the failed transactions, and sensitivity to possible political concerns would have contained the fallout and bruised feelings in those instances where national security legitimately prevailed.¶ To say the outcomes of such cases in China would have been no different or worse would not be good enough. The United States is not deliberately discriminating against foreign, nor specifically Chinese, investment, but like any sovereign it is mindful of its sovereignty, and its security.

### G

#### No chance of Israeli strike – Iran is too strong

Dan Williams, 3/7/07 (http://www.capetimes.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=3717229)

JERUSALEM: Israel has long been the wild card in debates on the Iranian nuclear programme - a country that, while formally outside negotiations, has lobbying clout given its penchant for pre-emptive strikes.   But Israeli officials, once quick to project military menace in the face of what Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has called an "existential threat", are increasingly taking a softer public line on how to meet Iran's refusal to halt uranium enrichment.   It appears that many **Israelis have decided that Iran is too tough an enemy for their armed forces to take on alone - and that the international community senses this too.**   "**The last thing Israel is interested in is military action against Iran,**" said Avigdor Lieberman, the Israeli strategic affairs minister.

#### Israel will not strike Iran

Dan Williams, 3/7/07 (http://www.capetimes.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=3717229)

Like its US ally, Israel refuses to rule out pre-emptive strikes as a last-ditch means of curbing a nuclear programme, that Iran insists is peaceful. But unlike Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Iran's nuclear facilities may be too distant, numerous and fortified for Israel to tackle. The sense of tactical limitation was reinforced, throughout the region and beyond, by last year's inconclusive Israeli war against Lebanese Hezbollah guerrillas.   **"It is becoming increasingly clear that Israel has no viable military option on Iran, and is pinning its hopes on some sort of solution by the Americans,"** said Alon Ben-David, Israel analyst for Jane's Defence Weekly. "But **there is a growing number of Israelis who think the country will just have to live with a nuclear-armed Iran,**" he said.

### Conventional Wars

#### No answer to our external impact –

#### Proliferation prevents conventional wars from happening because the nuclear weapons make the cost of going to war too high – that causes more mellow actions and leaders will avoid going to war.

#### Conventional war outweighs nuclear war –

#### 1. Absent nuclear weapons, conventional war is more probable – it removes restraints on aggression

**Waltz**, **1981** (Kenneth – professor emeritus of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, The spread of nuclear weapons, Adelphi Papers, No. 171, p. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm)

A deterrent strategy promises less damage, should deterrence fail, than does the Schles­inger-Brown ‘countervailing’ strategy, a strat­egy which contemplates fighting a limited, strategic nuclear war. War-fighting strategies offer no clear place to stop short of victory for some and defeat for others. Deterrent strategies do, and that place is where one country threat­ens another’s vital interests. Deterrent strate­gies **lower the probability** that wars will be fought. If wars are nevertheless fought, deter­rent strategies lower the probability that they will become wars of high intensity. A war between the United States and the Soviet Union that did get out of control would be catastrophic. If they set out to destroy each other, they would greatly reduce the world’s store of developed resources while killing mil­lions outside of their own borders through fall­out. Even while destroying themselves, states with few weapons would do **less damage** to others. As ever, the biggest international dangers come from the strongest states. Fearing the world’s destruction, one may prefer a world of conventional great powers having a higher probability of fighting less destructive wars to a world of nuclear great powers having a lower probability of fighting more destructive wars. But that choice **effectively disappeared** with the production of atomic bombs by the United States during World War II. Since the great powers are **unlikely to be drawn into the nuclear wars** of others, the added global dangers posed by the spread of nuclear weapons are **small**.

#### 2. Magnitude – conventional wars are seven times more intense than World War Two

**Gabriel and Metz**, June **1992** (Richard - professor of political science at the U.S. Army War College, and Karen S. - research librarian at the University of Michigan Medical Center, A short history of war, p. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/gabrmetz/gabr001f.htm)

In 1980 the U.S. Army estimated that modern non-nuclear conventional war had become 400 to **700 percent more lethal and intense** as it had been in World War II depending, of course, on the battle scenario. The increases in conventional killing power have been enormous, and far greater and more rapid than in any other period in man's history. The artillery firepower of a maneuver battalion, for example, has doubled since World War II while the "casualty effect" of modern artillery guns has increased 400 percent. Range has increased, on average, by 60 percent, and the "zone of destruction" of battalion artillery by 350 percent. Advances in metallurgy and the use of new chemical explosives has increased the explosive power of basic caliber artillery by many times. A single round from an 8-inch gun has the same explosive power as a World War II 250 pound bomb. Modern artillery is lighter, stronger, and more mobile than ever before. Computerized fire direction centers can range guns on target in only 15 seconds compared to 6 minutes required in World War II. The rates of fire of these guns are three times what they used to be. So durable are the new artillery guns that they can fire 500 rounds over a 4 hour period without incurring damage to the barrel. Range has increased to the point where the M-110 gun can fire a 203 millimeter shell 25 miles. The self-propelled gun has a travel range of 220 miles at a speed of 35 miles per hour. Area saturation artillery, in its infancy in World War II, has become very lethal. A single Soviet artillery battalion firing 18 BM-21 rocket launchers can place 35 tons of explosive rockets on a target 17 miles away in just 30 seconds. The American Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) is a totally mobile self-contained artillery system that can place 8,000 M-77 explosive rounds on a target the size of six football fields in less than 45 seconds. Air defense guns have developed to where a single M-163 Vulcan cannon can fire 3,000 rounds of explosive 20-millimeter shot per minute with almost 100 percent accuracy within 2 miles of the gun position. Modern antiaircraft guns command 36 times the airspace around their position as they did in World War II. Tanks have improved in speed, reliability, and firepower. Modern tanks can make 40 miles per hour over a 300 mile range, or three times that of earlier tanks. A tank equipped with modern gunsights and a cannon stabilization system has a probability of scoring a first round hit of 98 percent, 13 times greater than World War II tanks. Modern battletanks, unlike any earlier variety, can also fire while on the move. Their probability of hitting the target while moving is almost 10 times greater than the probability of a World War II tank firing from a stabilized position. New propellants and ammunition design have increased the lethality of the modern tank. During the Iraqi-U.S. war in 1991, Armor Piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS) rounds moving at 5,467 feet per second pierced 4 feet of sand in bunkered berms and still destroyed enemy tanks. Tank gunsights, lasers connected to computers, can locate a target in the dark, smoke, rain, or snow at 2,000 yards. The armed combat helicopter has produced a revolution in tank and armor killing power available to the combat commander. These weapons can be configured to kill either troops or tanks, and are truly awesome weapons. The Apache gunship carries 16 Hellfire antitank missiles that need only minimal further direction after they are fired to home in on the target. New sights allow the helicopter to acquire its target from more than 5 miles away. The helicopter has added new mobility and stealth to the battlefield permitting a division commander to strike with troops or antitank weapons 60 miles to his front, four times the range in World War II. The infantry, too, has increased its range, mobility, and firepower with new armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. Infantry can also bring to bear shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles and Jeep and Hummer mounted TOW antitank missiles with devastating results. The modern battlefield is a lethal place indeed. To place the increased intensity of the modern non-nuclear conventional battlefield in perspective, one need only remember that, in World War II, heavy combat was defined as 2-4 combat pulses a day. Modern combat divisions are configured to routinely deliver 12-14 combat pulses a day and to fight around the clock by night operations. A modern U.S. or Soviet motorized division can deliver three times as much firepower at 10 times the rate as each could in World War II. By these and any other historical (or human) standard, even conventional weapons have in a very real sense become **quite unconventional**.

#### If we win deterrence, that turns all of their impacts because it is a terminal conflict mitigator.

#### Conventional wars escalate to nuclear war

**Posen**, Fall **1982** (Barry R. - Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT, Inadvertent nuclear war?, International Security, p. 28-29)

Could a major East-West conventional war be kept conventional? American policymakers increasingly seem to think so. Recent discussions of such a clash reflects belief that protracted conventional conflict is possible, if only the West fields sufficient conventional forces and acquires an adequate industrial mobilization base. indeed, the Reagan Administration has embraced the idea of preparing for a long conventional war, as evidenced by its concern with the mobilization potential of the American defense industry.1 Underlying this policy is the belief that the United States should be prepared to fight a war that, in duration and character, **resembles World War II**. American decision-makers seem confident of their ability to avoid nuclear escalation if they so desire. That confidence is **dangerous and unwarranted**. It fails to take into account that **intense conventional operations** may cause nuclear escalation by threatening or destroying strategic nuclear forces. The operational requirements (or preferences) for conducting a conventional war may thus **unleash enormous, and possibly uncontrollable, escalatory pressures** despite the desires of American or Soviet policymakers. Moreover, the potential sources of such escalation are deeply rooted in the nature of the force structures and military strategies of the superpowers, as well as in the technological and geographical circumstances of large-scale East-West conflict. If the escalatory pressures that could attend a major conventional war are to be prevented from driving decision-makers towards decisions they neither intend nor wish to make, those pressures must be recognized and guarded against by the leaders of both superpowers.2

#### Proliferation reduces the likelihood of nuclear war

**Asal and Beardsley**, **2007** (Victor – assistant professor of political science at SUNY Albany, and Kyle – assistant professor of political science at Emory, Proliferation and international crisis behavior, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 2, p. 142)

Other, more optimistic, scholars see benefits to nuclear proliferation or, perhaps not actively advocating the development of more nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon states, see that the presence of nuclear weapons has at least been stabilizing in the past. For example, some scholars are confident of the promise of the ‘nuclear peace’.4 While those who oppose proliferation present a number of arguments, those who contend that nuclear weapons would **reduce interstate wars** are fairly consistent in focusing on one key argument: nuclear weapons make the risk of war **unacceptable for states**. As Waltz argues, the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. War between nuclear states may escalate as the loser uses larger and larger warheads. Fearing that, states will want to draw back. Not escalation but **deescalation becomes likely**. War remains possible, but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for. (Sagan & Waltz, 2003: 6–7) ‘Nuclear war simply makes the risks of war much higher and shrinks the chance that a country will go to war’ (Snyder & Diesing, 1977: 450). Using similar logic, Bueno de Mesquita & Riker (1982) demonstrate formally that a world with almost universal membership in the **nuclear club will be much less likely to experience nuclear war** than a world with only a few members.

#### Independently, European conventional wars are probable

**Kaiser**, 2/5/**2009** (Karl – director of the Program on Transatlantic Relations at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and adjunct professor of public policy at the Kennedy School, An alternative to nato membership, International Herald Tribune, p. lexis)

First, domestic conditions speak against membership. The **reckless engagement** with a superior Russian military by Georgia's president, Mikheil Saakashvili, although he had been thoroughly briefed by the United States about the Russian potential, demonstrated to NATO how bad leadership in combination with a very old conflict can **drag the Atlantic alliance into a war** it does not want. In Ukraine there is no majority support for membership among the general population; indeed, in the eastern part of the country there is strong opposition. If ever the leadership were to force this issue it would risk a deep split, with potentially disastrous consequences for the integrity of Ukraine. Second, contrary to the expectations at the end of the Cold War, large-scale conventional warfare in Europe has reappeared as a **threatening possibility**. The worst possible scenario for NATO would be that the alliance would be unable to defend an ally under Article V because of lack of political will (even now the majority of people in some NATO countries do not support going to war over Central European members), or for military reasons—as would be the case for Georgia and Ukraine under the present circumstances. This would expose NATO as a paper tiger and cause it to loose the essence of its credibility and meaning.

#### Conventional European wars escalate to nuclear war

**Axelrod**, **1990** (Robert - Institute of Public Policy Studies at the University of Michigan, The concept of stability in the context of conventional war in europe, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 247)

Before proceeding, however, it is worth point out that studying conventional warfare is important not only for its own sake, but also for the avoidance of nuclear war. The outbreak of conventional war in Europe would entail a **risk of escalation to nuclear war**. The risk would be **substantial** because the stakes in Europe are so **high**, the combat could be **very intense** from the very beginning, thousands of tactical nuclear weapons makes command and control **difficult**, and in any case NATO is pledged to use nuclear weapons if necessary to prevent a Warsaw Pact victory.

#### Proliferators will not be aggressive – that’s Alagappa -- the primary goal of new nuclear weapon states is not aggressive action. The goal is regime survival, international influence, and economic gains. Nuclear weapons ameliorate security concerns and cause states to become more relaxed

#### Prefer our evidence – it is written by a distinguished senior fellow at the East-West Center

#### This is a framing issue – If proliferators are not aggressive, then there is no incentive to pre-empt or miscalculate. Every state will view world events through a defensive lens

#### The only use of nuclear weapons is deterrence, not actual use

**Waltz**, Spring/Summer **2007** (Kenneth, A nuclear iran, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 2, with Scott Sagan and Richard Betts, p. 144-145)

**No one has discovered how to use nuclear weapons other than for deterrence**. Let me amend that. There is a form of blackmail that might work, and that is blackmail for money. North Korea might have had that in mind. But when most people say "nuclear blackmail," they think of one country saying, "We have nuclear weapons, and unless you do this—whatever this is—we'll drop one on you." That's simply not plausible. Nobody has tried it, and, if anyone does, it won't work. There are many countries with nuclear weapons, the United States among them, and we haven't figured out how to do anything with these things, except to use them for deterrence. How is a relatively backward, dinky nuclear country going to manage to use its nuclear weapons for purposes other than deterrence? I don't see any possibility of that. It may be, as Scott says, that possessing nuclear weapons gives a country a little more freedom of action. But it certainly does not gain much ability to act in a conventional way because it has nuclear weapons. Again, nuclear weapons have **one purpose and only one purpose**, and that's deterrence.

### Accidents

#### No risk of accidents – safety devices and conflict management prevent war

**Mueller**, **2009** (John – Woody Hayes chair of national security studies at Ohio State University, Atomic Obsession, p. 100-101)

It is a plausible argument that, all other things equal, if the number of nuclear weapons in existence increases, the likelihood one will go off by accident will also increase. In fact, all things haven't been equal. As nuclear weapons have increased in numbers and sophistication, **so have safety devices and procedures**. Precisely because the weapons are so dangerous, extraordinary efforts to keep them from going off by accident or by an unauthorized deliberate act have been instituted, and these measures have, so far, been effective: no one has been killed in a nuclear explosion since Nagasaki. Extrapolating further from disasters that have not occurred, many have been led to a concern that, triggered by a nuclear weapons accident, a war could somehow be started through an act of desperation or of consummate sloppiness. Before the invention of nuclear weapons, such possibilities were not perhaps of great concern, because no weapon or small set of weapons could do enough damage to be truly significant. Each nuclear weapon, however, is capable of destroying in an instant more people than have been killed in an average war, and the weapons continue to exist in the tens of thousands. However, even if a bomb, or a few bombs, were to go off, it does not necessarily follow that war would result. For that to happen, it is assumed, the accident would have to take place at a time of war-readiness, as during a crisis, when both sides are poised for action and when one side could perhaps be triggered – or panicked –into major action by an explosion mistakenly taken to be part of, or the prelude to, a full attack. This means that the unlikely happening –a nuclear accident – would have to coincide precisely with an event, a militarized international crisis, something that is **rare** to begin with, became more so as the cold war progressed, and has become even less likely since its demise. Furthermore, even if the accident takes place during a crisis, **it does not follow that escalation** or hasty response **is** inevitable, or even **very likely**. As Bernard § Marked 20:40 § Brodie points out, escalation scenarios essentially impute to both sides "a well-nigh limitless concern with saving face" and/or "a deal of ground-in automaticity of response and counterresponse." None of this was in evidence during the Cuban missile crisis when there were accidents galore. An American spy plane was shot down over Cuba, probably without authorization, and another accidentally went off course and flew threateningly over the Soviet Union. As if that weren’t enough, a Soviet military officer spying for the West sent a message, apparently on a whim, warning that the Soviets were about to attack.31 **None of these remarkable events triggered anything** in the way of precipitous response. They were duly evaluated and then ignored. Robert Jervis points out that "when critics talk of the impact of irrationality, they imply that all such deviations will be in the direction of emotional impulsiveness, of launching an attack, or of taking actions that are terribly risky. But irrationality could also lead a state to **passive acquiescence**." In moments of high stress and threat, people can be said to have three psychological alternatives: (1) to remain calm and rational, (2) to refuse to believe that the threat is imminent or significant, or to panic, lashing out frantically and incoherently at the threat. Generally, people react in one of the first two ways. In her classic study of disaster behavior, Martha Wolfenstein concludes, “The usual reaction is one of being unworried.” In addition, the historical record suggests that **wars simply do not begin by accident**. In his extensive survey of wars that have occurred since 1400, diplomat-historian Evan Luard concludes, "It is impossible to identify a single case in which it can be said that a war started accidentally; in which it was not, at the time the war broke out, the deliberate intention of at least one party that war should take place." Geoffrey Blainey, after similar study, very much agrees: although many have discussed "accidental" or "unintentional" wars, "it is difficult," he concludes, "to find a war which on investigation fits this description." Or, as Henry Kissinger has put it dryly, "Despite popular myths, large military units do not fight by accident."

#### Even if an accident occurs, it won’t escalate

#### --History is on our side – no war has ever been started accidentally. Unintentional use will de-escalate

#### --Psychological studies prove that states will err towards caution instead of aggression

#### --The Cuban Missile Crisis proves that even in hostile situations, accidents will err towards caution and will not escalate

#### Prefer our Mueller evidence because he is recognized national security chair at Ohio State and speaks to probability of an accidental war from proliferation

#### No risk of accidents – star this card

**Quinlan ‘9** (Michael, Former Permanent Under-Sec. State – UK Ministry of Defense, “Thinking about Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects”, p. 63-69)

Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. **It fails to consider what the situation of the decisionmakers would really be**. **Neither side could want escalation**. Both would be appalled at what was going on. **Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a halt**. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which modem delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclearweapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities, and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And **none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality**. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial nuclear armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be doing so (once given that it cannot count upon destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgement that the possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacked possessor used nuclear weapons, whether first or in response to the aggressor's own first use, this judgement would begin to look dangerously precarious. There must be at least a substantial possibility of the aggressor leaders' concluding that their initial judgement had been mistaken—that the risks were after all greater than whatever prize they had been seeking, and that for their own country's , survival they must call off the aggression. Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgement and in the second, if it were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed, as its leaders would know. It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating theznemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesi, makes them the less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternative—it can only be surrender. But a more positive and hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context. The context which concerned NATO during the cold war, for example, was one of defending vital interests against a postlated aggressor whose own vital interests would not be engaged, or would be less engaged. Certainty is not possible, but a clear asymmetry of vital interest is a legitimate basis for expecting an asymmetry, credible to both sides, of resolve in conflict. That places upon statesmen, as page 23 has noted, the key task in deterrence of building up in advance a clear and shared grasp of where limits lie. That was plainly achieved in cold-war Europe. If vital interests have been defined in a way that is dear, and also clearly not overlapping or incompatible with those of the adversary, a credible basis has been laid for the likelihood of greater resolve in resistance. It was also sometimes suggested by critics that whatever might be indicated by theoretical discussion of political will and interests, the military environment of nuclear warfare—particularly difficulties of communication and control—would drive escalation with overwhelming probability to the limit. But it is obscure why matters should be regarded as inevitably .so for every possible level and setting of action. Even if the history of war suggested (as it scarcely does) that military decision-makers are mostly apt to work on the principle 'When in doubt, lash out', the nuclear revolution creates an utterly new situation. The pervasive reality, always plain to both sides during the cold war, is `If this goes on to the end, we are all ruined'. Given that inexorable escalation would mean catastrophe for both, it would be perverse to suppose them permanently incapable of framing arrangements which avoid it. As page 16 has noted, NATO gave its military commanders no widespread delegated authority, in peace or war, to launch nuclear weapons without specific political direction. Many types of weapon moreover had physical safeguards such as PALs incorporated to reinforce organizational ones. There were multiple communication and control systems for passing information, orders, and prohibitions. Such systems could not be totally guaranteed against disruption if at a fairly intense level of strategic exchange—which was only one of many possible levels of conflict— an adversary judged it to be in his interest to weaken political control. It was far from clear why he necessarily should so judge. Even then, however, it remained possible to operate on a general fail-safe presumption: no authorization, no use. That was the basis on which NATO operated. If it is feared that the arrangements which 1 a nuclear-weapon possessor has in place do not meet such standards in some respects, the logical course is to continue to improve them rather than to assume escalation to be certain and uncontrollable, with all the enormous inferences that would have to flow from such an assumption. The likelihood of escalation can never be 100 per cent, and never zero. Where between those two extremes it may lie can never be precisely calculable in advance; and even were it so calculable, it would not be uniquely fixed—it would stand to vary hugely with circumstances. That there should be any risk at all of escalation to widespread nuclear war must be deeply disturbing, and decision-makers would always have to weigh it most anxiously. But a pair of key truths about it need to be recognized. The first is that the risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict and whoever may first have used any particular category of weapon. The initiator of the conflict will always have physically available to him options for applying more force if he meets effective resistance. If the risk of escalation, whatever its degree of probability, is to be regarded as absolutely unacceptable, the necessary inference is that a state attacked by a substantial nuclear power must forgo military resistance. It must surrender, even if it has a nuclear armoury of its own. But the companion truth is that, as page 47 has noted, the risk of escalation is an inescapable burden also upon the aggressor. The exploitation of that burden is the crucial route, if conflict does break out, for managing it, to a tolerable outcome--the only route, indeed, intermediate between surrender and holocaust, and so the necessary basis for deterrence beforehand. The working out of plans to exploit escalation risk most effectively in deterring potential aggression entails further and complex issues. It is for example plainly desirable, wherever geography, politics, and available resources so permit without triggering arms races, to make provisions and dispositions that are likely to place the onus of making the bigger, and more evidently dangerous steps in escalation upon the aggressor volib wishes to maintain his attack, rather than upon the defender. (The customary shorthand for this desirable posture used to be 'escalation dominance'.) These issues are not further discussed here. But addressing them needs to start from acknowledgement that there are in any event no certainties or absolutes available, no options guaranteed to be risk-free and cost-free. Deterrence is not possible without escalation risk; and its presence can point to no automatic policy conclusion save for those who espouse outright pacifism and accept its consequences. Accident and Miscalculation Ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons plainly needs to be taken most seriously. Detailed information is understandably not published, but such direct evidence as there is suggests that it always has been so taken in every possessor state, with the inevitable occasional failures to follow strict procedures dealt with rigorously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosion—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, Dr the accidental or unauthorized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems—initiating a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extreme **it is absurd to claim,** as has been heard from distinguished figures, **that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over sixty years**). But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh their reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life. There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements----it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. **A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low**. It might be further noted that the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by, indicators mistaken or misconstrued. **In none of these instances**, it is accepted, **did matters get at all near to nuclear launch**--extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. **But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote**. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. **To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets**. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of it initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way **belongs to science fiction**.

#### The nature of a small arsenal makes a proliferator’s arsenal accident-safe

**Mueller**, **2009** (John – Woody Hayes chair of national security studies at Ohio State University, Atomic Obsession, p. 101-102)

This dilemma is not present to nearly the same degree in the case of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states that are less militarily pretentious. In particular, the exquisite hair-trigger niceties of the first strike/second strike consideration –maintaining "crisis stability," as discussed in chapter 5 – scarcely holds where a country, or pair of rival countries, builds a **relatively small arsenal** of nuclear weapons and keeps them in reserve as a sort of final equalizer, something sometimes known as the "bomb in basement" approach. Countries in that situation are scarcely concerned about being able instantly to retaliate to a nuclear attack, and they are unlikely to have the sophisticated delivery system required to destroy their atomic capacity in a surprise attack in any case. Accordingly, the cold war contestants, such countries have the luxury of making their bombs **exceedingly safe** from accidental detonation. For example, when it had a small nuclear arsenal, South Africa disassembled its weapons and stored the parts in separate secure locations, an approach currently utilized by Pakistan and perhaps others. Judicious efforts to further reduce the danger of an accidental detonation, like those devoted to dissuading new states from nuclear weapons, are certainly justified. But the myopic hype and hysteria that have so routinely accompanied such efforts are not.

#### Prefer our arguments because it assumes small nuclear arsenals that are manageable. Ignore their evidence because it assumes bloated arsenals that outpace the ability of the state to spend resources